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 1
Introduction 
 
 
1. Background 
Pharmaceuticals are an essential part of modern life. They help satisfy our 
everyday nutritional, sanitary and medical needs, and represent a primary method for 
preserving health and treating many diseases and conditions. Their spread, fostered by 
the progress of pharmaceutical research, created a ‘health revolution’, increasing human 
life expectancy and improving quality of life. 
Compared to surgical procedures, drugs represent a very cost-effective means for 
governments to protect the public health of their citizens. This should help reduce total 
health care expenditure. However, the cost of pharmaceuticals is accounting for an ever-
greater proportion of that expenditure. This in turn means that there is increasing 
scrutiny by governments to tighten budget controls on drugs. 
These elements have recently generated a renewed interest in the pharmaceutical 
industry’s practices, and especially in companies’ pricing policies, from both the public 
and regulators. They frequently claim that drugs are priced too highly and that this may 
undermine patients’ access to medicines, as well as their right to health. 
In the absence of effective market mechanisms capable of controlling excessive 
prices, governments have resorted to a wide variety of different policy tools to help 
them cap the rise of drug prices and of their health care expenditures. 
It is the difference between the tools used that has contributed to the presence of 
large price gaps across countries. Such differences in prices are the basis of what is called 
‘parallel trade’. 
Parallel trade is a form of arbitrage that consists of the cross-border selling of a 
product protected by an intellectual property right (IPR) without the authorisation of the 
IPR owner. Parallel trade is an entirely EU phenomenon, because it is based on the 
principle of free movement of goods, as developed by the jurisprudence in the principle 
of regional exhaustion of IPRs. Under this principle any protected good that is first 
marketed in the EU by the IPR owner, or with his consent, shall freely circulate along the 
supply chain. 
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As I will explain better infra, the European Commission (hereinafter sometimes 
referred as the ‘Commission’) and the European Court of Justice (hereinafter, ‘ECJ’) have 
always strictly enforced this legal principle against any opposition coming from Member 
States or private entities to this form of cross border trade. Such a favourable legal 
environment helped the growth and development of parallel trade. 
Whilst at the beginning parallel trade in pharmaceuticals was essentially 
economically driven by price gaps, as the EU internal market developed, governments 
began to realise the important potential savings they could make for their health care 
systems by reimbursing cheaper products, and, indeed, using these lower prices to exert 
pressure on the prices of original products. 
The rapid increase of parallel trade triggered the concern of pharmaceutical 
companies, who were worried about their profits. They argue that parallel trade, first 
may not be capable of bringing savings for patients, because regulation on prices would 
drive out competition, and second it is likely to undermine the investment 
pharmaceutical companies would make in the development of new drugs. 
Therefore it is clear that stakeholders have competing and different interests. 
Patients want to get their medicines at the cheapest price possible, especially when 
pharmaceutical expenditures come out of their pockets. Similarly, governments and 
health care agencies need to control their health care budget and have every interest in 
lower prices that parallel imported medicines can bring. However, governments also 
want to grant the most innovative and effective drugs to their citizens, in order to secure 
their health status. Finally, pharmaceutical companies wants to protect their profits and 
their competitiveness, whose key driver is given by innovation. 
Essentially there is a trade off between two clashing objectives: the static 
efficiency (productive and allocative) achieved through competitive pressure from 
parallel trade that brings lower prices, and the dynamic efficiency realised through the 
innovative activity financed by higher prices that lead to the development of new 
products. According to the first policy goal, parallel trade is potentially beneficial for 
consumers, as long as it reduces prices of original products, whereas according to the 
second one, parallel trade is potentially detrimental, because the decline in profits may 
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determine a reduction in the research and development (hereinafter, ‘R&D’) activity and 
consequently stifle innovation. 
 
2. Past solutions and new challenges 
The tension between static and dynamic efficiency has been subject to a lengthy 
investigation both in the economic and legal literature. 
IPRs are inherently monopolistic, and this appears to be in conflict with 
competition policy purposes to ban every market power capable of lessening 
competition to the detriment of consumers’ welfare and hampering the freedom of 
economic initiative.  
However, the way IPRs are designed provides a second best solution to this 
trade off. Being shaped in a fashion that distinguishes them from traditional property 
rights, i.e. they are limited in time and scope, short run deadweight losses due to 
monopoly should be offset in the long run by the gains generated by competition, in 
terms of lower prices, after the expiring of the patent. 
Although IPRs embody the balance between the two competing objectives, the 
way this is concretely struck depends on how IPRs are actually exercised. 
For instance, a question that has been pervading the relevant EU case law and 
the economic literature is whether IPRs can be legitimately used to prevent competition, 
also in the form of parallel trade. 
Traditionally, both the Court of Justice of the European Union and the European 
Commission regarded restrictions to parallel trade negatively for two concurrent 
reasons: by impeding intrabrand competition, they harmed consumers, and, by putting 
obstacles to cross border trade, they acted against the completion of the internal market. 
This firm conclusion is supported by a robust and well-established strand of case 
law, and may persuade the reader to believe that the issue of parallel trade is exhausted 
and sufficiently defined in its legal and economic aspects. However, the so-called 
‘process of modernization of European competition law’, whose supporters strongly 
claim that the formalistic application of competition law provisions should be overruled 
in favour of a more economic approach, has, inter alia, cast several doubts about the 
appropriateness of the policy on parallel trade. 
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The development of certain jurisprudence shows a trend towards this direction. 
From the Bayer judgment, a jurisprudential revirement on parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals has been taking place. From then on the attitude of the Commission 
and of European Courts started diverging. In particular, the judges, educated by the 
findings of economic theory, doubted that in a highly regulated environment parallel 
trade on pharmaceuticals could be beneficial for consumers. Also, they feared that 
parallel trade, by eroding profits, could stifle the innovation incentives of 
pharmaceutical companies to the detriment of consumers. Under these grounds, it was 
claimed that restrictions of parallel trade might be permitted. 
These developments suggest that there may be scope for improvement in the 
current policy towards parallel trade. However, how this ‘more economic approach’ 
should be performed it appears far from clear. 
The reason for such uncertainty in the case of parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is, 
in my view, twofold: firstly, the way legal proceedings developed left many questions 
unanswered, with little guidance for handling future cases; secondly, the economics on 
which the departure from previous case law is based hardly fits the structure and the 
rationale of EU competition provisions. 
This background suggests that the boundaries between IPRs and competition 
law are still uncertain and that there are new unanswered questions that challenge the 
current policy pursued at a European level towards parallel trade. For instance, the 
presence of regulation in the pharmaceutical market poses new conditions of analysis of 
the effects of parallel trade on prices, especially in relation to the constraints that such 
regulation may put on market functioning and on firms’ pricing strategies. 
It thus appears that investigating the current policy pursued at a European level 
towards parallel trade in pharmaceuticals, in order to assess whether this is informed to 
economic theory, has policy and academic relevance. 
Moreover, this research has additional significance in the present context of 
reform of EU competition law. The analysis performed has policy implications at two 
different but interrelated levels: at a ‘micro’ level, it suggests potential solutions to the 
mentioned uncertainty created by the jurisprudential developments in the field of 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals; at a ‘macro’ level, it may also represent a paramount of 
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integration of economic reasoning into the legal assessment that can be used to guide the 
process of modernization of EU competition law. 
For this reason, this work appears to be very timely, too. 
The presented issue is also important from a societal standpoint. The 
fundamental role that drugs have in the health of individuals necessarily implies that 
pharmaceutical policies have very important social implications. The need to discover 
new medicines and therapies that improve quality and length of life in society is 
necessarily coupled with the duty for governments to make them affordable to the 
public. It follows that any change in the way the rules underpinning parallel trade in 
pharmaceuticals are enforced may have a significant impact over patients’ welfare, in 
terms of access to new and better medicines. 
 
3. General scope 
This thesis investigates the impact that parallel trade in pharmaceuticals has on 
consumer welfare, both in a static and in a dynamic sense. The ultimate goal of this 
analysis is, however, not to say whether parallel trade in pharmaceuticals is good or bad 
for society. It rather aims at examining from a Law&Economics perspective whether the 
current legal treatment of parallel trade is optimal and reflects economic theory, whether 
there is scope for a change, and, if so, on what basis the latter should take place. 
In order to comply with this objective, the analysis is going to be developed first 
on a positive level, and along a normative perspective. Thus, first the principles of law 
that fund the current policy on parallel trade are going to be examined and then 
confronted with the findings of economic theory. Last, it will be evaluated whether these 
findings provide an appropriate ground for a change in this policy. 
Inevitably, this thesis is not going to deal with all the antitrust issues related to 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals. In particular, as indicated above, the ‘macro’ 
implications of a change in the policy on parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in the present 
context of reform of the European competition law are evident. However, the 
significance and denseness of the issue of giving practical significance to the ‘efficiency 
defence’ now emerging in EU competition law require the formulation of an articulated 
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proposal that at this stage is impossible to provide, without enlarging too much the 
scope of the present work. This issue will be thus left for future research. 
 
4. Product and geographic scope 
The present work concerns reimbursed prescription medicines for human use. 
Medicines sold over the counter (hereinafter, ‘OTCs’) are referred to only to a limited 
extent, when the analysis requires it. Medicines for animal use, medical devices and 
health services are out of the scope of this research. 
Its geographic scope is the 27 Member States currently part of the European 
Union. In certain sections the analysis is limited to a narrower group of Member States, 
though. 
Reference to the US market is also going to be made. First, the pharmaceutical 
companies operate worldwide and many big pharma operating in the EU are also 
present in the US market, and vice versa. Secondly, from the regulatory point of view, the 
US represent the polar opposite of the EU, given that pharmaceutical prices are 
unregulated and freely established by companies. Thus, for the purpose of legal and 
market analysis, a comparison between the EU and the US pharmaceutical regulations 
and markets will be carried out from time to time, when considered appropriate for a 
more exhaustive and thorough analysis. 
Still, this thesis and its findings have mainly relevance for the EU and, as such, 
they cannot be extrapolated to other areas of the world with diverging regulatory 
regimes, e.g. on IPRs, on trade policies, or on pharmaceutical regulations. 
 
5. Methodology 
In conducting the present research, different methodologies are going to be used. 
As with regard to the positive part, involving mainly an overview of the case law 
and the analysis of the relevant principles of the Treaty, the analysis will rely on purely 
legal research. All the relevant jurisprudence and literature published so far on the 
related subjects are going to be discussed and examined. 
In the normative part, the legal analysis will be supported by the discussion and 
by the assessment of the findings of the relevant economic literature in the fields of 
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Industrial Organisations (hereinafter, ‘IO’), Economics of Innovation (hereinafter, ‘EI’), 
and Health Economics (hereinafter, ‘HE’). 
 
6. Theoretical baseline 
Finally, the reader should be aware of the theoretical baseline underlining this 
thesis. The balance of the trade off between different policy objectives will be driven by 
the assumption that consumer welfare is the main goal of EU competition policy. The 
concept of ‘consumer welfare’ certainly includes efficiency, in its static features as well 
as in its dynamic facets. However, efficiency is not going to be considered as a goal in 
itself here, but it is relevant as long as it concretely contributes to the wellbeing of 
consumers. 
The goal of competition, understood in the sense described above, under EU law 
must nevertheless be balanced against other non-competition goals that permeate the 
enforcement of antitrust law at a European level. Among them, market integration is the 
most important and will be included in large part of the analysis. 
 
7. Structure of the thesis 
Against this backdrop, the presented work is divided as follows. 
Chapter I provides an overview of the pharmaceutical legislation at a European 
level and up-to-date figures about of the European pharmaceutical market in terms of 
generated surplus, R&D investment, and units of employment. Despite the fact that this 
is a large and growing market, it appears that the EU pharmaceutical market is lagging 
behind its main competitors (US and Japan). One of the causes of this lack of 
competitiveness is attributed to the fragmentation of the market. 
Even if the European Commission has set up some centralized regulatory 
functions, still drugs pricing and related decisions are under the exclusive competence of 
Member States, given that national governments finance the largest part of 
pharmaceutical private expenditures. Budget concerns, in fact, induce them to refrain 
from relinquishing their sovereignty on health. This creates a fragmented market, 
especially at the level of prices. 
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The persistence of price gaps has generated the economic opportunity for 
arbitrage, or parallel trade. The birth, the growth and the maturity of this form of cross-
border trade are discussed at length through the analysis of the related figures and in 
light of the changes that took place in the relevant legislation. 
The economic and legal features characterising the pharmaceutical market have 
an important implication in antitrust: they render the definition of the relevant market 
quite complex, due to the distortion created by regulation and patients’ insensitivity to 
price in the mechanisms of interchangeability among drugs. The solutions proposed by 
scholars and adopted in the case law are provided. In particular, it is examined how the 
relevant market has been defined in parallel trade cases. 
Chapter II presents a comprehensive overview of European case law dealing 
with the trade off between the protection of IPRs and the rules of the internal market. It 
describes how judges defined the compromise between these two policy objectives over 
time, thereby developing the concepts of existence and exercise, of subject matter of an IPR, 
and establishing the principle of regional exhaustion of an IPR.  
Such principles have been guiding also the European policy towards parallel 
trade in all sectors, until the end of the nineties. 
The analysis shows how the mentioned developments in case law question these 
principles in the field of pharmaceuticals. Unfortunately, the history of the analysed 
cases does not offer the possibility of clearly envisaging the boundaries of this criticism: 
convoluted wording, procedural obstacles, unambiguous evidence, not to mention the 
partisan debate often animating the dispute between counterparts, created some 
loopholes that deserve further investigation. 
The fact that Courts opened the way to economic reasoning in a more explicit 
fashion pays tribute to the right need of modernising European competition law. Yet, the 
need to reconcile these developments with well-established principles built in forty 
years of case law arises. 
To this purpose, it appears essential to review and assess the economics 
underlining the new judicial scepticism about parallel trade of pharmaceuticals. 
Accordingly, the following two macro-questions are analysed: 
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1. whether the pharmaceutical sector is a ‘special’ one where regulation is so 
pervasive that parallel trade does not have any competitive effect on prices 
of original products; 
2. whether parallel trade is detrimental for pharmaceutical innovation. 
These two questions are at the centre of Chapters III and IV respectively. 
In order to disentangle the first question, the latter has been divided in three sub-
questions: 
a. whether regulation on prices is such that competition cannot take place; 
b. whether parallel trade on pharmaceuticals brings benefits to consumers 
and national health care systems, 
c. and how large are these savings. 
The answer to these questions is provided through the examination of the 
characteristics of national pharmaceutical regulations and of their economic rationale, 
through a survey that covers the main EU Member States, with special attention for the 
countries where imports take place: Sweden, Denmark, UK, Germany. Particular 
consideration is given to the mechanisms driving the negotiation procedures between 
health care authorities and pharmaceutical firms, in order to ascertain the role that 
parallel trade plays with respect to the bargaining power of parties. This overview is 
complemented with the analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature that studied 
the effect of parallel trade on prices of pharmaceuticals, both in importing and in 
exporting countries. 
The antitrust implications of these issues are then explored: if drug price 
formation is not entirely shielded from competitive mechanisms, it is reasonable to 
presume that parallel trade entails savings. If, on the contrary, competitive mechanisms 
are overruled by price controls, parallel trade cannot be presumed to put pressure on the 
price of original products. 
If parallel trade of pharmaceuticals can be presumed to bring savings 
notwithstanding regulation, restrictions of parallel trade could be alleged as 
anticompetitive under Article 101 TFEU, even if their effects are not concretely proven. 
In this case, there would be ground to uphold the traditional legal assessment of the 
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anticompetitive effects caused by restrictions to parallel trade, also in the pharmaceutical 
sector. 
If, on the contrary, the regulatory environment is such that parallel trade cannot 
be presumed to bring savings, any restriction should be caught only when harm to 
consumers is concretely ascertained. In this case, there is scope to support a change of 
the current legal assessment. 
However, the change cannot take place only by looking at the effects that parallel 
trade has at a static level, but it should also look into the impact it has from a dynamic 
perspective. Chapter IV is devoted to this latter aspect: it analyses the link between 
parallel trade and the incentives of pharmaceutical companies to innovate. 
Economic theory suggests that the level of expected profit may have an impact 
on the intensity of the R&D activity, namely on the amount of resources invested in 
innovation, and in turn on the firm’s output. The question of whether and how these 
findings apply to parallel trade did not find any practical application in the considered 
judgements. It follows that the issue of the impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical 
innovation is still open. 
This Chapter contributes to the debate that this topic is currently undergoing by 
placing it in an antitrust context. 
To this purpose, Chapter IV reviews the economic literature, starting from the 
Schumpeterian theory of constructive destruction, until the most recent developments in 
the Industrial Organisation (IO) theory and in the empirical literature in Health 
Economics, predicting that there exists a positive correlation between the expected 
return from drug innovation and the level of investment in R&D. 
On this basis, the innovation pattern in the drug industry is further examined, 
with particular regard to the relationship between patents, profits and firms’ incentive to 
invest in innovation. The literature that focuses on the link between parallel trade, 
profits and innovation is also analysed and discussed. 
Such analysis aims at ascertaining the appropriateness of the presumption that 
more financial incentives in the form of a broader exclusive right always lead to an 
increased innovation activity. 
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The answer to this question has an important implication from an antitrust point 
of view. In the context of modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, it helps respond the 
question of how dynamic efficiency considerations enter the antitrust assessment of 
unilateral restrictions to parallel trade: whether it is sufficient to affirm them to 
legitimize the abusive conduct, or whether they should be proved, and measured. 
The last part of the thesis starts from the acknowledgement that only when the 
overall effect of parallel trade in the market is clear, policy indications about changes in 
the legal treatment can be formulated. In considering the welfare implications of a 
conduct restricting parallel trade, two dimensions are, therefore, weighted: the losses in 
static efficiency and the gains in dynamic efficiency. 
This theoretical analysis is confronted with the literatures that claim that this 
balancing entails a full-blown market analysis whose complexities Courts may not be 
able to manage, especially when the examination is prognostic (as it is for efficiencies). 
Chapter V deals with these issues. In particular, it attempts to craft a legal 
standard that help judges apply an effect-based approach to competition law 
enforcement, especially in relation to restrictions to parallel trade. Also, it proposes a test 
for efficiencies that it is not too demanding for undertakings, nor too costly for antitrust 
agencies and judges. 
To this purpose, the Chapter looks into procedural instruments, and especially 
into presumptions and inferential reasoning, that may help Courts getting away from 
the impasse created by a forward-looking market analysis. The aim is to set out a legal 
standard that is clear, flexible enough to account for market reality and workable at the 
same time. 
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
The European pharmaceutical market 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter aims at providing the reader with a good grasp of the economic 
and legal features that characterise the European pharmaceutical market, in order to 
place the following analysis into an appropriate context. 
Section 1 is a very general platform, where the industry is described in its main 
elements: economic and financial performance, degree of concentration, 
competitiveness, level of investment in R&D, regulatory traits, etc. Also, the basic 
notions of health economics applied to pharmaceuticals are introduced: supply and 
demand features are discussed, together with their implications for pharmaceutical 
policies in the EU. 
Section 2 looks into the state of health of the European pharmaceutical industry, 
especially in terms of competitiveness with respect to the US industry. Such comparison 
provides an occasion to discuss the current crisis in innovation that the sector is 
experiencing. 
Section 3 starts from the premise that one of the reason for the lack of 
competitiveness of the EU pharmaceutical sector is the fragmentation of the market. To 
explain the roots of the present situation, the history of the harmonising efforts by EU 
institutions is reviewed, from the measures tackling marketing authorisation to those 
attempting to reduce the distortion associated with price controls. 
Section 4 focuses on drug price controls and analyses how the jurisprudence 
reconciled their existence with the principle of free movement of goods. 
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The legitimacy of drug price controls under EU law established by the European 
Courts has provided the basis for the existence and growth of parallel trade of 
pharmaceuticals. Section 5 is devoted to the definition and analysis of this typically EU 
phenomenon, from its earliest to the latest market developments, as well as in relation to 
the regulatory provisions disciplining it at a European level. 
Section 6 finally discusses the definition of the relevant market in the 
pharmaceutical market, and what is the impact of price controls on this definition. 
Specific examination is dedicated to the market definition in parallel trade cases under 
Article 102 TFEU. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. The economics of the pharmaceuticals 
Prescription drugs and the pharmaceutical industry have an increasingly 
important role in modern society. The progress of pharmaceutical research is responsible 
for the ‘health revolution’ of the last thirty years: thanks to the wider diffusion of more 
effective drugs, human life expectancy increased and the quality of life improved 
substantially. Insulin is a meaningful example in this respect: after its discovery in the 
‘20s, diabetes does not cause certain death any longer. 
Drug therapies have supplemented nutrition, sanitation, and medical care as 
methods for preserving health. Today, drugs are used to treat many diseases and 
conditions: chemotherapy for cancer, steroids for skin diseases, psychotropic drugs for 
mental health problems, beta-blockers for heart disease, protease inhibitors for AIDS, 
etc. Some of these drugs represent an alternative to more invasive surgical treatments, 
others are used in conjunction with them, or provide a cure for diseases for which no 
treatment was available before. 
Despite this success, the pharmaceutical industry has come under severe media 
and legislative scrutiny, especially in US1. 

1 During the 1960s, the drug industry was subject to two congressional investigations focusing on its 
business practices and pricing policies. The major concern expressed during the nine-months hearings held 
by the Senate Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly was that pharmaceutical products were overpriced. 
Senator Kefauver affirmed: “It is our purpose to inquire into the question of whether the drug manufacturers are 
setting their price at excessive levels. […] to determine whether the antitrust laws as applied to this industry are 
adequate and, if not, to devise specific remedial legislation”. A more harsh statement was made by another 
member of the Subcommittee, Senator Smathers: “It is readily apparent that the American people […] share alike 
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Pharmaceutical firms are among the largest and most profitable businesses 
worldwide. Led by Pfizer, with sales of $52.9 billion, five pharmaceutical firms ranked in 
the top 100 on the Fortune list of largest firms in 2004. The profit performance of the 
pharmaceutical industry is even more remarkable. In 2001, the industry ranked first in 
rates of return on revenues, assets, and stockholders’ equity2. 
Not only the level of prices charged for drugs has triggered public opinion’s 
disapproval3, but also the magnitude and the nature of these investments have come 
under criticism, in relation to the type of drugs being produced and for the failure to 
adequately warn consumers about side effects4. 

the distinction of paying the world’s highest premium for these basic human necessities… This is a shameful condition 
in our present-day society which spends tremendous sums on research to promote health and increase life-span, and yet 
the products are placed well out of reach of the average and low-income families”. Similar concerns are still raised 
today by members of the Congress and generated the proposal of allowing reimports of medicines from 
Canada and Europe into US. See GRAHAM DUKES, Accountability of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in The Lancet, 
2002, no. 360, November 23, 2002. Contra COMANOR, The Political Economy of the Pharmaceutical Industry, in 
Journal of Economic Literature, 1986, no. 24, p. 1178-1217, and GRABOWSKI and VERNON, A New Look at the 
returns and risks to pharmaceutical R&D, in management Science, 1990, no. 36(7), p. 804-821, explaining that 
without the increase in prices occurred since the ‘80s the drug industry would have not recovered the cost of 
the drugs introduced in the ‘70s. 
2 The Congressional Office of Technological Assessment (OTA) in February 1990 undertook an extensive 
study of costs, risks and reward of pharmaceutical R&D. The study found that pharmaceutical 
manufacturers, on average, earned a net profit of $36 million from each new drug introduced between 1981 
and 1983. On top of a ‘normal rate of return’ of about 10%, the study found an excess 4.3% profit over a 
drug’s life cycle. Further, profits by pharmaceutical manufacturers exceeded those of companies in 
industries with similar risks by 2% to 3% in each year from 1976 to 1987. Similarly see SCHERER, Pricing, 
Profits, and Technological Progress in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1993, no. 
7(3), p. 97-115, who affirmed that the pharmaceutical industry was either the first – or the second - most 
profitable industry for 24 out 32 years between 1960 and 1991, looking at the median after-tax profit return 
on stockholders’ equity. A 2002 report by Public Citizen cites the fact that US drug company profits 
increased by 33% in 2001 despite a slowdown in the economy, a drop in employment rates, and the 
September 11th terrorist attack. Contra see GRABOWSKI, VERNON and DI MASI, Returns on R&D for 1990s new 
drug introductions, in Pharmacoeconomics, 2002, no. suppl. 3, p. 11-29, where it is shown that pharmaceutical 
R&D is characterized by a highly skewed distribution of returns and a mean industry internal rate of return 
modestly in excess of the cost-of-capital. 
3 Several studies conducted during the ‘90s found that drug prices in US were significantly higher than in 
other countries. Two studies by the US General Accounting Office (GAO) in 1992 found that US prices were 
32% higher than in Canada and 60% higher than in the UK. In 1998 the Committee on Government Reform 
ad Oversight of the US House of Representative issues a minority staff report Prescription Drug Pricing in the 
1st Congressional District in Maine: an International Price Comparison, found that drug prices in US are 72% 
higher than in Canada and 102% higher than in Mexico. Similarly see the earlier work of SCHUT and VAN 
BERGEIJK, International price discrimination: The pharmaceutical industry, in World Development, 1986, no. 14(9), p. 
1141-1150. Contra see DANZON and CHAO, Cross-national price differences for pharmaceuticals: how large, and 
why?, in Journal of Health Economics, 2000, no. 19, p. 159–195; DANZON, Making Sense of Drug Prices, in 
Regulation, 2000, no. 23(1), p. 56-63, who affirms that the findings of these studies are biased because of 
methodology problems: they do not take into account generic substitution, liability risk, different 
consumption patterns, and, most of all, they consider wholesale prices and not retail prices. Her findings 
refute the conventional wisdom that US prices are higher than anywhere else. 
4 See ANGELL, The Truth about Drug Companies: How they Deceive Us and what to do about it, 2004, criticising 
especially the focus of pharmaceutical companies on ‘me too drugs’. For a definition of ‘me too’ drugs see fn 
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Other factors have been threatening the performance of the industry: a 
slowdown of productivity, due to the difficulty of finding new blockbusters, the 
increasingly pressing cost-containment measures from governments5, the development 
of the generic industry, also encouraged by governments, etc., diminished the outlook 
for future earnings. As a consequence, share prices of the most important 
pharmaceutical companies dropped on average about 25% between 2000 and 20056. 
The pharmaceutical industry is global, with thousands of firms. Although the 
largest firms are located in the industrialized countries of Europe, North America, and 
Japan, pharmaceutical manufacturers are found in nearly every country of the world. 
These firms are often referred to as ‘big pharma’ because of the size of individual firms. 
A relative new segment of the pharmaceutical industry is biotechnology, but firms 
remain far smaller than big pharma. 
The pharmaceutical industry as a whole is characterised by a certain level of 
fluidity and a good degree of entry of new firms, especially in the areas of 
biotechnology. While much of the pharmaceutical market is dominated by big pharma, 
the overall market is highly dynamic, with frequent entry and departure and rapid 
change in the year-to-year sales ranking of all products7. 
Despite the fluidity of the pharmaceutical market, however, the degree of 
competition among firms is decreasing in important respects. The worldwide market for 
pharmaceuticals is becoming more concentrated because of two factors: the wave of 
mergers that took place in the nineties and the increased concentration of top selling 
drugs among fewer and fewer firms. 
Four firms accounted for half of the total reported sales of the top 10 firms in 
1995, and nearly 50% in 2003, as it is shown in this table. 
 
 

54 in this Chapter. Also, recall the outcry that accompanied the withdrawal of the $2.5 billion arthritis drug 
Vioxx from Merck & Co. Inc. The company took this decision after five days, after data showed that the 
long-term use of doubled the risk of heart attacks and strokes, confirming concerns raised by earlier studies. 
5 Also in US, typically a country where pharmaceuticals have been freely priced, congressmen advocated for 
price controls either through government intervention or market forces. See BLANKEAU, OTA takes a Closer 
look at Cost of Drugs, in Hospitals, 1993, no. 67(7), p. 48-50. 
6 See BERENSON, Big Drug Makers See Sales Decline with Their Image, in New York Times, November, 14, 2005; 
ABBOUD, Stung by Public Distrust, Drug Makers Seek to Heal Image, in Wall Street Journal, August 26, 2005. 
7 See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, 2007, p. 24. 
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Table 1: Worldwide Sales of Pharmaceuticals by 10 Largest Manufacturers 
Company 
1995 Sales 
($ billion) 
Company 
2003 Sales 
($ billion) 
Glaxo Wellcome 
Merck 
HMR 
Novartis 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Pfizer 
Roche 
Johnson&Johnson 
AHP 
SmithKline Beecham 
Combined Sales 
12.5 
11.3 
8.4 
8.1 
7.4 
7.1 
6.9 
6.3 
6.1 
6.1 
80.2 
Pfizer 
GlaxoSmithKline 
Merck 
Johnson&Johnson 
Aventis 
Astrazeneca 
Novartis 
Bristol-Myers Squibb 
Wyeth (form. AHP) 
Eli Lilly 
Combined Sales 
39.6 
29.8 
22.4 
19.5 
18.9 
18.8 
16.0 
14.9 
12.6 
12.5 
205 
Source: Lehman Bros and company reports, as reported in The Economist, July 20, 2002, p. 55. 
 
In the pharmaceutical market, the degree of market concentration changes as one 
looks more narrowly at specific therapeutic products that actually compete with one 
another. When the industry is viewed as one market producing all drugs, there are 
thousands of firms producing pharmaceuticals. Such a market, with so many producers, 
appears competitive. But when one considers a specific therapeutic class, the number of 
firms producing these drugs is much smaller. For instance, the world market for statins 
is dominated by two products, which account for the 80% of the market share. 
 
Table 2: Market concentration of Statins, 2003 
Product Manufacturer Market Share of Sales (%) 
Lipitor 
Zocor 
Pravachol 
Lescol 
Lescol XL 
Others* 
Pfizer 
Merck 
BMS 
Novartis 
Novartis 
50 
30 
15 
1.3 
1.7 
2.5 
* Comprised of Altocor ad Mevacor, formulations of the generic lovastatin 
Source: Adapted from Marketos, 2004. 
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The number of firms and the competing products vary from a drug family to 
another and the market concentration index varies for each single therapeutic area. It 
follows that the competitiveness of the pharmaceutical market depends on the definition 
of the market, i.e. which family and which therapeutic area are considered8. 
1.1 Features of the supply-side of the market 
The introduction of a medicine into the market is the last step of a long procedure 
that starts with a the activity of research and development (hereinafter, sometimes 
referred as ‘R&D’), continues with clinical trials and ends up with the administrative 
obligations that lead to the granting of the marketing authorisation. 
Once a molecule is invented, pre-clinical trials begin. These tests consist of a 
pharmacological screening that under European law is regulated by the Directive 
2001/83/EC, as amended by Directive 27/2004/EC of the Parliament and the Council 
(the so called ‘Human Use Directive’), which disciplines in detail all the experiments 
that must be performed. Companies first carry out the tests in vitro: these indicate the 
therapeutic properties of the molecules and the type of diseases that can be treated. The 
identified therapeutic characteristics are then tested on animals. These trials aim at 
ascertaining the level of toxicity, the pharmacodynamic (how the drug works in the 
body) and pharmacokinetic (how the body processes the drug) properties of the 
molecules. 
Such tests assist pharmaceutical companies to decide whether a drug candidate 
has scientific merit for further development as an investigational new drug. 
At the end of this stage, which generally lasts two or three years9, companies are 
generally granted a patent on the new molecules and clinical trials begin. These are 
divided in three phases and they aim at ascertaining the efficacy and the safety of the 
drug on humans. For this reason, it is necessary to obtain the related administrative 
authorization, before volunteers are recruited. 
Under European law, these three phases are regulated by the Human Use 
Directive. 

8 For a deeper discussion about the issue of the relevant market definition see infra Section 6 in this Chapter. 
9 Note that patent applications are filed before or meanwhile pre-clinical trials start, because of the length of 
the procedure to obtain the patent. Companies judge important to start the clinical trials only after the 
patent has been granted, in order to avoid the risk of another company patenting the innovation before 
them. 
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Phase I of clinical trials also does not have any therapeutic objective but only 
cognitive aims, in order to test (on a small group of around people 20-50) the safety of 
the drug and to better understand the way the active substance is assimilated by the 
human body. 
Phase II represents the crucial part of clinical trials: it involves a larger group of 
people (20-300) and serves the purpose of identifying the target disease, establishing the 
minimum effective dose and the optimal regime of administration. 
Phase III represents the last check before the drug is marketed. To this purpose 
the drug is administered to a statistically significant group of patient suffering the 
targeted disease (300-3,000). At this stage, it should be ascertained whether the active 
substance offers advantages compared to existing drugs, in particular with respect to 
side effects10. 
If Phase III provides positive results, the company applies for the marketing 
authorisation. This may take up to several years, depending on the chosen procedure 
and on the State concerned11. 
In US, a preceding Phase 0, has been recently added to the three just mentioned. 
Phase 0 consists of exploratory, first-in-human trials conducted in accordance with the 
United States Food and Drug Administration’s (FDA) 2006 Guidance on Exploratory 
Investigational New Drug (IND) Studies. Phase 0 trials are also known as human 
microdosing studies and are designed to speed up the development of promising drugs 
by establishing very early whether the drug or the agent behaves in human subjects as 
was expected from preclinical studies. Distinctive features of Phase 0 trials include the 
administration of single sub-therapeutic doses of the study drug to a small number of 
subjects (10 to 15) to gather preliminary data on the agent’s pharmacokinetics and 
pharmacodynamics. 

10 However, ANGELL, The Truth about Drug Companies, cit., p. 103 et seq., claims that some drugs are tested 
against a placebo and not against comparable existing drugs. 
11 See on this issue SCHWEITZER ET AL., Is there a United States Drug Lag? The Timing of New Pharmaceutical 
approvals in the G-7 Countries and Switzerland, in Medical Care Research and Review, 1996, no. 53(2), p. 162-178, 
who measured the timing of drug approvals in eight developed countries. The authors found that any 
country is lagging behind others in approving many important products: even Switzerland, which is 
particularly quick in approving new drugs, lags behind other countries. But, on average, US are relatively 
fast, together with UK, Canada and France. Other countries, like Italy and Germany, are slower. 
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A Phase 0 study gives no data on safety or efficacy, given that administered 
doses are too low to cause any therapeutic effect. Drug companies carry out Phase 0 
studies to rank drug candidates in order to decide which has the best pharmacokinetic 
parameters in humans to take forward into further development12.  
Once these hurdles are overcome, 12-13 years have normally passed since the 
first synthesis of the new active substance13. It follows that more or less half of the 
exclusivity period, starting from the patent application, is not remunerative for the 
company, because it cannot market the product before the clinical trials are concluded 
and cannot earn any return on the investment made. For this reason, as from the 
beginning of the ‘90s companies were given the possibility of enjoying the 
Supplementary Certificate Protection (SPC), up to five years from the expiry of the 
patent14. 

12 Experts have raised questions about whether Phase 0 trials are useful, ethically acceptable, feasible, apt to 
speed up the drug development process or save money, and whether there is room for improvement. See 
CAMPORESI, Phase 0 workshop at the 20th EORT-NCI-AARC symposium, Geneva, 2008. 
13 See LUCIONI, Le conseguenze delle politiche di contenimento della spesa pubblica nel contesto attuale del mercato 
farmaceutico, in Rass. Dir. Far., 1996, p. 358, who affirms that the crisis of the traditional screening model used 
to select molecules, triggered tighter control over clinical trials. The increased regulatory hurdles increased 
the length of the procedure, especially starting from the ‘80s. 
14 In Italy see the Law no. 341/1991. At a Community level see the EC Regulation no. 1768/92. 
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Graph 1: Phases of the research and development process 
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Once the drug is on the market, the stage of the pharmacovigilance (or Phase IV) 
begins: the company has to comply with the obligation imposed by the Human Use 
Directive in order to keep under control the effects over the entire population, in order 
to further test its efficacy and identify possible additional side effects. 
The discovering process for pharmaceutical products is not only long, but also 
costly: it has been estimated that the cost of researching and developing a new chemical 
or biological entity is €800 million in 200315. This investment is allocated along the above 
indicated phases in the following way: 27.3% of the R&D expenditures are devoted to 
the pre-human/pre-clinical trials, 7.4% to the Phase I of the clinical trials, 13.1% to Phase 
II of the clinical trials, 28.5% to the Phase III of the clinical trials, 5.1% to the approval 

15 See DI MASI ET AL., The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs, in Journal of Health 
Economics, 2003, no. 22(2), p. 151-85. The methodology of the study has been criticised by the consumer 
advocacy group Public Citizen, which suggests on its web site that the actual cost is under $200 million, 
about 29% of which is spent on FDA-required clinical trials: see Critique of the DiMasi/Tufts Methodology and 
Other Key Prescription Drug R&D Issues, available at 
http://www.citizen.org/congress/reform/drug_industry/articles.cfm?ID=6532. 
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procedure, 13.4% to the pharmacovigilance and 5.2% to remaining administrative 
duties16. 
The length of the process that leads to the introduction of a new drug into the 
market has two effects. 
First of all, the costs of innovation are sunk by the time the medicines receive the 
approval of the health authority and the price is agreed upon. This generates the need 
for the company to quickly recoup the money invested in order to conduct new research 
projects17. 
Secondly, there is a high degree of uncertainty. On average only one or two out 
of 10,000 substances synthesised in laboratories successfully pass all the mentioned 
stages required by regulation to test the efficacy and the safety of medicines. And only 
the 23% of the compounds entering clinical trials is eventually approved. The 
uncertainty over the R&D activity determines the difficulty of foreseeing precisely if and 
when the product will reach the market and what will be the level of expected profits, 
which depends on the efficacy and the success of the product. For instance, between 
1961 and 1983, only about 1 in 60,000 compounds synthesized by pharmaceutical 
laboratories were ‘highly successful’, when success was measured in terms of global 
sales performance in excess of $100 million annually18. 
It should be noted, however, that whilst more lenient regulatory controls would 
diminish this uncertainty, they would also increase the risk to have the toxic products in 
the market to the detriment of public health19. 

16 European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries Associations (hereinafter, ‘EFPIA’) membership survey 
conducted in 2009 (percentages calculated from 2007 data). These figures, however, assume that all R&D is 
entirely conducted in-house. However, pharmaceutical companies rely, to a significant degree, on the 
acquisition of compounds from third parties. See the Commission Communication of 8 July 2009 on the 
outcome of the sectoral investigation undertaken by DG Comp in the EU pharmaceutical sector, at p. 8, 
where it is indicated that in 2007 about 35% of companies’ molecules whose application for the marketing 
authorisation was pending in Europe had been acquired or in-licensed. In ANGELL, The Truth about Drug 
Companies, cit., p. 32-36, the reader will find many examples of fundamental drugs (e.g. AZT, an 
antiretroviral drug, the first approved treatment for HIV; Taxol, the anticancer most ever sold in medical 
history; Glivec, the only drug that treats, and blocks, the myeloid leukaemia) that have been first discovered 
by universities or institutes of research that are publicly financed and only at a later stage developed into 
marketable products by pharmaceutical companies. 
17 See DANZON and TOWSE, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, R&D and Patents, in 
International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2003, no. 3(3), p. 183-205. 
18 See REDWOOD, New drugs in the World Market: Incentives and Impediments to Innovation, in American 
Enterprise, 1993, no. 4(4), p. 72-80. 
19 Tighter regulatory hurdles were triggered by the Thalidomide tragedy in the ‘50s. Thalidomide was 
developed by Grunenthal in 1954 in Germany. In the mid-1950s there were no guidelines for the 
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1.2 Features of the demand-side of the market 
The demand for pharmaceuticals has unique features. 
Demand for pharmaceuticals, like the demand for other health care goods and 
services, is derived from the demand for health itself20. Medications are important 
components of health services and are often a crucial element in medical care. 
Pharmaceuticals can be purchased both separately or jointly from the consumption of 
other health services. Under some circumstances, they are consumed together with 
physician office visits and/or hospital stays. In some other circumstances, 
pharmaceuticals are substitutes for other services, resulting in the reduction of the use of 
other types of care. 
In the market for drugs, as well as of health, patients are not sovereign: they do 
not choose, nor do they pay for the medicines they consume. 
1.2.1 Who chooses drugs: the role of physicians 
Patients do not know their present and future need for health and the 
appropriate level of consumption of medicines. Pharmaceuticals are, in fact, ‘post-
experience goods’, i.e. goods whose qualities and impact over the personal utility 
individuals are not perfectly able to judge, even after they consume them21. 

development, production and marketing of medicinal products, nor a uniform federal pharmaceutical law 
in Germany. Thalidomide was used to promote sleep and rapidly became the top selling hypnotic and 
sedative, through TV advertising. In 1958/1959 a significant increase was recorded in the number of 
newborn babies with congenital deformities. At the beginning of the ‘60s some surveys raised the suspicion 
that thalidomide products might possess a teratogenic (defect-causing) effect. On 27 November 1961 
Grunenthal withdrew Thalidomide from the market, 12 days after receiving notification of the first plausible 
suspicions. In 1964, three years after market withdrawal, proof of the teratogenic effect of the drug was 
obtained in animal experiments conducted in New Zealand on white rabbits. One of the most important 
consequences drawn from the Thalidomide tragedy was the creation of a wide range of measures to ensure 
risk minimization in connection with the licensing of newly developed pharmaceutical products. For 
Germany, the Medicines Act of 1976,which came into force on 1 January 1978, was a landmark event in this 
context. 
20 See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, cit., p. 116, where a difference between ‘demand’ and 
‘need’ is made. Need refers to professionally determined requirements and is often little related to demand. 
21 In economics, an experience good is a product or service where product characteristics such as quality or 
price are difficult to observe in advance, but these characteristics can be ascertained upon consumption. 
Experience goods pose difficulties for consumers in accurately making consumption choices. In healthcare, 
they reward reputation and create inertia. Experience goods typically have lower price elasticity than search 
goods, as consumers fear that lower prices may be due to unobservable problems or quality issues. Post-
experience goods, also called credence goods, are goods for which it is difficult for consumers to ascertain the 
quality even after they have consumed them, such as vitamin supplements. Potential consumers of these 
goods may require third-party information, provided by private rating agencies or government bodies. See 
SATTERTHWAITE, Consumer Information, Equilibrium Industry Price, and the Number of Sellers, in Bell Journal of 
Economics, 1979, no. 12(2), p. 488-506; NELSON, Information and Consumer Behavior, in Journal of Political 
Economy, 1970, no. 78(2), p. 311-329. 
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The inability of choosing among different therapies induces patients to rely on 
the expertise of a physician. The latter has primary authority to decide which prescribed 
medicine should be used, including the method of administration, dosage, and duration 
of usage. 
In the relationship between patients and physicians two problems arise. One is 
asymmetry of information: on the one hand, patients sense (some of) their symptoms but 
do not have the necessary skills to analyse them to make a diagnosis; on the other hand, 
physicians have these skills but do not precisely know all the symptoms suffered by 
patients22. 
The second issue relates to the alignment of the incentives of patients and 
physicians. On becoming ill, consumers hire health care professionals to act as their 
agents23. The perfect agent physician is one who chooses exactly as the patients 
themselves would choose, if they had the information the physician possesses. In other 
words, in order to avoid conflicts of interests, the physician should focus on patient’s 
preferences only24. 
However, physician is not only an agent but also a provider of care. Like any 
other rational individual, he, or she, tends to maximize his, or her, own utility, instead of 
patients’ utility. A physician’s utility is composed by net income, leisure and 
inducement25. Inducement is the physician’s own effort to induce patients to buy more 
care. If inducement is profitable, providers would do more inducement26 and patients 
would buy more medicines, no matter whether this reflects their utility27. 

22 For this reason it has been estimated that roughly only one-fourth or more of total personal health-care 
expenditures can be regarded as ‘reasonably informed’. See PAULY, A Primer on Competition in Medical 
Markets, in FRECH, Health Care in America: The Political Economy of Hospitals and Health Insurance, 1988, p. 16. 
23 See, for instance, SCOTT and VICK, Patients, Doctors and Contracts: an Application of Principal-Agent Theory to 
the Doctor-Patient Relationship, in Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 1999, no. 2(46), p. 111-134. 
24 See FOLLAND, Economics of Health and Health care, 2007, p. 316. 
25 See FARLEY, Theories of the Price and Quantity of Physician Services, in Journal of Health Economics, 1986, no. 5, 
p. 315-333. See MCGUIRE and PAULY, Physician Response to fee Changes with Multiple Payers, in Journal of Health 
Economics, 1991, no. 10(4), p. 385-410, for a policy proposal to correct physicians’ distorted incentives. 
26 See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, cit., p. 123. However, see DE JAEGHER and JEGERS, The 
physician-patient relationship as a game of strategic information transmission, in Health Economics, 2001, no. 7(10), 
p. 651-668, who show that there are some situations where the patient is able to constrain the physician in 
inducing demand. 
27 For this reason the demand for pharmaceutical is considered a ‘supplier-induced demand’ (hereinafter, 
‘SID’). See EVANS, Supplier-induced demand: Some empirical evidence and implications, in PERLMAN, The economics 
of health and medical care, 1974, pp. 162-173, who sees in the fact that demand for drugs is a derived demand 
the source for possible non alignment of incentives between patients and physicians. See DE JAEGHER and 
JEGERS, A model of physician behaviour with demand inducement, in Journal of Health Economics, 2000, no. 2(19), p. 
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1.2.2 Who pays for drugs: the financing of medicines’ consumption 
With regards to payment, the classical market functioning does not normally 
apply either: in most of the EU Member States patients use products that another agent – 
the government – pays. 
Pharmaceuticals are, in fact, merit goods, i.e. goods that every individual should 
potentially have at his disposal, even if he or she does not get a concrete utility out of it. 
It follows that access to medicines is commonly (almost entirely) granted by the State 
through consumption’s financing28. 
Drugs play an important role in the field of public health and pharmaceutical 
spending forms a crucial part of Member State’s health and industrial policy and an 
important share of the social security budget29. For this reason, policy makers face a 
trade off among overlapping and competing interest. 
First of all, they bear the responsibility of guaranteeing that only safe, good 
quality and effective medicines are marketed. Secondly, given that public or social 
insurance funds bear a considerable part of the cost of pharmaceuticals, health 
authorities have a legitimate interest in obtaining good value for money. Equity and 
efficiency are thus primary objectives of any pharmaceutical policy. Thirdly, in many 
countries, given the economic contribution of the sector, also the promotion of a 
regulatory environment conducive to business plays an important role. 

231-258, who point that physicians’ ability to induce patients may make them better off in some situations. 
For an evaluation of some aspects of prescribing practices see CHAPMAN, DURIEUX, WALLEY, Good Prescribing 
Practice, in MOSSIALOS ET AL., Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: striving for Efficiency, Equity and Quality, 
2004, p. 144-157. 
28 The governmental intervention in the financing of drug consumption is economically justified by the fact 
that merit goods are consumed at a suboptimal level if provided through market mechanisms, given that 
positive externalities generated from consumption are not internalised from consumers. The latter, in fact, 
are subject to asymmetry of information over the characteristics of the good and consider only individual 
utility they get from consumption rather than social benefits deriving from it, especially in the long run. To 
remedy this market failure, the State can choose to encourage a larger production or consumption of these 
goods through public procurement, regulation, or financial provision. See DELBONO and ZAMAGNI, 
Microeconomia, 1998, p. 794. They underline that “… l’attribuzione di meritorietà ad un bene presuppone che il 
singolo individuo non sia pienamente in grado di percepire il contenuto di pubblica utilità associato al consumo di 
particolari beni o servizi se non dopo averne, più o meno a lungo, sperimentato l’utilizzo. Ne consegue che l’autorità 
pubblica deve garantirne la diffusa accessibilità”. 
29 The amount for total health care expenditure in Europe is at present divided into three main categories: 
17% are represented by pharmaceutical products and other medical non-durables, 35.4% by in-patient care 
(hospital) and 47.6% by out-patient care and others. See OECD Health Data 2008, Statistics and Indicators for 
30 Countries, December 2008; EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2009, p. 25. 
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The separation of the functions of choice and payment, traditionally both 
pertaining to the consumer, and their attribution to distinct subjects have generated 
drug consumption patterns unrelated from their cost. This has caused an inflationist 
trend in the use of medicines and the consequent concern of governments. 
It should be noted that also those countries where historically the State did not 
intervene to cover private health expenditures and citizens (read: private insurers) pay 
for the drugs they are prescribed, experienced an extraordinary growth in 
pharmaceutical expenditures. 
This may be due to the fact that drugs, like any credence good, may display a 
direct (rather than inverse) relationship between price and demand. That is, a rise in 
price does not entail a reduction in consumption. In fact, even when patients pay their 
medicines out of their pockets, to a certain extent they remain insensitive to price. 
Generally consumers’ responsiveness to price is determined by their knowledge and 
other’s people knowledge of a product. But, given that consumers’ information over the 
utility that a drug brings to them is very limited, consumer demand for pharmaceuticals 
is largely inelastic. Sellers, on the contrary, know the utility impact of such goods on 
patients’ health. It is clear, thus, that there is asymmetric information on the side of 
patients. This, together with product differentiation within the same therapeutic area30 
and the presence of patents, helps companies have influence over prices and strengthens 
their monopoly power31. 
For these reasons, and despite cost sharing provisions recently introduced to 
render consumers more cost conscious32, altogether, spending on health care has been 
rising at a faster rate than the economies are growing33. 

30 Cf. Section 6 of this Chapter for a discussion about why drugs belonging to the same therapeutic area 
cannot be always considered perfect substitutes. 
31 The pharmaceutical market is generally considered to have the structure of monopolistic competition. 
Monopolistic competition is a market structure where many competing producers sell products that are 
differentiated from one another (i.e. the products are substitutes, but are not exactly alike), consumers 
perceive that there are non-price differences among the competitors’ products, the demand schedule is 
downward sloping, there are few barriers to entry and exit, producers have a degree of control over price, 
and, because of brand loyalty, they can raise prices without losing all of their customers. See CHAMBERLIN, 
Theory of Monopolistic Competition, 1933. 
32 These measures generally account for co-payment. Co-payment may work according to four different 
mechanism: a) fixed fee (per item, per prescription, or according to pack size); b) a percentage of the value of 
the prescribed drug; c) a deductible up to a certain limit; and d) a combination of the above, usually a fixed 
fee or a deductible plus a percentage of the value of the drug. It is difficult to assess overall the full economic 
impact of cost sharing on utilization, health status and income distribution. The first study that investigated 
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1.2.3 The cost-containment strategies applied by national governments 
From 1960 to 2001 total spending on health care as a percentage of GDP (at 
market prices) in Europe was 3.7% in 1960, 7.1% in 1980, 8.2% in 2000 and 8.4% in 200134. 
Between 1995 and 2000 most countries increased their total pharmaceutical expenditures 
as a percentage of total health care spending from 13.3% to 15.6% on average. Between 
1990 and 2000 the unweighted average of per capita pharmaceutical expenditures in the 
EU Member States (excluding Austria) increased by 79.9%35. 
The huge financial constraint such spending is playing on national budgets is 
illustrated by the following figures: 
 
 

the effects of cost sharing on patients’ welfare is the RAND HEALTH INSURANCE EXPERIMENT (HIE), a 
comprehensive study of health care costs, utilization and outcomes conducted between 1974 and 1982 in the 
US. An early paper with interim results (NEWHOUSE, ET AL., Some interim results from a controlled trial of cost 
sharing in health insurance, in N Engl. J Med, 1981, no. 305, p. 1501-7) concluded that health insurance without 
coinsurance “leads to more people using services and to more services per user”. However, the experiment also 
demonstrated that cost sharing reduced “inappropriate or unnecessary” medical care as well as “appropriate or 
needed” medical care. Later on NEWHOUSE, Consumer-directed health plans and the RAND health insurance 
experiment, in Health Affairs, 2004, no. 23(6), p. 107-13, wrote “For most people enrolled in the RAND experiment, 
who were typical of Americans covered by employment-based insurance, the variation in use across the plans appeared 
to have minimal to no effects on health status. By contrast, for those who were both poor and sick -- people who might 
be found among those covered by Medicaid or lacking insurance -- the reduction in use was harmful, on average”. 
33 See THOMSON and MOSSIALOS, Influencing Demand for Drugs through Cost Sharing, in MOSSIALOS ET AL., 
Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe, cit., p. 227-244. 
34 In Eco-Santé OECD, June 2008, it is reported that in 2006, the latest year for which comparable data are 
available, health spending on average across OECD countries grew in real terms by just over 3%, the lowest 
rate since 1997. Looking at the trend during this decade, health expenditure grew rapidly in many countries 
between 2000 and 2003, with an annual average growth rate of 6.2% over that period. Since 2003, the rise in 
health expenditure has slowed, however, to an average of 3.6% per year. In several countries, the percentage 
of GDP devoted to health actually fell slightly between 2005 and 2006, while in others it stabilised. Overall, 
this marked a pause in a long-term rising trend that has seen health spending rise from 6.6% of GDP on 
average in OECD countries in 1980. 
35 See OECD, Health Data 2002, su 
http://www.oecd.org/document/22/0,3343,en_2649_34631_1935190_1_1_1_1,00.html. It should be pointed 
that, unfortunately, most of data on pharmaceutical spending do not distinguish between public and private 
expenditures, and among the latter the different type of pharmaceutical spending, such as Over-The-
Counter products (OTC) or co-payment on reimbursed products; also, methodological problems exist when 
performing cross-country comparison because of rate fluctuation, price difference and variation in public 
coverage. 
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Table 3: Total expenditures in health care in % of GDP (2006) 
France 11,1 
Germany 10,6 
Belgium 10,4 
UK 8,4 
Spain 8,4 
Italy 9,0 
US 15,3 
Average OECD 8,9 
Source: Eco-Santé OECD, June 2008, available at www.oecd.org. 
 
 
Table 4 : Payment for pharmaceuticals by compulsory health insurance systems and 
national health services (ambulatory care only) 
EFPIA 2007 € million 
Austria  1,964 
Belgium  2,859 
Bulgaria  n.a. 
Croatia  349 
Cyprus  n.a. 
Czech Republic  1,196 
Denmark  988 
Estonia  62 
Finland  1,142 
France  21,276 
Germany  27,759 
Greece  4,298 
Hungary  1,194 
Iceland  81 
Ireland  1,721 
Italy  11,493 
Latvia  91 
Lithuania  n.a. 
Malta  n.a. 
Netherlands  5,062 
Norway  1,077 
Poland  1,765 
Portugal  1,401 
Romania  574 
Slovakia  796 
Slovenia  209 
Spain  10,719 
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Sweden  1,950 
Switzerland  2,683 
United Kingdom  10,845 
Total  113,554 
Source: EFPIA, 2009 
Note: Czech Republic, Estonia: 2006 data; France, Greece, Ireland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, 
UK: estimate. 
 
The dramatic increase of health care expenditures and the steady increase of 
demand for and reliance on pharmaceuticals as a (read: the most cost-effective) treatment 
triggered a wave of cost containment plans at national level in all Member States36. 
Governments traditionally targeted the supply-side of the industry, thereby 
attempting to cap the growth of pharmaceutical expenditures through price control 
schemes. The latter vary in nature to a great extent from country to country: from price 
negotiation, to profit cap, to price-volume agreements, to maximum reimbursed prices 
set by government37. 
The impact of these cost-containment policies is often very unclear. In the 
literature it is often claimed that these legislations did not achieve the goals for which 
they were enacted. Such failure is due to the fact that reducing pharmaceutical prices 
does not necessarily lead to a reduction in the total pharmaceutical expenditures, whose 
amount is determined also by quantities consumed, i.e. by consumption patterns, 
medical culture, etc.38 
Traditional cost containment measures are currently supplemented by new cost-
containment measures, based on new methods of accounting the value of a 
pharmaceutical product. At present the cost of medicines is only one of the sides 
considered by health authorities; the other one is the benefit generated by the medicine. 

36 In two countries, budget systems for pharmaceutical spending existed already before the rising cost of 
pharmaceutical expenditures became a common problem for policy makers in all European countries. In the 
UK, between 1991 and 1999, general practitioner fund holders were responsible for prescribing costs, and in 
Germany an overall expenditure cap for pharmaceutical prescribing has been used since 1993. 
37 See better Section 1.1 of Chapter III for an overview of the EU national pharmaceutical regulations. 
38 For instance, a controlled price system for drugs may lead to an increase in total drug expenditures, 
because of a rise in the use of less effective drugs. French drugs have the lowest prices in Europe. Still, 
pharmaceutical expenditures in France are extremely high: 20% of total health care expenditures, double the 
US proportion. In Canada, strict government price controls have had little effect on containing total drug 
spending: the percentage of total health care spending on pharmaceuticals climbed from 11.4% in 1990 to 
15.2% in 2000. See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, cit., p. 149. 
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Three methods are frequently used to relate these two variables: cost-benefit analysis39, 
cost-effectiveness analysis40 and cost-utility analysis41. 
Together with supply-side measures, demand-side instruments are now 
increasingly used to contain pharmaceutical expenditures. 
All the European governments put a variety of financial incentives on the 
relevant stakeholders, with the aim of influencing the demand for drugs and containing 
costs. Such financial incentives may take the form of formularies that restrict 
reimbursement to a selected list of approved drugs42, or generic substitution, or cost-
sharing provisions, etc. 
These measures determined an increased interposition by third parties payers 
between patients and their physicians, by deciding which drugs will be better covered 
than others in order to contain health care costs. Therefore, physicians’ professional 
autonomy is now partially restrained by such measures43. This may determine a 
reduction of the risk of inducement and change the way pharmaceuticals are 
demanded44. 
1.2.4 The role of pharmacists 
Pharmacists act both as sellers and counsellors for those using drugs and are 
responsible for ensuring that the patient is informed about the drug’s use, its method of 
administration, indications and contraindications, as well as its side effects. Although 
they are generally obliged to provide what the doctor prescribed, they are more and 

39 Cost-benefit analysis compares the costs of two options giving the same benefit on the basis of the 
associated costs. The chosen option should entail the lower cost. 
40 When calculations of monetary value are not possible, outcomes are measured in real terms. In the context 
of drugs, the comparison between two products is performed by looking at the ratio between the costs and 
their effectiveness in terms of the cure produced. The less expensive drug per cure is to be chosen. 
41 Cost-effectiveness analysis cannot be performed when two or more outcomes measures are compared. In 
this case, cost-utility is used, i.e. ratio between the cost of a health-related intervention and the benefit it 
produces in terms of the number of years lived in full health by the beneficiaries (measured in terms of 
Quality of Life, hereinafter ‘QALY’). 
42 A formulary is a list of drugs covered – positive formularies -, or not covered – negative formularies – by 
an insurance plan. More complex formularies are used by health plans in the attempt to encourage a more 
frugal use of expensive drugs. This is accomplished with through tiers within a group of therapeutic 
equivalents: among them a preferred product is designated. Generally these are generics. The second-
preferred drug is normally a branded one and is available with co-payment. The other products are 
available with higher co-payment rates. See MANDELKER, Formularies: Balancing Cost and Quality, in Business 
and Health, 1995, no. 13(3), p. 6-10. 
43 See WALLEY and MOSSIALOS, Financial Incentives and Prescribing, in MOSSIALOS ET AL., Regulating 
Pharmaceuticals in Europe, cit., p. 177-195. 
44 See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, cit., p. 131. 
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more involved in the campaign to reduce the level of pharmaceutical public 
expenditures. Thus, for instance, now doctors have the possibility, or the duty, to 
substitute the prescribed product with a cheaper equivalent. 
In sum, the demand for pharmaceuticals has unique features. It is four-tired: the 
physician prescribes, the patient consumes, and the government pays, and the 
pharmacists administers. Such fragmentation generates a situation where incentives are 
not aligned: physicians take decisions on behalf of patients but are not involved in the 
financial consequences; patients are not decision makers and often do not bear the cost 
of the physician’s decision; payers are not involved in the therapeutic decision either but 
bear the related cost; pharmacists are often mere executors of physicians’ decisions. Each 
of these actors generally acts in his, or her, own interests but the decisions he, or she, 
takes may have a negative externality on other stakeholders. 
However, in all countries governments are attempting to address these issues 
and correct these market failures through appropriate measures that help rationalising 
the use of medicines. 
 
2. The European pharmaceutical market 
The pharmaceuticals industry represents an important sector in Europe and 
plays a critical role in both the industrial and the health field. In terms of production, 
revenue generation and employment it is one of the best-performing high-technology 
industries in Europe, amounting to about 3.5% of the total EU manufacturing value-
added and 19.2% of the whole EU business R&D expenditures45. 
According to the latest estimates, the pharmaceutical industry in 2008 provided 
about 635,000 units of employment in Europe, of which 117,000 are devoted to R&D. It 
generated a trade surplus of € 52 billion (up from € 7.067 billion in 1990) and involved 
R&D investment of € 27.2 billion (up from € 7.766 billion in 1990). The estimated total 
value at ex-factory prices amounted to around € 145 billions46. 

45 See EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2009, p. 10, where it is referred that according to 
EUROSTAT data, the pharmaceutical industry is the high technology sector with the highest value-added 
per person employed, well ahead of the average value for high-tech and manufacturing industries. 
46 See EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2009, p. 10. 
 32 
These figures pay tribute to the fact that the European pharmaceutical sector is a 
large and growing market. Factors such as the ageing population47, higher life 
expectancy, advances in biotechnology and a greater reliance on pharmaceuticals as a 
cure for diseases are opening up this sector. 
Although the European pharmaceutical industry is overall performing well, 
recently the first symptoms of some difficulties have appeared. In particular, it would 
seem that the European pharmaceutical market is losing competitiveness with respect to 
the past and in regard to its main competitor, the US. 
In 2006 the EU pharmaceutical industry invested about € 24.8 billion in R&D, 
that is, about 18.5% of its sales. In absolute value, these figures seem to be high enough. 
However, if compared to previous figures, a declining trend appears. For instance, R&D 
expenditures represented 1.84% of the European Union’s GDP in 2006 against 1.86% in 
200048. 
This level of investment in R&D, besides being insufficient with respect to the 
target established at a EU level49, is also significantly lower with respect to the 
expenditures in the US. 
The US pharmaceutical industry leads other industries in the share of sales 
revenue allocated to R&D. US pharmaceutical manufacturers more than doubled the 
share of revenue allocated to R&D between 1980 and 2000. 
 

47 Total percentage of elderly people, (those aged 65+) in Europe was 21% in 2002 as compared to 10.6% in 
1990. 
48 See EUROSTAT, News release, no. 34, 10 March 2008; Science, technology and innovation in Europe, 2008. 
49 The goal in R&D investments, as set by the Lisbon summit strategy, is to achieve by 2010 an R&D intensity 
of at least 3% for the EU as a whole. 
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Graph 2: Pharmaceutical R&D expenditures in EU-US  
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As this graph shows, while in the ‘90s Europe was investing more than US in 
R&D, it is now largely lagging behind. Between 1990 and 2008 the R&D growth rate 
increased 5.2 times in US and 3.3 times in EU. This underpins the claims that there is an 
uneven distribution of R&D activity between Europe and the US50. 
Although European pharmaceutical firms are among the leading pharmaceutical 
groups, they generally obtain results vastly inferior to those of American companies. 
Also, European companies are, in general, of smaller size than US companies, which 
therefore benefit of larger amounts of resources to invest in R&D. 
This raises concerns about the ability of European pharmaceutical firms to face 
competition in a globalized environment51, especially in light of the rapid growth in the 
research environment in emerging economies such as China and India. This, together 

50 See GAMBARDELLA, ORSENIGO, PAMMOLLI, Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals - A European Perspective, 
a report prepared for the Directorate General Enterprise of the European Commission, November 2000. 
51 See EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2008, p. 2. 
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with the lower labour costs, may result in the closure of R&D sites in Europe and the 
opening of new sites on the Asian continent52. 
Not only the rate of investment in R&D from European firms has been declining, 
but also the productivity has been consistently slowing down. Between 1960 and 1965, 
European companies invented 65% of new active substance (NASs) placed on the world 
market. Forty years later their share had fallen to 33%.  
True, the US pharmaceutical firms are not exempt from this negative trend, 
which has been ascribed by some commentators to a more general crisis of the 
industry53. Analysts have been claiming, in fact, that also in US to a dramatic increase in 
R&D expenditures corresponds a decrease in the number of new molecular entities 
(hereinafter, ‘NMEs’) put onto the market and an increase in the number of ‘me-too 
drugs’ produced54. From 1999 to 2003, both the EU and US regulatory authorities have 
recorded significant reductions in approvals: from 27 to 17 NAS in the EU (through the 
centralised procedure) and 35 to 21 NMEs in the US. 
 

52 This is one of the concerns that triggered the Innovative Medicines Initiative, a Public-Private Partnership 
between the pharmaceutical industry, represented by the European Federation of Pharmaceutical Industries 
and Associations (EFPIA) and the European Communities, represented by the European Commission. See 
http//:imi.europa.eu/index_en.html. 
53 See GAMBARDELLA, ORSENIGO, PAMMOLLI, Global Competitiveness in Pharmaceuticals - A European Perspective, 
cit., p. 86 et seq. 
54 A ‘me-too drug’ is a variation of an already existing product, i.e. a re-engineered compound that has 
similar effects on the human body to the pioneer products. See the study published by CMR International, 
2003, describing the increasing trend in the production of ‘me toos’. See also infra Section 2.2 in Chapter IV 
for more detailed figures about the number of NMEs produced by US pharmaceutical companies in 2002. 
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Graph 3: New molecular or biological entities (1989-2008) 
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After 2003, the pharmaceutical productivity seems to have improved, both in US 
and in Europe: 25 new molecular (chemical and biological) entities, in fact, reached the 
world market for the first time in 2007. This has somehow relieved the concerns of some 
experts about the health of the pharmaceutical industry: it has been claimed that the 
crisis is not structural55 and that should be seen in a much wider historical perspective. 
Past trends show that there have already been fluctuations in drug launches in the 
history of the industry. However, as of the ‘50s overall there has been a steady increase 
in the number of new chemical entities launched56. Still, there is disagreement on how to 
interpret the downward trend and the subsequent improvement in drug launches. 
In any case, data available for the period 2003-2007 show the predominance of 
the United States in terms of R&D investments levels57. This fact continues to provide a 
source of concern from EU institutions for the competitiveness of the EU pharmaceutical 

55 CRA, Innovation in the Pharmaceutical Sector, a Study undertaken for the European Commission, November 
2004, where the assessment of European companies’ pipelines suggested that the likely number of new 
active substances to be brought to market or in the process of applying for marketing authorisation was 
increasing, and therefore the decline did not reflect a structural trend. 
56 See SCHMID and SMITH, Is declining innovation in the pharmaceutical industry a myth?, in DDT, no. 10(1), 2005. 
57 See EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2008, p. 23; PAMOLLI, What Happened to the European 
Pharmaceutical Industry? A European Perspective, presentation at American Enterprise Industry, Washington 
D.C., October 7, 2004. 
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industry. 
Such lack of competitiveness of the European industry can be attributed, among 
other things (like the absence of a federal R&D funding system equivalent to that present 
in US), to the fragmentation characterising the regulatory environment in Europe58. 
The latter has been the cause of duplication of costs of marketing, distribution 
and administration and, in some cases, of excess capacity59. In addition, differences in 
health care systems and regulations, has diminished the attractiveness of the European 
market as a favourable environment for R&D investments. 
For this reason, efforts to build a single market for pharmaceuticals have been 
made since early ages of the history of the European Union60, in the belief that this 
objective was the fundamental premise for the growth and the competitiveness of the 
industry and for the effective protection of patients’ health. The completion of the single 
market would, in fact, spur investments from pharmaceutical companies and favour a 
more efficient allocation of resources.  
 
3. A single market for pharmaceuticals. 
The abatements of barriers to integration have been pertaining to three different 
areas so far: the harmonisation of marketing authorisation procedures and other 
licences, and the indirect harmonisation of price controls measures; the elimination of 
national measures of control of public expenditures that create obstacles to free 
movement of pharmaceuticals; and the harmonisation of national patent systems where 
the degree of protection was not considered adequate to the logic of the single market61. 
3.1 The harmonisation of marketing authorisation for drugs 
Prior to the creation of European Medicines Evaluation Agency (hereinafter, 
‘EMEA’) in 1995, medical products were reviewed and approved at national level, with 

58 See Il costo della «NON EUROPA» nell’industria farmaceutica, in Rass. Dir. Far., 1989, p. 526. 
59 See CURRIE, European Registration: today, tomorrow, and beyond, in Journal of Clinical Pharmacology, 1990, no. 
30(5), p. 386-389. 
60 See the Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals. (93)718 Final, Brussels, 
March, where the Commission expressed concern about the slow development of the European market for 
pharmaceuticals and suggested that the lost in competitiveness could translate into an economic and social 
cost for Europe. It outlined an industrial policy that stressed the importance of a single internal market 
designed to establish a stable environment that would protect patients’ health.  
61 In this Chapter, I will focus on the first two mentioned areas. 
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each country having its own set of policies for drug approval and marketing 
authorization. 
Clearly, such disparities between the national regulations hindered the free 
movement of goods within the European Common Market and put an obstacle to 
market integration. 
For this reason, the Council, already long time ago started a process of 
approximation of pharmaceutical national laws, based on the powers that the Treaty 
attributes to this body to this purpose62. 
With Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 196563, the Council aimed at 
harmonising the conditions necessary to obtain a marketing authorisation and a 
manufacturing licence in each Member State, in order to ensure that the medicine 
complied with the requirements of quality, safety and efficacy. This first piece of 
European legislation still provides the foundation of the current regulatory framework 
for the assessment of medicines. 
The primary criterion that guided such harmonisation attempt was the limitation 
of the discretionary power of national health care authorities, through the adoption of 
generally accepted scientific standards in marketing authorisation procedures, and the 
harmonisation of bureaucratic practices with regards to documents, trials, and 
timelines64. 
Subsequently, the European Community has introduced a harmonised procedure 
that allowed the company to obtain a marketing authorisation valid in various Member 
States. 
Directives 75/318/EEC and 75/319/EEC65 established a mutual recognition 
procedure that allowed companies to request a marketing authorization in five or more 

62 See Article 94 of the EU Treaty: “The Council shall… issue directives for the approximation of such laws… 
[which] directly affect the establishment or functioning of the Common Market”. See CUVILLIER, The Role of the 
European Medicines Evaluation Agency in the harmonisation of pharmaceuticals, in GOLDBERG and LONBAY, 
Pharmaceutical Medicine. Biotechnology and European Law, 2000, p. 137-156.  
63 See Council Directive 65/65/EEC of 26 January 1965 on the approximation of provisions laid down by 
Law, Regulation or Administrative Action relating to proprietary medicinal products. 
64  See RISTUCCIA, Il farmaco tra autorizzazioni amministrative e privative industriali, in Riv. Dir. Civ., 1993, no. 1, 
p. 87. 
65 See Council Directive 75/318/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the approximation of laws of Members States 
relating to analytical, pharmaco-toxicological and clinical standards and protocols in respect of the testing of 
proprietary medicinal products. See also the Second Council Directive 75/319/EEC of 20 May 1975 on the 
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Member States, after having obtained a first authorisation on the basis of the criteria set 
by the Directives. 
Rules on chemical and pharmaceutical testing, pharmacological and toxicological 
testing and clinical trials, as already seen, were also harmonised. 
In 1977 the Committee for Proprietary Medicinal Products (hereinafter, the 
‘CPMP’) was also founded. It was a scientific review committee designed to ensure the 
quality, the safety and the efficacy of medicinal products awaiting approval from 
Member States. Through this body Member States could work together with the 
Commission in their efforts to harmonise evaluation criteria and co-ordinate the 
authorisation of medicines. The CPMP was a milestone: it provided the first EU-level 
pharmaceutical forum for Member State representatives, from which a the current 
network established among health authorities grew66. 
Still, companies did not make an extensive use of the harmonised procedure: in 
the first seven years after the enactment of the Directive only 41 requests were made. 
For this reason, and thanks to the major shift in legislative policy going on at that 
time at a European level67, the Commission then decided to introduce a multi-State 
procedure, disciplined by Directive 83/570/EEC, which had better success among 
companies. 
The goal was to create a unified standard for product review that all countries 
could use, thereby speeding up the process of authorization in all other EU countries. 
However, since national authorities were not required to accept the review as final, 
many States continued their own reviews before authorizing a product for market 
approval. This duplication of effort undermined the objective of faster market access for 
manufacturers68. 
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approximation of provisions laid down by law, regulation or administrative action relate to proprietary 
medicinal products. 
66 The CPMP now works within EMEA as scientific committee and is composed by two members nominated 
by each Member State. 
67 See the EU Commission, Completing the Internal Market. White Paper from the Commission to the European 
Council, 1985. The White Paper contained 300 legislative initiative covering almost all sectors across Europe, 
of which a dozen were in the pharmaceutical sector, dealing with several issues: from the transparency in 
national pricing, to the rational use of medicines. 
68 See EU Commission, Pharmaceuticals in the European Union, 2000, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/pharmaceuticals.htm. 
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In 1993 the Commission expressed its concern about the consequences of the lack 
of a single market for pharmaceuticals in terms of competitiveness, of social costs and of 
patients’ health protection in Europe. It then outlined an industrial policy program that 
led to the creation of the EMEA and to the establishment of new harmonised procedures 
to obtain a marketing authorisation. 
EMEA’s mission statement is “to promote the protection of human health… and of 
consumers of medicinal products”69. This goal is to be achieved through a greater level of 
harmonisation of pharmaceutical regulation within the EU. The evaluation of medicines, 
post-marketing surveillance and scientific advice, in fact, are major parts of the Agency’s 
work. Also, EMEA invests considerable resources in harmonisation activities, 
particularly in the development of testing guidelines, which generally address specific 
issues relating to the assessment of quality, safety and efficacy. 
The EC Regulation no. 2309/93, as amended by EC Regulation no. 726/2004, 
enriched the possibilities for pharmaceutical companies to have a marketing 
authorisation with two additional procedures to the national one. So, at present there are 
three different procedures to obtain a marketing authorisation for pharmaceutical 
products70: 
x the national procedure; 
x the procedure of mutual recognition and the decentralised procedure; 
x the centralised procedure. 
The national procedure allows companies to market their product in a Member 
State within the EU. Companies have to present the related documentation and 
information to the competent national health authority, which has to accept or refuse the 
request within a certain period established by national law. 
The second procedure was also introduced in 1993 but it was not implemented 
until 1998. It is now disciplined by the Directive 2004/27/EC and it is aimed at 
ameliorating cooperation among Member States. The marketing authorisation request 
should be presented to each Member State where the company is interested in 

69 See European Council Regulation No. 2309/93 of 22 July 1993 laying down Community procedures for 
the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and veterinary use and establishing a 
European Agency for the evaluation of Medicinal Products. OJ L 214, August 24, 1993, p. 1-21. 
70 See Pharmacos, Overview of the European Authorisation System, 2008 available at 
http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F2/home.html 
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commercialising the drug, on the basis of the same file. The company should then ask 
one of the Member States to act as referee and prepare an evaluation report. If the State 
referee accepts the marketing authorisation request, the other States should grant it 
within 30 days on the basis of the evaluation made by the referee. 
When the product has not been authorised anywhere, the decentralised 
procedure applies. The company asks the State referee to send the documents necessary 
or the evaluation to the other Member States, which within 90 days should either grant 
or refuse the authorisation71. 
The third procedure, entirely managed by EMEA, allows companies to have a 
unique authorisation valid within the whole territory of the European Union. The 
centralised procedure is fast and generally perceived to be efficient by stakeholders: the 
EMEA has 210 days to reply to the request of authorisation. Such authorisation is valid 
in each Member State for a period of five years. After this period the authorisation is 
renewable for an unlimited period of time. 
The centralised procedure is compulsory for orphan drugs, biotechnological 
products and pharmaceuticals containing new active substance indicated for the 
treatment of diseases listed in the EC Reg. no. 726/2004. From this point of view, EMEA 
is also playing an important role in the implementation of the European Union policy on 
orphan medicines72. 
Besides the harmonisation of market authorisation procedures, it is important to 
mention that the action of the European institutions also concerned the standards of 
quality, safety and efficacy of medicines and aimed at encouraging their free circulation, 
in order for European patients to have a better and wider choice of products at 
reasonable prices73. For instance, in all Member States, the Good Manufacturing Practice 
(hereinafter, ‘GMP’) is mandatory for manufacturing activities, including quality control. 
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71 See PIGNATTI, BOONE and MOULON, Overview of the European Regulatory Approval System, in Journal of 
Ambulatory Care Management, 2004, no. 27(2), p. 89-97. 
72 Recital 9 of the EC Reg. n. 726/2004 reads, “optional access to the centralised procedure should also be provided 
for in cases where use of a single procedure produces added value for the patient. This procedure should remain optional 
for medicinal products which, although not belonging to the abovementioned categories, are nevertheless 
therapeutically innovative. It is also appropriate to allow access to this procedure for medicinal products which, 
although not innovative, may be of benefit to society or to patients if they are authorised from the outset at Community 
level, such as certain medicinal products which can be supplied without a medical prescription”. 
73 The governments have initiated this process in 1964 “convinced that it is desirable and necessary to harmonize 
specifications for medicinal substances which, in their original state or in the form of pharmaceutical preparations, are 
of general interest and importance to the peoples of Europe”. 
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This is clearly stated in Commission Directive 2003/94/EC: “All medicinal products for 
human use manufactured or imported into the Community … are to be manufactured in 
accordance with the principles and guidelines of good manufacturing practice.”74 
The harmonisation activity of the European Institutions also focused on 
manufacturing licence, with the Human Use Directive, in order to ensure that 
production of pharmaceuticals is subject to adequate hygienic and technical 
requirements. The manufacturing licence is granted by the Member State where the 
request has been filed, after that the competent authority has inspected the company and 
ascertained the adequacy of technical machinery and personnel, within 90 days from the 
request. 
As a result, nowadays regulation on marketing authorisation, manufacturing and 
distribution licences, labelling, leaflet, and advertising is harmonised. What remains in a 
non-harmonised area are price controls. 
3.2 The harmonisation of price control measures 
National price controls mechanisms generate the observable price gaps existing 
for the same drug in different countries, although price discrimination strategies applied 
by pharmaceutical companies also play an important role in this respect. 
On the one hand, pharmaceutical companies price their products differently 
according to variations in the ability to pay, aiming to obtain the highest price each 
national market can bear. On the other hand, governments use their authoritative power 
to moderate pharmaceutical prices pursuant to cost containment objectives and public 
health protection goals. 
Drug prices are thus the result of the interplay between private and public 
interest. The way this balance between opposing interests is struck necessarily differs 
from country to country, depending on the health care system, on budget constraints, on 
the industrial policy pursued, on the type of regulatory tool used to moderate drug 
prices (profit cap, price controls, reference pricing75, substitution policy, reimbursement 

74 See the Commission Directive 2003/94/EC of 8 October 2003 laying down the principles and guidelines of 
good manufacturing practice in respect of medicinal products for human use and investigational medicinal 
products for human use. 
75 ‘Reference pricing’ indicates any mechanism of reimbursement used by national health authorities or 
insurances, which sets maximum reimbursement price of a drug with reference to the price of a cheaper 
substitute present in the market. In particular, under a reference pricing system, products are classified in 
sub-groups with similar therapeutic effects; a maximum reimbursement price is set for all the products 
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policy etc.), on the health status of the citizens, on medical culture, on the type of 
medicine, etc.76 
This creates a wide difference in prices among countries for the same product. 
Cross-national price differences, in fact, reflect differences in product characteristics and 
implicit price, which in turn reflect the regulatory regime. Strict price regulation lowers 
prices for older molecules and globally diffused molecules. Generic competition lowers 
prices in less-regulated regimes, which also have a more price-elastic demand. 
Price disparities are significant also across Member States. Significant differences 
exist in the terms and conditions under which prescription products are reimbursed by 
relevant national health funds or social security institutions as well as the number of 
products accepted for reimbursement77. These regulatory differences reflect the 
dissimilar relations government-industry, which stem from each country’s regulatory 
tradition78. 
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belonging to the subgroups; pharmaceutical companies are free to set prices of their products but if they 
exceed the reference price, the difference is paid by the patient. A reference pricing system was introduced 
for the first time in Germany in 1989. Later on other Member States adopted this policy: the Netherlands 
(1991), Sweden (1993), Denmark (1993), Italy (1996) and Spain (2000). In UK for long time there has been a 
form of implicit reference pricing given by the rule that provided for compulsory generic substitution at the 
pharmacy level. See DANZON, Reference Pricing: Theory and Evidence, in The Economics of Reference Pricing and 
Pharmaceutical Policy, ed. LOPEZ-CASASNOVAS and JÖNSSON, 2001, p. 86–126. 
76 The first consideration in explaining international drug price differences is the disparity in tastes and 
preferences that alter the demand. Significant difference also exists across cultures in the choice of drug, as 
well as the dosage and the form of administration. In addition, the incentives of the physician are very 
important. For instance, in Japan doctors tend to prescribe heavily because of the high ‘doctor margin’, 
whilst in US doctors do not have this incentive. See SCHWEITZER, Pharmaceutical Economics and Policy, cit., p. 
186; see also PAYER, Medicine and Culture, 1988. 
77 Differences exist even at the fundamental level of whether to classify a drug as prescription medicine or 
OTCs or allowed retail outlets: some countries restrict the sale of all medicinal products to pharmacies; some 
others consent the sale of OTCs also in supermarkets. 
78 See HANCHER and MORAN, Capitalism, Culture and Economic Regulation, 1989, who affirm that, for instance, 
in UK most of regulatory arrangements were evolved in a political culture marked by a deferential attitude 
on the part of mass publics towards, and by a preference for informal and private regulation on the part of 
the ‘élite groups’. 
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Graph 4: Pharmaceutical prices in Europe (2004) 
 
Source: Verband Forschender Arzneimittelhersteller e. V., 2005 
 
The graph above shows that prices are higher in Northern countries, while 
towards South they are significantly lower. 
Historically speaking, Northern European countries, counting on higher income 
per capita, always opted for health care policies allowing for free pricing of medicinal 
specialties, in order to foster the growth of in-house pharmaceutical industry; 
conversely, in Southern European countries, public budget concerns and lower income 
per capita induced regulators to implement policies that aimed at directly monitoring 
prices of medicines, in order to keep health care expenses under control, and to promote 
innovation through other policies (like subsidies to the industry or to universities)79. 
Although patterns may be changing80, what is clear is that significant price 
differences remain and create fragmentation of the European market at the level of 
prices. For this reason, as some commentators affirm, at present it is not possible to 

79 See KANAVOS, Overview of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement regulation in Europe, p. 13–19, available 
in http://pharmacos.eudra.org/F3/g10/docs/synthesis.pdf. 
80 On this point see Section 5, p. 42 et seq., in this Chapter. 
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speak of a single market for pharmaceuticals81. 
The ECJ82 and the European Parliament83 called many times the Commission and 
the Council to action to remedy distortions caused from price differentials. Still, drugs 
pricing and related decisions are under exclusive national competence and for the time 
being price gaps appear to be there to stay84. 
For this reason, the European Institutions has intervened only indirectly on the 
national measures used by Member States to monitor public pharmaceutical 
expenditures. 
In order to level as much as possible regulatory and price differences, the 
European Commission introduced two important Directives. Firstly, with the Directive 
70/50/EC of the 22 December 1969, the Commission established important provisions 
aimed at eliminating all the national obstacles of legislative nature to cross border trade, 
in the belief that the latter was to be encouraged in order to achieve integration85. The 
national measures favouring national products over imports, through discriminatory 
prices for exports or maximum/minimum prices above/below which exports are 
blocked, were consequently prohibited as contrary to the goals of the European Union. 
Subsequently, with Directive 89/105/EC of the 21 December 1988, the so-called 
‘Transparency Directive’, the Commission established clear and uniform rules for the 
control of pharmaceutical prices. Articles 2 and 3 of the Directive outline the 
administrative procedure of price setting for a medicinal specialty, as well as for price 
increases. Articles 4 and 5 outline the procedure that applies to price freezing decisions 

81 See FARQUHARSON and SMITH, Parallel Trade in Europe, 1998, p. 68, affirming that the pharmaceutical 
industry is a ‘sector where the creation of a single European market is highly unlikely to occur even in the medium to 
long term due to the interest of national governments in controlling spending on pharmaceuticals’. See also 
HANCHER, The European Pharmaceutical Market: problems of partial harmonisation, in 15 ELR, 1990, p. 9, 10–11; 
BOOER, EDMONDS, GLYNN and OGLIALORO, Economic Aspects of the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, in 5 ECLR, 
1995, p. 257 and 261. 
82 See ECJ, 31 October 1974, in case C-15/74 Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, para. 23. 
83 See the EU Parliament’s Resolution on the Communication from the Commission on the Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals [1999] OJ C279/79. 
84 Para. 1 of Art. 168 TFEU, reads as follows: “The Union action shall respect the responsibilities of the Member 
States for the definition of their health policy and for the organisation and delivery of health services and medical care. 
The responsibilities of the Member States shall include the management of health services and medical care and the 
allocation of the resources assigned to them.” See the EU Commission Communication on Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals COM(98)588 final, p. 7-8, 12, 18, where the Commission affirms that these matters are 
mostly within the exclusive competence of the Member States and, pursuant to the principle of subsidiarity, 
should be left to national authorities. 
85 Art. 2 of the Directive prohibits measures hindering imports, and Art. 3 forbids measures governing the 
marketing of products if their effect is to restrain free movement of goods. 
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and measures that impose direct or indirect controls over companies’ margins. 
Despite this effort, however, the European pharmaceutical market is still 
characterised by an appreciable degree of fragmentation and heterogeneity among 
Members States, especially with regards to pharmaceuticals’ prices, health care systems 
and reimbursement mechanisms. 
Given the ‘political’ impossibility to further use other instruments of 
harmonisation in the field of pharmaceuticals, the Commission recently switched to soft 
law tools86. 
One of the last initiatives undertaken by the European Commission to remedy 
the market fragmentation and improve the performance of the European pharmaceutical 
industry in terms of competitiveness and contribution to social and public health 
objectives, is the establishment of the High Level Group on Innovation and the Provision 
of Medicines (called “G10 Group”) on March 2001. The G10 Group presented its report 
in May 2002, setting out a framework of 14 wide-ranging recommendations87. Tracking 
these recommendations the Commission created the Pharmaceutical Forum88 in 2005, in 
order to take the process forward around three key themes: information to patients on 
pharmaceuticals, pricing policy and relative effectiveness. 
Surprisingly, both the G10 Medicines Group and the Working Group on pricing 
of the Pharmaceutical Forum suggested that such disparities in prices should not be 
regarded necessarily negatively: given that at present economies of Member States are 
too diverse to support a policy of uniform prices across Europe89. 
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86 As a matter of law, the Commission has the possibility to use Art. 95, in order to approximate national 
pharmaceutical legislation and remedy to market fragmentation. However, already from the Bangemann 
Three Round Tables that took place from 1996 it was clear that this choice was not feasible, because both the 
Members States and the industry were not in favour of this option. Also, the Commission itself feared that a 
‘European price’ would have diminished too much the contribution to R&D. See better Section 4.2 in 
Chapter III. 
87 See http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/phabiocom/g10home.htm. 
88 The Pharmaceutical Forum is a high-level ministerial platform for discussion between Member States, EU 
institutions, industry, healthcare professionals, patients and insurance funds. The Ministerial Forum is 
supported by a Steering Committee and three expert Working Groups, whose work is coordinated and 
supported by DG Enterprise. The website of the Pharmaceutical Forum is at 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/phabiocom/comp_pf_en.htm. 
89 This suggestion can be inferred from the minutes of the meetin of November 7-8, 2006, where it is 
affirmed that new medicines are launched at more or less similar prices all over Europe, without taking into 
account whether the price was aligned with the per capita wealth of the country. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/phabiocom/comp_pf_wg_min.htm. Similarly see HANCHER, The European 
Community Dimension: Coordinating Divergences, in MOSSIALOS ET AL., Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe, cit., 
p. 56, where he affirms that the G10 may mark a departure from the traditional approach of Community-led 
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4. Price controls and free movement of goods 
The ECJ has been called many times to decide upon the validity according to 
European law of the cost containment measures adopted by several Member States in 
the pharmaceutical field. In particular, the compliance of drug price controls with Article 
34 TFEU has been questioned several times. 
In application of the wording of Article 3 TEU, which sets the establishment of 
the internal market as one of the main goals of the European Union90, this provision 
prohibits quantitative restrictions to free movement of goods and measures having 
equivalent effect. 
While the notion of ‘quantitative restrictions’ has been easily defined by the 
ECJ91, the notion and the scope of ‘measures having an equivalent effect to quantitative 
restrictions’ proved to be more difficult to interpret and required some refinement. 
The Court first interpreted it as capturing national measures capable of hindering 
trade “directly or indirectly, actually or potentially” (the so called ‘Dassonville 
formula’)92. 
This formula was used in Cassis de Dijon93 to tackle a national measure that 
prevented a product manufactured and marketed for the first time in another Member 
State to enter the domestic market because it did not correspond to the requirements of 
the latter. This was considered an obstacle to trade because it entailed a double burden 
for the imported product and indirectly discouraged intra-EU trade. In this way the 
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harmonization of national rules and regulations. The G10 recommends a preference for coordination of 
national results, not of the underlying rules themselves. 
90 The provision states that: ”The Community shall have as its task, by establishing a Common market… and by 
implementing the Common policies or activities referred to in Articles 3 and 3a, to promote throughout the Community 
a harmonious and balanced development of economic activities”. 
91 See ECJ, 12 July 1973, in case C-2/73 Geddo v Ente Nazionale Risi, para. 7, where the Court defined them as 
‘measures which amount to a total or partial restraint of, according to the circumstances, imports, exports or goods in 
transit’. 
92 See ECJ, 11 July 1974, in case C-8/74 Procureur du Roi v. Dassonville (hereinafter, ‘Dassonville’): the case 
concerned Scotch whisky imported from France to Belgium in 1970. Belgian law required a certificate of 
authenticity issued by British customs authorities, while France did not demand such certificate. Clearly, it 
was difficult to obtain the certificate for imports from a third party. Only direct importers were able, whilst 
parallel importers were not. See STEINER, Drawing the Line: Uses and Abuses of Article 30 EEC, in CMLR, 1992, 
no. 29, p. 768-771. 
93 See ECJ, 20 February 1979, in case C-120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
(‘Cassis de Dijon’). The case concerned a German rule setting a minimum alcohol content for fruit liqueurs. 
French ‘Cassis de Dijon’ liqueur did not meet this requirement and therefore its marketing was prohibited 
by the German authorities. The Court held that the German rule was a measure having equivalent to 
quantitative restriction within the meaning of Art. 28 EC. 
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Court created a presumption that a product lawfully produced and marketed in a 
Member State has to be admitted to the markets of all other Member States94. 
The Dassonville formula was initially interpreted very widely and only at a later 
stage the rule was further refined to cover those measures judged unreasonable. For 
instance, a national measure that concerns the intrinsic characteristics of a product (such 
as shape or composition), i.e. a product rule, is generally considered capable of 
hindering intra-EU trade. Thus, it automatically falls within Article 34 TFEU95. By 
contrast, when the national measure concerns selling arrangements, i.e. issues extrinsic 
to the product, it falls within the prohibition only if it discriminates against goods from 
other Member States96. 
The examination of the existing cases also illustrates that the enlargement of the 
scope of the free movement rules went hand in hand with the development of the 
doctrine of justification. In fact, building on the concept of ‘reasonable restraints’ 
elaborated in Dassonville, the ECJ in Cassis de Dijon created a category of ‘mandatory 
requirements’ that could be used to justify a national measure falling within the scope of 
Article 36 TFEU97. Subsequent case law, especially in the field of health, further refined 
the notion of ‘mandatory requirements’. 
The first relevant case where these issues were discussed in the context of 
pharmaceuticals was Roussel98 in 1983. The Netherlands had adopted in 1982 new rules 
in response to the substantial profits made by companies importing pharmaceuticals 
from low price countries and subsequently selling them in the Netherlands at higher 
prices with respect to those applied in sourcing markets. While the pre-1982 price 
system applied indistinctly to all pharmaceutical products, the new system of price 
controls applied only to imports. In particular, prices of imported products should have 
been priced maximum at a price equal to that applied in the exporting country where 
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94 See CRAIG and DE BÙRCA, EU Law, 1998, p. 569-570. 
95 See ECJ, 24 November 1993, in cases C-267 and 268/91 Criminal Proceedings against Bernard Keck and Daniel 
Mithouard. 
96 This distinction is very useful in this context, since pharmaceutical price controls are selling arrangements 
between the government and the pharmaceutical company, as it was held by the ECJ, 11 August 1995, C-
63/94 Belgapom v. ITM Belgium. See OLIVER, Some further Reflections on the Scope of Articles 28-30 (ex 36) EC, in 
CMLR, 1999, no. 36, p. 783, 794. 
97 See ECJ, 30 November 1995, in case C-55/94 Reinhard Gebhard v. Consiglio dell’Ordine degli Avvocati e 
Procuratori di Milano, where the Court spoke of ‘overriding requirements of general public interests’. 
98 See ECJ, 29 November 1983, in case C-181/82, Roussel Laboratoires B.V. and Ors v. État Nèerlandais. 
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they were coming from. In practice, the Dutch government was applying a dual pricing 
system, namely a price mechanism varying on the basis of the provenience of the drug99. 
The Court began its judgment by affirming that price controls applied to imports 
were not in principle contrary to free movement of goods100. However, it then noted that 
the Dutch legislation did not apply to domestic and imported products alike, but, on the 
contrary, it discriminated between them, rendering the sale of imported products more 
difficult. Thus, the Dutch system, being a measure of equivalent effect to a quantitative 
restriction, contravened Article 34 TFEU. 
The Court in this way clarified that national price controls were not in 
themselves contrary to the free movement of goods, unless they fixed prices at a level 
that rendered the sale of imports more difficult than it was for domestic products. 
Not only directly discriminatory systems, such as the Dutch one in issue, fell 
within the scope of Art. 28 EC, but so did price controls that discriminated in a more 
indirect manner. For example, the imposition of a single maximum price for both 
domestic and imported products could have a discriminatory effect, in particular if the 
maximum price was fixed at such a low level that imported products could not be 
profitably marketed at all. 
In Duphar101 the Court analysed a Dutch list of drugs that did not qualify for 
reimbursement out of social security due to excessive costs. In that occasion, the Court 
made it clear that, because of the special nature of the products, the blacklisting of drugs 
was governed by the same principles as price controls and that it was outside Article 34 
TFEU, as long as it was based on objective and verifiable criteria, and it was not 
discriminatory against imported products. But the Court affirmed that if there was 
discrimination, even a budgetary purpose could not justify the cost containment 
measures. 
Some years later, the ECJ faced again the issue of legitimacy of price controls for 
pharmaceuticals in the case Commission v. Belgium102. The Belgian government signed 
with pharmaceutical manufacturers and importers a system of program contracts. The 
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99 For a discussion of the effects of dual pricing see infra Section 5.1 of Chapter II. 
100 See Roussel at para. 17. 
101 See ECJ, 7 February 1984, in case C-238/82, Duphar BV and others v The Netherlands State. 
102  ECJ, 19 March 1991, Commission of the European Commission of the European Communities v. Kingdom of 
Belgium. 
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contract provided for specific commitments about the level of investments in R&D, of 
employment and of export to be maintained by the companies in exchange for the 
authorised reimbursement prices. The European Commission contested this system of 
program contract, because it constituted a measure having equivalent effect to a 
restriction of free movement of goods. The ECJ confirmed this view and held that such a 
system obviously put at disadvantage the importers, while Belgian companies would 
have benefit of higher reimbursement prices. 
This negative attitude towards discriminatory measures, however, was partially 
and indirectly overturned in Decker103, where the Court indicated that even if price 
controls fall within the scope of the prohibition, they might benefit from a justification. 
Luxembourg rules provided that medical treatment abroad would only be reimbursed if 
the competent social security institution has given prior authorisation. These rule were 
found to run against Article 34 TFEU, because they encouraged to buy products in 
Luxembourg rather than in other Member States. Nevertheless, the Court accepted that 
the rules might be justified by the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of 
the social security system. 
Altogether, it is clear from the line of the case law that differences between 
national health care systems are not considered as obstacles to the free movement of 
goods104. Provided that they were not discriminatory, the ECJ found various escamotages 
either to consider them out of the scope of Article 43 TFEU, or to justify them on the 
basis of public policy. 
True, the fact that the competence on health is set at a national level can be 
perhaps a valid reason to explain the willingness of the Court to leave intact national 
measures entailing price controls. Where Member States remain solely or primarily 
responsible, it is legitimate the discharging of such responsibility that may involve the 
adoption of measures that are restrictive of free movement. Given that such measures 
have an immediate, but intermediate, economic aim, but an ultimate public interest aim, 
it would be unreasonable to ask Member States to achieve it through means less 
restrictive of free movement, if the latter require massive public finance, such that 
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103 See ECJ, 28 April 1998, in case C-120/95 Decker v. Caisse de Maladie des Employés Privés, para. 36 and 39. 
104 See SNELL, Free Movement of Pharmaceutical Products: an Overdose of Cheap Drugs?, in EBLR, 2003, p. 508; 
KANAVOS, The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union in Light of European Court of Justice 
Rulings, in Pharmacoeconomics, 2000, no. 18(6), p. 523-532. 
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Member States would abandon the policy entirely. In sum, such policies are justified on 
the fact that these measures are strictly part of national economic policy105. 
Still, this clashes with the principle that restrictions to trade cannot be justified 
for purely economic reasons. 
Nevertheless, the Court solved this contradiction by indirectly allowing 
economic aims as justification either by interpreting narrowly the concept of restriction 
(like in Duphar106), or linking the economic aims with other public policy considerations 
(like in Evans Medical107, where the profitability of an undertaking was considered to be 
necessary for the achievement of a public interest, i.e. public health) or simply denying 
or ignoring the economic nature of the justifications (like in Decker108). 
One could argue that the EU legislative process could have removed the problem 
by repealing all the legislative disparities creating the price gaps. However, the history 
of the EU’s action in this respect proved to be a failure. Lacking Member States’ 
consensus on this point, the EU has not been able to undertake this task, nor in the 
past109 and neither today110. 
For this reason, the ECJ has built a case law that allows the Treaty to tolerate a 
patchwork of national measures controlling the pricing of pharmaceutical products. 
That is why the EU pharmaceutical market is currently experiencing a transition 
phase where the policy of price harmonisation is indirectly pursued through trade 
liberalisation, while keeping regulation at a national level. The differences in regulatory 
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105 Cf. SNELL, Economic Aims as Justifications for Restrictions on Free Movement, in SCHRAUWEN, Rule of Reason: 
Rethinking Another Classic of European Legal Doctrine, 2005, p. 49; OLIVER and JARVIS, Free Movement of Goods in 
the European Community, 2003, p. 193-204. 
106 The Dutch rules clearly amounted to a restriction in need of a justification, as the Advocate General 
Mancini affirmed. However, the Court did not follow his advice, probably in order to avoid going into the 
issue of justification and to safeguard the doctrine that economic grounds cannot act as justifications. 
107 See ECJ, 28 March 1995, in case C-324/93 The Queen v. Secretary of State for Home Department, ex parte Evans 
Medical Ltd and Macfarlan Smith Ltd., where the Court rules that the refusal to grant import licence of narcotic 
drugs could not be justified if the reason was simply the need to safeguard the survival of an undertaking, 
but the survival of the undertaking was necessary to ensure reliable medical supplies, justification would be 
available, subject to proportionality. 
108 See Decker, para. 39: “it cannot be excluded that the risk of seriously undermining the financial balance of the 
social security system may constitute an overriding reason in the general interest capable of justifying a barrier to free 
movement’. It should be noted that while in Duphar the need to preserve the financial balance lead to 
consider the national measure entirely out of the scope of Art. 34 TFEU, the same reason provided a 
justification to the restriction under Art. 36 TFEU in Decker. Cf. SNELL, Economic Aims as Justifications, cit., p. 
43-44  
109 See ARMSTRONG, Regulating the Free Movement of Goods: Institutions and Institutional Change, in SHAW and 
MORE, New Legal Dynamics of European Union, 1995, p. 578-580. 
110 See better infra Section 4.2 in Chapter III. 
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measures used by Member States to control pharmaceutical expenditures generate price 
gaps and the consequent possibility to arbitrage, or to parallel trade. 
 
5. What is parallel trade? 
In the literature, parallel trade emerges either because of the possibility for 
arbitrageurs to free ride on the investments of authorized distributors at various levels 
of the distribution chain111, or because of price differentials, i.e. as a consequence of 
currency exchange or international price discrimination practices from manufacturers112. 
In the pharmaceutical market parallel trade is the result of price differentials determined 
by manufacturers’ pricing policies, currency fluctuation, as well as governmental price 
controls. 
The price differential creates scope for parallel import, as long as shipping costs 
are lower than such price disparity. 
Parallel trade consists of the importation of legitimately produced goods into a 
country without the authorization of the trademark, copyright, or patent holder. 
In its Communication of 1998 the European Commission re-affirmed that 
pharmaceuticals are fully governed by the rules that oversee the functioning of the 

111 See LEXECON, The Economics of gray-market imports, 1985; BRANDER and KRUGMAN, A reciprocal dumping 
model of international trade, Journal of International Economics, 1983, no. 15, p. 313-321, where parallel trade 
flows occur profitably in both directions, contrary to what happens under the price discrimination-
hypothesis, where flow is always from low-price countries to high-price countries. 
112 Ex multis, see TARR, An Economic Analysis of Grey Market Import, mimeo, Federal Trade Commission, 
September 1985, who found that differentials in manufacturers’ prices to the United States versus their 
domestic markets exceeded plausible estimates of the differential marketing costs, thereby concluding that 
free riding was an important factor determining parallel trade only in some industries, like perfumes, while 
price discrimination was the main explaining factors in other sectors like German cars and Japanese 
cameras: HILKE, Free-trading or free-riding: an examination of the theories and available empirical evidence on grey 
market imports, in World Competition, 1988, no. 32, p. 75-91, who found that the fact that import prices in the 
destination currency were not reduced in the same proportion as the appreciation of that currency (so called 
‘incomplete pass-through’) was the most convincing explanation to emerging of parallel import; MAULEG 
and SCHWARTZ, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, and International Price Discrimination, Journal of 
International Economics, 1994, no. 37, p. 167-195, 174, recalling different cross-sectional comparisons on 
luxury cars, pharmaceuticals and books, acknowledges that in general, there is widespread evidence of 
international price discrimination from manufacturers; SCHUT and BERGEIJK, International Price 
Discrimination: The Pharmaceutical Industry, World Development, 1986, no. 14, p. 1141-1150. 
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internal market113, and subsequently in 2003 recalled that parallel trade as a legal form of 
trade among Members States114. 
The term derives from the fact that such a form of trade occurs ‘in parallel’ to 
manufacturers’ channel of distribution115, albeit within the same legal and regulatory 
framework ensuring patient safety.  
Parallel trade has developed more or less consistently in all sectors116. However, 
in the pharmaceutical market the economic driver of this business is particularly strong: 
indeed, price differentials for drugs may be significant, up to 30% and more. 
The flow of goods originally occurred from southern European countries to 
northern European countries, as Member States of the Mediterranean area applied direct 
cost containment policies that kept prices down, whereas northern countries always 
allowed free pricing. 
However, market analysis suggests that some of the traditional patterns are 
changing. Tougher recent cost-containment measures have been imposed in the 
traditional free markets of Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands and the UK, while some 
former low-price countries are introducing higher prices. This has somewhat reduced 
price gaps. 
Also, currency fluctuations, not only determine a cyclical widening of price gaps 
among countries, but also generates trade routes previously not existing or not enough 
profitable. For instance, the UK has always been an importing country, due to the high 
prices charged there. But under the present economic conditions, the Pound lost very 
much compared to Euro. As a result, the UK is starting exporting into Scandinavian 
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113 See Communication from the Commission on the single market in pharmaceuticals, COM(1998) 588, 
Brussels, 25.11.1988  
114 The Commission also underlined that these products are not identical but essentially similar to the 
products that have already received a marketing authorisation in the Member State of destination. See 
Communication from the Commission on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorizations have already been granted, COM(2003) 839 , Brussels, 30.12.2003. 
115 See WARWICK, Parallel Imports, 1993, p. 1, who defines parallel trade as having ‘two vital, distinguishing 
features. They are lawfully put on the market in the place of export, the foreign country. But, an owner of the 
intellectual property rights in the place of importation, the domestic country, opposes their importation (usually 
because the goods are sold in the two different countries at quite disparate prices) and, taking advantage of the lower 
price, some enterprising middleman buys stocks in the cheaper, foreign country and imports them into the dearer, 
domestic country. Hence, the imports may be described as being imported in ‘parallel’ to the authorized distribution 
network.’ 
116 See the International price comparisons. A survey of branded consumer goods in France, Germany, Sweden, the 
UK and the US, research report for the UK Department of Trade and Industry and the Swedish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs, 2001. 
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countries and into Germany. 
Thus, it is no longer possible to speak of traditional low-price and high-price 
countries, as the prices for specific products may be the exact opposite in certain cases. 
Parallel trade seems no longer to be a simple south-north route, or even a one-way flow, 
but instead many countries act as suppliers and importers at the same time, albeit for 
different products. 
Accordingly, price variation is becoming more and more diverse, and countries 
that historically were exporters are now also importers. This is the case, for example, 
with both France and Italy. Furthermore, the EU enlargement in 2004 contributed to the 
integration of new markets and the expansion of the concept of parallel import to the 
accessing countries (see infra). 
Parallel trade on pharmaceuticals started in ‘70s but it increased significantly 
with the maturing of the internal market. From the half of the ‘90s the share of parallel 
trade grew up to 7-17%, especially in countries like Denmark, Sweden, United Kingdom, 
Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
Graph 5: PT market share evolution along time in some importing Member States 
 
Source: IMS Health, EFPIA, and EAEPC. 
 
 54 
The UK market has one of the highest level of penetration among the four 
countries mentioned. In the years 2000–2002, the UK market for parallel imports was one 
of the largest in Europe and was worth around $1, 700 million, that is, about 15% market 
share and 14% of the National Health Service expenditures117. In 2003 parallel imports 
were estimated to account for 17% of the pharmacy market sales. After a period of 
stagnation in 2004, the business is now expanding again118. 
Likewise, the German market for parallel trade experienced a rapid growth. Over 
the period 1998-2003 the market shares of total pharmacy market sales increased from 
less than 2% to around 7%. In 2002, parallel imports penetration increased significantly, 
as legislation required pharmacists to source at least 5% of the sales from parallel 
imported products. In 2003 such percentage was incremented to 7%. In 2004 the 
reversion to 5% of the mandatory quota reduced parallel import market share again to 
around 5%. However, it increased again to around 8.5% by the end of 2006. The average 
market share for the 20 drugs with largest turnover is around one third. 
In the Netherlands, parallel imports reached about 13% of the market in 2006. 
In Denmark, the first approval for parallel import of a drug was given in 1990 
and since then marketing authorisation has been granted for 6-8, 000 products. Over the 
period 1998-2004 the share of total drug expenditures spent on parallel imported 
products has remained more or less constant at slightly above 12% of total sales of 
prescription and non-prescription drugs in the primary health care sector. The 
expenditures on parallel imported medicine in the hospital sector amounts to 2% of total 
expenditures on drugs in the hospital sector. 
The first parallel imported drug was available on the Swedish market in 1997. 
The parallel import increased rapidly also in Sweden. The market share of 1.9% in 1997 
increased to 6.1% in 1998. By 2000 the market share was 8.6% and reached 12.1% in 2006. 
Here below a graph illustrates the parallel trade market penetration for the year 
2007 in those European countries where imports mainly take place: 
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117 Data are even more significant in specific cases: Merck & Co. Inc. estimated that parallel imports for 
Timoptic (an anti-glaucoma) reached at that time 56% and for Renitec (a cardiovascular drug) 50% of the UK 
market sales. 
118 This is the outcome of market analysis performed by IMS Health, and presented at Management Forum, 
London, February 2006, by Janice Haigh. 
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Graph 6: Parallel trade market penetration in 2007 in importing countries 
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Source: EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Industry in Figures, 2008 
 
Germany is currently the top destination country for incoming parallel trade, 
with sales approaching €2 billion and 8% retail penetration, having overtaken the UK for 
the first time ever in 2007. According to IMS, parallel trade market penetration in 
Germany increased by 75% over the past three years whilst the UK has recorded a 14% 
decline119. 
One of the main drivers of German growth has been the switch from traders to 
speciality products. Though often categorised ‘hospital only’ in other European 
countries, these are retail market products in Germany due to the high number of office 
based specialists there. High price speciality products provide the best opportunity for 
importers to deliver the amount of saving (15% with respect to the original product) 
required by law, which allows parallel imported products to be preferred to an original 

119 I obtained this information from Mondher Toumi (IMS) at the SMi conference on Pharmaceutical Parallel 
Trade, in London, on February 2009. 
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product in the dispensing120, and for pharmacists to meet the mandatory quota (5% of 
sales) of parallel imported products to be dispensed most easily121. 
In the UK parallel trade experienced a slump for several reasons. 
First of all, patent expiries had a marked negative impact on parallel imports. 
Secondly, the price reduction renegotiated in 2005 within the Pharmaceutical 
Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme (hereinafter, the ‘PPRS’) scheme122 have 
reduced the scope for parallel trade, and this trend is going to be strengthened by the 
price reduction decided by the Department of Health123. As a result, exports from the UK 
into other countries, like the Scandinavian ones and Germany, grew. 
Thirdly, it has now become more expensive to source from the Eurozone due to a 
steadily weakening Pound (-20% against Euro in 2007). The only encouragement for the 
trade is that parallel imports remain popular with pharmacists, who see them as a way 
of recouping dispensing losses resulting from the government’s generic reimbursement 
pricing policy and the claw-back not taking into account lower wholesaler discounts 
after three major manufacturers switched to direct-to-pharmacy distribution124. 
The Netherlands has become Europe’s third largest parallel import market, 
recording a penetration of 15% (it’s been 13-18% throughout the past decade) and 2007 
growth of 10%. Discounts retained by pharmacists and vertical integration between the 
leading parallel trader, the largest wholesaler and the largest pharmacy chain, are the 
main drivers.  
Requirement on pharmacists to substitute the cheapest equivalent version has 
favoured parallel imports usage in Sweden and Denmark. Penetration of the retail 
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120 See fn 480 in Chapter III for an exhaustive description of the financial requirements mandated by law for 
parallel traded products dispensation in Germany. 
121 See better infra 3.1 of Chapter III. 
122 The PPRS is the Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme is described infra Section 1.1 in Chapter III. 
123 Provision is made for two separate price cuts (a price cut of 3.9% in February 2009 and a further price cut 
of 1.9% in January 2010) and the introduction of generic substitution in the NHS. It is intended that the 
initial price cut and the introduction of generic substitution will have the combined effect of reducing NHS 
expenditure on branded medicines by an average of 5% per annum over the lifetime of the scheme 
compared to expenditure on 31 December 2008 on products on the market on that day (with an additional 
1% price cut being applied from 1st January 2010). Date Price adjustment are established as following: 
February 2009: -3.9%; January 2010: -1.9%; January 2011: +0.1%; January 2012: +0.2%; January 2013: +0.2%. 
124 Direct-to-Pharmacy (hereinafter, ‘DTP’) distribution has been implemented firstly by Pfizer in the UK 
market in 2007. DTP schemes enable the manufacturer to control distribution of its products until the point 
of sale: in fact, the manufacturer does not sell its products to wholesalers any longer but to an agent, which 
supplies pharmacies against a fixed fee agreed on a contract. The DTP has been under the scrutiny of the 
OFT, which in April 2007 affirmed that no particular competition concerns were arising for the time being. 
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market in both countries is about 12%, with 9% growth in Sweden in 2007 and 4% in 
Denmark. In particular, changes in pharmacy remuneration are planned in Sweden 
alongside the abolition of Apoteket’s monopoly, with dispensing fees adjusted in line 
with the discounts that pharmacies are expected to obtain with purchases of parallel 
imported products. 
In Norway and Finland parallel imports are, instead, declining. 
Overall, in the period between June 2005 and June 2007 the turnover in all import 
markets increased of the 11.8%, reaching the level of 4600 million Euros. In 2007, parallel 
imports represent roughly the 9.1% of the sales in import markets and the 3.2% of the 
total pharmaceutical sales of the EU 27125. 
Contrary to a widespread belief, the 2004 EU enlargement has not caused a rise 
in parallel trade. The main reason behind this is related to the derogation to the rules of 
the internal market that prevents parallel exportation from the new countries provided 
by the Specific Mechanism126. However, the expiry of the derogation may not trigger a 
large rise in parallel trade, because – surprisingly – some new accession countries, like 
Poland, are experiencing quite high launch prices of new products, so that overall they 
are importing more than exporting. 
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125 See IMS Health, MIDAS at MAT/JUN/07. Germany, UK, Netherlands, Sweden, Norway, Finland, 
Denmark, Belgium, Austria are the considered countries. Values are at standard purchase price in importing 
markets. Transaction can be pharmacy sell-in or sell-out. 
126 When new countries where patent protection does not exist or is weaker to European standard, access the 
EU, there is a temporal interregnum (the so called ‘Specific Mechanism’) when parallel exports and imports 
towards the other Member States are not allowed. The Act of Accession of Spain and Portugal contained 
provisions that were temporarily freezing the provisions on free movement. According to Articles 42 and 
202 respectively of the Act of Accession of the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic to the 
European Communities, quantitative restrictions on imports and exports and any measures having 
equivalent effect were to be abolished on 1 January 1986 between the Community and Spain and Portugal. 
However, pursuant to Article 47 regarding Spain and Article 209 regarding Portugal, the entry into force of 
Article 36 TFEU was postponed for the patented products in the following terms: ‘Notwithstanding Article 42 
[Article 202], the holder, or his beneficiary, of a patent for a chemical or pharmaceutical product or a product relating to 
plant health, filed in a Member State at a time when a product patent could not be obtained in Spain [Portugal] for that 
product may rely upon the rights granted by that patent in order to prevent the import and marketing of that product 
in the present Member State or States where the product enjoys patent protection even if that product was put on the 
market in Spain [Portugal] for the first time by him or with his consent.’ The Act of Accession contained parallel 
provisions providing transitional provisions subject to the introduction of effective patent laws by those two 
Member States. Ten new countries joined the EU on 1 May 2004. Among these, eight countries (Czech 
Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Slovenia or Slovakia) did not previously have the 
same level of intellectual property protection as it could be found in the former EU-15. This was particularly 
the case with medicines. As such the Accession Treaties signed between the EU and each new country 
introduced the ‘Specific Mechanism’, effectively suspending the principle of the free movement goods in 
this sector to prevent parallel trade in pharmaceutical products that lack equivalent IPR protection. 
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5.1 The current regulatory environment 
Parallel distribution involves the transfer of genuine, original, branded products, 
authorised in accordance with EU legislation, marketed in one Member State (source 
country) to another Member State (destination country) by ‘exporting’ wholesalers and 
‘importing’ parallel distributors. The parallel distributed product is placed on the 
market in competition with an essentially similar product already marketed there at a 
higher price by or under licence from the owner of the brand’s intellectual property (the 
directly-distributed product).  
Such a transfer cannot take place without several specific authorisations and 
licences. Parallel trade is regulated at several levels:  
1. at the level of the exporting wholesaler (hereinafter, the ‘exporter’) to be 
authorised to store and distribute medicines; 
2. at the level of the parallel distributor (hereinafter, the ‘importer’) with respect 
to three aspects:  
a) wholesaling - authorisation to store and distribute medicines; 
b) manufacturing - activities of repackaging and re-labelling; 
c) individual products - marketing authorisation/EMEA parallel 
distribution notice (see below). 
The exporters are required to hold a pharmaceutical wholesaling authorisation 
issued (in accordance with Article 77 of the Human Use Directive) by the competent 
authority in the Member State in which they are located. In accordance with the 
wholesaling authorisation, the exporters are obliged to follow Good Distribution 
Practice (hereinafter, ‘GDP’) guidelines pursuant Article 84 of the mentioned Directive, 
to employ a Responsible Person (hereinafter, ‘RP’) and are subject to periodic inspection 
by the competent authority. Separate and additional authorisation must be obtained 
from the relevant competent authority in order to handle and distribute controlled 
drugs. 
Medicines, when parallel distributed, are subject to a second process of approval: 
the first time when the manufacturer applies for the marketing authorisation in the 
originating Member State; subsequently a second regulatory assessment takes place 
before the distribution in parallel can start. It follows that the parallel distributors in the 
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country of destination need to have in the first place a marketing authorisation (or 
licence) to be able to commercialise imported products. However, the type of licence 
needed depends on the adopted approval process. 
If the directly distributed product has been subject to the national approval 
process, pursuant the Human Use Directive, then the parallel distributor must obtain a 
parallel import marketing authorisation from the same competent authority for the 
product to be distributed in parallel. Together with any applicable fee, the applicant 
must indicate the source country and the product’s marketing authorisation number 
there. The competent authority then conducts checks, in conjunction with the competent 
authority in the source country, to assure itself that there are no differences of 
therapeutic significance from the directly-distributed product covered by a full 
marketing authorisation in the country of destination. The general principles to be 
considered by national competent authorities when granting simplified marketing 
authorisations for parallel-distributed products were first outlined in a 1982 
Communication from the European Commission127. 
If the directly distributed product has been approved centrally by the European 
Commission, following a positive opinion from the EMEA and in accordance with EC 
Regulation no. 726/2004128, then no further regulatory approval is necessary as the 
product on the market is, by definition, authorised and identical in every Member State. 
However, a linguistic compliance check on the pack labelling and patient package leaflet 
of the parallel-distributed product by the EMEA is required in accordance with Article 
57.1(o) of Title IV of the Regulation, resulting in the issue of a Parallel Distribution 
Notice. 
In accordance with Article 76(3) of Directive 27/2004/EC, importers are required 
to notify the full marketing authorisation holder and the competent authority in the 
Member State of destination of their intention to parallel distribute a product. In 
addition, under trademark law, the importer must also notify the trademark owner. 
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127 See Commission Communication on parallel imports of proprietary medicinal products for which 
marketing authorizations have already been granted, 30.12.2003, COM(2003) 839 final, p. 5. 
128 It is the Reg. (EC) No 726/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 31 March 2004 laying 
down Community procedures for the authorization and supervision of medicinal products for human and 
veterinary use and establishing a European Medicines Agency. 
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Moreover, importers also have to adapt the packaging/labelling of every 
incoming batch to access the local market, in accordance with the marketing 
authorisation, national law and decisions of the ECJ129. To this effect, they need a 
manufacturing authorisation130 issued by the competent authority in the country of 
operation. Holders of manufacturing authorisations are obliged to follow GMP 
guidelines, to employ a Qualified Person and are subject to periodic inspection by the 
competent authority. The Qualified Person (hereinafter, ‘QP’) has to be a person who has 
received the relevant education and training (in accordance with Article 48 of the 
Directive 27/2004/EC), usually a pharmacist with industry experience, or a chemist, 
with responsibility to personally ensure that a quality system is implemented and 
maintained. 
If a parallel distributor does not repack or re-label goods in his own facility, he 
will have to subcontract these processes to an authorised re-packer, who will have to 
demonstrate that he is in possession of a manufacturing authorisation and operates 
under GMP conditions. In these cases, all legal and technical requirements that must be 
observed by the parallel importer/distributor will be laid down in a technical agreement 
between him and the re-packer. This ensures full compliance with all legal and technical 
requirements under GMP. 
 
6. The definition of the relevant market for pharmaceuticals 
The presence of price controls has a significant impact also in the way the 
relevant market for pharmaceuticals is defined in competition cases. In parallel trade 
cases this task involves specific interpretative issues that are going to be analysed in this 
final Section. 
In order to perform this analysis, I will first introduce some basic notions in 
relation to the tools used to define the relevant market in competition cases. Such 
notions are going to be later on applied to the pharmaceutical market, and specifically in 
parallel trade cases. 
6.1. The definition of the relevant market 
As it be will illustrated in Chapter II, strategies intended to hinder or prevent 
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129 See infra Section 3.1 in Chapter II. 
130 In UK the licence for repacking/re-labelling is called a ‘manufacturers (assembly only)’ licence. 
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parallel trade may fall under the scope of Article 102 TFEU, if put in place by dominant 
companies131. 
A prerequisite for any assessment of unilateral conducts under the mentioned 
provision is the identification of the relevant market on which the undertaking may 
have a dominant position132. The concept of relevant market is, in fact, functional to the 
objective of preventing the creation or the reinforcement of a dominant position that 
may impede effective competition in a substantial part of the common market133. 
For this reason, the operation of the definition of the relevant market serves the 
purpose of establishing the boundaries of the competitive constraints that the 
undertakings face, in order to ascertain whether they are capable of disciplining their 
behaviour134. 
In Continental Can, in fact, the ECJ said: “… the definition of the relevant market is of 
essential significance, for the possibilities of competition can only be judged in relation to those 
characteristics of the products in question by virtue of which those products are particularly apt 
to satisfy an inelastic need and are only to a limited extent interchangeable with other 
products.”135 
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131 See KOENIG and ENGELMANN, Parallel Trade Restrictions in the Pharmaceutical Sector on the Test Stand of Art. 
82 EC: Commentary on the Opinion of Advocate general Jacobs in the Case Syfait/GlaxoSmithKline, in ECLR, 2005, 
p. 338; VAN KERCKHOVE, Parallel trade in pharmaceutical products following the ECJ’s Bayer judgement: Can a case 
be made under Article 82 EC?, in The European Antitrust Review, 2005. 
132 Under European case law, a dominant position is a “position of economic strength enabling to behave to an 
appreciable extent independently of competitors, customers and ultimately of consumers”. See ECJ, 13 February 
1979, in case C-85/76 Hoffman-La Roche & Co. AG v. Commission, para. 38. Community Courts and the 
Commission have interpreted this definition for long time in a rather formalistic way. The first criterion 
used by the Commission to assess dominance is, in fact, the market share of the undertaking in a given 
market, followed by other factors such as entry barriers, customers’ capacity to react, etc. See the EC 
Commission notice on the definition of the relevant market, of 9 December 1997 (hereinafter the ‘Commission’s 
notice on market definition’), para. 10. Note also that Community approach to dominance does not match the 
concept of market power referred by economic theory. The latter is the ability of an undertaking to set prices 
above marginal costs, measured by the Lerner index Pm-Pc/P. Such index is based on the inverse of the 
demand elasticity and it indicates the profit-maximizing price for a monopolist. See LERNER, The concept of 
monopoly and the measurement of monopoly power, in Review of Economic Studies, 1993, no. I, p. 157; LANDES and 
POSNER, Market power in antitrust cases, in Harvard Law Review, 1981, no. 94, p. 937. 
133 See Commission’s notice on market definition, para. 2. The Director’s Guideline on Market Definition 
OFT 403, March 1999, para. 1.5, follows the same approach: “Market definition is not an end in itself, but rather a 
step which helps in the process of determining whether undertakings possess, or will possess, market power”. See also 
PITOFSKY, New Definitions of relevant Market and the Assault on Antitrust, in Colum. L. Rev., 1990, no. 90, p. 1805, 
at 1806-1807, where the author acknowledges that the definition of the relevant market is the most 
important, and often the most difficult, issues in enforcement actions. 
134 See LUTZ and STIROH, The Relevant Market in Intellectual Property/Antitrust Litigation, in 658 Practising Law 
Institute – Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Property Course Handbook Series, 2001, p. 75, at 86. 
135 See ECJ, in case C-7/62 Continental Can v. Commission, para. 32, where the ECJ quashed the Commission’s 
decision, because it failed to define the relevant product market. 
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In general, the market analysis focuses on two dimensions of the relevant market: 
the product and the geographic market. 
The former has been described as “the market for all the products and/or services in 
question which are regarded as interchangeable, or substitutable, by the consumer by reason of 
their use, price and characteristics”136. 
Therefore, the exercise of the product market definition consists of identifying 
effective alternative sources of supply for the consumer. 
In Hoffman-La Roche, the ECJ held: “The concept of the relevant market in fact implies 
that there can be effective competition between the products which form part of it and this 
presupposes that there is a sufficient degree of interchangeability between all the products 
forming part of the same market in so far as a specific use of such products is concerned”.137 
A first step that helps in limiting the field of investigation of possible substitutes 
is the analysis of the product characteristics and its intended use. 
However, functional interchangeability and similarity in characteristics are 
insufficient to know whether two products are demand substitutes, because the 
responsiveness of customers to changes in price may be determined by other 
considerations as well. Stated differently, differences in product characteristics are not in 
themselves sufficient to exclude demand substitutability, since this depends on how 
customers value different characteristics138. 
Following the developments in the jurisprudence along this trend139, the 
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136 See the Commission’s notice on relevant market, para. 7. 
137 See Hoffman-La Roche, para. 28. 
138 Products’ characteristics was the only criterion guiding the definition of the relevant market in United 
Brands, where the ECJ at para. 22 held that bananas constituted alone a market because of the “special features 
distinguishing it from other fruits that it is only to a limited extent interchangeable with them and is only exposed to 
their competition in a way that is hardly perceptible”. 
139 See GC, in case T-83/91, Tetra Pack v. Commission, para. 63: “… the definition of the market in the relevant 
products must take account of the overall economic context, so as to be able to assess the actual economic power of the 
undertaking in question. […] it is necessary first to define the products which, although not capable of being 
substituted for other products, are sufficiently interchangeable with its products, not only in terms of the objective 
characteristics of those products, by virtue of which they are particularly suitable for satisfying constant needs, but also 
in terms of the competitive conditions and the structure of supply and demand on the market.” See also GC, in case 
T-504/93, Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission, para. 84: “According to settled case law, for the purposes of applying 
Article [82] of the Treaty, the relevant product or service market includes products or services which are substitutable 
or sufficiently interchangeable with the product or service in question, not only in terms of their objective 
characteristics, by virtue of which they are particularly suitable for satisfying the constant needs of consumers, but also 
in terms of the conditions of competition and/or the structure of supply and demand on the market in question”. 
Similarly, ECJ, in case C.31/80 L’Oreal, para. 25; ECJ, in case C-322/81 Michelin v Commission, para. 37; ECJ, 
in case C-62/86 AKZO Chemie v Commission, para. 51; GC in case T-30/89 Hilti v Commission, para. 64, and in 
case T-83/91 Tetra Pak v Commission, para. 63. 
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Commission notice on market definition has rendered the analysis of substitution more 
flexible and enriched it with criteria other than physical identity of products. For 
instance, substitution may not be symmetrical: a mid-quality product does not 
necessarily compete with a more sophisticated product. Nevertheless, the existence of 
the latter may exert pressure on the price of the mid-quality product, as consumers may 
switch to the superior product for certain levels of price140. 
A comprehensive analysis of the demand’s side possibility of substitution, hence, 
has to take into account the economic context, including the objective characteristics of 
the product and the degree of inter-changeability between the products, having regard 
to their relative prices and intended use; but also consumers’ preferences, consumption 
patterns, the competitive conditions (like barriers to entry, switching costs, network 
effects, etc.), the structure of supply and demand, the existence of consumers groups that 
facilitate price discrimination141. 
However, this checklist is neither fixed, nor exhaustive, nor is every element 
mentioned in the case law necessarily mandatory in every case. Each case will depend 
on its own facts, and it is necessary to examine the particular circumstances in order to 
establish whether the supposed dominant product competes with others and to what 
extent the latter exert a competitive constraint on the former, and consequently on the 
conduct of the allegedly dominant firm. 
6.1.1. The product market and the SSNIP test 
The competitive constraint to which a given good may be subject to is generally 
considered threefold and consists of demand substitutability, supply substitutability and 
potential competition142. 
The main theoretical instrument to find alternative sources of supply from the 
consumers’ perspective is the hypothetical price increase test, based on the assumption 
that consumers’ reaction to a change in price signals the presence of suitable alternatives 
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140 See BRUZZONE, L’individuazione del mercato rilevante nella tutela della concorrenza, 1995. 
141 See BELLAMY and CHILD, European Community Law of Competition, 2001, para. 9-011 until 9-064; FAULL and 
NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition, 1999, chapter 1; WISH, Competition Law, 2003; Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 28; 
ECJ, 14 February 1978, in case C-27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 30 et seq.; ECJ, 9 November 1983, in case C-322/81, 
Nederlandsche Baden – Industrie Michelin v Commission, (Michelin I), para. 37. Finally see the decision of the 
Commission of the 18 July 1988, in case No. IV/30.178 Napier Brown-British Sugar. 
142 See Commission’s notice on market definition, para. 13. 
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(the so-called ‘SSNIP test’, acronym for Small but Significant and Non-transitory 
Increase in Price)143. 
This test consists of a mental experiment, postulating a hypothetical small (in the 
range of 5 % to 10 %) but permanent change in prices and evaluating the reaction of 
consumers to it. The question to be answered is whether they would switch to other 
substitute products, i.e. whether the increase in price is profitable or not. If substitution 
were enough to make the price increase unprofitable because of the resulting loss of 
sales, additional substitutes and areas are included in the relevant market. 
In other words, starting from the type of products that the undertakings involved 
sell, additional products will be included in, or excluded from, the market definition, 
depending on whether competition from these other products and areas affect or 
restrain sufficiently the pricing of the parties’ products in the short term. The relevant 
market therefore consists of a basket of goods and/or services that are considered 
substitutes by consumers. Such a basket is considered “worth monopolizing” provided 
that the undertaking could profitably increase its price without its customers turning 
away and choosing other goods and services from other suppliers144 145. 
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143 The original concept founding the SSNIP test probably has been proposed first in 1959 by economist 
Morris Adelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. See ADELMAN, Economic Aspects of the 
Bethlehem Opinion, in Virginia Law Review, 1959, no. 45, p. 686. Several other researchers formulated, 
apparently independently, similar conceptual approaches during the 1970s. See WERDEN, The 1982 Merger 
Guidelines and the Ascent of the Hypothetical Monopolist Paradigm, in Antitrust Law Review, 2003, no. 71, pp. 253-
269. The SSNIP approach was then implemented in three antitrust cases: in a 1972 Justice Department 
attempt to enjoin the merger of Associated Brewing Co. and G. W. Heileman Co., in 1975 during hearings on the 
U.S. government’s monopolization case against IBM, and in a 1981 proceeding precipitated by Marathon Oil 
Company’s effort to avert takeover by Mobil Oil Corporation. In 1982 the U.S. Department of Justice Merger 
Guidelines introduced the SSNIP test as a new method for defining markets and for measuring market 
power directly. In EU law it was used for the first time by the Commission Decision 92/553/EEC of 22 July 
1992 related to the proceeding No. 4064/89 (Case No IV/M.190 - Nestlé/Perrier) and has been officially 
recognised by the European Commission in its notice on Relevant Market. 
144 The test has been for the first time applied in the Tetra Pak I case, where the Court found the two types of 
milk, apparently perfectly substitutable, were instead in different relevant markets. Such rigidity in the 
determining substitution between products has been tempered in Hoffman-La Roche and Michelin. 
145 A relevant problem with the application of this test is the so-called “cellophane fallacy”. The test uses 
competitive price as benchmark, and if the undertaking is already charging monopoly prices, any further 
increase in price looks unprofitable. In this case, the SSNIP test is likely to fail in correctly assessing the 
relevant market. The cellophane fallacy arises from the fact that economic theory predicts that any profit-
maximizing firm sets its prices at a level where demand for its product is elastic. Therefore, when a 
monopolist sets its prices at a monopoly level it may happen that two products appear to be close 
substitutes whereas at competitive prices they are not. This may cause a too broad definition of the relevant 
market, including products that are not substitutes. The cellophane fallacy takes its name from the well-
known case United States v E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., No. 5 Supreme Court of the United States, 351 US 
377 of 11 June 1956. In this case, Du Pont (a cellophane producer) argued that cellophane was not a separate 
relevant market since it competed with flexible packaging materials such as aluminum foil, wax paper and 
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This ‘thought experiment’ can be implemented through the use of several 
methodologies that help the understanding of buyer substitution patterns. 
First of all, past buyer responses can be very informative. This data can, for 
instance, be inferred by interviewing consumers about their buying decisions. 
Interviewing executives may be instructive too, given their knowledge of rivals’ 
strategies. 
Econometric and statistical estimates of cross-price elasticities for the demand of 
a product, the examination of price movements over time, and the analysis of causality 
between price series and similarity of price levels and/or their convergence, are useful 
tools to determine the degree of substitutability among products146. 
Supply-side substitutability is also taken into account when defining the relevant 
market. This criterion looks at whether suppliers are able to switch production to the 
relevant products in the short term without incurring significant additional costs or risks 
in response to small and permanent changes in prices. If such switch takes place, the 
additional production that is put on the market will have a disciplinary effect on the 
competitive behaviour of the dominant undertaking147.The third source of competitive 
constraint, potential competition, is not taken into account by the Commission when 
defining the relevant market, since conditions under which potential competition 
actually displays an effective competitive constraint occur only when entry is favoured. 
But this element is generally part of the analysis on dominance148. 
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polyethylene. The problem was that Du Pont, being the sole producer of cellophane, had set prices at the 
monopoly level, and it was at this level that consumers viewed those other products as substitutes. Instead, 
at the competitive level, consumers viewed cellophane as a unique relevant market (a small but significant 
increase in prices would not have them switching to goods like wax or the others). In the case, the US 
Supreme Court failed to recognize that high own-price elasticity might mean that a firm is already 
exercising monopoly power. 
146 See BAKER and BRESNAHAN, Economic Evidence in Antitrust; Defining Markets and Measuring Market Power, 
Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 328, 2006 available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=931225; BAKER and RUBINFELD, Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and 
Critique, in American Law & Economics Review, 1999, no. 1, p. 424-427. 
147 See the Commission notice on relevant market, para. 20.  
148 See the Commission notice on relevant market, para. 24. If required, this analysis is only carried out at a 
subsequent stage, in general once the position of the companies involved in the relevant market has already 
been ascertained, and when such position gives rise to concerns from a competition point of view. Cf. 
WHISH, Competition Law, 2003, p. 25, where he affirms that the definition of the relevant market is based only 
on the constraints coming from actual competitors. 
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6.1.2. The geographic relevant market 
The geographic relevant market has been defined as ‘the area in which the 
undertakings concerned are involved in the supply and demand of products or services, in which 
the conditions of competition are sufficiently homogeneous and which can be distinguished from 
neighbouring areas because the conditions of competition are appreciably different in those 
area’149. 
What matters, therefore, is the possibility for consumers to have an alternative 
source of supply of a given product located elsewhere within the same territory150. 
The Commission’s approach to geographic market definition starts from the 
overview of the distribution of market shares of the undertaking(s) and their 
competitors, and continues with the analysis of price differences at national and EU 
level. This should give a preliminary view of the weight that the undertakings enjoy 
both in their domestic markets and abroad. Then the examination of national or local 
preferences, current patterns of purchases of customers, product differentiation/brands 
will serve the purpose of establishing whether other companies in other areas constitute 
a real alternative source of supply for consumers, and in this way determining whether 
the working hypothesis is consistent with the finding of national or regional geographic 
markets.  
Also, it is very important to determine the geographical distribution of trade 
flows, in order to ascertain whether the price policy applied in a certain area is 
influenced by the policy applied in a neighbouring area151. 
Finally, obstacles and additional costs, like expedition costs, labour and raw 
material costs, difficult access to the distribution chain and differences in the legal 
system, are relevant to determine the easiness for consumers to reach another 
geographical area where consumers can purchase the same good. The presence of chains 
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149 See the Commission Notice on Relevant Market, para. 8. 
150 See FRIGNANI, Abuso di posizione dominante, in Diritto Antitrust italiano, ed. FRIGNANI, PARDOLESI, PATRONI 
GRIFFI, and UBERTAZZI, 1993, p. 332. 
151 The absence of imports does not necessarily signal the presence of to distinct markets, since the threat of 
potential coming from abroad disciplines domestic manufacturers’s behaviour. See BRUZZONE, 
L’individuazione del mercato rilevante, cit., p. 40. 
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of distribution that link distant areas to the same market can, conversely, facilitate the 
possibility for consumers to find an alternative supplier152. 
6.2 The definition of the relevant market in the pharmaceutical sector 
6.2.1 The limits of the SSNIP test 
It is acknowledged both in the economic and legal literature that defining the 
relevant market in the pharmaceutical industry is not straightforward153. 
First of all, the analysis of the characteristics of the products is not conducive to 
any result, because products with the same pharmaceutical form are often destined to 
target different diseases. At the same time, there exist medicines of different forms that 
are therapeutically equivalent. It follows then that the market analysis should focus on 
the intended use of the products rather then on their physical characteristics. 
Secondly, most of the assumptions that underline the SSNIP test do not hold, due 
to the particularity of the market mechanisms characterizing drug price formation and 
consumer choice. 
As previously explained, patients are to a large extent insensitive to price, 
because the financial resources for their pharmaceutical expenditures does not come out 
of their pockets but they are provided either by the national health care system, or by 
private insurance, or by both. 
Not only consumers do not pay the drugs they consume, but also they do not 
choose them, as they have to rely on the therapy prescribed by physicians on the basis of 
the anamnesis made. In other words, prescribing doctors are the main determinant of 
demand in pharmaceutical prescription markets. The latter, as already indicated, is a 
derived demand generated by the interaction of different stakeholders in a pluralistic 
decision-making process. 
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152 For instance, in the retail markets the distribution of the population is such that, even if consumers 
purchase their products from a given area, the latter can compete with other that are geographically distant 
and may seem to far to reach. See, for instance, the Commission decision in the case No. IV/M.0026 Cargill-
Unilever, of 29 December 1990, related to the distribution and sale of agricultural products where the 
geographic relevant market was defined as corresponding to the entire UK. 
153 See MORSE, Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, in Antitrust L.J., 2003, no. 71, p. 633; 
COSCELLI and OVERD, Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Sector, in ECLR, 2007, no. 25(3), p. 294- See also 
the Indagine Conoscitiva nel settore farmaceutico performed by the Italian antitrust authority in 1997, available 
at 
http://www.agcm.it/agcm_ita/DSAP/DSAP_IC.NSF/0/3a250fe3093bed4ac12564c3004594a7/$FILE/Ic14.
pdf. 
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Actual trends in the consumption of medicines prescribed therefore constitute 
important indicia of the degree of substitutability among medicines. Still, the assessment 
of the competitive constraints between categories of medicines cannot be based on price. 
In fact, there is usually very limited price sensitivity on the part of the physicians, too154. 
And albeit cost containment measures on physicians are increasingly playing an 
important role in the choice of the therapy, the decision process is more often dominated 
by considerations about the effectiveness and the appropriateness of the therapy in 
relation to physical characteristics of patients. This may cause some inertia in doctors’ 
prescribing behaviours, which often tend to crystallize after a certain period of time. 
Such limits are exacerbated by the fact that pharmaceutical companies do not 
normally compete on price but resort to other means to gain larger market share: 
detailing activity to doctors, advertising in medical journals, funding of clinical studies, 
mailing doctors, general marketing, diversifying pharmaceutical forms and widening 
the indications for which a product can be prescribed. 
These features explain the presence of low cross price elasticities among branded 
products and undermine any attempt to apply the SSNIP test in a traditional manner to 
a given pharmaceutical product. 
From the supply side, the analysis of the possibility of alternative supplies is not 
easier. In fact, the pharmaceutical industry is sometimes characterized by many market 
segments of small dimension, especially for highly specialized products that treat 
particular diseases only. The high level of investment necessary to discover, develop and 
commercialize these products may constitute a powerful barrier to entry for competitors. 
In this case, the possibilities of substitution for patients who suffer of a given illness are 
reduced to zero. 
In light of these remarks, it appears that the traditional principles that guide 
market analysis under European competition law may not be suitable for antitrust 
analysis in the pharmaceutical sector, as they may not provide any useful insight about 
competitive dynamics. This does not mean that market definition in the pharmaceutical 
industry should be different from that in other industries. Notwithstanding the 
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154 The trial court in SmithKline Corp. v. Ely Lilly & Co., 427 F. Supp. 1089, 1117, affirmed that price has little to 
do with physicians prescribing practices. 
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ambiguous opinions of Courts at this regard155, it seems that the same rules should 
apply, but they should be adapted to the features that characterise the industry156. 
Notably, in US the Federal Trade Commission (hereinafter the ‘FTC’) applies the 
substitutability principles and the SSNIP test, with a certain dose of flexibility that leaves 
some scholars with the impression of lack of transparency in the procedure157. 
This method has led to find disparate product market definitions for prescription 
drugs, ranging from narrow markets including a single chemical compound in non-
merger cases158, to broader markets including various drugs having the same 
mechanism of action159, and to even wider products markets that consider all the drugs 
that cure a particular disease, generally in merger cases160. 
6.2.2 The criteria used by the antitrust authorities in EU and in US 
Both the FTC and the European Commission usually distinguish among 
prescription pharmaceuticals, OTC products and ‘pipeline products’, i.e. products that 
are not yet in the market but that are at an advanced stage of development, that is to say 
at Phase II or III of clinical trials. 
Normally OTCs are considered together with branded products, but in some 
cases, the FTC alleged OTC markets only161. In other cases, both the FTC and the 
Commission considered together marketed drugs and pipeline products, alleging 
‘innovation markets’162. 
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155 See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 1956, 351 U.S. 377 supporting the view the usual 
principles apply also to the pharmaceutical market. Contra see In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litig., 2001, 200 
F.R.D. 297. 
156 See MORSE, Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, cit., p. 676. 
157 See MORSE, Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, cit., p. 633. 
158 For instance, the FTC used the dosage form, the dosage frequency or the dosage strength of products to 
narrow markets. See e.g. Baxter Inc. & Wyeth, FTC Docket No. C-4068, 3 February 2003, available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/12/Baxter_wyethcomplaint.pdf; GlaxoWellcome plc & SmithKline Beecham plc, FTC 
Docket No. C-3990, 26 January 2001, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/glaxosmithklinecmp.pdf. 
159 See Amgen Inc. & Immunex Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4053, 3 September 2002 available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2002/07/amgencomplaint.pdf. 
160 See Pfizer Inc. & Pharmacia Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4075, 27 May 2003 available at www. 
ftc.gov/os/2003/04/pfizercmp.pdf. The FTC in that case alleged a market of ‘research and development, 
and the manufacturing and sale of prescription drugs or the treatment of Erectile Dysfunction’. 
161 See Pfizer Inc. & Pharmacia Corp.  
162 See GLADER, Innovation markets and competition analysis, 2006, p. 114. Notwithstanding the scepticism of 
some scholars to the use of ‘innovation markets’ in antitrust, still the latter appear to be very important in 
market analysis for pharmaceuticals. The industry is, in fact, characterized by a continuous and intense R&D 
activity. For this reason, especially in merger cases, the examination of future products that are present in 
the pipeline plays a key role in determining the relevant market. See MORSE, The Limits of Innovation Markets, 
ABA, Antitrust and Intellectual Property Newsletter, 2001, p. 22-35, available at 
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In Europe, each of these three mentioned segments is subsequently divided into 
groups that present similarity in therapeutic indications and clinical effects through the 
WHO Anatomical Therapeutic Chemical Classification system (hereinafter, the ‘ATC’)163 
for market definition purposes. The ATC groups pharmaceutical products according to 
the organ or system in which they act and their chemical, pharmacological and 
therapeutic properties164. The ATC system differentiates between five different levels, 
starting with the anatomical group, followed by the therapeutic group and three 
subgroups. 
According to this taxonomy there are 14 anatomical groups, 92 therapeutic 
groups, 222 therapeutic subgroups, 560 chemical/therapeutic groups and 1597 chemical 
subgroups. 
The first and the second level identify the system (digestive, nervous, etc.) 
targeted by the medicine and the type of drug (anaesthetic, anti-asthmatic, etc.) 
respectively. These levels are generally considered not enough to find substitute 
products from the demand side, because the first one identifies the anatomical part of 
the human body affected by the disease, while the second one groups medicines that 
have different therapeutic uses. 
That is why the European Commission, as well as national authorities and 
Courts, mainly use the third level of the ATC to establish a market definition. The ATC 3 
is the therapeutic/pharmacological sub-group. Therefore, it groups medicines with the 
same therapeutic properties for a given disease or family of diseases. In other words, the 
ATC 3 indicates the intended use of a given product.165 
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www.abanet.org/antitrust/mo/premium-at/ip/559817_2.pdf, who affirms that the use of innovation 
markets to challenge some mergers in US generated substantial controversy. See also GILBERT, Comments on 
the Use and Misuse of Innovation Market Analysis, en banc testimony before the Federal Trade Commission 
Hearings on Global and Innovation-Based Competition, Washington, D.C., October 25, 1995. 
163 The ATC classification has been drawn up by EphMRA (European Pharmaceutical Marketing Research 
Association). The second ATC level corresponds to therapeutic main groups, whereas the third ATC level 
reflects therapeutic/pharmacological subgroups. 
164 The ATC system was originally intended to provide a useful method of pharmaceutical product 
categorization for statistical, population-based analyses and evaluation of health policy. 
165 Note that the future products do not have an ATC collocation because they do not have a marketing 
authorisation yet. Therefore, the innovation markets are defined in relation to the intended use of the future 
products. See Commission Decision of 8 May 2000, Case COMP/M.1846 – Glaxo Wellcome/Smithkline 
Beecham, para. 198. For a detailed analysis of the case law and the criteria used by the European Commission 
and the FTC in defining innovation markets for merger cases see GLADER, Innovation Markets and Competition 
Analysis, cit., pp. 114-124 and pp. 208-213. 
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The clusters at the ATC 3 level form distinct market segments. And given the 
relatively low cross price elasticity of demand between them, products belonging to 
different therapeutic classes are commonly not considered to be substitutes, even though 
the pharmaceutical form is the same. 
However, this is not always the case, as there are products that belong to several 
clusters, since they can be used to cure more than one disease166. At the same time, all 
the products included in the same cluster are not always directly competing. Stated 
differently, it is not possible to rigidly isolate clusters, as sometimes the definition of the 
relevant market may require the aggregation of different clusters, or, on the contrary, 
further narrowing the ATC 3 down to the ATC 4 level (see better infra). 
6.2.3 The limits of the ATC for Article 102 TFEU cases 
There are a number of merger decisions on Article 101 TFEU cases in which the 
ATC classification has been used to discuss the market definition in the pharmaceutical 
sector167. But, so far, there is almost no case law on product market definition in the 
pharmaceutical sector under Article 102 TFEU168. 
It is suggested by several commentators that, given that the market analysis 
conducted for merger cases has a different objective from the analysis under Article 102 
TFEU, the use of the ATC classification may not be entirely appropriate169. 
First of all, in merger control cases the concern of the authorities is whether 
horizontal concentration will in the future lead to a reduction in the competitive 
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166 As MORSE, Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, cit., p. 639 notes, there are disease that 
can be treated with one product only, and there are other diseases that can be treated with various drugs 
that may compete among each other. On this last point see DI MASI, Price trends for Prescription 
Pharmaceuticals 1995-1999 prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Conference on 
Pharmaceutical Pricing Practices, Utilization and Costs, 8-9 August 2000, available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/health/reports/drug-papers/dimassi-final.htm. Alternative therapies may be 
chemically similar or very different, and may have the same mechanism of action and still be functionally 
similar. In this case, other factors like safety and efficacy profiles help in determining the degree of 
substitutability among them. 
167 See Commission Decision of 16 July 1996, Case IV/M.737 – Ciba-Geigy/Sandoz; Commission Decision of 27 
February 2003, Case COMP/M.2922 – Pfizer/Pharmacia; Commission Decision of 29 April 1993, Case 
IV/M.323 – Procordia/Erbamont; Commission Decision of 6 September 1994, Case IV/M.464 – BMSC/UPSA; 
Commission Decision of 13 September 1996, Case IV/M.781 – Schering/Gehe-Jenapharm; Commission 
Decision of 22 May 2000, Case COMP/M.1878 – Pfizer/Warner-Lambert. 
168 The Commission, in fact, ruled for the first time on this issue in the AstraZeneca case. See Commission 
decision of 15 June 2005, COMP/A. 37.507/F3 Ω AstraZeneca. 
169 See also the CAT in the Genzyme case, where the Tribunal held at para. 198 that neither the ATC 
classification, nor the Commission’s previous decisions applying that classification in merger cases, are 
determinative of the issue of market definition in Art. 102 TFEU cases. 
 72 
constraints on the merged entity. Enforcement actions aim at preventing the 
establishment of a dominant undertaking in the future, rather than controlling the 
behaviour of a dominant undertaking as such. Therefore, market definition in merger 
control consists in a dynamic analysis that combines current market information with a 
prognosis of the future development. In contrast, the market definition in an Article 102 
TFEU case aims at assessing the past and present effects of a specific corporate conduct. 
It is, therefore, a retrospective analysis of the market that is solely based on market 
information at the time of the anticompetitive behaviour and, thus, it is more stringent 
than the one in merger control cases170. 
Secondly, the application of the ATC in an Article 102 TFEU case may be too 
simplistic. Merger cases often involve a large number of products and the use of the 
ATC 3 level aims at verifying where overlaps between the two undertakings’ pipeline 
exist. That is why the Commission considers also future products: it investigates the 
competitive state of future markets, and then it studies the competitive situation with 
respect to products that have reached a level of development such that their competitive 
impact on the near-future market can be easily predicted171. In other words, the 
European Commission looks at where the pipelines may coincide in the product 
development, in order to foresee whether competition in the future product market will 
be lessened. In fact, such examination is generally aimed at maintaining a sufficient level 
of R&D competition after a merger. 
However, this approach is concerned with issues that have little relevance in 
Article 102 TFEU cases and, on the contrary, it overlooks other issues that may be 
determinant172. 
The use of the ATC alone does not always reflect on the substitutability of the 
pharmaceutical product with all aspects that a doctor takes into account when 
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170 See GLYNN, Article 82 EC and price discrimination in patented pharmaceuticals: the economics, in ECLR, 2005, p. 
135; MORSE, Product market definition in the pharmaceutical industry, cit., p. 633. 
171 See Case No. IV/M.072 – Sanofi/Sterling Drug (1991); Case No. IV/M.323 – Procordia/Erbamont (1993); Case 
No. IV/M.426 – Rhône-Poulenc/Cooper (1994); Case No. IV/M.457 – la Roche/Syntex (1994); Case No. 
IV/M.500 – AHP/Cyanamid (1994); Case No. IV/M.555 Glaxo/Wellcome (1995); Case No. IV/M. 495 - 
Behringwerke AG/Armour Dow Pharmaceutical Co. (1995); Case No. IV/M.587 – Hoechst/Marion Merell Dow 
(1995); Case No. IV/M. 631 Upjohn/Pharmacia (1995); Case No. IV/M. Hoffman LaRoche/Boehringer Mannheim 
(1997); Case No. IV/M. 1229 _ American Home Products/Monsanto (1999); Case No. IV/M. 1403 – AstraZeneca 
(1999); Case No. IV/M. 1378 – Hoechst/Rhône-Poulenc (1999). 
172 See PAUTKE and JONES, Competition Law Limitations for the Distribution of Pharmaceuticals – Rough Guide to 
the Brave World, in ECLR, 2005, no. 26(1), p. 27. 
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prescribing a product. As already underlined above, medicines belonging to the same 
class may not be substitutes. The replacement of a drug with another one depends on 
medical culture, gravity of the disease, and physical characteristics of patients. As the 
WHO notes, the “(…) assignment to different ATC groups does not mean difference in 
therapeutic effectiveness and assignment to the same ATC group does not indicate therapeutic 
equivalence.”173 
That is why the ATC 3 level alone might not be sufficient to define a market in 
Article 102 TFEU cases. 
Therefore, the question remains whether the method used to define the relevant 
market in a merger control procedure can be equally applied in an Article 102 TFEU 
case. 
The Commission itself acknowledged that the identification of the relevant 
therapeutic classification is just the opening of the market analysis174. In fact, it may be 
appropriate to carry out an analysis at other levels of the ATC system where the ATC 3 
does not reflect the reality of the market. 
In recent comments on the Bayer and the Glaxo cases, for instance, it is suggested 
that narrow market definitions may be used as a tool to help authorities investigate 
issues that could otherwise escape competition law provisions. This may mean that the 
ATC 3 level may become just the starting point of the analysis and that the latter may 
continue further to the ATC 4 level when the previous does not seem to be appropriate 
to define relevant markets175. Should demand factors require it, the relevant market 
could be narrowed even more and potentially arrive to be identified with a single 
brand176. 
Symmetrically, it may be the case that the ATC 3 is too limited and that other 
therapeutic groups of the same level need to be included in the relevant market, or that 
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173 See, for instance, the indications about the use and misuse of the ATC provided by the WHO, available at 
http://www.whocc.no/atcddd/. 
174 See para. 134 of the decisions taken by the European Commission adopted in the context of the 
Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89, where it affirmed that the ATC classification is only ‘starting point’ in the 
market analysis. 
175 See the Commission decision of 17 May 1999, in the case IV/M.1397 Sanofi-Synthelabo, where the 
Commission defined the relevant market for one of the products at the ATC 4 level. See also the case of the 
Italian competition authority n. 8916, 23 November 2000, procedimento I337 - Bracco-Byk Gulden Italia-
Farmades-Nycomed Amersham Sorin-Schering, where the authority started defining the market from the ATC 3 
level and then went further down to ATC 4 level. 
176 GYSELEN, Comments at the EU Pharmaceutical Forum, Brussels, May 2004. 
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medications in the same class belong to various markets. 
6.2.4 When pharmaceutical product markets are narrow 
The trend of defining relevant product markets more narrowly in non-mergers 
cases emerges from authorities’ practice and from the case law both in US and at 
national level within the EU. 
The FTC generally starts market analysis in merger cases with a presumption of 
narrow markets, limited to a specific therapeutic compound. And then it broadens the 
market as long as evidence shows that physicians and hospitals use other compounds as 
substitutes177. 
In non-merger cases, instead, the FTC has alleged very narrow prescription 
drugs markets limited to a single branded drug and its generic equivalent178 or even to 
generics only179. 
For instance, the FTC alleged separate markets for different dosage strength of 
the same generic hypertension drug, and excluded the branded equivalent (Adalat 
CC®), because the entry of a second generic at each dosage level caused a significant 
reduction in price for each single dosage of the first generic180. 
Notably, the claim of narrow relevant market has been extended to merger cases 
recently181: in that occasion, the FTC defined the market as the manufacture and sale of a 
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177 See BALTO and MONGOVEN, Antitrust Enforcement in Pharmaceutical Industry Mergers, in Food and Drugs L.J., 
1999, No. 54, p. 255, at 259. 
178 In Abbott Labs. & Geneva Pharm., Inc., FTC Docket Nos. C-3945, 3946, 22 May 2000, available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/05/c3945complaint.pdf, the FTC alleged a market of terazosin hydrochloride used 
principally to treat benign prostatic hyperplasia or enlarged prostate, bioequivalent to Abbott’s Hytrin. The 
FTC alleged that other drugs are not effective substitutes because they are different in terms of chemical 
compound, safety, efficacy and side effects, as well as in terms of price sensitivity from consumers. In 
Hoechst Marion Roussel Inc. & Andrx Corp., FTC Docket o. 9293, 16 March 2000, available at 
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/03/hoechstsndrxycomplaint.htm, the FTC alleged a market of once-a-day time-
release diltiazem in capsule form, designed to be taken once every twenty-four hours. The product belongs 
to a group of drugs used to treat hypertension and the occurrence of angina but the other products treating 
the same diseases were not considered substitutes because of difference in efficacy and side effects, as well 
as risks associated with the switching from a drug to another within the group. 
179 The justification for alleging generic-only markets was in found in the fact that generic version of the 
branded products varies in price to a large extent. On these grounds consumers may not view the product as 
equivalent or interchangeable. Accordingly, when the price differential between the branded product ad the 
generic product is large, they are in separate markets. When, conversely, the price gap is narrow, products 
are more likely to be in the same market. See Dow Chem. Co & Marion Merrell Dow Inc., 24 May 1994, File No. 
941-0019, p. 7. 
180 See Biovail Corp. & Elan Corp., FTC Docket No. C-4057, 15 August 2002, available at 
www.ftc.gov/opa/2002/06/biovailelan.pdf. 
181 See Baxter Int’l, Inc. & Wyeth, FTC Docket No. C-4068, 3 February 2003, available at 
www.ftc.gov/od&2002/12/baxter_wyethcomplaint.pdf.  
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specific general anaesthetic commonly used during surgery and as a sedative for 
patients on mechanical ventilators, because the product proved to be superior in terms 
of safety profile and quickness in adjusting the amount of sedation, with respect to other 
equivalent products. 
At national level several European cases confirm this trend: Napp 
Pharmaceutical182, Genzyme183, Glaxo Principi Attivi184, Phoenix-Pharma185, Pharmalab186, 
Pharmadex187, Sandoz188, Flavelab189, and Syfait190. In all these cases Courts and antitrust 
authorities considered markets composed by the active ingredient. 
In Napp Pharmaceuticals the UK’s Office of Fair Trade (hereinafter, the ‘OFT’) 
defined a separate market for ‘sustained release morphine tablets and capsules’. The 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (hereinafter, the ‘CAT’) later on supported this market 
definition. Justification for this assessment was found on the evidence showing that the 
analysed product, MST Continuous®, a sustained release morphine product, was in the 
market with a similar product, which, however, was a second line treatment, used only 
when patients were intolerant to morphine. Owing to practical disadvantages related to 
the administering the substitute product, the latter was not considered to pose 
substantial competitive constraints on the allegedly dominant product. For this reason, 
the two products were not regarded as substitutes and the relevant market was confined 
to oral morphine. 
The Genzyme case was about the tying conduct put in place by a 
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182 See case No. 1001/1/1/01, Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings limited and subsidiaries, January 15, 2002, 
Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT). 
183 See Genzyme v. OFT, March 4, 2004, CAT. 
184 See case of the Italian Competition authority against GSK, Glaxo Principi Attivi, August 2, 2006. The 
authority defined the relevant market starting from the ATC 3 level where a large cluster composed by 
molecules and finite products with analgesic properties was identified. Within this cluster the authority 
focussed on one of three subgroups that included the so-called ‘Triptans’ (N02CC), antimigraine products. 
The alleged dominant product, Sumatriptan Succinato, was the first to come into the market and in its 
injectable version remains the only existing remedy for the cluster headache. The specific characteristics of 
the product and the way of administering it were considered by the Italian authority enough to distinguish 
the allegedly dominant product from other antimigraine drugs. 
185 See case No. 04-D-05, Phoenix Pharma, February 4, 2004. 
186 See case No. 00-MC-14, Pharmalab. 
187 See case No. 01-MC-04, Pharmadex TDC, September 24, 2001. 
188 See case No. 03-D-35, Sandoz, September 24, 2003. 
189 See case No. 00-MC-16, Flavelab, November 7, 2000. 
190 I refer here to the national phase of the Syfait case, before the Hellenic Competition Authority asked the 
ECJ to rule on the referred legal questions: there the authority found GSK to be dominant for Lamictal®, an 
antiepileptic, because patients could not be effectively treated with other drugs without substantial side 
effects. 
 76 
biopharmaceutical company that developed an orphan drug, Cerezyme®, an 
intravenous infusion aimed at curing the so called Gaucher disease191. The administering 
of the drug is normally supported by homecare companies who can co-ordinate drug 
supply and delivery, education and support for patients to self cannulate and infuse, 
and a long term home infusion service where necessary. Patients suffering from Gaucher 
disease, therefore, have a constant need for effective treatment, including responsible 
clinicians. 
The defendant argued that the relevant market was constituted by all the LSDs 
products, because the R&D facilities and marketing activities, as well as the 
administering method are the same for these products and the allegedly dominant drug. 
The Tribunal, however, overturned the defendant’s argument and defined the 
product market definition based on the concept of interchangeability from the demand 
side. 
The CAT acknowledged the fact that biopharmaceutical companies regard 
themselves as competitors in the upstream research market for orphan drugs, because 
research techniques leading to the development of drug for Gaucher disease may be 
transferable to research into possible other drugs based on the same technology for other 
diseases. 
Yet, this approach did not address the issue of substitutability for patients 
suffering this rare disease and their need to be treated with an effective product. Also, 
this argument disregarded the fact that a producer possessing a marketing authorisation 
for a LSD product may not be able, without substantial switching costs due to the 
separate approval procedures for orphan drugs, to swiftly obtain another marketing 
authorisation that allows it to sell the same product for other diseases192. 
For this reason, the CAT considered the product market to be constituted by the 
alleged dominant product and its competitor. The latter were, in fact, the only ones 
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191 The Gaucher’s disease is one of many lysosomal storage diseases (LSDs). It is caused by a hereditary 
deficiency of the enzyme glucocerebrosidase (also known as acid ǃ-glucosidase), leading to an accumulation 
of fatty material in the spleen, liver, kidneys, lungs, brain and bone marrow. Symptoms include enlarged 
spleen and liver, liver malfunction, skeletal disorders and bone lesions that may be painful, severe 
neurologic complications, as well as other symptoms. It is named after the French doctor Philippe Gaucher, 
who originally described it in 1882. 
192 See para. 212 of the final decision of the CAT in the Genzyme case. 
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having a marketing authorisation for the Gaucher disease193.  
Also, the Court affirmed that, given that Genzyme’s competitor’s product was a 
second line treatment used for those patients for whom the ERT therapy194 was not 
suitable, beside Genzyme’s product and a competitor de facto there were no other 
products to treat the disease in the UK market. Thus, the market could be reduced to the 
allegedly dominant product only195. 
In Flavelab, the Conseil de la Concurrence in France faced a case of predation where 
the defendant company produced Céfuroxime®, belonging to the family of 
cephalosporins, an injectable antibiotic used to prevent the occurrence of infections in 
the surgery operations, marketed with the name of Zinnat®. The defendant argued that 
the relevant market included all the antibiotics that have the same indications in the 
family of the cephalosporins. The complainant, on the contrary, supported a much 
narrower definition of the market, which was in its view composed by the allegedly 
dominant medicinal specialty. 
The Conseil de la Concurrence observed that hospitals specifically ordered 
GlaxoSmithKline’s (hereinafter refereed as ‘GSK’) product. This, in the view of the 
authority, indicated that for doctors the product was not substitutable with other 
molecules belonging to the group of cephalosporins. Moreover, the authority pointed to 
the fact that hospitals generally carry out the prophylactic policy by purchasing different 
antibiotics that target different bacteria, which cannot be considered substitutable. 
The Conseil, therefore, deduced that nothing prevented at that stage to identify 
the relevant market as composed by the allegedly dominant product and the generic 
version. 
In the Astrazeneca case, where for the first time the European Commission 
operated the assessment of the relevant market for pharmaceuticals in an Article 102 
TFEU case, the defendant company was found dominant on the proton pump inhibitors 
market (hereinafter, ‘PPI’), which belongs to the ATC category (AO2BC), with its 
product Losec® (omeprazole). 
The market analysis conducted by the Commission started from ATC 3 level 
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193 See para. 209-210 of the final decision of the CAT in the Genzyme case. 
194 Some forms of Gaucher’s disease may be treated with enzyme replacement therapy (ERT), i.e. the direct 
replacement of the missing enzyme. 
195 See para. 205-206 of the final decision of the CAT in the Genzyme case. 
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where the cluster of ‘drugs for the treatment of peptic ulcer’ was first identified, 
including omeprazole and histamine antagonists (hereinafter, ‘H2 blockers’), widely 
used for the treatment of ulcers before the launch of omeprazole. The Commission 
narrowed the market to the mere omeprazole, because of its different mode of action 
with respect to H2 blockers. The latter, in fact, have only indirect effects on the treatment 
of acid related diseases, while the former has a direct effect on the proton pump in the 
stomach’s cells.  
In the appeal against the Commission decision, Astrazeneca argued that, 
although it was true that PPI are therapeutically superior to H2 blockers, and despite 
such superiority was accepted by the scientific community from the early 1990s196, 
doctors did not recognise it immediately. The increase in use of PPIs was gradual, 
because the H2 blockers exerted a competitive constraint on the former and because 
doctors were concerned with the possible side effects of PPIs, being the latter much 
stronger drugs with respect to H2 blockers. This prescribing pattern showed, according 
to the applicant, that H2 blockers and PPIs are prescribed for the same medical 
treatment and are therefore in the same relevant market. This was confirmed by the 
significant percentage of use that H2 blockers had in several countries and by the fact 
that they were not entirely replaced by the PPIs in any country197. 
However, the Commission invalidated these argument by pointing at the fact 
that PPIs were superior products with respect to H2 blockers, as well as to other 
medicines in the field of acid-related gastrointestinal disease, because of the direct effect 
on the proton pump in the stomach’s cell, whatever the cause of the acid secretion into 
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196 Due to their singular mode of action, the therapeutic effectiveness of PPIs is considered to be superior to 
that of other categories of medicinal products used for the treatment of gastrointestinal diseases related to 
conditions caused by acid production, including the H2 blockers. PPIs’ superior characteristics with respect 
to H2 blockers show up in terms of healing rate, symptom relief, eradication rates and the prevention of 
relapse. Indeed, AZ states in its 1994 annual report: “Losec (omeprazole) offers significant clinical advantages 
compared with H2-receptor antagonists. Comparative clinical studies of these pharmaceuticals have shown that 
patients treated with Losec become symptom-free earlier and more patients get their ulcers healed. This applies to peptic 
ulcer as well as to reflux oesophagitis. In the case of RO and [duodenal ulcer], long-term therapy with Losec is 
effective in preventing recurrence”. In its 1996 annual report AZ notes that “Astra’s success with Losec is due in 
large part to the product’s good clinical effect and specific mode of action: It inhibits the final stage in the formation of 
hydrochloric acid in the stomach. This means that Losec is more effective than previous drugs in the treatment of peptic 
ulcer, and it has essentially no side effects”. 
197 These arguments were opposed by the Commission, in particular by referring to the fact that the Court in 
the case T-340/03 France Télécom v. Commission acknowledged that when consumers migrate from one 
product to another, and when they have similar functions but substitutability is asymmetric, these products 
are do not belong to the same market. 
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the stomach. This differentiates PPIs from H2 blockers, which targeted only one of the 
factors stimulating the acid-production proton pump without any direct impact on the 
pump itself. Such characteristic was one of the factors that induced the Commission to 
exclude the H2 blockers from the relevant market. 
As for the price substitution, the Commission noticed that in the relevant period 
of time the H2 blockers did not exert any competitive pressure on Losec, whose market 
share kept growing steadily and fast, though Losec was priced three times higher than 
H2 blockers. 
Thus, the Commission affirmed that therapeutic superiority, prescribing 
patterns, lack of correlation of prices of the two groups led to place them in two distinct 
product markets 
6.2.5 How to properly define the relevant market for antitrust cases in 
the pharmaceutical sector? 
The examination of the recent Commission’s enforcement action in the 
AstraZeneca case provides a good indication of the criteria used to define markets in non-
merger cases. 
Great weight is attributed to differences between medicines’ modes of action, i.e. 
the way they produce their therapeutic effects198. For instance, quickness of the relieving 
effects and lack of substantial side effects may prove the superiority of a product over 
the other equivalents. This can first help in understanding whether confronted products 
are similar or one of them is therapeutically superior. 
This does not mean that to be in the same markets drugs should be identical. But 
the presence of sufficiently unique features and significant differences may lead to 
identify discrete markets. 
The fact that a product is priced at a higher level with respect to predecessors 
also indicates therapeutic superiority that may induce to consider the former to belong 
to a separate market with respect to the latter. That means that also cost-effectiveness 
information contributes to the market analysis. 
With regards to the ‘functional interchangeability’, generally considered the 
pivotal criterion that determines the boundaries of the relevant market, it is necessary 
(but not sufficient) to check whether different medicines are prescribed for the same 
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198 Cf. the Commission decision in the AstraZeneca case, para. 373-374. 
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disease, as degrees of efficiency and appropriateness may determine separate and 
possibly narrower product markets199. The evidence of a higher rate of efficacy provided 
by scientific literature and medical publications, in fact, may lead to distinguish 
products that are prima facie equivalent. 
Also, gradual but steady process of replacement of an old product with an 
emerging one in medical prescriptions generally lead to deduce that they do not belong 
to the same relevant market. Indeed, the fact that two products are prescribed for the 
cure of the same symptoms or illness, but one follows an increasing pattern, while the 
rate of prescription of the other one is decreasing, signals the absence of competitive 
constraints between them and leads to consider them as belonging to different markets. 
In the economic literature the application of a four-pronged test has been 
suggested in order to properly assess the relevant market for pharmaceuticals and to 
determine, for instance, whether the allegedly dominant drug and the supposed 
competitors belong to the same relevant market. 
First of all, evidence of therapeutic substitution should be used to narrow down 
the number of products that according to physicians can be considered interchangeable 
in the treatment of a disease. All the products that are not considered to be suitable 
substitutes from doctors should be excluded by the relevant market, unless it appears 
from the indications that they are specifically designed to treat the same physical 
condition, despite doctors’ perception. 
This information can be inferred from medical literature, as well as from 
labelling information. 
Secondly, it is important to look at prescribing patterns. This information 
indicates the actual use of a medicinal product. If there is evidence that two or more 
products are prescribed for the same disease over time, this indicates that they are in the 
same product market. 
This evidence is also important to understand how quickly a product has started 
to be prescribed by doctors, how much they have been influenced by advertising in 
switching to the new product, and how patients react to it. 
Third comes the commercial evidence. Internal documents of both undertakings 
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199 See Sanofi/Synthelabo, para. 31. 
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may give good insights of the commercial and marketing strategies they adopted to 
compete with the rival and gain market share over it. 
Finally, if data are available, it is critical to look at an econometric estimation of 
the effect that advertising, entry of competing products, introduction of new 
presentation forms and conducted clinical studies, have on the substitution pattern 
among different drugs200. 
6.3 The relevant market definition in parallel trade cases 
It is a well-established principle in the law that relevant markets cannot be 
limited to a single manufacturer’s product201. However, as already pointed, some case 
law suggests that in some instances one good alone can constitute a separate market202. 
The tendency to identify relevant market composed by a single product particularly 
emerged for parallel trade cases under Article 102 TFEU in the field of pharmaceuticals. 
The particular perspective required, namely the wholesalers’ standpoint, 
provided the occasion to address one feature of the pharmaceutical market that only few 
Courts have considered until now: the degree of substitutability among medicines for 
wholesalers. 
It has been argued that the mechanisms of substitution among pharmaceuticals 
cannot be determined by the product analysis alone, but it is necessary to take into 
account the distribution and the dispensing process. 
As opposed to a normal demand and supply chain, the buying and selling of a 
prescribed pharmaceutical product involves various actors with different decision-
making functions at different stages of the process. In particular, among the latter, the 
physician appears to play a key role in the choice of the product to be administered to 
the patient. After pharmacies receive the prescription from the patient, they often have 
very limited possibility of substitution of that product and they generally order from 
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200 See COSCELLI and OVERD, Market Definition in the Pharmaceutical Sector, cit., p. 295. 
201 See ABA Section of Antitrust Law, Antitrust Law Developments 566, 2002. In DuPont the Supreme Court 
explained that whenever manufacturers have power over price and production of its own product, they 
cannot be considered to have a power that amount to an illegal monopoly. 
202 Cf. Kodak, 504 U.S. at p. 482, where the Court said that the relevant market could be limited to parts and 
services for Kodak machines because once customers bought the equipment they were locked into buying 
only Kodak parts and services. It follows that the outcome of the case was very much fact-specific and 
cannot be extended through analogy to any case. 
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wholesalers those indicated by doctors203. Equally, wholesalers do not have any other 
choice but provide exactly the requested product from manufacturers. The prescribed 
product then goes down along the distribution chain back to the patient. 
In light of the rigidity of the pharmaceutical supply distribution chain and of the 
binding constraint posed by the medical prescription, one may argue that often no – or 
very limited – possibility of substitution exists for the pharmaceutical wholesaler when 
it comes to the satisfaction of the order of the pharmacist204. It follows that the definition 
of the relevant market in the relationship between pharmaceutical manufacturers and 
their customers may in certain cases be limited to the prescribed pharmaceutical product 
(‘one product-one market’ definition). 
This may be the case when wholesalers must necessarily have one of the specific 
medications from this pharmaceutical company in their range, failing which they would 
lose a substantial part of their clientele, not occasionally for the delivery of this single 
medication, but for all the services it can offer to their pharmacist customers. 
Not only the refusal to supply of a non otherwise substitutable product from the 
manufacturer would endanger the commercial relationship between the wholesaler and 
the pharmacy, but also it would prevent the wholesaler from complying with the legal 
obligation that in certain Member States – like Italy or France - requires him to keep in 
stock at least 90% of the products marketed in the domestic market205. 
The ‘one-product-one market’ definition has been subject to criticism in the 
literature from both commentators and industry stakeholders206. 
Pharmaceutical industry representatives argue, in fact, that narrow markets 
should be applied only when assessing the market power at the stage of manufacturing 

203 In In re Cardizem CD Antitrust Litigation the district Court suggested the once a physician prescribes a 
particular drug, a patient may only purchase that drug or its FDA-approved AB-rated bioequivalent. It also 
added that de facto there are no other choices available for consumers, because they cannot obtain any other 
product than the one prescribed by the doctor. Similarly, in Schering Plough Corp., Upsher-Smith Labs. & Am. 
Home Prods Corp., FTC Docket No. 9297, 21 October 2002, the complaint counsel suggested that the 
requirement that a physician must approve switching a prescription significantly prevents 
interchangeability. 
204 This criterion has been applied from the Court of Appeal of Milan, decision of 12 July 2005, case 
2056/2005, Farmacia Petrone v Pharmacia Italy and Pfizer Italy (not published). 
205 In Italy, the Decree no. 538 of 30 December 1992, which translated into national law the principle 
contained into the Directive 92/25/EEC (“Attuazione della Direttiva 92/25/CEE riguardante la distribuzione 
all’ingrosso dei medicinali per uso umano”), established at art. 7(1) that, inter alia, pharmaceutical wholesalers 
should keep in their stock the 90% of medicinal specialties marketed in Italy. 
206 See JENNY, Pharmaceuticals Competition and Free Movement of Goods, EU Competition Law & Policy, 2002, p. 
82; EFPIA, Article 82 EC: Can it be applied to control sales by pharmaceutical wholesalers?, 2004, p. 31. 
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of molecules, or at the stage of direct sale of medications by pharmaceutical companies 
to dispensaries and hospitals207. 
When there is a direct sale to the customer, i.e. hospitals and pharmacists, the 
therapeutic use of the product is certainly relevant, because this is the feature in which 
these subjects are interested. 
Conversely, when sales are directed towards distributing wholesalers, the 
therapeutic criterion seems to be less relatable. Indeed, in this case, neither the physician 
nor the patient is involved and the wholesaler seeks no therapeutic indication. It follows 
that the therapeutic criterion may not be adequate in parallel trade cases208. 
These stakeholders thus allege that the relevant market should be determined 
not from the perspective of the final consumers but from the point of view of 
wholesalers. 
Such approach has been justified on the following grounds. 
Wholesalers rationalise distribution, make use of economies of scale and scope, 
and use resources (space, stores, transport means and workers) to obtain the maximum 
profit from the capital invested in infrastructures, given the regulatory constraints on 
margins they are subject to. 
From this point of view, the rigidity of choice among products deriving from the 
doctor’s prescription does not have any influence on wholesalers’ assortment. On the 
contrary, the fact that wholesalers can freely choose the composition of the residual 
unregulated 10% of their stock gives them a sufficient degree of discretion. In choosing 
the composition of that part of their stock, wholesalers rely, for instance, on the 
dimension of boxes, on price and on the intensity of demand. The account of these 
variables allows wholesalers to calculate the expected average revenue of each product 
and to consequently plan the assortment and the quantities of that product to be kept. 
Therefore, the worsening of the sale conditions of a product is likely to trigger the 
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207 EFPIA, Article 82 EC: Can it be applied to control sales by pharmaceutical wholesalers?, cit., p. 31. 
208 Confirmation to this approach comes from the French case on ‘small hand equipment’ where the Paris 
Court of Appeal criticized the construction of the relevant market, identified with the single tool, done by 
the Competition Council as liable of artificially fragmenting the market. See the case Sifco Stanley SA, May 
17, 1994, Paris Court of Appeal. See also the letter from the Minister of the Economy of January 20, 2003, 
concerning the concentration in the pharmaceutical distributing wholesalers sector: “[…] the market test did 
not make it possible to clearly delineate a segmentation of the wholesaler distribution market as a function of products 
distributed by wholesaler-distributors. In this case, and for the needs of this analysis, we shall be interested in the 
overall pharmaceutical distribution market.” 
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reduction of wholesalers’ demand of that product and the switch to another product. 
In light of this, wholesalers’ demand may be thought to be very elastic, as 
compared to consumers’ demand. In fact, no matter the therapeutic characteristics of 
drugs, a wholesaler could consider two products as substitutes, as long as they provide 
him with the same average revenue. 
The reasoning should apply a fortiori to wholesalers who engage in parallel 
importing activities and to pure exporters209: when they sell in importing countries, they 
are free from any public service obligation. Thus, the therapeutic characteristics of drugs 
do not represent an issue for them. On the contrary, they base their selling decisions 
mainly on price differentials across countries, in order to maximise their margins and 
profits. From this point of view, when for a given product margins are squeezed due to 
the reduction of its price gap across countries, parallel importers would switch to a more 
profitable product. In this sense, the medicaments that provide the same margin are 
‘equivalent’ economically speaking210. 
Accordingly, it has been thus suggested that, for cases under Article 102 TFEU 
concerning parallel trade, there is a separate product market for all pharmaceutical 
products capable of being profitably parallel distributed from exporters/wholesalers. It 
follows that the relevant market in parallel trade cases should include ‘all tradable drugs’. 
Criticism against the ‘one-product-one-market’ definition can be inferred also 
from the jurisprudence at the national level in other sectors. In France it has been 
argued, for instance, that such an approach would lead to paradoxically attribute market 
power also to small pharmaceutical undertakings211. 
However, at present the jurisprudence and the authorities did not express their 
view on the alternative definition of the relevant market as ‘all tradable drugs’212. 
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209 To my knowledge the difference between exporters and wholesalers, on the basis of their subjection to 
the public service obligation, exists only in France, where regulation explicitly distinguishes between them, 
also in terms of the licence released by the authorities. 
210 I assume here that the costs of purchasing drugs, repacking and reselling them abroad are constant in 
time and across drugs. 
211 EFPIA, Article 82 EC: Can it be applied to control sales by pharmaceutical wholesalers?, cit., p. 25. 
212 Such approach seems to be accepted by the GC in the Glaxo case, where at para. 159 it affirms “It does not 
appear to be manifestly incorrect to consider that the buyer, that is to say, the Spanish wholesaler who might engage in 
parallel trade, is less interested, for that purpose, in the therapeutic indication and the pharmacological products of each 
of the medicines which he buys from GW than in the fact that all of those medicines are reimbursed by the Spanish 
sickness insurance scheme and that their price is therefore set by the Spanish authorities. Likewise, it does not appear to 
be manifestly incorrect to consider that the buyer is less interested in the price of each of the medicines as such than in 
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The reason of this caution may be found on the shaky economic foundations of 
this criterion. In fact, following this logic, any item or commodity, which gives the same 
margin, no matter the nature of product considered, should be part of the relevant 
market. Such criterion, therefore, does not give any real guidance to assess the relevant 
market in pharmaceuticals. 
It rather appears that therapeutic interchangeability should remain the guiding 
criterion in the assessment of the relevant market also when wholesalers are concerned. 
Pharmaceutical markets definition should not be any different from that in other 
industries. Traditional methods and principles generally used to define markets would 
apply but should be adapted to the particular features of the industry. 
The interchangeability principle should be applied also in parallel trade cases, in 
order to ascertain that they cannot substitute the source of the product requested by the 
pharmacy with another one. This is consistent with the notion provided by the European 
Commission, which defined the assessment of the relevant market as an exercise of 
identification of the substitute sources of supply for consumers213, both in terms of 
surrogate products and of alternative geographical location of suppliers. 
It follows that a narrow definition of the relevant market can be supported only 
where medicines that may be considered substitutes for patients and doctors, can prove 
to be complementary for wholesalers. In other words, it should be demonstrated that 
wholesalers could not resort to other sources of supply for that product requested by the 
pharmacy. 
If the domestic legal framework prevents wholesalers from sourcing supplies 
from other stakeholders in the pharmaceutical supply chain, like other wholesalers, this 
means that a wholesaler does not have alternative and legitimate sources of supplies and 
that is locked-in by the rigidity of the doctor’s prescription. In this case the relevant 
market should be identified on the basis of the commercial relationship between the 
manufacturer and the single wholesaler. In turn, this would lead to affirm the existence 
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the fact that there is a sufficient price differential to render parallel trade lucrative, for all of those medicines, between 
Spain and the Member State of destination. In those circumstances, it is not manifestly incorrect to accept that all the 
medicines reimbursed by the Spanish sickness insurance scheme which are capable of being sold at a profit owing to the 
price differential between Spain and the Member State of destination constitute a product market.” However, the 
Court did not explicitly rule on this issue. 
213 Note that the notion of ‘consumer’ under competition law includes also other stakeholders along the 
distribution chain, hence also wholesalers. 
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of a relevant market composed by a single chemical compound. 
If, on the contrary, wholesalers are able to fulfill their legal and commercial 
obligations through the replacement of the requested product with another one or, if 
they manage to offer anyway their services to the pharmacies, there exists a certain 
degree of substitution among source of products that impedes to consider each of them 
as a distinct market214. 
In fact, the presence of alternative sources of supply, even if they are at the same 
level in the supply chain215, has a positive impact on the possibilities of substitution. This 
reduces the anticompetitive impact of a refusal to supply, because it does not affect the 
minimum stock required by law to fulfil the public service obligation216. 
6.4 The geographic market definition for pharmaceuticals 
Relevant geographic markets in the pharmaceutical sector are defined as national 
in scope217. 
The national nature of pharmaceutical markets derives from a number of factors. 
These include in particular the enduring differences in national health care 
systems, different price and reimbursement rules, e.g. the wide differences between 
national rules on incentives for cheaper generic and parallel imported products, as well 
as different brand and packing strategies, different distribution and different prescribing 
habits of physicians. 
As explained in previous Sections, at this stage, harmonisation is mainly limited 
to rules relating to the authorisation of medicinal products (either nationally or through 
a centralised EU system), and in particular rules aimed at ensuring that the products 
concerned fulfil requirements in terms of safety, quality and efficacy. In all Commission 
decisions regarding pharmaceutical products, the relevant geographic market has been 
thus defined as national. 
However, the mentioned jurisprudential trend suggests that there is a new 
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214 See case No. 04-D-05, Phoenix Pharma, February 4, 2004, Competition Council, where the latter concluded 
that “Seule une instruction approfondie pourra permettre de mesurer la marge de manoeuvre dont disposent les 
grossistes-répartiteurs mais il ne peut être exclu, à ce stade de l’instruction, que l’approvisionnement de ces derniers, 
en chacune des spécialités protégées par brevet, constitue un marché pertinent sur lequel le fabricant est en position 
dominante”. 
215 For instance, art. 6, para. 1, lett. b) of the Italian Law No. 538/1992 provides that the wholesaler can 
source his supplies from companies who have a legal distribution license. 
216 See the Court of Appeal of Milano, 20 April 2005, in the case no. 2056 Petrone v. Pfizer/Pharmacia. 
217 See Commission’s decision in GlaxoWellcome, para. 114. 
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approach to market definition in relation to cases on parallel trade of pharmaceuticals. It 
is advocated that conventional competition law assessment is not appropriate in these 
cases, because this does not take into consideration the specific features that parallel 
trade of pharmaceuticals entails. Exporters and exporting wholesalers do not operate 
only in the exporting countries, where regulatory features determine the narrow 
geographic limitation of markets, but they take advantage of this regulation to exploit 
price differences abroad. That means that wholesalers who mainly engage in exporting 
activities operate in a different market, i.e. outside the exporting countries. 
Other scholars confirm this approach through another argument: since R&D is 
global, the geographic consideration of future markets should focus at least on the 
territory of the EU and, possibly, on worldwide markets218. 
Still, differences in the patent system and in pharmaceutical regulations across 
Member States lead to different market conditions and degrees of competition. And this 
is why it appears correct to follow the approach adopted by the European Commission, 
which always defines relevant markets for pharmaceutical products as national in scope. 
 
7. Conclusions 
This Chapter has examined the main legal and economic features of the 
European pharmaceutical industry. 
The main lesson to be drawn from the above analysis is that the European 
market is, despite the harmonisation efforts started already long time ago, still highly 
fragmented especially at the level of prices. This represents a concern for the 
competitiveness of the European firms in a globalized environment. 
Such fragmentation finds its origins in the different medical culture and health 
status, but especially in the diverse way Member States conceive and shape their 
intervention in the market to solve the tripartite trade off they face in the regulation of 
pharmaceuticals: safety, efficiency and equity. 

218 See GLADER, Innovation markets and Antitrust Analysis, cit., p. 114 and 218; GILBERT and SUNSHINE, The Use 
of Innovation Markets: a Reply to Hay, Rapp and Hoerner, in Antitrust Law Journal, 1995, no. 64, p. 81, where they 
affirm that “the boundaries of innovation markets are typically broad, usually encompassing the world and often 
including products that, if defined at the goods level, would be in multiple markets. Good markets are often more local 
because of the need for local distribution assets, regulatory barriers, etc.” 
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The architecture of the Treaty and the application that EU Courts have provided 
are such that the ultimate responsibility of the health of European citizens is attributed 
to Member States, which, concerned by their budget constraints, have generally been 
reluctant to relinquish their sovereignty to the EU on this matter and to favour 
harmonisation. 
This generated the proliferation of mechanisms of price controls that are very 
different in nature and that create wide price gaps among countries for the same 
products. 
The EU Courts have been called many times to discuss the validity of such 
regulation in light of the principle of movement of goods. However, de facto enlarging 
the scope of mandatory requirement that can justify a departure from this principle to 
economic aims, they have constantly affirmed the validity of national price controls 
where they aim at stabilising pharmaceutical price expenditures and when they are not 
discriminatory. 
This provided the legal basis that favoured the development of parallel trade on 
pharmaceuticals. 
The latter has been used, together with other instruments, by European 
institutions to indirectly pursue a policy of price harmonisation in the European 
pharmaceutical market. One would expect this policy to be temporary, though. In fact, 
once harmonisation is achieved, there is no scope for parallel trade any longer. Still, after 
thirty years of parallel trade, drugs prices are not harmonised, though. As I will better 
illustrate in the following Chapters, regulation on prices, in fact, is acting as a 
counterbalancing force that from time to time allows price gaps to re-emerge in the 
market. 
These two coexisting forces create a continuous ‘push-and-pull’ effect, where 
some price harmonisation is contrasted by the creation of new price gaps due to 
regulation. For this reason, at present the European pharmaceutical market remains 
stuck in a transition phase, where parallel trade can still exist. 

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CHAPTER II 
 
 
The intersection between intellectual property rights and 
competition policy goals in the pharmaceutical sector 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
This Chapter reviews an old legal issue that has been subject to abounding 
theoretical elaboration both from the legal scholars and the jurisprudence: the 
intersection between IPRs and competition law. 
The two bodies of law are complementary components of a modern industrial 
policy and pursue the same goal: the improvement of consumer welfare, through the 
promotion of innovation. However, it is apparent that they do it through different 
means. Industrial property laws offer a period of exclusive rights to the inventor to spur 
its inventive activity through a monetary reward. On the contrary, competition law 
attempts to keep markets innovative by maintaining effective free access and preventing 
foreclosure. 
Starting from the grand arrêt in Consten and Grundig, this Chapter traces the path 
followed by the EU jurisprudence to reconcile IPRs and EU competition law. 
In the early stages of the EU case law, this clash was thought to be of great 
concern for antitrust authorities and led to place overly strict limits on the exercise of 
IPRs. Later on, this misconception of the effects of IPRs was mitigated by the progress of 
economic understanding. So, for instance, EU competition law does no longer assumes 
that the legal monopoly conferred by IPRs amounts to an economic monopoly or even 
confers market power, but it accepted the view that this issue should be established 
empirically. 
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Under EU law, the intersection between IPRs and competition law takes an 
additional feature. In fact, IPRs are inherently national, whilst competition provisions 
maintain a EU dimension and, for this reason, bear market integration overtones. From 
this point of view, the exercise of an IPR according to national law can run against 
Treaty provisions, especially when it provides the IPR owner with absolute territorial 
protection that limits cross border trade. 
In order to solve this friction, European Courts engaged in a lengthy and gradual 
work of interpretation of the Treaty provisions, which led to the well known, albeit 
harshly criticised, distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘exercise’ of IPRs. In turn, this 
provided the basis for the development, through an articulated and tortuous route, of 
the notion of ‘specific subject matter’ and of the principle of ‘regional exhaustion’ of 
IPRs. 
The result of this evolution is that, whilst competition law intervention is now 
more limited, as the ‘exceptional circumstances’ test for IP protected products in refusal 
to licence cases shows, in some cases where IPRs’ use unjustifiably runs against the 
‘constitutional’ goals of the Treaty, EU competition law comes into play again as a 
‘second tier’ of regulation of IPRs. 
This legal environment shaped the current European policy towards parallel 
trade. On the basis of the above mentioned principles, traditionally the Commission and 
the EU Courts regarded negatively any attempt to impede parallel trade, either through 
the refusal to supply wholesalers who engage in exporting activities, or by applying a 
price policy that renders exports economically uninteresting. 
Yet, recently the jurisprudence has been questioning this policy in the field of 
pharmaceuticals, inspired by the ambiguity of welfare effects of parallel trade professed 
by economic theory. 
This Chapter reviews these developments traced above according to the 
following structure. 
Section 1 sets the theoretical basis of the analysis, by recalling the economic 
rationale of IPRs – the stimulus to innovation – and explaining where and to what extent 
the clash with competition law arises. This analysis is applied to the pharmaceutical 
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sector, in order to understand how legal systems reconciled the generalised access to 
medicines and the incentive on companies to produce new drugs. 
Section 2 reviews the early case law dealing with the use of IPRs that runs against 
the rules of the internal market, which led to the elaboration by EU Courts of the 
dichotomy ‘existence-exercise’ of IPRs and of the notion of ‘specific subject matter’. 
Section 3 continues the analysis by disentangling the jurisprudence that founded 
the principle of regional exhaustion of IPRs within the EU and examines all the cases 
that defined when trademarks and patents are exhausted according to the principles of 
EU law. A final section is devoted to the exhaustion of IPRs covering products that are 
first marketed outside the EU. 
Section 4 specifically examines the case law dealing with the exercise of IPRs 
according to European competition law rules. In particular, the jurisprudence on the 
refusal to licence IPRs to competitors and the related ‘essential facility doctrine’ are 
discussed. 
The principles elaborated by the analysed jurisprudence guided the legal 
treatment and the policy of favour pursued by the Commission and the EU Courts 
towards parallel trade. Section 5 is entirely devoted to the discussion of the case law that 
consolidated this approach. 
Section 6 examines the revirement in the jurisprudence’s attitude towards parallel 
trade, which took place around ten years ago. 
Section 7 concludes. 
 
1. The structure and the function of intellectual property rights 
It is widely acknowledged among scholars that there exists a trade off between 
IPRs and free competition219. 

219 Classical readings are: BAXTER, Legal Restrictions on Exploitations of Patent Monopoly: An Economic Analysis, 
76 Yale L.J., 267 (1966); KAPLOW, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection: A Reappraisal, in Harv. L. Rev., 1984, no. 97, 
p. 1813; PRIEST, What Economists Can Tell Lawyers About Intellectual Property: Comment on Cheung, in Res. in L. 
& Econ., 1986, no. 8, p. 19; BOWMAN, Patent and Antitrust Law: A Legal and Economics Appraisal, 1973. More 
recently, we have the works of PITOFSKY, Antitrust and Intellectual Property: Unresolved Issues at the Heart of the 
New Economy, in Berkeley Tech. L.J., 2001, p. 535; NASCIMBENE, Diritto d’autore e abuso di posizione dominante: i 
rapporti (difficili) tra proprietà intellettuale e disciplina antitrust, in Foro it., 2002, IV, 338; PARDOLESI, Di 
regolazione antitrust e diritti di proprietà intellettuale, in Mercato Concorrenza Regole, 2004, n. 1, p. 7 et seq. The 
Antitrust Bullettin and the Minnesota Law Review devoted monographic volumes to the issue in Fall 2002 and 
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German-speaking lawyers would speak of Spannungsverhaltnis (relationship of 
tension) between the individual right to exclusively benefit from situations of 
competitive advantage in the market (‘property’)220, and the economic freedom of 
everybody to enter the market and operate in it at the same conditions (‘liberty’)221. 
The economic rationale of intellectual property rights protection rests on the non-
rivalry feature typical of knowledge. 
Non-rivalry has been described by Thomas Jefferson with the following words: 
“If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others of exclusive property, it is the 
action of the thinking power called an idea, which an individual may exclusively possess as long 
as he keeps it to himself; but the moment it is divulged, it forces itself into the possession of every 
one, and the receiver cannot dispossess himself of it. He who receives an idea from me, receives 
instruction himself without lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light 
without darkening me.”222 
The non-rivalry characteristics of knowledge-based products, like inventions, 
impedes the appropriability of the return on investment made by inventors. The 
possibility of everybody to enjoy and use at zero cost the information on which the 
product is based does not allow the inventor to recoup the money invested and 
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in Spring 2003 respectively. See also the Federal Trade Commission report entitled To Promote Innovation: 
The Proper Balance of Competition Law and Policy, released in October 2003. 
220 Intellectual property rights, as a form of private property, are both internationally and nationally 
protected. Art. 15 (and in particular 15.3) of The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR) protects the right of individuals to enjoy the moral and material fruits of its inventions. The 
article recognizes “the right of everyone” both “to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications” and 
“to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.” To achieve these goals, the Covenant mandates that States Parties 
undertake a series of steps. These include “those necessary for the conservation, the development and the diffusion 
of science and culture.” More specifically, States Parties “undertake to respect the freedom indispensable for 
scientific research and creative activity.” At a European level see Art. 345 TFEU, which states: “The Treaty shall 
in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property ownership.” 
221 Such general interest is protected at a European level by the provision set forth by Article 3 TEU and 
Article 3 TFEU, and in particular at Article 3(1)(b) TFEU, which establishes among the exclusive 
competences of the European Union “… (b) the establishing of the competition rules necessary for the functioning 
of the internal market”. Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are the principal means to achieve such goal. In Italy the 
freedom of carry out an economic activity, but not the method of interfirm rivalry, as IRTI, L’ordine giuridico 
del mercato, 1998, pp. 47 et seq. recalls, is protected at a Constitutional level by Art. 41(1). The principle of free 
competition is protected from the antitrust Law n. 287/90. 
222 See the letter to Isaac McPherson dated Aug. 13, 1813. In the same letter, Thomas Jefferson also wrote that 
for these reasons “Inventions then cannot, in nature, be a subject of property”. However, note that Jefferson 
disregarded the fact that knowledge has only some of the features of public goods: in fact, it is excludable, as 
long as it is not disclosed and remains under the control of the individual, or the firm, behind the discovery. 
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discourages innovation ex ante. That is why appropriability in a knowledge-based 
economy represents a concern for public policy. 
IPRs have been generally identified as a valid policy instrument to overcome 
such a market failure. They give the inventor the exclusive right to sell his/her invention 
at a price above the marginal cost, and in this way the possibility to recover the 
investments made through a sufficient monetary reward. The prospect of these earnings 
provides an incentive mechanism that spurs innovation223.  
The exclusionary nature of IPRs appears in contrast with the basic rules of the 
free market economy, where agents are free to enter the market and carry on economic 
activities and consumers get their preferred products and/or services at a cost equal to 
the marginal cost of the producer. These features, assumed to be the best way to serve 
the collective interest, are guaranteed by competition law. 
‘Property’ and ‘liberty’, however, are not necessarily at odd. They are rather two 
sides of the same coin. Two faces, in a continuous dialectic relationship, of the principle 
of free economic initiative that guides and shapes the economic organization of Western 
countries224. 
The attribution to individuals of a ius excludendi alios has, in fact, primarily a pro-
competitive function: notwithstanding the monopolistic features, IPRs spur competition 
on innovation225. Patents, in particular, embody the Schumpeterian logic of “constructive 
destruction”226. As already indicated, the prospect of monopolistic returns deriving from 

223 On the economic function of IPRs see, among legal scholars, UBERTAZZI, Invenzione e innovazione, 1978; 
BEIER, The Significance of the Patent System for the Technical, Economic and Social Progress, in IIC, 1980, p. 563; 
GUGLIELMETTI, Rileggendo Einaudi: giustificazione e scopo della tutela brevettuale per le invenzioni industriali, Studi 
Franceschelli, 1983. In the Law and Economics literature see the work of LANDES and POSNER, The Economic 
structure of Intellectual Property Law, 2003. For formalizations see ARROW, Economic welfare and the allocation of 
resources for invention, in NELSON, The rate and direction of economic activities: economic and social factors, 1962; 
NORDHAUS, Invention, growth and welfare, 1969. See infra Chapter IV for a deeper analysis of the economics of 
IPRs and further references. 
224 See ASCARELLI, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali, 1960, p. 41 et seq.; FRANCESCHELLI, Contenuto e 
limiti del diritto industriale, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1952, I, p. 7; ID., Valore attuale del principio di concorrenza e funzione 
concorrenziale degli istituti di diritto industriale, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1956, I, p. 28; GHIDINI, Profili evolutivi del diritto 
industriale, 2001, pp. 6 et seq., all of them considering the institutions of industrial property as part of the 
theory of competition. Finally see PARDOLESI and GRANIERI, Proprietà intellettuale e concorrenza: convergenza 
finalistica e liaisons dangereuses, in Foro Italiano, 2003, no. 5, p. 193 et seq. 
225 See ASCARELLI, Teoria della concorrenza e dei beni immateriali, cit., p. 41 et seq.; FRANCESCHELLI, Trattato di 
diritto industriale, 1960, ch. XLII; MARCHETTI, Sull’esaurimento del brevetto di invenzione, 1974, pp. 119-120; 
GHIDINI, Profili evolutivi del diritto industriale, cit., pp. 8-9. 
226 The original notion of “creative destruction” is found in the writings of Mikhail Bakunin, Friedrich 
Nietzsche and in Werner Sombart’s Krieg und Kapitalismus (War and Capitalism), 1913, p. 207, where he 
wrote: “again out of destruction a new spirit of creativity arises”. The economist Joseph Schumpeter popularized 
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the exclusivity in the production and commercialisation of patented products induces 
firms to be pioneers in the market and invent better technologies and new products. 
Once the market is opened up, new profits expectations are available. This attracts the 
entry of competitors that developed alternative technologies and products that compete 
with the first one and eventually replace it. 
This positive function, however, comes at a cost: the exclusionary nature of IPRs 
in fact produces the so-called dead weight loss. Although they do not necessarily imply 
the existence of a monopoly227, IPRs imply a restriction of competition. In the case of 
patents, from a “subjective perspective” such restriction is functional to grant the 
inventor a necessary reward that it is impossible to get in a competitive market (the so-
called ‘differential profit’). But from an “objective perspective”, the restriction to 
competition also implies a restriction to economic opportunities available in the market 
for other economic agents228. 
That is why IPRs constitute a legal (temporary) exception to the paradigm of 
competition specifically designed to stimulate innovative activity and economic 
progress, to the benefit of society229. Therefore, they are a policy tool intended to solve 
appropriability problems related to knowledge-based goods, rather than a form of real 
property230. 
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and used the term to describe the process of transformation that accompanies radical innovation. In 
Schumpeter’s vision of capitalism, innovative entry by entrepreneurs was the force that sustained long-term 
economic growth, even as it destroyed the value of established companies that enjoyed some degree of 
monopoly power. See SCHUMPETER, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, 1942. See further discussion in 
Section 2.1 of Chapter IV. 
227 It should be noted that an IPR does not confer automatically monopoly power to its owner. The DOJ/FTC 
IP guidelines at Section 2.0 apply a general rule that market or monopoly power will not be presumed as 
arising from intellectual property. Some US courts, however, including in recent opinions, have held that in 
a tying case (as opposed to a monopolization case), if the tying product is patented, there is a rebuttable 
presumption of market power (which presumption would be the defendant’s burden to rebut). See 
Independent Ink, Inc. v. Illinois Tool Works Inc., 396 F.3d 1342, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005). The same principle applies 
under EU competition law. See better infra Section 4 of this Chapter. 
228 See MARCHETTI, Sull’esaurimento del brevetto di invenzione, 1974, pp. 98-99. 
229 Art. 9 of Italian Constitution promotes the stimulus to innovation through scientific research. The latter, 
normally carried out through private economic activity, is, in turn, embodied in the principle of economic 
freedom set forth by Art. 41 of the Italian Constitution and of free competition set forth by the EU Treaty. 
See GHIDINI, Profili evolutivi del diritto industriale, cit., p. 8 and 9. 
230 See LEMLEY, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, in 83 Texas Law Rev., 2004-2005, p. 1031 et seq., 
strongly arguing against the idea that IPRs constitute a form of real property. In the same spirit see previous 
works of scholars reporting a “misappropriation explosion” and the proliferation of overprotectionist trends 
misinterpreting the original function of IPRs: GORDON, On Owning Information: Intellectual Property and the 
Restitutionary Impulse, in Va. L. Rev., 1992, p. 149; REICHMAN, Beyond the Historical Lines of Demarcation: 
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The limitation in time and scope provides an important device to coordinate the 
intersection between competition and IPRs. In particular, with patents short run 
deadweight losses due to monopoly power are offset in the long run by the gains 
generated by competition, in terms of lower prices, after the expiration. In this way, the 
legislator found an equilibrium point between the individual interest of innovators and 
the general interest to the safeguard of competitive conditions of the market231. 
1.1 The trade off in the pharmaceutical sector 
The pharmaceutical sector represents an area where the portrayed dialectic 
relationship between competition and IPRs assumes additional features to those present 
in other markets. In this field the stimulus of innovation through the attribution of IPRs 
serves a general interest of supreme importance: the protection of health, recognised as 
everybody’s right by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights232, by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union233, and as a constitutional right, or an objectif 
à valeur constitutionnel, at national level234. 
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Competition Law, Intellectual Property Rights, and International Trade after the Gatt’s Uruguay Round, in Brooklin 
J. of Int. L., 1993, p. 75; GHIDINI, Prospettive “protezioniste” nel diritto industriale, in Riv. Dir. Ind., 1995, I, p. 73. 
231 Patents are, in fact, considered a second best solution to the trade off between IPRs and competition. A 
first best solution, where a socially desirable level of innovation is associated to the absence of market power 
and to a global diffusion of goods at accessible prices, would be given by public procurement. Nevertheless, 
concerns related to the possibility of regulatory capture, moral hazard and asymmetry of information with 
respect to real costs and benefits of R&D investments, impose to delegate innovation activity to individual 
agents and to set up a patent system. 
232 Art. 25 of the UDHR states: “Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and wellbeing 
of himself and his family...”. The Preamble to the WHO constitution also affirms that it is one of the 
fundamental rights of every human being to enjoy “the highest attainable standard of health”. Inherent in the 
right to health is the right to the underlying conditions of health as well as medical care. The United Nations 
expanded upon the “Right to Health” in Article 12 of the International Covenant in Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights in 1966. Not only did this document guarantee the “right of everyone to the enjoyment of the 
highest attainable standard of health”, but it also specifically called for the “provision for the reductions of... infant 
mortality and for the healthy development of the child; the improvement of all aspects of environmental and industrial 
hygiene; the prevention, treatment and control of epidemic, endemic, occupational, and other diseases; and the creation 
of conditions which could assure to all medical service and medical attention in the event of sickness.” 
233 Art. 35 of the ECHR states: “Everyone has the right of access to preventive health care and the right to benefit 
from medical treatment under the conditions established by national laws and practices. A high level of human health 
protection shall be ensured in the definition and implementation of all the Union's policies and activities.” The 
principles set out in this Article are based on Art. 168 TFEU, which states: “Union action, which shall 
complement national policies, shall be directed towards improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness 
and diseases, and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such action shall cover the fight against 
the major health scourges, by promoting research into their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as 
health information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating serious cross-border threats to 
health. Also see Articles 11 and 13 of the European Social Charter available at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/163.htm. 
234 Art. 32 of the Italian Constitution states: “La Repubblica tutela la salute come fondamentale diritto 
dell'individuo e interesse della collettività, e garantisce cure gratuite agli indigenti.” Recital 11 of the Préambule de 
la Constitution Française of 1946 states: “La Nation garantit à tous, notamment à l'enfant, à la mère et aux vieux 
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A generalised access to medicines is an essential tool to guarantee the right to 
health to everybody. It seems, therefore, that the grant of a patent over a pharmaceutical 
specialty that allows the patent owner to charge high prices for its products would 
obstacle such a policy objective. At the same time, without the possibility to patent their 
discoveries, private parties would lose the incentive to invest in research to find new 
molecules in the first place. 
The framework just sketched indicates that in this sector the paradigm of 
‘consumer welfare’ necessarily means ‘affordable medicines’ and ‘new and better 
medicines’ for the improvement of quality of life of individuals, at the same time. 
Nevertheless, while the two policy objectives appear necessarily complementary, it is 
undeniable that the means to achieve them are conflicting and need to be balanced. 
1.2 Striking the balance: the Italian case 
A meaningful example of the balancing exercise operated by the legal 
community to solve this tension is given by the history of patentability of medicinal 
specialties in Italy. 
Initially the Law no. 872 of 12 March 1855 and then the Legge sulle Invenzioni, the 
Royal Decree no. 1127 of 29 June 1939, prohibited the patentability of pharmaceuticals in 
Italy235. The rationale of the prohibition was inspired by the concerns related to the 
creation of a monopoly over goods essential for public health. Pharmaceuticals were 
considered vital products for individuals and for this reason, everybody, also poor 
people, should have had access to them. On the contrary, the exclusivity right that 
pharmaceutical firms would have enjoyed through a patent over their products would 
have brought an increase in prices and a decrease in the quantity sold in the market, in 
contrast with the policy objective to grant universal access to health care236. 
The unpatentability of medicinal products, however, would have allowed any 
competitor of the inventor to freely copy the formula of new invented molecules without 
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travailleurs, la protection de la santé, la sécurité matérielle, le repos et les loisirs”. Articles 43 of the Spanish 
Constitution states: “Se reconoce el derecho a la protección de la salud”. Even where the right to health is not 
considered a subjective right (for instance, in France, in South Africa, in Poland and in Germany), it is 
anyway regarded as a objective à valeur constitutionelle, which may pose limits on other constitutional rights, 
like the right to private property.  
235 Art. 14 of the cited Royal Decree established that “non possono costituire oggetto di brevetto i medicamenti di 
qualsiasi genere, né i processi per la loro produzione”. 
236 FRANCESCHELLI, Ciarlatani, speziali e segretisti, in Problemi attuali del Diritto Industriale, 1977, p. 375. 
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incurring in substantial sunk costs and to market it a competitive price. It has been 
argued that the impossibility of recover investments discouraged innovation and the 
sector remained dominated by small players unable to reach a critical mass, with respect 
other companies in other European countries: few Italian firms destined their financial 
resources to the discovery of new products, while the majority of companies (of small 
size) was mainly basing its activity on the imitation of products discovered and patented 
elsewhere237. 
The Italian Constitutional Court in 1978 declared the prohibition to patent 
pharmaceuticals contrary to the Constitution238. Among other things, such prohibition 
was contrary to Article 9 of the Italian Constitution, which explicitly promotes scientific 
development and research. 
According to the Court, Article 32, par. 1, of the Constitution could not to be 
interpreted as if the protection of public health would always automatically prevail over 
the value of scientific research. On the contrary, the latter was seen as the engine of the 
progress in the pharmaceutical sector and a means to improve public health through 
new medicines. 
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237 PALLINI, Invenzioni Farmaceutiche, p. 427. However, see the work of BOLDRINE and LEVINE, Against 
Intellectual Monopoly, Chapter 9: The Pharmaceutical Industry, available at 
http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/papers/imbookfinal09.pdf, where the authors support the idea that the 
productivity of the Italian pharmaceutical industry was not undermined by the impossibility to patent 
pharmaceutical products. In particular, they affirm “the possibility of freely imitating products patented elsewhere 
favoured the creation of a large number of Italian imitative firms, which improved upon existing products and, at the 
same time, allowed for their diffusion at much lower prices. In spite of this, the forty largest Italian firms (out of about 
500, until the late 1970s) did not simply imitate but developed their own products and innovated extensively, either by 
using existing products as ingredients (25%) or by using products which were not patentable or with expired patents 
(31%)”. During the period 1961-1980 a total of 1282 new active chemical compounds was discovered around 
the world. Of these, a total of 119 came from Italy (9.28%). During the period 1980-1983 a total of 108 
compounds were discovered. Of these, 8 came from Italy (7.5%). SCHERER, A Note on Global Welfare in 
Pharmaceutical Patenting, in The World Economy, no. 27(7), 2004, p. 122, confirms this by saying“…research by 
Sandy Weisburst and mentored by me showed, for example, that Italy, with a vibrant generic drug industry, did not 
achieve any significant increase in the discovery of innovative drugs during the first decade after the Italian Supreme 
Court mandated the issue of pharmaceutical product patents.” Cf. with CAMPANELLA, La politica dei farmaci in Italia 
con particolare riferimento ai problemi della ricerca scientifica, in QUERINI, La concentrazione industriale. Problemi 
teorici e considerazioni empiriche con particolare riferimento all’industria farmaceutica, 1979; FERRAGUTO, LUCIONI 
and ONIDA, L’industria farmaceutica italiana. L’innovazione tecnologica, 1983.  
238 ITALIAN CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, judgement n. 20 of 20 March 1978, in case Dr. Madaus & Co. ed altri contro 
Ufficio Centrale Brevetti. The Court also maintained that art. 14 of the Royal Decree was contrary to the 
principle of equality set forth by art. 3 of the Italian Constitution, because “pone in condizione di svantaggio le 
imprese che organizzano la ricerca stessa rispetto a quelle che si avvalgono, puramente e semplicemente, della 
possibilità di imitare le invenzioni altrui, realizzate in Italia e all’estero”. See comments on the judgement from 
UBERTAZZI and GROPPALI, in Rass. Dir. Farm., 1978, p. 301-317. 
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The Italian Constitutional Court acknowledged that in this context patents play 
an essential function, as they keep alive companies’ incentive to invest in innovation, to 
the benefit of society. For this reason, the Court considered that the best way to serve the 
collective interest in the field of pharmaceuticals was to allow the exercise of individual 
exclusive rights239. 
At the same time, the Court admitted that the need to discover new medicines 
and therapies that improve quality and length of life in society is necessarily coupled 
with the duty for public bodies to make them available and affordable to their citizens. 
In order to comply with the universality principle, the Court stated that the 
generalised access to medicines would have been ensured to citizens through public 
intervention on prices, especially through the tools of price controls and compulsory 
license240. The last two means in particular were, according to the Court, essential to 
grant the appropriate quantity of drugs to satisfy domestic demand and impede an 
excessive increase in price241. 
In sum, from the decision of the Court it can be inferred that public health should 
be protected and guaranteed through the necessary combination of two different 
policies: on the one hand, patents should be enforced to foster pharmaceutical 
innovation; on the other hand, regulation of prices should cap prices to a certain extent, 
in order to grant a generalised access to the new medicines. 
1.3 ‘Law in book’ v. ‘law in action’ 
From the analysis conducted in the previous sections, one can safely affirm that 
the IPRs and competition are complementary tools, which latu sensu pursue the common 
goal of economic efficiency242. And indeed, IPRs provide an equilibrium to the 
intersection between ‘property’ and ‘liberty’. 

239 MASSIMINO, Brevetto di base e Certificato Protettivo Complementare per le specialità medicinali: la conferma di un 
bilanciamento, in Dir. Pub. Com. Eur., 2000, no. 1, p. 306. 
240  FRANCESCHELLI, Ciarlatani, speziali, cit., p. 496-498. 
241 See comments on the judgement from UBERTAZZI and GROPPALI, cit., p. 301-317. RISTUCCIA, Il farmaco tra 
autorizzazioni amministrative e privative industriali, in Riv. Dir. Civ., no. 1, 1993, p. 91. For later comments on 
the issue, see PARDOLESI and GRANIERI, Alcune considerazioni sui rapporti tra proprietà intellettuale e concorrenza 
nel settore farmaceutico, in Dir. ind., 2002, p. 379. 
242 Confirmation of this view comes from the EU Commission Guidelines on the Application of Article 81 EC 
to Technology Transfer Agreements (‘TTBE Guidelines’), no. 7, where it is affirmed, “both bodies of law share 
the same basic objective of promoting consumer welfare and an efficient allocation of resources”. Similarly see US 
jurisprudence: in Atari Games v. Nintendo, 897 F.2d 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1990), the Court opined that “When [a] 
patented product is so successful that it creates its own economic market or consumes a large section of an existing 
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How this equilibrium takes place depends on how IPRs are exercised. 
For instance, the potential anti-competitive effects of patents are evident: 
depending on the characteristics of the market, they can facilitate the consolidation of a 
dominant position or even a monopoly. 
The described solution of coordination offered by IPRs, thus, remains in the 
domain of the ‘law in book’. The concrete interplay between IPRs and competition law, 
i.e. what is ‘law in action’, puts the interpreter in a situation of constant balancing of 
conflicting interests. 
Parallel trade of pharmaceuticals represents a meaningful example of fleeting 
boundaries in the intersection between free competition and IPRs, as well as of the 
tension existing between the need to grant wide access to medicines for patients and the 
need to reward pharmaceutical companies for their creativity efforts. 
Such a form of arbitrage, being a form of cross border trade, represents one of the 
most noteworthy examples of the opportunities available to economic agents in an 
integrated economic area. On the contrary, IPRs, which are characterised by 
territoriality, have an obvious propensity to interfere with the principle of free 
movement of goods driving the integration of the internal market. 
In addition, parallel trade constitutes a form of intrabrand competition capable of 
offering a cheaper choice to consumers, i.e. bringing allocative efficiency. But at the same 
time, by exerting pressure on the price of original products, it can reduce the IPR 
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market, the aims and objectives of patent and antitrust laws may seem, at first glance, wholly at odds. However, the 
two bodies of law are actually complementary, as both are aimed at encouraging innovation, industry and 
competition”. In the literature there is not a consensus about what is the ultimate goal of competition law. In 
US he thinking of the Chicago School was very much influential in instilling the idea such goal is efficiency 
intended as consumer welfare. See MURIS, Competition and Intellectual Property Policy: The Way Ahead 
(announcing the jointly-sponsored FTC/DOJ Hearings on Competition and Intellectual Property Law and 
Policy in the Knowledge-based Economy), who affirms that “The tensions between the doctrines tend to obscure 
the fact that, properly understood, IP law and antitrust law both seek to promote innovation and enhance consumer 
welfare”. BRODLEY, The Economic Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and Technological Progress, cit., 
p. 1023, affirms that competition law, besides being animated by social and political motivations, pursues 
the three objective of allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency; MOTTA, Competition Policy, Theory and 
Practice, 2004, p. 30, believes that competition policy is “the set of policies and laws which ensure that competition 
in the marketplace is not restricted in a way as to reduce economic welfare”. Partially contra to this opinion see 
BRUNNEL, Appropriability in Antitrust: how much is enough?, in 69 Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, p. 42, where he 
affirms that “This is not to say that dynamic efficiency considerations are unimportant or should be ignored […] But 
the limitations of dynamic efficiency analysis should be recognized, and the analysis should not obscure the “non-
economic” values that are inherent in antitrust policymaking”. It is known that this thinking has been embraced 
only partially in the EU, where competition law was shaped by the ordoliberal School of thought, which 
based its view on the economic freedom of market actors. Also, EU competition law bears market 
integration overtones that render it unique. 
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owner’s profits. From this point of view, the possibility to grant wider access to 
consumers through affordable prices for products may clash with the need to grant 
inventors the appropriability of their investments, in order to provide them an incentive 
to discover newer and better products. 
The acknowledgement of the existence of a certain degree of tension between 
IPRs and competition triggered a threefold action from European Institutions aimed at 
striking the balance between the two bodies of law: 
a) the Commission started from the early ‘60s to provide privates with 
guidelines to the appropriate use of IPRs through communications and 
regulations and the application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU243; 
b) the Council and the Parliament carried on, on the basis of the proposals of 
the Commission, an important program of harmonisation national laws on 
IPRs244; 
c) the EU Court have been constantly engaged in a long and progressive 
activity of interpretation, in order to establish what is the permitted use of 
IPRs under the rules of the Treaty. 
The scope of this Chapter is to analyse the third action mentioned. 
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243 See the Notice on patent licensing agreement, OJ n. 139, 24 December 1962, p. 2922, where the EU 
Commission applied the criterion of the “inherent restrictions” and exempted them from the application of 
Art. 101(1) TFEU. Such criterion has been revised and the Notice repealed with the EU Commission 
Regulation (EC) No. 2349/84 of 23 July 1984, with which the Commission started embracing the idea that 
there are exclusivity clauses linked to the patent rights that may fall within the scope of such provision. The 
position of the Commission on the issue has been refined with the Regulation No 240/96 of 31 January 1996 
and with the Regulation (EC) No 772/2004 of 27 April 2004 on the application of Article 85(3) of the Treaty 
to certain categories of technology transfer agreements. At the same time, the Commission released the 
Guidelines for the application of Art. 81 EC to technology transfer agreements. See also infra Section 4 of this 
Chapter. 
244 With regards to patents, see the European Convention on patents signed in Munich in 1973 and in force 
from 1978, which established a centralised system of notification that allowed the patentee to register its 
patent contemporarily in all adhering States. See the Convention on the Community Patent signed in 
Luxembourg 1975, which establishes the possibility to obtain a patent valid in all Member States. The 
Convention, however, never entered into force. With regards to trademarks, see the Council Directive n. 
89/104/EC of the 21 December 1988, containing different aspects of the trademark disciplines, e.g. the 
exhaustion (see fn 276 below); the Council Regulation no. 40/49 of the 20 December 1993 on the Community 
trademark. With regards to copyrights, see the Council Directive no. 93/98/EC of the 29 October 1993 
harmonising the duration of copyright and other connected rights. 
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2. The relationship between intellectual property rights and competition law 
under the EU Treaty 
Under EU law, the balance between competition policy goals and IPRs has been 
shaped by the architecture of the EU Treaty, as interpreted by the EU Courts245. The 
consolidation of these principles into an organic and systematic set of rules de facto 
provides a second layer of regulation of IPRs246. The Court, in fact, always maintained 
that the exercise of intellectual property right must in principle be compatible with the 
rules of free movement of goods (Artt. 34-36 TFEU), as well as with those regarding 
competition law (Artt. 101-102 TFEU). 
As seen in the previous Chapter247, in the field of free of movement of goods, the 
Treaty itself provides for an explicit balance mechanism. 
The prohibition of quantitative restrictions to trade, and of any equivalent 
measures to such restrictions, is accompanied by the provisions set forth by Article 36 
TFEU, which states that ‘the protection of industrial and commercial property’248 can justify 
impediments to import or export among Member States, as long as it does not constitute 
a ‘means of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction on trade’. 
Despite the existence of this framework, the rules on the free movement of goods 
‘articulate a conflict between two competing interests’249, namely the goal of free trade in the 
establishment of the common market and the need to safeguard the national interest in 
respect of industrial property rights. Whereas the former is concerned with the fusion of 
national markets into one single market, the latter is inherently territorial250. This 
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245 See the opinion of AG Jacobs in case C-10/89 HAG GF (see better infra), affirming at para. 10 that the 
Treaty does not lay down any exhaustive code of rules, but ‘[i]t merely provides a skeleton. The task of putting 
flesh on the bones falls to the Community legislature and to the Court of Justice’. 
246 See ANDERMAN, The interface between intellectual property rights and competition policy, 1998, p. 3. Contra see 
REINDL, Intellectual Property and Intra-Community Trade, in Fordham Corp. Law Inst., 1996, p. 453; GOVAERE, The 
Use and Abuse of Intellectual Property Rights in EC Law, 1996, who maintain that IPRs and EU competition law 
should be viewed as of equal weight under EU law. 
247 See infra Section 4 of Chapter I. 
248 Such provision contained in Art. 36 TFEU should be read in conjunction with Art. 345 TFEU, which reads 
as follows: “This Treaty shall in no way prejudice the rules in Member States governing the system of property 
ownership.” Art. 345 TFEU is designed to protect the national systems of property ownership. It prevents 
Community law from interfering with the status or ownership of industrial and commercial property rights. 
249 See the opinion of AG Jacobs in HAG GF, at para. 9. 
250 See COPINGER and SKONE, Copyright, 1980, p. 1016, saying: “The fact that an industrial property right is the 
creature of the national laws of the State granting the right necessarily places limits on the territory within which such 
right is effective. This has been referred to as the ‘territoriality principle’ of industrial property rights, ... but it is really 
no more than a necessary reflection of the territorial limit to the sovereignty of the State concerned.” 
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triggered an intense work of reconciliation of these two conflicting forces co-existing 
under the Treaty from the ECJ. 
With regards to competition law rules, the Treaty contains no comparable 
balance. Therefore, the interplay between competition law and intellectual property 
rights has been entirely built on the interpretative work of the EU Courts, on a case-by-
case basis. 
Such balancing has been made in light of the principle set forth by the former 
Article 3(g) EC (repealed by the Lisbon Treaty), which required the institution of a 
system to ensure that competition in the internal market is not distorted, where Articles 
81 and 82 EC (now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU) were (and still are even under the new 
Treaty) the means available to achieve such goal251, as well as by largely borrowing from 
the principles developed by the Court in the field of free movement of goods. 
2.1 In search of a compromise (I): existence v. exercise of an IPR 
The foundations of the current form of reconciliation between competition law 
and IPRs trace back to the landmark case Consten and Grundig252, where a German 
manufacturer used its trademark, registered also in France by its exclusive distributor, to 
stop exports by an unauthorised distributor from Germany into France. The 
Commission condemned the practice as contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU, because it was 
giving absolute protection from imports to the authorised distributor, and therefore it 
impeded goods protected by the trademark to freely circulate in the EEA. 
The defendant argued that the importation of the good protected by trademark 
constituted a counterfeit, since only the authorised distributor was entitled to use it. The 
defendants responded that such interpretation of the Treaty was contrary to Articles 34 
and 345 TFEU, because it impeded the IPR owner to benefit of a right whose existence 
was granted by national law. However, the Commission responded that the use of the 
trademark done by defendants was going beyond its function for which it was originally 
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251 Art. 101 TFUE voids “all agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and 
concerted practices which may affect trade between Member States and which have as their object or effect the 
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the common market”. Art. 102 TFUE prohibits “any abuse 
by one or more undertakings of a dominant position within the common market or in a substantial part of it shall be 
prohibited as incompatible with the common market in so far as it may affect trade between Member States.” 
252 ECJ, 13 July 1966, in joint cases C-56/64 e C-58/64 Établissements Consten S.à.R.L. and Grundig-Verkaufs-
GmbH v Commission of the European Economic Community. 
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granted, i.e. guaranteeing the origin of the good, because it was aimed at protecting the 
French market from competition253. 
The tension between national industrial policies and EU policies aimed at 
constructing a single market through competition and free trade was then evident. 
The way the ECJ stroke the balance is well known: the Court observed that there 
exists a fundamental distinction between the existence and the exercise of an IPR254. EU 
law does not interfere with the existence granted at a national level of an IPR but only 
limits its exercise when this runs contrary to the Treaty’s provisions. Articles 34 and 345 
EC, in the view of the Court, cannot limit the scope of competition rules and thus do not 
impede that the exercise of rights granted at national level is scrutinised under the 
principles of EU competition law. 
It follows that the exercise of the exclusive right can fall under the prohibition set 
out by the Treaty, for instance, when, by preventing imports from other Member States, 
it is a means to partition the common market. 
In the specific case, the defendant was the owner of a valid right nationally 
granted, but the exercise of such right was linked to an agreement that could have 
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253 See the EU Commission decision of 23 September 1964 IV-A/00004-03344 Grundig-Consten, p. 2547 and 
2548. 
254 See KORAH, Dividing the Common Market through National Industrial Property Rights, in MLR, 1972, no. 32, p. 
634, at 636, affirming that the distinction between the existence and the exercise of an intellectual property 
right is a tenuous one, since the way in which a property right is exercised is the practical expression of its 
existence; CORNISH, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks and Allied Rights, 1989, p. 21, where 
he states that “[…] these definitions have the appearance of being formulated only in the wake of a policy decision to 
give preference to EEC policies beyond a certain point. All this may seem an exercise in legal obscurantism, but the 
basic intent is not hard to grasp: intellectual property rights are properly exercised when used against goods that come 
from independent competitors in trade; but they are not to be used against the movement from one Member State to 
another of goods initially connected with the right owner.” Similarly JOLIET, Patented Articles an the Free Movement 
of Goods within the EEC, in Current Legal Problems, 1975, no. 28, p. 15, at 23-24; and AG Fennelly in his opinion 
in the Joined Cases C-267 and 268/95, Merck & Co. Inc., Merck Sharp & Dohme Ltd and Merck Sharp & Dohme 
International Services BV v Primecrown Ltd, Ketan Himatlal Mehta, Bharat Himatlal Mehta and Necessity Supplies 
Ltd and Beecham Group plc v Europharm of Worthing Ltd.Merck (ruling of the ECJ, 5 December 1996), at para. 
97: “The distinction between the ‘existence’ and the ‘exercise’ of rights can, at times, be quite unreal; it has not been 
referred to in recent case-law […] and may now, at least in so far as the interpretation of Articles 30 to 36 of the Treaty 
is concerned, be discarded.” FLORIDIA and LAMANDINI, Privative Industriali e artt. 30-36 e 86 del Trattato: la Corte di 
Giustizia può risolvere la vexata quaestio dei pezzi di ricambio, in Contratto e Impresa/Europa, 1998, p. 144 et seq., 
suggest that the distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘exercise’ of an IPR was functional to the national 
character of IPR law. The Court was therefore (temporarily) entrusting Member States of the definition of 
the requirements necessary to grant the existence of IPRs, confident of an upcoming (but never realised) 
harmonisation. However, the authors believe that the distinction may have lost meaning, given the 
progressive trend of determining the existence of IPRs at Community level (see, for instance, the 
Supplementary Certificate Protection established by Council Regulation (EEC) No 1768/92 of 18 June 1992 
concerning the creation of a supplementary protection certificate for medicinal products). 
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violated Article 101(1) TFEU255. In particular, the defendant’s behaviour frustrated the 
rules of competition law and prevented intrastate trade through the use of its trademark 
right. Permitting that would have reduced the Treaty to empty words256.  
In practice the Court singled out three categories in the interface between EU law 
and IPRs: 
1. Existence, whose conditions remain competence of Member States (as there 
is no competition interest in how Member States grant IPRs)257; 
2. Permitted exercise, and, 
3. Prohibited exercise, which are both determined by EU competition law and 
free movement of goods. 
With this categorization, the negative interference between competition law and 
IPRs did not take place, at least in relation to the existence and to the permitted exercise. 
Whilst this conceptualisation represented a nice practical solution to the 
presented trade off, still it does not consider that any exercise of an IPR can potentially 
go against competition rules, given that by definition the bundle of rights embedded 
into it restricts competition258. 
The Court in Parke Davis grasped this problem and affirmed that “a patent taken 
by itself and independently of any agreement of which it may be subject… exhibits none of the 
elements of contract or concerted practice required by art. 85(1). Nevertheless it is possible that 
the provisions of this article may apply if the use of one or more patents, in concert between 
undertakings, should lead to the creation of a situation which may come within the concepts of 
agreements between undertakings, decision of associations of undertakings or concerted practices 
within the meaning of article 85(1).”259 
Still, the Court reaffirmed the above-mentioned distinction between existence 
and exercise of an IPR, by saying that a patent is merely the expression of a legal status 
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255 See Consten and Grundig, pp. 522-523. 
256 The Court found that neither Art. 36 TFEU or Art. 345 TFEU could operate to exclude ‘any influence 
whatever of Community law on the exercise of national intellectual property rights’. 
257 See ECJ, 6 April 1995, Joined Cases C-214/91 P and C-242/91 P Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent 
Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v. Commission of the European Communities (also known as ‘Magill’), where the 
Court affirmed that ‘in the absence of Community standardisation or harmonisation of laws, determination the 
conditions and procedures for granting protection of an intellectual property right is a matter for international rules’. 
258 See PAPPALARDO, Il Diritto Comunitario della Concorrenza. Profili Sostanziali, 2007, p. 745. 
259 See ECJ, 29 February 1968, in case C-24/67, Parke Davis and Co. v Probel, where the Court decided that a 
Dutch patent could be used to prevent the import to Holland of drugs put on the market in Italy, where no 
patent protection was possible. In particular, see para. 72. 
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granted by Members States, whose ‘normal exercise’ shall not interfere with the rules set 
forth in the Treaty260. 
But what is the ‘normal exercise’ of an IPR? 
The ECJ inferred such concept from the interpretation of Article 36 TFEU. 
In Sirena261, the ECJ affirmed that, in line with the first paragraph of this 
provision, agreements that strictly pertain to the IPRs, i.e. they contain clauses that are 
necessary for their existence, are excluded from the application of the principle of free 
circulation of goods (as well as of competition rules262). Such immunity, however, does 
not apply when the clauses constitute a means for discrimination or dissimulated 
restraints to trade among Member States, as the second part of Article 36 TFEU states. 
Similarly, agreements that contain restrictions to trade or to competition, which are not 
necessary for the existence of IPRs are immediately caught by this provision263. 
In other words, Article 36 TFEU admits derogations from the rules of the internal 
market only to the extent that such exceptions are justified for the purpose of 
safeguarding the rights that constitute the core of the IPR. From this, it follows that the 
normal exercise of an IPR encompasses those exclusivity rights necessary to realise the 
essential function for which the right has been conferred, or, as it will be defined later, its 
specific subject matter (see infra). 
For instance, the use of an IPR that imposes additional restrictive effects on 
competition to those already inherent to the IPR, which are realised by the owner 
through the exploitation of his market power (like leveraging its dominant position from 
a market to another one) may constitute a prohibited exercise of an IPR and for this 
reason may be subject to antitrust scrutiny. 
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260 See Parke Davis and cf. with ECJ, 14 July 1981, in case C-187/80, Merck & Co. Inc. v Stephar BV and Petrus 
Stephanus Exler: the elements of the case were essentially the same, except for the fact that it was the Dutch 
patentee who had put the drugs onto the market in Italy. It was held that it was not permissible to use a 
patent to prevent importation from Italy in this circumstance. 
261 See ECJ, 18 February 1971, in case C-40/70, Sirena S.r.l. v Eda S.r.l. and others. An Italian trademark owner 
brought action against the German owner of the same trademark, because the former was exporting into 
Italy. The Court envisaged the existence of an agreement between the two, in order to apply Art. 101(1) 
TFEU and condemn the attempt to stop export from the Italian trademark owner. 
262 The Court explicitly said that although Art. 36 TFEU belongs to the dispositions related to restrictions to 
trade among Member States, it is based on a principle that is applicable to competition law rules as well, in 
the sense that even if IPRs attributed by the legislation of a Member States are not included in Articles 101 
and 102 TFEU, they can always fall within the scope of such provisions. See Sirena, p. 69. 
263 See Sirena, p. 69. 
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2.2 In search of a compromise (II): the ‘specific subject matter’ 
In the first phase of the jurisprudential stream dealing with the tension between 
national industrial policies and EU goals, the ECJ saw in the competition law rules a 
means to remove obstacles to the integration of the internal market. 
Such approach has been subject to criticism. In Consten and Grundig, the Court 
saw an agreement between Consten and Grundig in the joint registration of the 
trademark Gint in France. However, the defendants claimed that the lamented negative 
effect on competition derived not from an agreement, but from the existence of an IPR 
that conferred an exclusive right pursuant national law264. 
In Sirena, the judge envisaged the existence of an agreement where its elements 
were not clearly proved. In fact, the parties acquired the same trademark in a different 
period, and no economic or financial connection existed between them. The Court, 
nevertheless, affirmed that the existence of the agreement resided in the contract signed 
by the importer to purchase the trademark. This, together with the negative effect on 
intrastate trade, was considered sufficient for the application of the provision.  
For this reason, it has been argued that the Court had been pursuing the policy 
objective of common market integration, through a non-orthodox application of 
competition rules265. At the same time, the non-application of competition rules to those 
cases would have created a gap that impeded to condemn practices that de facto ran 
contrary to the objectives of the Treaty. 
This loophole in the system has been filled in by the Court through the recourse 
to the rules on free movement of goods. 
Already in Parke Davis, the Court also touched upon the real issue behind the 
whole problem, when affirmed that ‘the national character of the protection of industrial 
property and the variations between the different legislative systems on this subject are capable of 
creating obstacles both to the free movement of the patented products and to competition within 
the Common Market’266. 
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264 See Consten and Grundig, p. 522. See PAPPALARDO, Il Diritto Comunitario della Concorrenza, cit., p. 736. 
265 Among many see PAPPALARDO, Il Diritto Comunitario della Concorrenza, cit., p. 746. See Sirena, p. 82. 
266 See Parke Davis, pars. 71. 
 107
In Deutsche Grammophon267, a German undertaking manufacturing owner of a 
copyright on sound recordings used its exclusive right of distribution to prohibit the 
import from France into Germany of sound recordings which had itself supplied to its 
French subsidiary. 
The Court, drawing especially from Sirena, recalled that while the existence of an 
IPR is protected under both Articles 36 and 345 TFEU, the exercise of an IPR may violate 
the rules contained in the Treaty. The reasoning goes, when such exercise runs against 
the free movement of goods, it should be verified whether there are grounds for 
justifications under Article 36 TFEU. The latter, being an exception to the paradigm of 
free movement, should apply as long as this derogation is indispensable to protect the 
rights that constitute the specific subject matter of the IPR. Therefore, any exercise of IPRs 
that contrasts the rule of free circulation of goods is justified only when it is functional to 
the realisation of the IPR’s specific subject matter. Any other use of IPRs that exceed their 
specific subject matter is considered unjustified under the rules on free movement and 
prohibited268. 
The next issue is to understand what is a ’subject matter’269. 
The specific subject matter of a trademark has been defined by the ECJ as ‘the 
guarantee that the owner of the trademark has the exclusive right to use that trademark, for the 
purpose of putting products protected by the trademark into circulation for the first time, and is 
therefore intended to protect him against competitors wishing to take advantage of the status and 
reputation of the trademark by selling products illegally bearing the trademark’. 
Further the Court said that the essential function of a trademark is to: ‘… 
guarantee the identity of the origin of the trademarked product to the consumer or ultimate user, 
by enabling him without any possibility of confusion to distinguish that product from products 
which have another origin. This guarantee of origin means that the consumer or ultimate use can 
be certain that a trademarked product which is sold to him has not been subject at a previous 
stage of marketing to interference by a third person, without the authorisation of the proprietor of 
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267 See ECJ, 8 June 1971, C-78/70 Deutsche Grammophon GmbH v. Metro-SB-Groomarkte GmbH & Co. KG. 
268 On the basis of this qualification, in his opinion on the case Magill, the AG Gulman inferred that the 
concept of ‘existence’ is not confined to the conditions that have to be fulfilled to qualify for the grant of an 
IPR, but it encompasses both the notion of ‘normal exercise’, ‘permitted exercise’ and ‘specific subject 
matter’. However, see ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, 1998, p. 12, noting that 
the application of the two concepts often generated confusion. 
269 CORNISH, Intellectual Property: Patents, Copyright, Trade Marks, cit., p. 43. 
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the trademark, such as to affect the original condition of the product. The right attributed to the 
proprietor of preventing any use of the trademark which is likely to impair the guarantee of origin 
so understood s therefore part of the specific subject-matter of the trademark right’270. 
With regards to patents, the Court affirmed that the specific subject matter is the 
‘guarantee that the patentee, to reward the creative effort of the inventor, has the exclusive right 
to use an invention with a view to manufacturing industrial products and putting them into 
circulation for the first time, either directly or by the grant of licenses to third parties, as well as 
the right to oppose infringements’271. 
The subject matter of copyrights has been defined much later by the ECJ, which 
in Volvo stated “the right of the proprietor of a protected design to prevent third parties from 
manufacturing and selling or importing, without its consent, products incorporating the design 
constitutes the very subject-matter of his exclusive right”272. 
The Court clarified in several instances that the use of the IPR from third parties 
wishing to export goods protected by such IPR did not deprive it of its specific subject 
matter, as it was defined by the ECJ, and therefore it did not infringe the exclusivity right 
of the proprietor. On the contrary, the use of the IPR from the owner in order to prevent 
parallel trade was considered beyond the protection of the specific subject matter of the 
IPR and, because it contributed to the isolation of national markets, contrary to the rules 
on free movement of goods. 
According to the revisited approach taken by the ECJ, the owner of an IPR 
conferred by national law, who impeded other firms to commercialise the good 
protected by that exclusive right in a given Member State, was contravening the rules on 
free movement of goods, and not competition law rules. But, the negative effect on 
competition and on free movement of goods was not to be attributed to individual firms 
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270 See ECJ, 23 May 1978, in case C-102/77, Hoffmann-La Roche et Co. AG v. Centrafarm Vertriebsgesellschaft 
Pharmazeutischer Erzeugnisse MBH, para. 7. Cf. GENDREAU, An Intellectual Property Renaissance in European 
Community Law, in IRISH, STEWART and TAWFIK, International Trade and Intellectual Property, 1994, p. 51. 
271 See ECJ, 31 October 1974, in case C-15/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v Sterling Drug Inc., p. 1162, 
n. 9. See also the definition provided by AG Trabucchi in his opinion on the case at para. 4: “The real essence 
of the protection conferred on the patent owner is the exclusive right to manufacture and market the patented product, 
given to compensate him as the inventor of a process and bring him a financial reward for his efforts and the 
commercial risks he runs, and it is recognized on a purely temporary basis...”. See SNELL, Free Movement of 
Pharmaceutical Products: An Overdose of Cheap Drugs?, in EBLR, 2003, no. 29(2), p. 513. 
272 See ECJ, 5 October 1988, in case C-238/87 AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd, para. 8. 
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that were exercising their exclusive right by virtue of the law of Member States, but to 
Member States themselves273. 
Such approach has been confirmed by the ECJ in Hag I274, where, similarly to 
Sirena, no agreement between the two owners of the same IPR in two different Member 
States existed. In that occasion the judges explicitly refused the previous approach by the 
ECJ and affirmed that in absence of an agreement to be scrutinized under Article 101(1) 
TFEU, the case was to be examined in the light of the rules on free movement of goods. 
At this regard, the judge maintained that the exclusivity right enjoyed by an IPR owner 
does not entitle him to stop distribution from non-authorized firms in a given Member 
State of goods having the same origin, i.e. produced by the IPR owner under the same 
trademark in another Member State275. 
From this judgement onwards, the EU jurisprudence on the subject started to 
split in two strands: one stream focused on competition law rules to be applied to 
undertakings whenever it was clear that impediment to parallel trade derived from 
restrictive agreements or from the abuse of dominant position; the other one was based 
on the application of the rule of free movement of goods to Member States, when 
obstacles to parallel trade came from the inappropriate use of the exclusivity right. 
 
3. The principle of ‘regional exhaustion’ 
From the above, it appears that the ECJ was not able, until Deutsche Grammophon, 
to properly solve the impasse that arose in Consten and Grundig. 
As emphasized in the previous section, national law may give the IPR owner the 
right to impede the re-importation of a good protected by his, or her IPR, into a country 
where the latter is recognised. But, it may also occur the opposite case and the IPR 
owner may not be allowed to prevent re-imports, when the country applies the 
exhaustion of the mentioned right, i.e. the loss of the right to further control goods’ 
movement after first sale (see better infra)276. 
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273 See Deutsche Grammophon, p. 500. 
274 ECJ, 3 July 1974, in case C-192/73, Van Zuylen frères v Hag AG (Hag I). 
275 See Hag I, p. 742. However, notice that the test based on the common origin will be reversed some years 
later in the case C-10/89 CNL-SUCAL NV v. HAG GF AG (Hag II), and abandoned in favour of the principle 
of consent (see infra). 
276 At the time of the entry into force of the Treaty between the original Member States, virtually all of the 
national patent laws limited the patentee’s monopoly to the first sale (the US first sale doctrine applied in 
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The former case, preventing free circulation of goods, collides with the goal of the 
internal market. 
The attribution of the market segmentation effects to Member States granting 
exclusive rights that permitted the impediment of re-imports within the territory of the 
said Member State, instead of ascribing the obstacle to market integration to firms which 
were merely exercising such rights, opened the way to the solution to the problem and 
gave rise to the doctrine of the ‘regional exhaustion’ of IPRs277. 
In Deutsche Grammophon, the ECJ maintained that national rights of exclusivity of 
an IPR-owner cannot be used to prevent the import and distribution of products, which 
have been marketed in another Member State by the IPR-owner himself with his 
consent, or by a person economically or legally dependent on him. A similar 
impediment would in fact amount to a violation of Article 34 TFEU. 
Otherwise stated, once a good is legally produced and placed onto the market 
within the EU by the owner of the right, the latter cannot use its trademark, copyright or 

Adams v Burke 84 US 453 (1873) is commonly considered the first application of the exhaustion principle) of 
the patented product, either as a result of the statutory definition of patent infringements or as a result of an 
express exhaustion doctrine. The accession of the common law Member States to the Community somewhat 
altered the picture: United Kingdom and Irish patent laws are different because purchasers of patent-
protected products are allowed to use such products under the fiction that an implied licence is granted on 
their sale by the patentee. This system is also called ‘optional exhaustion’ and is mainly applied in most of the 
common-law countries including Australia, Canada, New Zealand and the United Kingdom. According to 
this theory, an exhaustion of the exclusive rights is presumed if the owner of the IPRs abstained from 
imposing in the sale contract restrictions with regard to the use, sale or distribution of the product by the 
acquirer. In the absence of any restriction embodied in the sale contract, purchasers will be able to freely 
dispose of the goods covered by an IPR. On the other hand, no exhaustion of exclusive rights takes place if 
the title-holder imposes strict conditions with regard to the use and distribution of the product in a sale 
contract or in a restrictive licensing agreement. See DEMARET, Patents, Territorial Restrictions and EEC Law: A 
Legal and Economic Analysis, in IIC Studies in Industrial Property and Copyright Law, 1978, no. 2, Ch. 3. 
277 According to the ‘exhaustion of intellectual property rights’, from the moment of first sale the product can 
freely circulate along the distribution chain within a given market and in those countries where the 
manufacturer did not apply for the intellectual property right. Given the territoriality of IPRs, traditionally, 
exhaustion was limited to national territories and thus referred to as ‘national exhaustion’. Nevertheless, some 
countries apply the principle of ‘international exhaustion’, where after the good is put into the market the IPR 
protecting such good is considered exhausted everywhere in the world and re-importation in the country of 
origin is allowed. On the contrary, if the principle of ‘national exhaustion’ is applied, the IPR is considered 
exhausted only within the country of origin. It follows that re-importation from other countries is illegal. 
The ‘regional exhaustion’ option is a choice that stands in the middle of the two, where free circulation of 
goods after the first sale is allowed only within the European Economic Area. The above principles of 
exhaustion, which have their origin in continental Europe, are also called ‘automatic exhaustion’. See for 
discussion FORSYTH and ROTHNIE, Parallel Imports, in ANDERMAN, The Interface between Intellectual Property 
Rights and Competition Policy, cit., p. 429; AMMANN, Intellectual Property Rights and Parallel Imports, in Legal 
Issues of Economic Integration, 1999, no. 26(1-2), pp. 91-122; YUSUF and MONCAYO VON HASE, Intellectual 
Property Rights and International Trade – Exhaustion of Rights Revisited, in World Competition, 1992/93, no. 6(1), 
p. 115-131. 
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patent right to hinder the further sale of the product elsewhere in the EU, except in 
exceptional circumstances where, for example, public health is at risk278. 
The exclusivity right (of production and first commercialisation) of the IPR 
owner is, in other words, exhausted in the moment he/she voluntarily puts the goods 
protected by IPR in one of the national markets belonging to the EU. A different 
solution, in fact, would entail the fragmentation of the internal market and frustrate one 
of the main goals of the EU Treaty. 
After the first sale, thus, the owner of the IPR is entitled to enforce only those 
rights that are essential to it and that are damaged by third parties’ activity.  
The exhaustion of the IPR is based on the principle of the consent279. Goods should 
be placed on the market with the IPR owner’s consent for the rights connected to the IPR 
to be exhausted. 
The jurisprudence considers such consent as given when the good accessed the 
market through the IPR owner (of his own free will, not by expropriation or under a 
compulsory licence, as the Court had the chance to clarify later (see infra)), or through an 
authorised licensee280. Also, any connection – legal, economic, financial or technical – 
between enterprises is considered sufficient to infer the existence of ‘consent’. So, for 
instance, if the marketing of a product is by one subsidiary of a group, or by a 
manufacturing licensee, or the licensor, none of the latter can object to parallel 
importation. 
Only if the IPR has been assigned so as to belong to different owners in separate 
countries will there be no exhaustion281. But even then, when this arrangement that 
forms part of an agreement, is a mere pretext to partition the internal market, 
competition law rules come into play again and it may well be that the latter falls within 
the scope of Article 101 TFEU. 
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278 As it will defined later by the ECJ, 31 October 1974, in case C-16/74, Centrafarm BV et Adriaan de Peijper v 
Winthrop BV and in Centrafarm v Sterling. 
279 See para. 12 of the judgment in Deutsche Grammophon, where the Court referred to the principle of consent 
before even formulating the exhaustion principle: “If a right related to copyright is relied upon to prevent the 
marketing in a Member State of products distributed by the holder of the right or with his consent on the territory of 
another Member State on the sole ground that such distribution did not take place on the national territory, such a 
prohibition, which would legitimize the isolation of national markets, would be repugnant to the essential purpose of 
the Treaty, which is to unite national markets into a single market.” 
280 See ECJ, 14 September 1982, in case C-144/81, Keurkoop BV v Nancy Kean Gifts BV, p. 2873, n. 5. 
281 See ECJ, 22 June 1994, in case C-9/93, IHT v. Ideal Standard, in relation to trademarks. 
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3.1 The exhaustion of trademarks 
The identification of circumstances that allow derogation from the principle of 
free movement of goods, i.e. of situations where ‘consent’ has not been expressed, has 
been the object of many cases concerning pharmaceuticals before the ECJ282. 
With regards to trademarks, there is a flourishing case law dealing with the issue 
of whether there are legitimate reasons for the IPR owner to oppose the circulation of the 
goods. These cases are particularly important in the field of pharmaceuticals, because 
most Member States require pharmacists to dispense drugs in their original packaging 
and, for some reason or another, package sizes and quantities prescribed quite often 
vary considerably across Member States. 
In Centrapharm v. Winthorp283, a pharmaceutical company tried to prevent the sale 
in the Netherlands of a medicine it had previously marketed in England, by invoking its 
Dutch trademark rights, while simultaneously enjoying parallel rights in the United 
Kingdom. 
The Court established that beyond the protection of the specific subject matter of 
the trademark, its exercise aimed at preventing parallel importation of genuine goods 
from other Member States, is contrary to the provisions of the EU Treaty on free 
movement of goods. The ECJ confirmed the key role of consent to the exhaustion of 
rights. If the goods are placed on the market by the trademark holder itself, or with its 
consent, the exclusivity rights connected to the IPR are exhausted. 
In subsequent cases, the ECJ set forth the conditions under which the trademark 
owner may prevent or not prevent such action. 
In Hoffmann-La Roche v. Centrafarm, Hoffmann brought an action for infringement 
of its German trademark when Centrafarm obtained in the UK drugs, which it then 
repackaged (to comply with German packing requirements) before selling them there, 
using Hoffmann’s trademark. Hoffmann argued that repackaging interfered with the 
essential function of the trademark, i.e. the indication of the origin and guarantee of the 
quality of the product. 
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282 CORNISH, The free Movement of Goods I: Pharmaceuticals, Patents and Parallel Imports, in GOLBERG and 
LONBAY, Pharmaceutical Medicines, Biotechnology and European Law, 2000, p. 19, affirms that the fact most of 
cases were on pharmaceuticals is due to the very different regulatory regimes present in each Member States 
that cause large price differentials, which in turn spur parallel trade. 
283 See Centrafarm v Winthrop, p. 1194. 
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The ECJ rejected this claim. It held that the trademark owner could not impede 
the repackaging of the product without artificially partitioning the market. However, the 
repackaging activity should be done in a way that users are not confused and that the 
original conditions of the product are not negatively affected. In particular the parallel 
importer has to indicate in the box that the goods have been repackaged, and by whom. 
Also, he has to notify the trademark owner of its intention to repack284. Absent these 
conditions, the trademark owner is entitled to oppose repackaging285. 
In Bristol-Myer Squibb286, the Court dealt again with the issue of repackaging of 
pharmaceutical products from parallel importers. In this case, the parallel importer went 
one step further: not only it repackaged the product, but it introduced additional 
material or replaced it with a product coming from a source other than that of the 
original manufacturer287. Refining the criteria set by the Court in Hoffmann-La Roche v. 
Centrafarm, the ECJ identified five conditions under which repackaging does not infringe 
the right of the trademark owner: 
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284 See ISAAC, The free Movement of Goods II: Pharmaceuticals, Trademarks, and Parallel Imports, in GOLBERG and 
LONBAY, Pharmaceutical Medicines, Biotechnology and European Law, cit., p. 34, saying that the effect of Hoffman-
La Roche was to grant the parallel importer the right to re-affix the a registered trademark belonging to a 
third party, provided that the requirements indicated in the text were satisfied. This may give importers the 
opportunity to take advantage of trademarks and build up their own trademarks and good will. See on this 
issue GROSS and HARROLD, Fighting for Pharmaceutical Profits: the Decision of the ECJ in Boehringer Ingelheim v. 
Swingward, in EIPR, 2002, no. 10, p. 497-503, at 497. 
285 Such principles have been subsequently codified in the Directive 89/104/EC (the Trade Mark Directive) 
and in the Regulation EC n. 40/94 (the Community Trade Mark). See art. 7 Section 2 of the Trade Mark 
Directive: “1. The trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in relation to goods which have been put 
on the market in the Community under that trademark by the proprietor or with his consent. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not 
apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further commercialization of the goods, especially 
where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been put on the market”. See further art. 13 
Section 2 of the Regulation: “1. A Community trademark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit its use in 
relation to goods which have been put on the market in the Community under that trademark by the proprietor or with 
his consent. 2. Paragraph 1 shall not apply where there exist legitimate reasons for the proprietor to oppose further 
commercialization of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after they have been 
put on the market”. 
286 ECJ, 11 July 1996, in joined cases C-427/93, C-429/93 and C-436/93, Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova A/S 
(C-427/93) and C. H. Boehringer Sohn, Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Boehringer Ingelheim A/S v Paranova A/S (C-
429/93) and Bayer Aktiengesellschaft and Bayer Danmark A/S v Paranova A/S (C-436/93) (hereinafter, sometimes 
referred as ‘BMS’). 
287 In BMS, the plaintiff sought clarification as to whether the repackaging of goods and the inclusion of 
material of a different origin constituted a ‘legitimate reason’ within the meaning of Art. 7(2) of the 
Trademark Directive to object the repackaging or whether this provision should have been interpreted in 
light of previous jurisprudence.  
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i) The repackaging is necessary for the parallel trader to enter the market (so 
called ‘necessity requirement’)288, under which “the change brought about by any 
new carton or relabelling of a trade-marked medicinal product creates by its very 
nature real risks for the guarantee of origin which the mark seeks to protect. Such a 
change may thus be prohibited by the trade mark proprietor unless the new carton 
or relabelling is necessary in order to enable the marketing of the products imported 
in parallel and the legitimate interests of the proprietor are also safeguarded.” 289 
i) The repackaging does not alter the original conditions of the good; 
ii) The name of the importer, and of the firm which realised the repacking, if 
different from the importer, and of the producer shall appear in the box; 
iii) The presentation of the new package should not damage the reputation of 
the trademark and of its owner; 
iv) The importer, before selling the products in the new package, should 
inform the trademark owner and send him a mock-up. 
That last condition enables the proprietor to check that the repackaging is not 
carried out in such a way as directly or indirectly to affect the original condition of the 
product and that the presentation after repackaging is not likely to damage the 
reputation of the trade mark290. 
Subsequent case law291 clarified that the parallel importer bears the burden of 
proving compliance with the five conditions. As regards to the fifth condition, it is 
sufficient, however, that the parallel importer furnishes evidence that leads to the 
reasonable presumption that that condition has been fulfilled. This applies a fortiori also 
to the condition that the presentation of the repackaged product must not be such as to 
be liable to damage the reputation of the trademark and of its proprietor. Where the 
importer provides this initial evidence that the latter condition has been fulfilled, it will 
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288 This requirement has been inferred from the following passage contained in the BMS ruling at para. 56: 
“[T]he power of the owner of trademark rights protected in a Member State to oppose the marketing of repackaged 
products under the trade mark should be limited only insofar as the repackaging undertaken by the importers is 
necessary in order to market the product in the Member State of importation”. 
289 See ECJ, 12 October 1999, in case C-379/97 Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova, para. 39. 
290 See BMS, para. 78. 
291 See ECJ, 26 April 2007, in case C-348/04, Boehringer Ingelheim KG and Others v. Swingward Ltd and Others, 
Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Court of Appeal of England and Wales, and the subsequent 
decision from the Court of Appeal, 21 February 2008, in the case Boehringer Ingelheim & Ors v Dowelhurst 
Limited, 2000, basically following the decision of the ECJ. 
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then be for the proprietor of the trade mark, who is best placed to assess whether the 
repackaging is liable to damage his reputation and that of the trade mark, to prove that 
it has been damaged292. 
Also, the condition that the repackaging of the pharmaceutical product, inter alia 
by reboxing it, be necessary for its further marketing in the importing Member State is 
directed only at the fact of repackaging the product, and not at the manner or style in 
which it has been repackaged. Thus, the condition of necessity is directed only at the fact 
of repackaging the product, and not at the presentation of that new packaging293. 
A recent case, a reference from the Austrian Supreme Court to the ECJ294, raised a 
question as to whether there should be some principle of ‘minimum intervention’ 
limiting the right of the parallel importer to repackage. The Court held that it would be 
inconsistent to accept that there is no need to ascertain whether the presentation of the 
new packaging of the product in question, chosen by the parallel importer, is necessary 
for the further marketing of the product and, at the same time, to demand that the 
importer satisfy the criterion of the minimum possible adverse affect on trade mark 
rights295. 
With regards to parallel imports of identical products with different marks (re-
branding), the Court first affirmed in Centrafarm v. American Home Production that the 
trademark owner was entitled to prevent repackaging and subsequent resale of his 
product under a different name with respect to that used in the source country. 
However, later on in Pharmacia & Upjohn, the Court affirmed that if such change of name 
were necessary for the parallel importer to access the destination market, then this action 
would be permissible296. 
Another strand of the case law, mainly at national level, relates to the issue of co-
branding, i.e. the activity from parallel importers to affix their own trademark together 
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292 See Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward, para. 48 and 54. 
293 See Boehringer Ingelheim v. Swingward, para. 38 and 39. 
294 See ECJ, 22 December 2008, in case C-276/05 The Wellcome Foundation. 
295 See Wellcome v. Paranova, para. 27. 
296 See Pharmacia & Upjohn, para. 44: “the condition of necessity will not be satisfied if replacement of the trademark 
is explicable solely by the parallel importer’s attempt to secure a commercial advantage”. However, see what the AG 
Jacobs said in his opinion at para. 54: “I do not find it helpful to postulate a necessity of ‘purely commercial reasons’ 
which can never fall within the concept of necessity […] The decisive test is whether in a given case prohibiting the 
importer from re-branding would constitute an obstacle to effective access by him to the markets of the importing 
State”. 
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with the manufacturer’s. The case was referred from a Norwegian court to the EFTA 
Court297. The latter held, contrary to the national court, that ‘legitimate reasons’ may 
exist to oppose co-branding if this is liable to damage the reputation of the trademark. 
Therefore, this was an issue left to national Courts. Still, the EFTA court gave some 
indications: it held that the mere fact that a parallel importer gains additional advantage 
from a particular type of graphic design is, in itself, immaterial. Damage to the 
trademark could only be found where the repackaging may give the impression that 
there is a commercial connection between the importer and the manufacturer, or that the 
importer is part of the official distribution chain. 
Finally, the case law discussed the issue of de-branding. The UK Court of Appeal 
expressed the view that, “to say that removing (or not applying) the original supplier’s mark 
to the goods amounts to an infringement is absurd. There is simply no answer to the proposition 
‘no use, no infringement’ “. A trademark owner, therefore, has no right to insist that his 
trademark stays on the goods for the aftermarket298. 
3.2 The exhaustion of patents 
The Court defined for the first time the exhaustion of patents in Centrafarm v. 
Sterling Drug. Centrafarm purchased a drug called Negram in the UK and exported it to 
the Netherlands where prices were higher. Sterling Drug, which held the patents for the 
drug in both countries, brought an action against Centrafarm to prevent them selling in 
Holland. 
 The ECJ held that “the exercise, by a patentee, of the right which he enjoys under the 
legislation of a Member State to prohibit the sale, in that State, of a product protected by the 
patent which has been marketed in another Member State by the patentee or with his consent is 
incompatible with the rules of the EEC Treaty concerning the free movement of goods within the 
Common Market”299 
The Court recognized that the IPR might be invoked subject to the presence of a 
twofold condition: that the product is not patentable in the State of export and that it has 
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297 See EFTA Court, 8 July 2003, in case E-3/02, Paranova AS v. Merck and Co. Inc. & Others. 
298 See Boehringer Ingelheim v. Dowelhurst, para. 34. 
299 See Centrafarm v Sterling, cit., summary, para. 15. Similarly, for trademarks, see Centrafarm v. Winthorp, 
cit., para. 12. This general principle, based on the distinction between the existence and the exercise of IPRs, 
has been enshrined in EU legislation on industrial property. See article 7 of Council Directive 89/104/EEC 
of 21 December 1988 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to trademarks, which reiterates 
the case law of the ECJ. 
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been produced by a third party without patentee’s consent. Lacking this second 
condition, i.e. where the product was put onto the market in a legal manner, by the 
patentee himself or with his consent, derogations from the free movement of goods were 
not justified300. 
For instance, in Parke Davis, the two conditions were both missing: the 
pharmaceutical company invoked its Dutch patent for chloramphenicol in the Dutch 
Courts to prevent imports by Centrafarm and other companies of products 
manufactured by third parties in Italy, allegedly in breach of its patent, at a time when 
no patent could be obtained there for pharmaceutical products or their processes. 
However, at that time the Court had not developed the doctrine of exhaustion of IPRs 
yet, and could not rule on the basis of the principle of consent. 
Until the ‘80s, the Court never faced the situation where only one of the two 
conditions was satisfied, i.e. when parallel trade originates from a Member States where 
the company voluntarily put the product, which is not patentable there. 
The issue came up in Merck v. Stephar: Merck & Co. Inc. owned parallel patents in 
most Member States for Moduretic®, a pharmaceutical product used in the treatment of 
hypertension. It marketed the patented product in Italy at a time when patent protection 
was expressly excluded for pharmaceutical products and their manufacturing processes. 
Stephar purchased batches of the product sold in Italy by Merck and imported them into 
the Netherlands where, due to the prevailing high Dutch prices, it was able to undercut 
the prices charged by Merck. 
Merck argued that the impediments to import of a drug from Italy into the 
Netherlands where he had a patent did not run contrary to the rule of exhaustion, 
because there was no patent protection in Italy, and hence its sales in that country did 
not secure it any monopoly return. 
However, the Court, strictly following the principle of consent, maintained that 
even in that case the patent owner could not oppose the re-importation, since, by putting 
the good in the market, he was implicitly accepting the consequences of the rule of free 
circulation of goods within the EU301. 

300 See Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, para. 11. 
301 See Merck v. Stephar, cit., p. 2082, n. 11. 
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Subsequently, the Court showed more willingness to qualify the principle of 
exhaustion of intellectual property rights in cases concerning copyright, when the 
application of the principle appeared inappropriate to the Court due to the special 
features of the situation. In particular, the Court showed itself prone to consider 
divergences in national protection for copyright and the different legal nature of certain 
forms of copyright protection. 
In Coditel302, the Court affirmed that the right of a copyright owner to require fees 
for any showing of the film was part of the specific subject matter of the right. Also, the 
Court held that exclusive territories are necessary to enable the licensor to regulate the 
collection of royalties, and this formed the specific subject matter of the copyright, too. 
This approach was re-affirmed in subsequent case law303 where the Court 
emphasized that denying to the copyright owner the special rights conferred by 
domestic copyright law would be tantamount to a denial of the existence of the right 
itself. 
Also the evolution of Court’s attitude to the issue of common origin represented 
a qualification of the principle of regional exhaustion. In Hag I the Court held that 
prohibiting the marketing of a product in one Member State of a product covered by the 
a trademark, for the sole reason that the same mark is protected in the Member State of 
importation by another proprietor in circumstances where divided ownership is a result 
of expropriation, is contrary to free circulation of goods. In Hag II the ECJ held that the 
specific circumstances of the case were excluding the existence of consent on the part of 
the trademark owner. Therefore, each of the owners of the trademark was entitled to 
prevent the importation and marketing of the parallel mark304. 
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302 See the application of the doctrine of protection of copyright that is incorporated in a material form, as in 
products incorporating musical work and performing rights. See ECJ, 6 October 1982, in case C-55 and 
57/80 Coditel SA v. Ciné Vog Films SA, concerning licences of copyright in the film Le Boucher. A Belgian 
company, Ciné Vog, was given the exclusive licence for seven years for both film and television in Belgium 
and Luxembourg. The same happened in Germany with a German television company. However, a cable 
company picked the film showed in the German television and retransmitted in Belgium, thereby infringing 
the Ciné Vog’s exclusive right. 
303 See ECJ, 9 April 1987, in case C-402/85 Basset v. SACEM; ECJ, 17 May 1988, in case C-158/86 Warner 
Brothers Inc. v. Christiansen; ECJ, 24 January 1989, in case C-341/87 EMI Electrola Gmbh v. Patricia. 
304 See the opinion of the AG Jacobs in Hag II, para. 26. The doctrine was established in Hag I, and overruled 
in Hag II and in case C-9/93 IHT Internationale Heiztechnik GmbH v. Ideal-Standard GmbH. In Hag II, the AG 
Jacobs made clear that the doctrine of common origin “was not a legitimate creature of Community law”. 
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These developments in the case law triggered the question of whether the 
principle set forth in Merck v. Stephar had to be overruled. 
This answer came in Merck v. Primecrown305. The case called into question the 
legitimacy of a consensual exhaustion of rights in a market, like the pharmaceuticals, 
where regulatory intervention is substantial, and where patent protection had not 
existed before and a ‘Specific Mechanism’ was operational306. 
Despite the favourable opinion of the AG Fennelly towards a departure from the 
principle of consensual exhaustion, the Court finally decided that “if a patentee decides… 
to put a product on the market in a Member State in which it is not patentable, he must accept 
the consequences of his choice as regards the possibility of parallel imports”. The Court also 
stated that the only legitimate exception to the principle set forth in previous case law 
would be the existence of a genuine, existing legal obligation to market pharmaceutical 
products in a Member State. Only in that case the patentee could not be deemed to give 
his consent to the marketing of the product concerned307. 
The logic of the principle of the consent was replicated in Pharmon v. Hoechst308: a 
compulsory license was awarded in a Member State because of the failure by the 
patentee to exploit its patent. The ECJ held that there was no exhaustion in such 
circumstances, because there was no consent on the part of the patentee. In these 
circumstances the import of the goods could be prevented309. 
Some commentators saw a contradiction in the way the jurisprudence developed 
the principle of regional exhaustion. The latter does not apply when parallel imports 
originated from an involuntary source. However, a compulsory licence, which is likely 
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305 See Merck v Primecrown, p. I-6386, n. 36. This approach was extended also to copyrights: in Musik-Vertrieb 
v. GEMA, the Court held that the owner of a phonogram could not recover the difference in royalties 
between the country where the protected work was first marketed and the country of import, where a 
higher royalty was paid to copyright. 
306 For a definition of the Specific Mechanism see fn 126 in Chapter I. 
307 The reasoning of the Court was guided by the fact that the opposite principle would allow IPR holders to 
partition national markets along borders and for this reason it was heavily criticized. See REINDLE, Intellectual 
Property and Intra-Community Trade, in Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 1996, p. 453-466; KON and SCHAEFFER, 
Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products: a New Realism, or Back to Basics, in ECLR, 1997, no. 3, p. 138, where 
it is affirmed that the reasoning in both Merck v. Stephar and Merck v. Primecrown is seriously flawed because 
it favours irrational decision that are potentially harming also for consumers to withhold products from the 
market of Member States where exports start from. See also KORAH, Merck v Primecrown: The Exhaustion of 
Patents by Sale in a Member State where a Monopoly Profit could not be earned, in ECLR, 1997, no. 18, p. 265. 
308 See, ECJ, July 1985, in case C-19/84, Pharmon BV v Hoechst AG. 
309 In his opinion to this case, Advocate General Mancini stated that it is the patentee or licensee’s consent 
which ‘opens the door of the common market to patented products’ and not the actual realization of a monopoly 
profit. If this consent does not exist, then import of the goods can be prevented. 
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to have been voluntarily negotiated between the government and the company, justified 
an exception to the principle of free movement, even where the patent was present in 
both countries. On the contrary, the absence of a patent in one of the countries, which 
did not involve any type of consent, did not provide any justification310. 
The strongest argument in favour of a derogation from the exhaustion principle 
is that, since the specific subject-matter of a patent consists of the exclusive right of first 
marketing the patented product, permitting parallel imports of such products marketed 
by the patentee in a Member State where no patent protection exists and where, 
consequently, the patentee is subject to potential competition already at the first 
marketing stage, would empty that exclusive right of much of its significance. In other 
words, it may be that the patentee must at least have had the opportunity of obtaining 
monopoly profits in the exporting Member State before its national rights in the 
importing Member State can be said to have been exhausted311. 
Thus, the question of what the specific subject matter of a patent includes arises 
again. 
By interpreting the exhaustion principle in light of the definition of the subject 
matter of patents provided in Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug312, it may seem that the 
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310 See JOLIET, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods, cit., p. 15; DEMARET, Patents, Territorial 
Restrictions and EEC Law, cit., Ch. 3; ROTHNIE, Parallel Imports, 1993, ch. 6. See CORNISH, The free Movement of 
Goods I, cit., p. 20, who says that the mere fact that a proprietor of rights elsewhere in the EU was connected 
with the goods when initially marketed made the all difference between the two cases. This connection 
made the ‘consent’. However, see the opinion of AG Fennelly in the case Merck v. Primecrown at para. 111: 
“The diverging policies of Member States regarding the patentability of pharmaceutical products were the real cause of 
the non-uniformity in the common market. In such circumstances, to impose a form of ‘venire contra factum 
proprium’ […] on patentees attempting to exercise their national patent rights, on the sole basis that they have 
already sought to profit from another national market despite being denied patent protection there, effectively imposes 
on patentees the discipline of the Common Market where it does not in fact exist.” The reasoning goes: “Patents are 
creatures of national, not Community law. The doctrine of exhaustion exists in some, not all Member States. A right 
conferred by a national patent cannot be exercised and, consequently, cannot be exhausted by an act of marketing in a 
Member State which recognizes neither that nor any other patent right in the relevant product”. Similarly AG 
Warner in his opinion in Musik-Vertrieb Membran v. GEMA affirmed that ‘[T]here can be no exhaustion of rights 
where no rights exist’. Also see KON and SCHAEFFER, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 137, report that at 
the oral hearing before the ECJ in Merck v. Primecrown, the Commission favoured reviewing the principle of 
exhaustion of patent rights where patent protection is not available and there is a legal or ethical obligation 
to supply the market. 
311 This view was supported by JOLIET, Patented Articles and the Free Movement of Goods, cit., p. 37, who stated: 
“to say that the product has been manufactured by the patentee is irrelevant if someone else could have manufactured it 
as well. The test of whether the manufacturing took place with the consent of the patentee implies in my view, that the 
patentee could control it, i.e. that he enjoyed a parallel patent in the exporting country. Needless to say that 
consideration of the patent function also justifies a restriction on imports in such a situation”. 
312 See fn 271 above and accompanying text. 
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patentee is entitled to earn a monopoly profit at the point at which the products are first 
put onto the market, but after having done so his right is exhausted. 
However, AG Reischl in Merck v. Stephar rightly opposed that “the rights 
recognized as forming part of the specific subject-matter of a patent cannot be regarded as an end 
in themselves; but they are designed to provide the patentee with ‘the possibility of obtaining a 
recompense for his creative effort of invention ... [which although being] one of the objectives of a 
patent right [...] is not ... inherent in that right ... the realization of which depends on numerous 
market factors such as the presence of substitute products, commercial exploitability and similar 
conditions’313. 
A patent, in fact, surely encompasses a ius excludendi alios in the manufacturing 
and first marketing of the protected product, but not a grant of the level of profitability 
coming from the selling of that product. 
Keeping this distinction in mind, a third view that sees in the subject matter of a 
patent the exclusivity at the point of first marketing, which is not a guarantee of any 
monopoly profits, appears more appropriate314. In other words, EU-law version of the 
exhaustion doctrine merely permits the patentee to choose the place where he wishes to 
be first in marketing the relevant products in the EU. Once that choice is made, the 
goods must, in accordance with the EU exhaustion principle, thereafter be allowed to 
circulate freely throughout the Common Market. 
If one accepts this definition of the subject matter of a patent, the rulings of the 
Court in the cases Merck v. Stephar and Merck v. Primecrown lose grounds. The absence of 
a patent system, in fact, prevented the company from having the exclusivity in the first 
marketing of the drug there, given that generic companies could legally enter the market 
and sell the same drug315. 
It should be noted that the arguments, which suggest a qualification of the 
exhaustion principle when patent is absent in the Member State of export, do not appear 
to justify a departure also when regulation on prices is present. 
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313 See the opinion of the AG Reischl at p. 2090. 
314 Cf. the opinion of the AG Fennelly at para. 97. See also para. 9 and 10 of the judgement in Merck v. 
Primecrown: the specific purpose of a patent “lies essentially in according the inventor an exclusive right of first 
placing the product on the market. It is this right which enables the inventor, by allowing him a monopoly in exploiting 
his product, to obtain the reward for his creative effort without, however, guaranteeing that he will obtain such a 
reward in all circumstances”. 
315 Nevertheless, Merck had a de facto monopoly in the commercialization of the drug in Italy. 
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In Centrafarm v. Sterling Drug, the defendant claimed that allowing parallel 
imports from a country where there was price regulation would have deprived it from 
the possibility to have an appropriate return on the investment made, i.e. the subject 
matter of the patent would have been damaged. The Court, however, expressly stated 
that the fact that prices were low due to government controls was immaterial316. 
Such approach is consistent with the definition of patents’ subject matter 
provided above: the absence of patent protection does not allow the manufacturer to be 
first in the market, due to the exposure to competition from generics; under these 
circumstances, restrictions to parallel trade should not be seen as going against the 
principle of regional exhaustion because the subject matter of the patent has not been 
exhausted. But when the company is granted a patent, it has the exclusivity right that 
allows it to protect its profits from generic companies, no matter the presence of 
regulation on prices. 
3.3 The exhaustion of IPRs covering products coming from third countries 
A different policy towards IPRs that are used to prevent entry in the EU of 
products coming from third countries prevails. 
With regards to trademarks, the issue was discussed first when the Trade Mark 
Directive was enacted. A first proposal in the text of the Directive317 contained a wording 
of Article 7 that provided for international exhaustion318. However, during the debate at 
the European Parliament, an amendment changing the text of Article 7 and inserting the 
wording ‘in the Community’ was adopted319. 
During the re-drafting procedure, thus, the Commission faced the choice of 
introducing the principle of international exhaustion or establishing a EU-wide 
exhaustion principle. In the end the Commission decided to opt for the second 
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316 See Centrafarm v. Sterling, para. 2, summary. “It is a matter of no significance that there exist as between the 
exporting and importing Member States price differences resulting from governmental measures adopted in the 
exporting State with a view to controlling the price of the product…” The principle was confirmed in Merck v 
Primecrown, para. 47. See also Bristol-Myers Squibb v. Paranova, cit., and Centrafarm v. Winthrop, cit. Finally see 
General Motors v Commission, where it was affirmed that lacking harmonisation, it is normal that domestic 
and export sales are subject to different regulations, albeit this does not modify the anticompetitive features 
of an agreement. 
317 See the older proposal in OJ C351/1, 1980. 
318 The older text of Art. 7 read as follows: “The trade mark should not entitle he proprietor thereof to prohibit its 
use in relation to goods which have been put on the market [i.e. in or outside the Community] under that trade mark by 
the proprietor or with his consent”. 
319 See the amended proposal in the OJ, C351/4, 1985. 
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alternative, in consideration of two policy issues: the possibility of a lack of reciprocity 
from third countries in commercial relations, and the cost of introducing the principle of 
international exhaustion into national laws at a stage where not all Member States 
applied such principle. 
Still, the literature had been for some time speculating about whether Article 7 
introduced a EU-wide exhaustion or a minimum standard such that Member States 
could implement international exhaustion if they wished320. This second option was 
suggested by the EFTA Court in Mag Instruments v. California Trading Co.321 
However, the Court in the Silhouette case settled the debate and indicated that the 
first option was the more appropriate from a legal point of view322. 
Silhouette brought a trademark action to prevent parallel imports into Austria of 
spectacles frames that it had sold in Bulgaria. Under Austrian trademark law, Silhouette 
had exhausted its rights, after having placed them on the market voluntarily. Austrian 
law did not distinguish between sales within the EU and sales between Austria and 
third countries, i.e. it applied international exhaustion of IPRs. 
The ECJ was asked whether Article 7(1) of the Trade Mark Directive precluded 
national laws from providing for the exhaustion in respect to products that were coming 
from outside the EU. The Court, following the opinion of the Advocate General 
(hereinafter, sometimes referred as ‘AG’) Jacobs323, held that the principle of EEA 
exhaustion could not apply, because the latter, as well as the Trade Mark Directive, have 
the purpose of promoting the single market324. An opposite interpretation would have 
imposed the adoption of international exhaustion on Member States. Such obligation 
would not be legally valid because the principle of regional exhaustion was developed 
in the context of intra-EU trade and it was not appropriate in an international scale325. 
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320 See CARBONI, Cases Past the Post on Trade Mark Exhaustion: an English Perspective, in EIPR, 1997, p. 198. 
321 See EFTA, 3 December 1997, in case C-2/97 Mag Instruments v. California Trading Company Norway. 
322 See ECJ, 16 July 1998, in case C-355/96 Silhouette International Schmied GmbH v. Hartlauer Handelgesellschaft 
GmbH. 
323 The AG based his opinion on the legislative development of the Directive and on the wording of the 
Council Regulation 40/94/EEC on the Community Trade Mark, which used wording equivalent to Art. 7 of 
the Trade Mark Directive.  
324 The Court drew this conclusion despite the arguments put forward by the Swedish government that 
international exhaustion would have brought advantages for consumers thanks to price competition.  
325 Reaction to the ruling were mixed. Brand owners were pleased, whilst parallel importers and consumers 
associations were outraged. For comments see ABBOTT and FEER VERKADE, The Silhouette of a Trojan Horse: 
Reflections on Advocate General Jacobs’ in Silhouette v. Hartlauer, in JBL, 1998, p. 413; CARBONI, Cases about 
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In Sebago326, the defendant brought an action to prevent import of shoes from El 
Salvador. The Plaintiff argued that given that Sebago had put identical shoes on the 
market within the EU, it has exhausted its rights in relation to all shoes, wherever they 
were marketed. However, the ECJ confirmed the approach taken in Silhouette and re-
affirmed that trade mark rights are exhausted only if the products have been put on the 
market in the EU and that consent must relate to each item or product concerned. 
In Zino Davidhoff327, the Court faced the issue of the definition of ‘consent’, as this 
had not been addressed before and remained open to speculation. In this case, a parallel 
importer sold in UK toiletries and cosmetic products that the trademark owner had 
marketed outside the EU. Davidhoff argued that its rights were not exhausted. When 
referring the questions to the ECJ, Laddie J’s affirmed that the Trade Mark Directive 
does not impose the regime of international exhaustion, but if the proprietor of the IPR 
agrees, expressly or implicitly, to allow the entry of goods marketed in a third country 
into the EU, he cannot afterwards use its IPR to prevent re-imports. Such consent may be 
inferred from the circumstances prior to, simultaneously or subsequent to the placing of 
the goods on the market outside the EU328. Zino Davidhoff thus seemed to provide a 
qualification to the principle expressed in Silhouette. 
Another derogation to the principle seems to come from the judgement Javico329, 
where the Court held that an export ban in a distribution agreement with a non-EU 
distributor restricting sales into the EU might be found to infringe Article 101(1) TFEU, if 
the effect of this provision is to restrict or distort competition within the EU330. 
With regards to patents, national patent laws determines the legal treatment of 
re-imports of patented goods when they are initially marketed by the patentee or an 
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Spectacles and Torches: Now Can we see the Light?, in EIPR, 1998, no. 20, p. 472; HAYS and HANSEN, Silhouette is 
not the Proper Case to Decide the Parallel Importation Question, in EIPR, 1998, no. 20, p. 277; WHITE, Sunglasses: a 
Benefit to Health?, in EIPR, 1999, no. 21, p. 176; KUILWIJK, Parallel Imports and WTO Law: Some thoughts after 
Silhouette, in ECLR, 1999, no. 292; ALEXANDER, Exhaustion of Trade Mark Rights in the European Economic Area, 
in ELR, 1999, no. 24, p. 56; NORMAN, Parallel Imports from Non-EEA Member States: the Vision of Remains 
Unclear, in EIPR, 2000, no. 22, p. 159; JONES, Does an Opportunity still Exist for the Development of a Doctrine of 
International Exhaustion at a Community level under Article 28 and 30?, ibid., p. 171. 
326 See ECJ, 1 July 1999, in case C-173/98 Sebago Inc v. GB-Unic SA. 
327 See ECJ, 20 November 2001, in case C-414/99 Zino Davidhoff SA v. A & G Imports Ltd. 
328 However, consent cannot be inferred by the fact that the IPR owner does or says nothing about parallel 
imports from third countries. See para. 48-65 in Zino Davidhoff. 
329 See ECJ, 28 April 1998, C-306/96 Javico v. Yves Saint Laurent. 
330 This hypothesis was first outlined by the AG in the Silhouette case. See ROTHNIE, Parallel Imports, cit., p. 
315. 
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associate elsewhere. There is no overarching law operating at a EU level, which imposes 
a common solution upon all countries. True, Member States signed the EU Patent 
Convention in 1975, and revised it in 1989. Although the Convention has not been 
brought into effect, it requires national patent laws to adopt the principle of EU-wide 
exhaustion331. But no provision clarifies whether patent rights are exhausted when 
protected products are first marketed outside the EU. Therefore, also parallel imports of 
patented products coming from outside the EU follow the rules set out in the mentioned 
case law for trademarks. 
From the above it appears doubtless that the EU law embraced the principle of 
regional exhaustion, which ring-fences the EU and its single market, leaving the 
Commission the power to negotiate reciprocity agreements with third-party States. 
In this context, the question of whether the regional exhaustion principle applies 
also to countries with which the EU has signed a free trade agreement, arises. These 
agreements, based on Article 284 TFEU, generally contain a clause that is the mirror 
image of Article 36 TFEU: in the free trade agreement with Israel, for instance332, it is 
stated at Art. 11 that “l’accord ne fait pas obstacle aux interdictions ou restrictions 
d’importation, d’exportation ou de transit justifiée pas de raisons de […] protection de la 
propriété industrielle et commerciale. Toutefois, ces interdictions ou restrictions ne doivent pas 
constituer un moyen de discrimination arbitraire ni une restriction déguisée dans le commerce 
entre les parties contractantes”. 
From this it should follow that the principle of regional exhaustion is valid also 
for trade between Israel and the European Union, and that, consequently, the use of IPRs 
that restricts imports from Israel is not permitted. However, this interpretation rests on 
the hypothesis that such agreement is binding for the EU and has direct effect. Whilst it 
is true that agreements signed by the European Union become part of the sources of EU 
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331 Art. 28 of the Patent Convention states: “The rights conferred by a Community patent shall not extend to acts 
concerning a product covered by that patent which are done within the territories of the Contracting States after that 
product has been put on the market in one of these States by the proprietor of the patent or with his express consent 
unless there are grounds which, under Community law, would justify the extension to such acts of the rights conferred 
by the patent.” 
332 Israel and the European Community signed a free trade agreement on May 11, 1975. 
 126 
law within the EU, this does not necessarily entail that they have direct effect, so that 
individuals can action them before the ECJ333. 
It was in Bresciani that the Court for the first time considered an international 
agreement had a direct effect, “simultaneously paid regard to the spirit, the general scheme 
and the wording of the Agreement and the provision concerned”334. This principle has been 
subsequently re-affirmed in Kupferberg335, where the Court held that the principle of free 
movement of good between the EU and third countries is valid if there is a free trade 
agreement that lays it down in clear, precise and unconditioned336 manner. 
This cannot, however, lead to the conclusion that the principle of regional 
exhaustion is tout court extended to countries with which there exists a free trade 
agreement containing a clause that provides for the free circulation of goods between the 
signing parties. 
In Polydor337, the ECJ held that provisions related to the free movement of goods 
and to the prohibition of measures having equivalent effect to restrictions to trade 
contained in an international agreement should be interpreted in a more restrictive way 
with respect to those contained in the Treaty. The reason for this differential treatment is 
that only the latter aim at building the internal market. 
It follows that “in the context of the agreement restrictions on trade in goods may be 
considered to be justified on the ground of the protection of industrial and commercial property in 
a situation in which their justification would not be possible within the Community”338. That 
means that the exclusive licensee of a copyright in a EU Member State could validly 
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333 See ECJ, 12 December 1972, in case C-21-24/72 International Fruit, where the Court held that some clauses 
of the GATT agreement, invoked against the Community legislation, had direct effect, because they were 
indeterminate. 
334 See ECJ, 5 February 1976, in case C-87-75, Conceria Daniele Bresciani v Amministrazione Italiana delle Finanze, 
where the ECJ considered the Yaounde Convention providing for non-reciprocal duty free entry into the 
Community of goods from the ACP countries. 
335 See ECJ, 15 January 1985, in case C-253/83 Sektkellerei C.A. Kupferberg & Cie KG a.A. v Hauptzollamt Mainz, 
where the ECJ considered the Free Trade Area Agreement between the Community and Portugal which 
eliminated all tariffs and other barriers to trade between the two parties. 
336 A legal provision is considered unconditioned when it can be applied as it is, without any intervention 
from national legislators. 
337 See ECJ, 9 February 1982, in case C-270/80 Polydor. 
338 See Polydor, para. 19. 
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oppose his right to importations of disks from non EU Member State, where the licensor 
voluntarily sold them339.  
 
4. The balance of IPRs with the European competition law rules 
The strand of the case law dealing with the use of IPRs under competition law 
rules developed along the definition of ‘permitted exercise’. 
The European Courts have, from Parke Davis, established that the exclusivity 
right connected to an IPR and its exercise is not in itself regarded as anticompetitive 
under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Only where the IPR becomes the means to implement 
and agreement restrictive of competition that the prohibition comes into play. 
4.1 The exercise of IPRs under Article 101 TFEU 
The antitrust assessment of the use of patents under Article 101 TFEU 
predominantly concerned IPR licensing agreements. 
Before the ruling in Consten and Grundig, the Commission considered patent 
licensing agreements as not restrictive of competition, as long as the content of the 
license remained within the ‘scope of patent’340. In the First and in the Fourth Report of 
Competition Policy341, the Commission distinguished between licensing agreements that 
were related to the subject matter of the IPR and formed part of the right itself and the 
clauses of these agreements that went beyond it and represented an attempt to extend 
the market power of the licensor342. 
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339 See LAMANDINI, Le importazioni parallele tra l’Unione Europea e Israele, in Il Diritto Industriale, 1995, no. 4, p. 
357-360. 
340 The concept of ‘scope of the patent’ was derived from US antitrust law, where patent law developed the 
patent misuse doctrine, which was later taken by antitrust law to identify clauses, such as price and 
territorial restrictions on the sale of a patented product, that went beyond the scope of the original 
exclusivity and that were prohibited per se. See, for instance, Mercoid Corpn. v. Mid Continent Investment Co. 
320 US 661 (1943). Similarly, S.20(1) of the German Act Against Restraints on Competition provides that 
patent licensing agreements are void to the extent that they impose restraints on the licensee that exceed the 
scope of the patent grant. 
341 See the First Report on Competition Policy, 1972, p. 65-74 and the Fourth Report on Competition Policy, 
1974, para. 20. 
342 This approach emerges from Art. 4(2) of EC Regulation no. 17/62 that provided that notification was not 
required with respect to bilateral agreements that imposed restrictions on the exercise of IPRs form the 
assignee. Also, in the Notice on Patent Licensing of 1962 the Commission affirmed that limitations as to 
technical applications or field of use, quantity products to be manufactured, or restrictions in time were out 
of the scope of Art. 101(1) TFEU. 
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With Consten and Grundig, the awareness of the potentials of IPRs to 
compartmentalise markets and limit intrastate trade and competition emerged343. 
The legacy of this grand arrêt was to establish that an IPR-related agreement that 
has the object of restricting competition in the internal market goes against the provision 
set forth by Article 101(1) TFEU, and therefore to delimit the permitted exercise of the 
IPR itself. 
Such limitation, nevertheless, cannot apply in the absence of the elements that 
constitute an agreement. On the contrary, the use of an IPR in connection with an 
agreement restrictive of competition within the internal market is not permitted, because 
it runs contrary to the provisions set forth by the mentioned article. So, for instance, an 
IPR licence is unlawful if it is ‘the means of‘ an agreement restrictive of competition344. 
Accordingly, exclusive licensing agreements, which as such may be thought of 
falling within the scope of the Grundig rule, are not by themselves anticompetitive. 
Under this type of agreements, which just limit the number of licensees with the right to 
manufacture and sell in the protected area, there is always the possibility for licensees to 
compete among themselves, thanks to the rules of free movement of goods that allow 
them to engage in direct sales in other territories where other licensees manufacture the 
protected good345. The territorial sales restrictions, on the contrary, limit this possibility 
and for this reason may run contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU, provided that the 
restriction has an appreciable effect346. 
The appreciability test and the distinction between exclusive licence to 
manufacture and territorial sales restriction came in Nungesser347. The Court held that 
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343 See Consten and Grundig, p. 343, where the Court held that the infringement of Art. 101(1) TFEU consisted 
in the attempt of the licensor and the licensee to isolate the French market for Grundig products and 
maintain artificially separated national markets. 
344 See Coditel, para. 14. 
345 See JOLIET, Trademark Licensing under the EEC Law of Competition, in IIC, 1984, p. 31. 
346 ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, cit., p. 63, affirms that from the reading of 
both Société Technique Minière and Consten and Grundig, it appears that the Courts do not exclude the 
appreciability test for exclusive licence agreements in vertical commercial relationships. The concern of the 
Court was directed towards the import ban placed on wholesalers. 
347 See ECJ, 8 June 1982, in case C-258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission, para. 53. The case 
concerned a licence of breeders’ rights to maize seed variety from a French institution, INRA, to a German 
company. INRA undertook to refrain, and prevent others, from importing maize seeds in Germany. Eisele 
relied upon its IPR to stop a parallel importer that was importing seeds from France into Germany. 
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‘open exclusive licence’ agreements do not violate competition rules348, while ‘closed 
exclusive licence’ agreements do, being the former a contract where the exclusivity 
relates only to the commercial relationships between the licensor and the licensee, and 
the latter a contract that limit the possibilities of sales from other licensees in other 
territories349. 
Although this case did not explicitly draw any line between the exercise of IPRs 
and competition law, it implicitly started sketching a criterion for this distinction: if the 
territorial restriction is essential to the licensing agreement that is aimed at opening up 
the market for a new product, then this may represent a permitted exercise of the IPR 
under competition law. 
The Court went further in Coditel, where - as already underlined - it held that an 
agreement conferring an exclusive right to exhibit a film for a certain period in a given 
Member States with absolute territorial protection is not necessarily caught by Article 
101(1) TFEU. In the view of the Court, the fact that a literary or artistic work can be 
infinitely copied and transmitted, differentiated films from other products covered by 
copyright that, however, can be circulated only in their physical form. Also, the Court 
observed that the copyright includes the right for the owner to charge a fee for any 
showing or performance. Therefore, impeding such right by allowing other companies 
to transmit the film would have emptied the copyright completely. The concern of the 
Court then seems to be directed to the impossibility to recoup, under competition from 
other companies, the investment made for the realisation of the film350. 
The judges made clear that this qualification, however, does not apply when the 
agreement has the object or the effect of restraining the distribution of films or where 
competition in the market for films is distorted351. 
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348 The Court, however, did not hold that all ‘open licences’ were cleared, but at para. 55-57 it set out four 
conditions that have to be satisfied in order for the agreement to be compatible with Art. 101(1) TFEU: first, 
the product had to be new to the licensee’s market; second, the technology had to be developed after years 
of research and experimentation; third, without the exclusivity licence the licensee would not be willing to 
take on the risk of developing and marketing that new product; four, the absence of intrabrand competition 
would result in the improvement of interbrand competition. 
349 See Nungesser, para. 58. 
350 The AG suggested that a fair return for IPRs in the film industry related to the specific object of the IPR 
and was therefore not caught by Art. 101(1) TFEU. But the Court only mentioned a fair return upon the 
investment made. 
351 See Coditel, para. 20. 
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4.2 The exercise of IPRs under Article 102 TFEU 
Regarding cases under Article 102 TFEU, the Court held several times that the 
ownership of an IPR does not entail a dominant position. For instance, in Deutsche 
Grammophon, the Court stated that possession of an IPR does not automatically amount 
to dominance352. As one prominent scholar has noted, in fact, an IPR is a negative right 
for other parties to commercially exploit the protected product and not a positive right 
attributed to the IPR owner353.  
This obviously does not mean that ownership of an IPR and dominance can 
never coincide. On the contrary, the possession of an IPR might give rise to a position of 
dominance. There are, in fact, situations where the power to exclude the marketing of 
infringing goods can create a dominant position by impeding competition. Or, there are 
situations where the ownership of an IPR amounts to a de facto monopoly. And for this 
reason, it may be scrutinized under Article 102 TFEU354. 
Whether the two situations coincide, much depends on how the relevant market 
is constructed. If it is constructed narrowly, i.e. there is a single product market, the 
existence of an IPR could extinguish competition and put the IPR owner in a position of 
de facto monopoly. 
In Hugin355, for instance, the ECJ found that the defendant was dominant in the 
market for spare Hugin parts of cash registers, because the latter were covered by an 
IPR. This meant that there were no substitutes and maintenance firms were forced to 
source their supplies from Hugin. 
Also, both in Volvo356 and in CICRA357, the Advocate General underlined that 
when the relevant market is reduced to a single product, which is covered by an IPR, the 
absence of substitutes itself entails the finding of dominance358. 
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352 See Deutsche Grammophon, para. 16: “The manufacturer of sound recordings who holds a right related to 
copyright does not occupy a dominant position within the meaning of Article 86 of the Treaty merely by exercising his 
exclusive rights to distribute the protected article.” 
353 See ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property rights, cit., p. 169. 
354 See ECJ, 3 October 1985, Centre belge d'études de marché - Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie 
Luxembourgeoise de Télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux (IPB), para. 16, where the Court 
affirmed that “the fact that the absence of competition or its restriction on the relevant market is brought about or 
encouraged by provisions laid down by national law in no way precludes the application of Article 86.” 
355 See ECJ, 31 May 1979, in case C-22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v Commission of 
the European Communities. 
356 See ECJ, 5 October 1988, in case C-238/87, AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. 
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This conclusion has been inferred also when the exclusivity right conferred by 
IPRs was seen as a barrier to entry. 
In Hoffman La Roche, the Court found that the defendant enjoyed technological 
superiority, despite the fact that the patent for the manufacture of vitamins had expired. 
The extensive know-how of the company was a factor giving it a lead over its 
competitors was essential to a finding of technological advantage that determined the 
persistence of the dominant position359. 
However, even in those cases where the mere ownership of an IPR gives rise to a 
de facto monopoly, this does not equal to the finding of an unlawful conduct. The breach 
of Article 102 TFEU, in fact, takes place when such position in the market is abused. 
At first reading, the wording of Article 102 TFEU would trigger antitrust 
concerns whenever IPRs are at stake. In fact, the first two conducts indicated in the 
provision – (a) unfair pricing, and (b) limitation of production, which are concerned with 
the ability of a dominant firm to exploit its consumers and customers respectively by 
extracting monopoly rents – are the essence of an IPR. 
However, competition law has long ago acknowledged that the mentioned 
corporate practices just represent the way the IPR owner seeks the reward for his 
inventive activity. 
Accordingly, the ECJ said that ‘the mere fact of securing the benefit of an exclusive 
right granted by law, the effect of which is to enable the manufacture and sale of protected 
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357 See ECJ, 5 October 1988 in case C-53/87 Consorzio italiano della componentistica di ricambio per autoveicoli and 
Maxicar v Régie nationale des usines Renault. 
358 See FRIDEN, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law: The Distinction between Existence and 
Exercise Revisited, in CML Rev., 1989, n. 193, p. 209, says “the crucial point is the definition of the relevant market. 
If it can be defined with reference to the supply of products or the provision of services, subject to the right in question, 
then the right can in practice be said to make the holder dominant… such absence of substitutes logically implies 
dominance”. 
359 See Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 48. Technological superiority vis-à-vis rivals has been often adduced as an 
element leading to the reinforcement of dominance. See ECJ, 2 March 1994, in case C-53/92 P, Hilti AG v 
Commission of the European Communities; GC, 10 July 1990, in case T-51/89 Tetra Pak Rausing SA v Commission 
of the European Communities (Tetra Pak I); ECJ, 9 November 1983, in case C-322/81 NV Nederlandsche Banden 
Industrie Michelin v Commission of the European Communities (Michelin I). In this last case, see at para. 57 the 
reported arguments of the French government, claiming that this criterion was implicitly levying a penalty 
for R&D investments and high quality of the products. The Commission has generally replied to this kind of 
arguments that the finding of dominance was not itself a finding of an abuse, but simply puts the company 
under the special responsibility of not engaging in prohibited conducts. Still, see WHISH, Competition Law, 
cit., p. 268, saying that, nevertheless, the finding of dominance raises the costs for the company of defending 
its conduct under Art. 102 TFEU. 
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products by unauthorised parties to be prevented, cannot be regarded as an abusive method of 
eliminating competition’360. 
In Hoffmann-La Roche, it was established that the use of a trademark right, if 
exercised in accordance with Articles 34–36 TFEU, could not be contrary to Article 102 
TFEU just because it comes from an undertaking in a dominant position. Only if the 
trademark right has been used as an ‘instrument for the abuse’ of such a position, i.e. the 
exercise of the IPR must be linked in some way to a commercial practice which runs 
contrary to competition rules, then the prohibition set forth by Article 102 TFEU comes 
into play. 
So for instance, in Volvo the Court pointed out that for a corporate conduct to be 
abusive, some ‘additional factors’ were required in addition to the elimination of 
competition from other manufacturers in respect of the protected product361. 
When the exercise of the exclusive rights connected to the IPR remains in the 
primary market for the protected product, this does not normally fall within the scope of 
Article 102 TFEU. 
However, this principle suffers an exception: in Continental Can362, the Court 
faced the issue of whether the acquisition of an IPR by a dominant undertaking may be 
considered abusive. It is generally acknowledged that the development of an innovation 
and the related inventive and economic effort entitles the IPR owner to exclude potential 
competitors from the primary market. The question was whether the same principle was 
valid when the innovation was purchased. In Tetra Pak I, the Court and the Commission 
responded negatively, given the absence of any inventive activity from the dominant 
purchaser363. It follows that the special position of an IPR owner under Article 102 TFEU 
cannot be extended to a licensee, and the latter, if it occupies a dominant position, is not 
entitled to exclude potential competitors from using the research tools. 
This does not mean that the acquisition of an IPR from a dominant company is 
always unlawful and is to be prohibited. For the purpose of applying Article 102 TFEU, 
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360 See CICRA, para. 15. 
361 See Volvo, para. 8. 
362 See ECJ, 21 February 1973, in case C-6/72 Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company. 
363 See the opinion of AG Kirschner at p. 47 saying: ”Where a patent or registered design is obtained by its 
originator, the undertaking is protecting its own development work from imitation by third parties. […] In contrast, 
the acquirer of a patent licence procures for himself the development work carried out by others. That is legitimate, but 
it distinguishes his legal position from that of the original proprietor of the protective right. It is to the latter that the 
exclusive entitlement belongs and it is intended to allow him to obtain the reward for his creative effort”. 
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the circumstances surrounding the purchase must be taken into account, i.e. attention 
should be paid to the competitive structure of the market. If, for instance, the acquisition, 
prevents or delays significantly the entry of competitors in the market, where little or no 
competition exists because of the dominant position, the finding of an abuse is likely to 
hold364. 
The extension of the exclusivity right to a second market or to a second product 
unprotected by the IPR, through a tie-in or a refusal to supply or licence, also, generates 
concerns under antitrust law365. 
Two prerequisites before the finding of abuse is made are necessary: the link 
between the primary and the secondary market, and the dominant position of the 
defendant precluding an alternative sources of supply. This generally happens in case 
the dominant company owns an IPR that protects an essential inputs necessary to access 
the second market, and refuses to supply such inputs to potential competitors in that 
market. By foreclosing access to rivals in the second market, the dominant company can 
leverage its market power from the first into the second market366. 
4.2.1 The refusal to licence IPRs 
When essential inputs or infrastructures necessary to access the second market 
are covered by an IPR, the use of the latter that leads to refuse to licence the access to 
such inputs may give rise to an abuse of dominant position367. However, in the early case 
law it was not clear whether and to what extent the obligation of a dominant 
undertaking not to refuse to supply a product could be extended to a refusal to licence 
an IPR. 
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364 See Tetra Pak I, para. 23. 
365 Note that the refusal to supply may fall under the scope of letter b), if the dominant company refuses to 
supply a product that does not exist in the second market and that is required by consumers; instead, it falls 
within the scope of letter c) if the dominant company has a subsidiary in the secondary market, and the 
refusal to supply has a discriminatory effect. 
366 See ECJ, March 1974, in case C-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial Solvents 
Corporation v Commission of the European Communities, where the world monopolist in the production and 
commercialisation of the raw material nitropropane refused to supply a customer, producer of ethambutol, 
for which this raw material was necessary input. The refusal allowed the dominant company to monopolise 
the downstream market for the production and distribution of ethambutol, since the only competitor was 
forced out of the market. For this reason, the conduct was considered abusive by the ECJ. See also 
Télémarketing, para. 25-27; and GC, 10 July 1990, in case T-64/89, BPB and British Gypsum v. Commission, para. 
69. 
367 The issue of refusal to licence is strictly related to the scope of this work but it does not constitute a core 
subject in the field of parallel trade. For this reason, jurisprudential developments will be only briefly 
described. 
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The first attempt to solve this question came in cases about the refusal to supply 
car body panels covered by copyright. 
As already said, both in CICRA and in Volvo, the ECJ suggested a qualified test of 
permitted exercise of an IPR. Volvo had used its design right to stop Veng from 
importing cheaper copies of Volvo front wings. The ECJ held that “the right of a proprietor 
of a protected design to prevent third parties from manufacturing and selling or importing, 
without its consent, products incorporating the design constitutes the very subject matter of its 
exclusive rights. It follows that an obligation imposed upon the proprietor of a protected design to 
grant to third parties … a licence for the supply of a product incorporating the design would lead 
to the proprietor being deprived of the substance of its exclusive right.”368 And in this way, it 
concluded that refusing to grant such licence could not itself constitute an abuse of a 
dominant position. 
However, levering on the distinction between ‘existence’ and ‘exercise’ of an IPR, 
the Court also added that the “arbitrary refusal to supply spare parts to independent repairers, 
the fixing of prices for spare parts at an unfair level or a decision no longer to produce spare parts 
for a particular model even though many cars of that model are still in circulation” may be 
prohibited by Article 102 TFEU, if it is capable to affect trade between the Member 
States369. 
The balance operated by the Court in this case unfortunately left many issues 
unsolved. The precise circumstances in which refusal to licence an IPR is abusive 
remained unclear, because the ECJ discharged the analysis by relying on the subject 
matter of copyrights and assuming the conduct within the scope of the latter. Also, the 
Court did not further deepen the question of the permitted exercise. 
Clarification arrived when the European Commission started applying the 
‘essential facility doctrine’370 to the cases of refusal to licence. In its view, the preservation 
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368 See Volvo, para. 8. 
369 See Volvo, para. 9. 
370 The essential facilities doctrine (sometimes also referred to as the essential facility doctrine) is a legal 
doctrine that describes a particular type of claim of monopolization made under competition laws. In 
general, it refers to a type of anti-competitive behavior in which a firm with market power uses a 
‘bottleneck’ in a market to deny competitors entry into the market. It is closely related to a claim for refusal 
to deal. The doctrine has its origins in United States law, but it has been adopted (often with some 
modification) into the legal systems of the United Kingdom, Australia, South Africa, and the European 
Union. The first case to use the idea was the Supreme Court’s judgment in United States v. Terminal Railroad 
Association, 224 U.S. 383 (1912). A group of railroads controlling all railway bridges and switching yards into 
and out of St. Louis prevented competing railway companies from offering transportation to and through 
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of effective competition required dominant companies which owned ‘essential facilities’ 
to offer access to competitors as well as customers on a non-discriminatory basis. 
In this regard, three fundamental cases trace the route taken by the European 
Courts: Magill, Oscar Bronner, and IMS. 
In Magill371, three TV broadcasting companies in Ireland, RTE, BBC, and ITP, 
refused to licence the information contained in their programme listings for publication 
in a new weekly comprehensive TV guide. Such content was covered by copyright and 
for this reason the defendants argued that they were entitled to reserve the right to 
publish weekly TV listings in their own single channel weekly guides. 
The Commission held that the conduct of the TV companies was abusive, 
because they were using their dominant position to prevent the entry of a new product 
in the market. The Commission saw in the TV listings covered by copyright an essential 
facility used by the defendants to reinforce their position in the market. 
The General Court (hereinafter sometimes referred as the ‘GC’), confirming the 
concerns of the Commission, declared that refusal to licence cannot itself constitute an 
abuse, even if put in place by a dominant undertaking, but such practice may under 
certain exceptional circumstances be considered abusive372. The Court regarded the 
refusal to licence opposed by the defendants as going beyond the essential function of 
the copyrights protecting the magazines and being used as an instrument to monopolize 
the market, because it prevented the introduction of a new product for which there was 
demand and retained the derivative market for weekly guides for the defendants373. 
On appeal, the AG Gulman questioned this approach in his opinion. He affirmed 
that the use of the IPR from the defendant was within the subject matter and that Article 
102 TFEU could restrict the use of an IPR that falls within its specific subject matter only 
in special circumstances. However, the appearance of a new product did not prove to be 
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that destination. The court held it to be an illegal restraint of trade. A unilateral refusal to deal with ‘essential 
facilities’ means potential liability as a monopoly violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. See VENIT and 
KALLAUGHER, Essential Facilities – a Comparative Law approach, in Fordham Corp. Law Inst., 1994, p. 315. 
371 See ECJ, 6 April 1995, in joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and 
Independent Television Publications Ltd (ITP) v Commission of the European Communities. 
372 ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, cit., p. 205, sees in this approach the EC 
Commission’s concern that the ruling in Volvo could have provided the immunity to IPRs from Art. 102 
TFEU, thereby creating the conditions to use them as instruments of abuse. 
373 The Court at para. 74 affirmed that where the copyright is exercised in a manner manifestly contrary to 
the objectives of Art. 102 TFEU, it is no longer exercised in a manner that corresponds to its essential 
function. 
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a ‘special circumstance’ to him. On the contrary, the obligation to licence permitted the 
entry of directly competing products that could have endangered the possibility of 
earning the necessary profits to reward the inventive activity, as well as his incentive to 
engage in such activity in the first place. But, if the new product was not competing with 
the one covered by IPR, then a refusal to licence would be abusive374. 
The ECJ was not persuaded by the opinion of the AG, and upheld the decision of 
the GC and the Commission. In doing so, it re-affirmed that it is wrong to assume that 
the exercise of an IPR that is legal under national law cannot be scrutinized under EU 
law. Also it held that requirements for granting the IPR are dealt with at national level, 
in absence of harmonisation; that the exclusive reproduction is part of the essential 
function of a copyright and, therefore, that a refusal to licence is not necessarily abusive, 
even when it comes from a company in dominant position. But it finally added that in 
exceptional circumstances this refusal may run contrary Article 102 TFEU. 
For this reason, in light of Article 3 of Regulation EC no. 17/1962, the Court 
entrusted the Commission with the task of imposing a compulsory licence on the 
defendant against the payment of reasonable fees from the plaintiff375. 
The Court also refined the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’, where the refusal 
to licence constituted an abuse of dominant position: firstly, there should not be 
substitute for the product covered by IPR (i.e. the company enjoys a de facto 
monopoly)376; secondly, there should not be an objective justification to the refusal; 
finally, the refusal allows the IPR holder to reserve for itself the secondary market377. 
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374 AG Gulman attempted to define a minimum level of protection of IPRs against competition law, by 
affirming that the essential function of the IPR, i.e. its subject matter, should have been treated equivalently 
to its existence. Moreover, he affirmed that even if the product is newer and better, the interest of consumers 
should not always trump the function of IPR and the right of IPR owners to get a reward for their effort. 
However, the Court interpreted this suggestion as indicating that the essential function of IPRs is subject to 
the competition rules. See, Magill, para. 48. 
375 See BENABOU, Droits d’auteur, droits voisins et droit communautaire, 1997, p. 209, predicting ‘des effets 
particulièrement désastreux’, in fact ‘poussée au paroxysme, cette théorie viderait les droits de propriété intellectuelle 
de leur attrait principal: le droit exclusif. Le droit … s’apparenterait, au mieux, à un simple droit à rémunération’. 
376 This requirement, i.e. the essentiality of the facility, according to ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and 
Intellectual Property Rights, cit., p. 212 et seq., remains unclear, because it is not straightforward to distinguish 
when a product is an essential facility or just a part of another product. Take, for instance, the application for 
diagnostic software for maintenance purposed included in a hardware: they may be considered integral 
parts of the same products, or the latter can belong to a separate secondary market for maintenance. 
377 See Magill, para. 54. 
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It should be noted that the Court explicitly said to follow Volvo and the criteria 
set forth there378. Yet, the two rulings appeared to be at odd, because in Magill the notion 
of ‘exercise’ of an IPR was extended to comprise also what previously had been 
considered to be merely its ‘existence’379. 
An important judgement where the Magill doctrine was applied was Oscar 
Bronner380. 
In Oscar Bronner, an Austrian court referred to the ECJ the question whether the 
refusal by a newspaper group holding a substantial share of the market in daily 
newspapers to allow the publisher of a competing newspaper accessing its home-
delivery network, or to do so only if it purchased from the group certain additional 
services, constituted an abuse of dominant position contrary to Article 102 TFEU. 
The claimant argued that under the doctrine of ‘essential facilities’, the defendant 
was obliged to allow access to the home-delivery service by competing products and at 
market prices. 
Following the opinion of the AG Jacobs, the Court ruled in favour of the IPR 
owner. The ECJ established, in fact, that the eventual compulsory licence to access an 
essential facility should be based on a strict indispensability test. According to the ECJ, 
the refusal to licence is abusive when the essential facility is indispensable for the 
claimant to access the downstream market and that without it, it would be out of that 
market. Furthermore, the claimant should demonstrate that it cannot technically 
replicate the essential facility or that this is not economically feasible381. Absent this 
condition, the compulsory license cannot be imposed on the IPR owner. 
So, according to the Court, in order for an IPR to be an ‘essential facility’, it is 
necessary that the product covered by such IPR (i) does not have substitutes, i.e. it 
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378 However, see FLORIDIA and LAMANDINI, Privative Industriali, cit., p. 146, affirming that, on the contrary, the 
rulings reached diametrically opposed conclusions. Similarly see GOVAERE, The Use and Abuse of Intellectual 
Property Rights in EC law, 1996, Section 8.45. 
379 See ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, cit., p. 14 and 15, claiming that the 
qualifications of the right of normal exercise of an IPR indicated in Volvo where misunderstood and given 
excessive weight, leading to the outcome in Magill. Similarly, FRIDEN, Recent Developments in EEC Intellectual 
Property Law, cit., p. 210, saying that “one should not read too much into them… the Court probably felt obliged to, 
after having given an example of what was not abusive conduct, to give a few examples of what would be considered as 
abusive”. Contra FLORIDIA and LAMANDINI, Privative Industriali, cit., p. 145 et seq. 
380 See ECJ, 26 November 1998, VI Ch, in case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- 
und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint 
Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. 
381 See Oscar Bronner, para. 41. 
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confers a monopoly to the owner; (ii) is an indispensable input to another product in a 
secondary market382. As it appears, the element of the new product was not 
mentioned383. This inconsistency in the case law created quite some confusion about the 
concept of ‘exceptional circumstance’ in the literature384. 
Clarification came with the IMS case385. The case concerned a refusal by IMS to 
grant a licence to its competitor NDC to use part of a copyrighted database, using a brick 
structure, containing all the information related to the volume of sales of pharmaceutical 
products in the German market. 
The Commission ordered IMS to grant a licence to NDC for the use of the brick 
structure against the payment of royalties, even if the plaintiff claimed its right to access 
it without the intention of providing a new product in the market. 
The ECJ confirmed that a refusal to grant a licence could amount to an abuse of a 
dominant position. The ruling further clarified the ‘exceptional circumstances’, which 
justify compulsory licensing of intellectual property rights under EU competition law 
rules: the refusal must prevent the emergence of a new product for which there is 
potential consumer demand, must be unjustified and must exclude any competition in 
the secondary market386. The Court also made clear that these circumstances are 
cumulative387. 
For the same reasons, the Court clarified that Article 102 TFEU is applied to 
refusal to licence IPRs, subject to the tripartite test, only when the conduct relates to a 
secondary market separated from the primary where the company is dominant. 
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382 Under US law, the basic elements of a legal claim under this doctrine under United States antitrust law, 
which a plaintiff is required to show to establish liability, are: 1) control of the essential facility by a 
monopolist; 2) a competitor’s inability to practically or reasonably duplicate the essential facility; 3) the 
denial of the use of the facility to a competitor; and 4) the feasibility of providing the facility to competitors. 
The U.S. Supreme Court's ruling in Verizon v. Trinko (2004) added a fifth element: absence of regulatory 
oversight from an agency with power to compel access. 
383 The Court affirmed that the refusal to supply must be likely to eliminate all competition in a downstream 
market, that it must lack any objective justification, and that the requested input must be indispensable for 
doing business in the downstream market, because there is no actual or potential substitute to the product. 
384 See PRETE, From Magill to IMS, in EBLR, 2004, p. 1076; GOVAERE, The use and abuse of intellectual property 
rights in EC Law, 1998, p. 149, who considers the definition of the concept of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as 
the crucial issue left open by the jurisprudence. 
385 See ECJ, 29 April 2004, V Ch., in Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. 
KG. 
386 See IMS, para. 34-38. 
387 Some authors believe that IMS has further extended the Magill rule. See KORAH, The Interface between 
Intellectual Property and Antitrust: the European Experience, in AJL, 2001, p. 825; contra see FINE, NDC/IMS: in 
Response to Professor Korah, in ALJ, 2002, p. 250. 
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However, it is sufficient that this second market is just hypothetical and not currently 
existing. What matters is that two different production stages are identified and that 
they are interconnected388. 
This interpretation also helped find some consistency between Volvo and the 
other cases. 
First of all, as it appears from this summary of the ruling, the Court re-introduced 
the criterion of the new product. According to the Court this requirement was necessary 
to balance the economic freedom of the copyright holder with the interest of free 
competition. This, according to AG Tizzano, explains why the Court ruled differently in 
Volvo: in that case, the plaintiffs were merely replicating the car body panels, without 
providing a new product389. Allowing such ‘copying’ from rivals would greatly 
undermine inventors’ incentives to innovate. The development of a new product, 
instead, places competitors in a different market, without that the inventor is exposed to 
direct rivalry from them. In this case, incentive to innovate are protected enough and 
further restrictions to competition are not justified. 
Secondly, whilst Volvo pertained to the exclusive use of the IPR in the market 
where the IPR holder was dominant, the three cases applying the ‘essential facility 
doctrine’ were about the use of IPRs to leverage the dominant position in a second 
market390. 
From this brief overview, it appears that, although IPRs are granted a higher 
standard of protection than other forms of property under European competition law, 
they do not enjoy an a priori blank cheque. The case law clearly indicates that the 
enforcement of EU competition law should safeguard innovation incentives, but this 
cannot justify a suppression of competition that is unnecessary for this purpose. 
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388 See the opinion of the AG Tizzano at para. 40-45. 
389 See the opinion of the AG Tizzano at para. 65. 
390 This triggered a very intense debate in the literature. For criticisms see STAMATOUDI, The hidden agenda in 
Magill, in JWIP, 1998, p. 161; VAN DER WAL, Article 86 EC: the limits of compulsory licensing, in ECLR, 1994, p. 
232; SUBIOTTO, The right to deal with whom one pleases under EEC competition law: a small contribution to a 
necessary debate, in ECLR, 1992, p. 239; REINDL, The Magic of Magill: TV Program Guides as a Limit of Copyright 
Law?, in IIC, 1993, p. 60; Contra, and favourably to the ruling see VINJE, The Ànal word on Magill, in EIPR, 1995, 
p. 297. 
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Altogether, it thus appears that innovation as such cannot be a policy objective under EU 
competition law391. 
 
 
5. The early case law on parallel trade 
The principles that the European Courts and the Commission have been 
developing in the effort of reconciling IPRs with competition law have provided the 
legal guidance that helped the Courts and the Commission in shaping the policy 
towards parallel trade. 
5.1 Export bans and other indirect obstacles to exports 
The relevant case law under Article 101 TFEU mainly deals with agreements 
containing export bans and similar clauses, like dual pricing, that confer absolute 
protection to authorised distributors from parallel imports. 
Dual pricing clauses consists of a two-tier price model where two different prices 
are applied to the same good depending on its final destination. If the drug is 
distributed in the domestic market, a lower price is set; vice versa, a higher price is 
applied if the drug crosses the border. In this way, the price differential between the 
low-priced country and the high-priced country automatically disappears, together with 
the economic incentive to trade for the parallel distributors. 
In this sense, it could be thought of dual pricing as a form of geographical price 
discrimination. However, dual pricing automatically eliminates or drastically reduces 
the price differential between the low-priced country and the high-priced country, 
thereby discouraging intermediaries to enter the importing markets. It follows that, 
being an indirect disincentive to trade across the borders, dual pricing actually has the 
same effects as an explicit prohibition to export392. 
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391 This approach appears to be remarkably different from what applied in US, where there is a reverting 
trend in the assessment of IPRs in the context of monopolization provisions. For instance, see Verizon 
Communications Inc v Law OfÀces of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US (2004), where the US Supreme Court 
criticised antitrust infringements consisting in a mere refusal to deal. See para. 11 of the Trinko decision, 
where the Court stated: “Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the 
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist, the rival, or both to invest in 
those economically beneficial facilities.” For a comparison of the EU and US systems on this point see Section 4 
in Chapter IV. 
392 See the Commission decision Gosme-Martell, cit., where the Commission found that the elimination of the 
usual discount system applied to customers by the manufacturer de facto rendered export more expensive 
and equated it to an export ban; similarly, see in particular the Commission decision Pittsburgh Corning 
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By applying a higher price for goods intended for export, the manufacturer de 
facto raises its competitors’ costs393. In fact, the price at which wholesalers purchase 
products from the manufacturer constitutes their marginal cost (always provided that 
repackaging and shipping costs are small). The higher price applied to exports increases 
this marginal cost up to a point where export is economically less interesting or 
impossible. 
As a result, intermediaries lose their price advantage necessary to penetrate the 
foreign market, and the manufacturer ensures that no competitor having lower costs 
enters the importing markets, thereby contending its market share. 
The enforcement of this pricing policy is also easier than an export ban: the 
indirect influence of the economic conditions of transactions automatically renders 
intrastate trade economically uninteresting and thus it does not require the 
establishment of monitoring devices394. 
On the one hand, dual pricing restricts the economic opportunities available to 
other agents as a result of the establishment of the internal market, whereas, on the other 
hand, it allows the manufacturer to seal off the market of origin for exports and to 
protect the destination markets. 
In the European context, these effects clearly represent a concern, as they lead to 
the restoration of trade barriers along national borders, thereby holding up the economic 
interpenetration that the Treaty intends to bring about. In other words, they frustrate the 
policy goal of internal market integration, which constitutes one of the ‘constitutional’ 
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Europe, cit., the increase of Belgian wholesale prices of 40% aimed at impeding re-importation into Germany 
was considered to be anticompetitive by the Commission, which explicitly drew up an analogy between 
export bans and dual pricing systems, having the former the same effects as the latter on parallel trade. There is 
also a clear parallelism – not mentioned by the GC - between the Glaxo case and the previous Sandoz case. In 
that occasion, the ECJ established that sending invoices to wholesalers with the wording ‘export prohibited’ 
constitutes a vertical agreement capable of hindering competition under Art. 101 TFEU. See ECJ, C-277/87 
Sandoz v. Commission, cit., para. 13, and also ECJ, 15 July 1970, in case C-41/69, ACF Chemiefarma NV v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 12. 
393 From this point of view, dual pricing can represent a preferable alternative to price war, as it has the 
advantage of avoiding profit reduction and sacrifice of financial resources. See SALOP and SCHEFFMAN, 
Raising Rivals’ Cost, in American Economic Review, 1983, no. 73(2), p. 267-271. 
394 Similarly, in Distillers, cit., the Commission considered the non-applicability of price allowances on spirits 
for export and the application to the same customers of different prices for spirits for export and for spirits 
for United Kingdom consumption a more efficient way to discourage export than direct export bans. See 
point 2 of the cited decision. 
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objectives of the European Union395. 
For this reasons, all agreements entailing absolute market protection from 
imports are considered as running against Article 101(1) TFEU in their object. 
The counterargument traditionally adduced to justify the existence in an 
agreement of a clause of absolute protection rests on the need to protect the authorised 
distributors from competition and to spur the entry of a new product in a market, i.e. to 
foster interbrand competition396. However, both the Commission and the European 
Courts have repeatedly refused this argument, by opposing that allowing parallel 
imports to erode price differentials was not capable of endangering the market position 
of authorised distributors. They both believed, in fact, that such competition would just 
induce more competitive prices from the originator, which would prevent importations 
in the first place and at the same time help the authorised distributors to gain the 
market. 
5.1.1 The Commission practice 
Such approach has been constantly re-affirmed and almost never suffered 
exceptions in the Commission practice. According to the Commission, all types of 
territorial restriction that impedes parallel trade, also in the forms of passive sales397, are 
hardcore restrictions that fall outside the Commission’s block exemption regulation on 
vertical restraints and do not meet the requirements of Article 101(3) TFEU398. 
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395 In Consten and Grundig, p. 518, the Court recalled that the Treaty aims at suppressing barriers to trade 
among Member States and that, in various provision contained therein, it harshly prohibits their restoration. 
396 See, among many, BORK, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, in Yale 
L. J. 775, 1965, no. 74(Part I), p. 775; COMANOR, Vertical Territorial and Customer Restrictions: White Motor and 
its Aftermath, Harv. L. Rev., 1968, no. 81, p. 1419. For further references see infra Section 1.1.1 in Chapter V. 
397 Passive sales are sales in response to unsolicited requests from individual customers including delivery of 
goods or services to such customers. Sales generated by general advertising or promotion in media or on the 
Internet that reaches customers in other distributors’ exclusive territories or customer groups, are normally 
considered passive. On the contrary, active sales are sales made by actively approaching individual 
customers inside another distributor’s exclusive territory or exclusive customer group by for instance direct 
mail or visits, or by actively approaching a specific customer group or customers in a specific territory 
allocated exclusively to another distributor through advertisement in media or other promotions specifically 
targeted at that customer group or customers in that territory, or by establishing a warehouse or distribution 
outlet in another distributor’s exclusive territory. Clauses limiting a distributor’s right to sell actively into 
another distributor’s territory are usually part of exclusive distribution networks and can benefit from the 
block exemption for vertical agreements. See Commission Regulation 2790/99 on the application of Article 
81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ L 336, 22.12.1999), 
Commission Notice - Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (OJ C 291, 13.10.2000). 
398 See for instance the Commission decision no. 2003/675/EC of 30 October 2002, COMP/35.587 PO Video 
Games, COMP/35.706 PO Nintendo Distribution and COMP/36.321 Omega — Nintendo) at para. 338: “it is 
well established in the case-law of the Court of Justice […] that enhancing the exclusivity granted by virtue of 
distribution agreements, to a state of absolute territorial protection, by completely prohibiting distributors from making 
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For instance, Distillers399 and Gosme Martell400 are cases where companies 
implemented various forms of dual pricing: price allowances, rebates and discounts 
were granted exclusively for products resold and consumed in the domestic market. 
Parallel traders, not only were not given the discounts granted to other distributors, but 
they were also explicitly prohibited to export products bought in the domestic market 
from being exported to another EU Member State. 
The European Commission affirmed that these pricing strategies amounted to an 
indirect export prohibition, which was likely to affect trade between Member States. This 
was considered capable of causing an artificial partition of the market along national 
borders and likely to hinder the establishment of the single market among Member 
States. 
Accordingly, those price allowances constituted an infringement by object of 
Article 101(1) TFEU. 
On the same grounds, in Moët et Chandon401, the European Commission 
condemned a clause establishing a price list for champagne valid only for consumption 
in United Kingdom but not for consumption outside that territory, as a restriction by 
object. 
Also this price strategy was considered tantamount to a ban on exports. The 
Commission considered that both the object and effect of this clause was to restrict 
competition within the common market. The clause was designed to prevent, and did 
prevent, the firm’s customers in the United Kingdom and persons subsequently buying 
champagne from them, from reselling champagne in other European countries and 
hence from competing with resellers in those countries. 
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any sales outside the territories assigned to them or from selling to customers who intend to export, is not indispensable 
to realise the potential benefits of an exclusive distribution system. Instead, in regard to the goods in question 
territories are hermetically sealed off, making interpenetrating of national markets impossible, thereby, bringing to 
nought economic integration”. 
399 See the decision of the Commission 78/163/EEC in case IV/28.282 — The Distillers Company Limited — 
Conditions of sales and price. 
400 See the decision of the Commission 91/335/EEC in case IV/32.186 — Gosme-Martell — DMP; similarly 
see the decision 72/403/EEC in cases IV/26.894, 26.876 and 26.892 — Pittsburgh Corning Europe — Formica 
Belgium — Hertel, where a fine was imposed on a firm that required its distributors to charge different prices 
according to the destination of the goods, thereby trying to protect the German market from lower priced 
parallel imports. 
401 See the decision of the EU Commission 82/203/EEC in case IV/30.188 - Moët et Chandon (London) Ltd, 
where the Commission qualified a clause which established a price list for champagne valid only for 
consumption in United Kingdom but not for consumption outside that territory, as a restriction by object. 
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It is interesting to note that in that case the Commission underlined that the 
alleged shortage and the measures taken to deal with it could not justify the deprivation 
of UK buyers of the possibility of reselling in other countries of their choice products 
released on to the UK market by the defendant402. 
5.1.2 The case law 
The Commission practice has generally received the support of European Courts, 
which considered restrictions to parallel trade as a ‘mortal sin’ going against the goal of 
market integration403. 
Nevertheless, the original approach taken in Consten and Grundig has been 
subsequently qualified by the European Courts, which, already from Société Technique 
Minière404, interpreted Article 101 TFEU in a less strict way405 and developed the de 
minimis doctrine406. Still, plenty of cases on parallel trade, where conditions to apply the 
de minimis Notice were lacking, have been decided on the grounds built by the 
mentioned grand arrêt. 
In BMW407, the ECJ established that when the importer of a given product invited 
dealers established in the same Member State to subscribe to an agreement whereby 
they undertake not to re-export the said product, and that agreement is in fact 
concluded, there is an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
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402 The issue of shortages recurs in the case law on parallel trade, in particular in the new cases in the field of 
pharmaceutical. See better infra Section 6 of this Chapter. 
403 This principle has been firmly upheld by the Community Courts in all cases, and especially by the GC, 9 
July 1994, in case T-43/927, Dunlop Slazenger International Ltd v Commission of the European Communities; by 
the ECJ, 21 September 2006, in case C-167/04 P, JCB Service v Commission of the European Communities; GC, 30 
April 2009, in case T-13/03 Nintendo Co., Ltd and Nintendo of Europe GmbH v Commission of the European 
Communities. 
404 See ECJ, 30 June 1966, in case C-56/65 Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH 
(M.B.U.). 
405 The better understanding of economic theory about the functioning of vertical agreements contributed to 
convey the consideration of pro-competitive effects of exclusive license agreements (among other 
agreements) into the antitrust assessment. This raised the question of whether there exists a rule of reason in 
Art. 101(1) TFEU. For a deeper discussion of this issue see Chapter IV and V. 
406 The de minimis doctrine was elaborated by the ECJ in the case C-5/69 Volk v. Vervaecke and then ‘codified’ 
in the de minimis Commission Notice exempting from the application of Art. 101 TFEU those agreements 
where joint market share of parties does not exceed the threshold of 15%. See better infra Section 3.2.1 
Chapter V. 
407 See ECJ, 12 July 1979, in case C-32/78, BMW Belgium SA and others v Commission of the European 
Communities. 
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In General Motors408, the defendant was pursuing a policy of systematically 
obstructing exports of new vehicles from the Netherlands to other Member States. The 
corporate strategy comprised, inter alia, a restrictive bonus policy excluding export sales 
to final consumers from retail bonus campaigns, and an indiscriminate direct export ban. 
The ECJ recalled that previous case law already established that an agreement 
concerning distribution has a restrictive object for the purposes of Article 101 TFEU if it 
clearly manifests the will to treat export sales less favourably than national sales and 
thus leads to the partitioning of the internal market in question. Such an objective could 
be achieved not only by direct restrictions on exports but also through indirect 
measures, such as the implementation by a manufacturer in its dealership contracts of a 
measure excluding export sales from the system of bonuses granted to dealers. Such 
restrictions are, in fact, capable of influencing the economic conditions of such 
transactions. 
In Volkwagen409, the ECJ maintained that the implementation by a manufacturer 
of a policy of imposing supply quotas on dealers with the aim of restricting re-exports is 
not a unilateral act but rather an agreement within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU, 
inasmuch as the manufacturer, for the purpose of imposing that policy, uses clauses in 
the dealership contract, such as the restriction of supplies to dealers and, in so doing, 
influences the business conduct of the latter. 
The Court also affirmed that those concerted practices constituted an 
infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU, since they represent the implementation of a 
market-partitioning policy410.  
The Sandoz411 case represents, in the present context, an important ruling where 
the ECJ dealt with an export ban applied by pharmaceutical manufacturers to 
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408 ECJ, 13 November 1975, in case C-26/75, General Motors Continental NV v Commission of the European 
Communities. 
409 ECJ, 8 September 2003, in case C-338/00, Volkswagen AG v Commission of the European Communities. See 
also the decision of the Commission 98/273/CE, 28 January 1998, in case IV/35.733 D VW- Audi/Volkswagen, 
para. 210, where it is stated that “the obstruction of parallel exports of vehicles by final consumers and of cross 
deliveries within the dealer network hampers the objective of the creation of the common market, a principle of the 
Treaty, and is already for that reason to be classified as a particularly serious infringement”. 
410 The Court also explained that those measures were not covered by Regulation No. 123/85 and Regulation 
No 1475/95, since no provision of those regulations exempts an agreement which aims to prevent parallel 
exports by final consumers, by intermediaries acting on their behalf or by other dealers in the dealer 
network. It also stated that an individual exemption could not be granted in the present case, since the 
applicants did not notify any aspect of their agreement with the dealers, and that in any event the barriers to 
re-exportation were at variance with the objective of consumer protection set out in Article 101(3) TFEU. 
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wholesalers. In this case, the manufacturer systematically dispatched to his dealers 
invoices bearing the words “export prohibited”. 
Both the Commission and the Court considered this behaviour a signal of the fact 
that the manufacturer was seeking the cooperation of wholesalers in order to reduce 
parallel trade of products from Italy to other European countries. This, according to the 
ECJ, again constituted an agreement prohibited by Article 101(1) TFEU, and not a 
unilateral conduct, because it formed part of a set of continuous business relations 
governed by a general agreement drawn up in advance. Such agreement was based on 
the consent of the supplier to the establishment of business relations with each customer 
prior to any delivery and the tacit acceptance by such customers of the conduct adopted 
by the supplier in their regard, which was attested by renewed orders placed without 
protest on the same conditions. 
On this basis, the defendant policy was condemned as contrary to Article 101 
TFEU, because of the effect of market compartmentalization. 
Interestingly, subsequent case law, which will be the object of analysis of the 
present work, dealing substantially with the same issues, albeit in different contractual 
forms, followed a different approach, both with regards to the issue of the elements 
constituting an agreement412 and of the object of a pricing policy that by definition has 
market partitioning purposes413. 
5.2 Unilateral conducts restricting parallel trade 
The case law under Article 102 TFEU is much less abounding. However, the 
cases ruled by the ECJ represented milestones for the development of subsequent 
jurisprudence. 
5.2.1 The case law under Article 102(d) TFEU 
One strand of the case law related to situations where manufacturers refused to 
supply some distributors, who were engaging in exporting activities, and for this reason 
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411 See ECJ, VI ch., 11 January 1990, in case C-277/87, Sandoz prodotti farmaceutici SpA v Commission of the 
European Communities. 
412 See ECJ, full court, 6 January 2004, in joined cases C-2/01 e C-3/01 BAI v Bayer and Commission of the 
European Communities. See better infra next Section. 
413 See GC, IV Ch., ext. composition, 27 September 2006, in case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited 
v Commission of the European Communities. See better infra Section 6. 
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were considered an abuse of dominant position and prohibited under Article 102(d) 
TFEU414. 
The refusal to deal with competitors, in fact, might pose antitrust concerns, when 
a company refuses to provide a customer with a good or a service in the upstream 
market where it holds a position of dominance. The good or service in question is an 
input necessary for entering the downstream market, where the dominant company 
wishes to enter and where the customer, previously operating there, can be a competitor. 
By foreclosing access to rivals in the downstream market, the dominant company can 
charge prices unrestrained by competition and expand its market power. 
EU Courts and the Commission commonly reject the notion that a dominant 
company has always the obligation to deal with rivals415. Generally, companies enjoy the 
freedom to choose their trading partners. However, this rule is subject to an exception 
and a duty to supply could be imposed where the refusal would ‘eliminate all competition’ 
in the downstream market, i.e. when the exclusionary effect caused by the conduct 
results in the creation of a monopoly downstream416.  
The concerns of the Commission and the European Courts about the refusal to 
deal opposed by dominant companies to competitors arises because this conduct might 
give rise to leveraging, i.e. the attempt to extend market power from an ‘upstream’ into a 
‘downstream’ product market417. 
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414 See GC, 10 July 1990, in case T-64/89, BPB and British Gypsum v. Commission, para. 69. 
415 See, for instance, the Commission decision 7/500/EEC of 29 July 1987, IV/32.279 - BBI/Boosey & Hawkes: 
Interim measures), where it was affirmed that a dominant company is not expected to subsidize competitors 
and it would be even entitled to review its commercial ties with a customer that turned to be competitor 
with a view of terminating “any special relationship”. See also in US, where Courts explicitly rejected the 
idea that a company always has a duty to deal with rivals. See United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 333 
(1919) (a business is generally free to deal with whomever it chooses so long as that conduct is “in the absence 
of any purpose to create or maintain a monopoly”); Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 
601-03 (1985); American Key Corp. v. Cole National Corp., 762 F.2d 1569, 1578 (11th Cir. 1985) (the “antitrust 
laws do not compel a company to do business with anyone”). 
416 Cf. the opinion of AG Jacobs on Syfait I at para. 66. 
417 See ECJ, 6 March 1974, in joined cases C-6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano S.p.A. and Commercial 
Solvents Corporation v Commission of the European Communities, where the world monopolist in the production 
and commercialisation of the raw material nitropropane refused to supply a customer, producer of 
ethambutol, for which this raw material was a necessary input. The refusal allowed the dominant company 
to monopolise the downstream market for the production and distribution of ethambutol, since the only 
competitor was forced out of the market. For this reason, the conduct was considered abusive by the ECJ. 
Similarly, in Telemarketing, the ECJ stated that an abuse is committed when a dominant undertaking, 
without any objective necessity, reserves for itself a secondary activity in another market, which was carried 
out by another undertaking. See ECJ, V Ch., 3 October 1985, in case C-311/84, Centre belge d'études de marché 
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Differently from the cited landmark case, in a parallel trade case, the effect of the 
exclusionary behaviour on competition at the downstream level may have two 
dimensions: in the export market and in the import markets. 
With regards to the export market, the refusal to supply a number of wholesalers 
is likely to put them at competitive disadvantage vis-à-vis others distributors, who 
continue to receive goods and therefore become the only suppliers capable of satisfying 
pharmacists’ purchase orders. Such differential treatment potentially has the effect of 
both rendering the supply distribution chain partially foreclosed inside the export 
market and restricting, if not eliminating, competition among wholesalers.  
In addition, the supply restraints are also capable of generating distortions 
outside the export market. Having been denied deliveries, wholesalers who would 
engage in export activities lose, in whole or in part, the possibility to supply the import 
markets. Therefore, the conduct potentially results in a restriction of trade flows between 
the exporting country and the importing countries. 
This type of exclusionary conduct not only has a negative effect on the 
availability of products in importing countries, but also significantly restricts price 
competition in that market. 
First of all, with a lower stock at their disposal, exporters are forced to charge 
higher prices than would otherwise have been the case, absent the restrictions on 
supply418. As a result, their efficiency in the market is likely to be impaired: by having 
supply quantities restricted, they lose their competitiveness vis-à-vis the authorised 
distributors. 
Furthermore, when foreclosure is total, the manufacturer is able to (indirectly) 
reserve for itself the distribution in the export market. It follows that, when the 
manufacturer has a dominant position in relation to a specific product in the export 
market, it might be able to extend it also to the importing countries, absent the presence 
of any effective substitute. Free from any price competition, the dominant company 
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- Télémarketing (CBEM) v SA Compagnie luxembourgeoise de télédiffusion (CLT) and Information publicité Benelux 
(IPB), para. 25-27. 
418 The concept of ‘elimination of all competition’ does not necessary imply complete foreclosure of 
competitors. It might suffice to prevent them to maintain their economies of scale, thereby hampering their 
efficiency. See ELHAUGE, Defining Better Monopolisation Standards, in Stanford Law Review, 2003, no. 56, p. 321; 
SALOP and SCHEFFMAN, Rising Rivals’ Costs, American Economic Review, 1983, no. 73, p. 267. 
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faces no constraint on its market power and it is able to charge higher prices than it 
would in presence of parallel trade. 
Therefore, consumers in importing countries suffer a direct harm, because they 
become unable to purchase a cheaper variant of a given product, and an indirect harm, 
since they are left with no choice but to buy it from authorised distributors at a higher 
price419. 
For this reason, in BPB, the company was found to have infringed Article 102 
TFEU by granting rebates to plasterboards merchants in a given Member State in 
response to a threat from a group of merchants to sell plasterboards imported from 
another Member State at lower prices. The GC held that the rebates were not directed at 
meeting competition but at strengthening BPB’s dominance and abusing it, because the 
conduct was likely to affect the structure of the market where, as a consequence of the 
presence of BPB, competition was already weakened420. 
This analysis has been replicated in General Motors, where the ECJ has held that a 
practice by which an undertaking in a dominant position aims at restricting parallel 
trade in the products that it puts on the market constitutes abuse of that dominant 
position, particularly when such a practice has the effect of curbing parallel imports by 
neutralising the more favourable level of prices which may apply in other sales areas in 
the EU421. 
In United Brands, the Court affirmed that the fact that an undertaking is in a 
dominant position cannot disentitle it from protecting its own commercial interests if 
they are attacked, and that such an undertaking must be conceded the right to take 
reasonable steps to safeguard the said interests422. However, this does not entitle it to 
stop supplying a long-standing customer who abides by regular commercial practice, 
because its effect on the market are disproportionate with the goal that such measures 
are deemed to attain. The ECJ, thus, was prepared to tolerate sanctions towards parallel 
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419 See ECJ, 21 February 1973, in case C-6/72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v 
Commission of the European Communities, where it was affirmed that the concept of abuse encompasses both 
direct and indirect harm to consumers. Indirect harm occurs as a result of restrictions on effective 
competition, such that ‘only undertakings remain in the market whose behaviour depends on the dominant one’. 
Similarly in US law ‘a monopolist's act must have an "anticompetitive effect." That is, it must harm the competitive 
process and thereby harm consumers.’ (U.S. v. Microsoft Co., 253 F.3d 34, 346 U.S. App. D.C. 330, p. 23). 
420 See BPB, para. 69. 
421 See General Motors, para. 12. 
422 See United Brands, para. 189. 
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traders when appropriate and suitable to the threat suffered. So for instance, the Court 
was willing to justify a drastic reaction from the dominant undertaking only if the orders 
placed by that customers were in no way out of the ordinary423. 
5.2.2 The case law under Article 102(c) TFEU 
The other strand of the case law focuses on discriminatory practices prohibited 
by Article 102(c) TFEU. The landmark case is constituted by above mentioned United 
Brands, where a producer of bananas charged widely different prices to its distributors 
in different Member States according to the destination of the bananas, although they 
were sold in the same two ports (Rotterdam and Bremerhaven). Also, it imposed on 
wholesalers a clause in its general sale conditions whereby it was prohibited to resell 
bananas when still green. Finally, it systematically refused to supply one of its 
customers. 
The European Commission considered United Brands’ conducts an abuse of 
dominant position within the meaning of Article 102 (b) and (c) TFEU. 
First, the application of different prices to distributors was considered abusive, 
because it discriminated among them (read: it applied different conditions to similar 
transactions), with the effect of eliminating a competing trading party from the relevant 
market (Article 102 TFEU, letter c))424, i.e. it caused as a second-line injury425. 
Second, the clause prohibiting the resell of bananas while green had the effect of 
reducing a lot the period where trade was possible, because bananas are perishable 
products. Therefore, this clause was found to have similar effects to a prohibition of 
exports. 
The European Commission, thus, believed that, all together, these clauses 
rendered trade among Member State practically impossible, thereby partitioning 

423 The Court indicated that a proportionality principle was a constituent element of the necessity test. See 
ECJ, 14 February 1978, in case C-27/76, United Brands Company and United Brands Continentaal BV v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 139. 
424 See United Brands, para. 225. The principle has also characterised the approach of Community Courts to 
discriminatory rebates, starting from Hoffmann-La Roche. Courts have traditionally considered discounts not 
abusive if they are based on quantities purchased. See, for instance, ECJ, 30 September 2003, in case T-
203/01, Manufacture française des pneumatiques Michelin v. Commission of the European Communities (Michelin 
II). 
425 Second-line injuries cause distortions of downstream competition, due to the discrimination operated by 
the dominant company towards its customers, i.e. by imposing on them differential conditions, although 
transactions are commercially similar. Primary-line injury prejudices competitors of the dominant company 
and therefore has exclusionary effects. 
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national markets. Such an effect was further increased by the mentioned supply 
restriction policy adopted by United Brands. 
These practices were considered by the Commission as functional to enabling the 
manufacturer to control the entire marketing of its product. This indirectly strengthened 
and consolidated the manufacturer’s dominant position. 
The ECJ upheld the analysis of the Commission almost entirely426 and affirmed 
that the ‘green bananas’ clause was abusive. It affirmed that the policy of differing prices 
created a rigid partitioning of national markets at the level of prices and enabled the 
defendant to apply dissimilar conditions to equivalent transactions with other trading 
parties, thereby placing them at a competitive disadvantage, was an abuse of dominant 
position. 
The reasoning of the Court raised in the literature several questions about the 
legitimacy of price differences when the product is sold in different product markets or 
in different geographic areas427. 
From the analysis of the case law, it appears that neither the Commission nor the 
European Courts are pursuing a policy aimed at equalizing prices across markets. On 
the contrary, even a dominant company can charge different prices in different product 
markets when different conditions, like price elasticity, transport cost, taxes, etc., allow 
it. In fact, the Court several times affirmed that a dominant company is entitled to 
charge what the market can bear provided that this complies with the rules of the 
internal market428. In fact, price discrimination alone fosters intra-EU trade and for this 
reason it cannot be considered in itself unlawful under EU competition law. 
Indeed, United Brands’ conduct did not upset this principle, given that 
distributors were operating in different markets. Thus, the discriminatory commercial 
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426 The Court only disagreed with the Commission about the allegation of excessive prices, because it found 
the findings of the comparative test used by Commission to be incorrect. The Court, in fact, held that 
comparison of prices can be used but should be based on adequate evidence that lower prices actually cover 
costs. See United Brands, para. 302. 
427 See SPRINGER, Borden and United Brands revisited, in ECLR, 1997, p. 42 and 44. 
428 See United Brands, para. 228. See also Deutsche Grammophon, summary, para. 7, where the ECJ held that 
“the difference between the controlled price and the price of the product re-imported from another Member State does 
not necessarily suffice to disclose an abuse [within the meaning of Article 82]”; Hoffmann-la Roche, para. 28, where 
the Court affirmed that if a product can be used for different purposes in accordance with different needs, 
then relevant market are separate and different prices are justified. On this basis, FRIDEN, Recent 
Developments in EEC Intellectual Property Law, cit., p. 211, affirms that price discrimination should be out of 
the scope of Art. 102(c) TFEU. 
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conditions were not capable of putting some of the distributors in a competitive 
disadvantage with respect to others. 
However, the Court saw in that practice an abuse, because it believed it had a 
discriminatory effect and it was capable of reintroducing barriers to trade. 
Still, the market partitioning effect did not come from the price discrimination 
itself but from the ‘green banana’ clause429. 
But the Court affirmed that it was the involvement of the dominant firm in the 
local market downstream, where it does not actually bear any risk of competition and 
consumer choice, that provided indicia for the finding of abuse. In simple words, 
according to the ECJ, United Brands was extending the dominant position enjoyed 
upstream to the market downstream430. 
The literature commenting the early case law on pricing abuses criticised this 
approach for not taking into account the teaching of the economic theory about the 
possible welfare-enhancing effect of price discrimination431. Still, the landmark 
principles that have shaped the case law have been constantly re-affirmed by European 
Courts. 
 
6. New cases on parallel trade of pharmaceuticals: a revirement? 
After having pursued for almost forty years a policy aimed at protecting and 
encouraging parallel trade432, through the firm prohibition of corporate conducts that 
restrict exports, European Courts have recently questioned the legal principles 
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429 ANDERMAN, EC Competition Law and Intellectual Property Rights, cit., p. 239, correctly notes that the clause 
impeding parallel trade was actually the one relating to green bananas. Therefore the Court could have 
struck only that clause leaving the discriminating pricing policy intact. Similarly, WAELBROEK, Price 
Discrimination and Rebate Policies under EU Competition Law, in Fordham Corp. Law Inst., 1995, p. 154; SIRAGUSA, 
The Application of Article 86 to the Pricing Policies of Dominant Companies: Discriminatory and Unfair Prices, in 
CMLR, 1979, no. 16, p. 179. 
430 See United Brands, para. 229. 
431 It is largely claimed that, although it would have been possible to give an economic interpretation of Art. 
102, lett c), TFEU, in order to seek for a competitive explanation of the rebates, the provision has been 
applied rather formalistically. See ZANON, Price Discrimination under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty: a Comment 
on the UBC Case, in International and Comparative Law Quarterly, 1982, no. 31, p. 36; WAELBROWEK, Price 
Discrimination and Rebate Policies under EU Competition Law, in Fordham Corp. Law Inst., 1995, p. 147, at 148. 
For further economic references and a deeper discussion about the welfare effects of price discrimination see 
infra Section 2.1 and 2.2 in Chapter III. 
432 See ECJ, V ch., 16 January 1992 in case C-373/90 Criminal Proceeding against X, where the Court explained 
the rationale of this policy by affirming that “parallel imports enjoy a certain protection in Community law 
because they encourage trade and help reinforce competition”. 
 153
underpinning such a policy with specific regard to their application to the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
6.1 New cases under Article 102 TFEU: the Syfait saga 
This revirement, which stems from the economic-oriented approach advocated 
within the ongoing process of so-called ‘modernization of EU competition law’433, 
started with the mentioned judgment delivered in the Adalat case.  
In that occasion, both the GC, before, and the ECJ, after, have indirectly ruled in 
favour of quantity restrictions imposed by Bayer on Spanish and French pharmaceutical 
distributors. In fact, both European Courts qualified these restrictions as unilateral 
conduct rather than an export ban falling within the scope of Article 101 TFEU and, in so 
doing, they reversed the Commission’s decision on this specific issue and dissented from 
previous jurisprudence434. 
But most importantly, according to some commentators, the GC suggested in 
seemed to suggest that the application of Article 101 TFEU should not bear strong 
market integration overtones435. 
Such shift of the attitude towards parallel trade can be also mapped out of the 
opinion of the Advocate General in a reference request made by the Epitropi 
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433 Many commentators consider the application of Article 102 TFEU from the Commission and the Courts 
to be too formalistic, following the heritage of the ordoliberal theory, and little in line with economic theory. 
See GYSELEN, Rebates: Competition on the merits or exclusionary practices?, in EHLERMANN and ATANASIU, The 
European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, 2003, p. 287; FOX, Abuse of 
Dominance and monopolization: how to protect competition without protecting competitors, in EHLERMANN and 
ATANASIU, The European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, 2003, p. 69; 
FOX, We protect competition, you protect competitors, in World Competition, 2003, p. 149; AHLBORN and PADILLA, 
From Fairness to Welfare: Implications for the Assessment of Unilateral Conduct under EC Competition Law, 
presented at EUI for the Twelfth Annual EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop. A Reformed Approach to 
Article 82 EC, 2007; and finally see also the GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC, 2005. 
434 The concept of ‘agreement’ has been extensively interpreted by the ECJ, which inferred its existence 
indirectly through the analysis of parties’ behaviour, even in absence of written formalities. For instance, the 
existence of an agreement has been often based on factual circumstances, like the commercial relationship 
existing between the parties. Accordingly, the ECJ considered the invoices, sent by the manufacturer to 
wholesalers, bearing the wording ‘export prohibited’, as indicia of the existence of an implicit agreement 
aimed at impeding parallel trade, to be integrated the in the existing commercial relationship. See Sandoz, 
para. 13; ECJ, 15 July 1970, in case C-41/69 ACF Chemiefarma NV v Commission of the European Communities, 
para. 12. 
435 I refer here to para. 179 of the Adalat ruling in the first instance, where the Tribunal affirmed “it is not open 
to the Commission to attempt to achieve a result, such as the harmonisation of prices in the medicinal products market, 
by enlarging or straining the scope of Section 1 (Rules applying to undertakings) of Chapter 1 of Title VI of the 
Treaty”. VENIT and REY, Parallel Trade and Pharmaceuticals: a Policy in search of itself, in ELR, 2004, no. 29, p. 154, 
where the in fn 6 they write that the GC was, with these dicta, rejecting an aggressive enforcement policy 
favouring market integration at all costs. 
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Antagonismou (i.e. the Greek Competition Commission)436, the ‘Syfait I’ case, on refusal to 
supply. 
The AG Jacobs argued, in open contrast with mentioned prior case law under 
Article 102 TFEU, that a pharmaceutical company does not necessarily abuse its 
dominant position if it refuses to supply wholesalers in order to protect its commercial 
interests (read: its incentive to innovate) from parallel trade. More specifically, the AG 
sought for a justification to the abusive conduct based on the efficiency gains deriving by 
the latter. He claimed, following the defendant’s allegations, that the impediment to 
parallel trade would have allowed the company to recoup money that could be devoted 
to R&D, thereby providing the possibility to pursue new projects that could lead to the 
discovery of new and better drugs. 
Echoes of this new approach can also be observed at national level. For instance, 
the French Conseil de la Concurrence in its decision n. 05-D-72 of the 20th December 2005 
held that pharmaceutical laboratories do not abuse their dominant position when they 
restrict or refuse deliveries of medicinal products to exporters437.  
Nevertheless, the issue of whether supply management strategies specifically 
designed to hamper parallel trade on pharmaceuticals are legitimate or not is still far 
from clear from a legal standpoint. Indeed, while significantly departing from the 
traditional case law, the outcome of the aforementioned cases does not help to identify 
clear guidance for handling future cases. 
Indeed, in the Adalat ruling the ECJ focused its reasoning on the issue of the 
‘concurrence of wills’ when discussing the possible existence of an agreement restrictive 
of competition438. Unfortunately, it did not consider the legal status of supply quotas 
under EU competition law. 
The ECJ dismissed Syfait I on procedural grounds since the Greek Competition 
Authority was not deemed to be a ‘Tribunal’ within the wording of Article 267 TFEU. 
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436 See ECJ, 31 May 2005, in case C-53/03, Reference for a preliminary ruling from the Epitropi Antagonismou in 
Synetairismos Farmakopoion Aitolias & Akarnanias (Syfait) and Others v GlaxoSmithKline plc and Others. 
437 The Conseil with its subsequent decision n. 07-D-22 of 5 July 2007 also accepted the quota system 
proposed by several pharmaceutical companies to rationalize distribution in the French market. 
438 The issue of the existence of an agreement in the Adalat case has been subject to animated debate. For 
comments on this, inter alia, see PARDOLESI, Ritorno dall'isola che non c’è: ovvero l'intesa malintesa e l'integrazione 
del mercato come obiettivo dell'antitrust comunitario, in Mercato concorrenza regole, 2001, no. 3, p. 561–575. 
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Therefore, the merits of the case were only addressed in the opinion of the Advocate 
General. 
Three years after the dismissal, a new case, Sot. Lélos Kai Sia (hereinafter ‘Syfait 
II’), stood before the ECJ, based on questions identical to those previously submitted439. 
On April 1, 2008 the Advocate General Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer (hereinafter ‘AG 
Colomer’) submitted his opinion. The Advocate General also refused the reading of 
Article 102 TFEU as a per se prohibition of abusive conducts and accepted the application 
of a rule of reason in the antitrust analysis, in consideration of possible efficiency gains 
deriving from them440. 
However, the Grand Chamber of the ECJ, differently from what AG Colomer 
argued441, wiped away the R&D debate entirely and reclassified the R&D issue as an 
impact of parallel trade on profits442. Therefore, rather than an efficiency argument, it 
looked to be an objective justification looking at protection of commercial interests.  
For this reason, the Court left open the possibility that the pharmaceutical 
manufacturer might be able to justify a refusal to supply where the orders are ‘out of the 
ordinary’, having regard to size of the order and its impact in the market of the exporting 
country and the previous course of dealing between the pharmaceutical manufacturer 
and the wholesaler concerned443. 
Albeit the outcome of the Syfait II case may give some guidance to the solution 
for future cases dealing with the same issue, there are several problems in the 
implementation of this criterion too. 
The rule of thumb provided by the ECJ does not really solve the appropriability 
issue alleged by the defendants and does not take a dynamic efficiency perspective. In 
fact, the reasoning of the Court, rather than an efficiency argument, seems a classical 
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439 See joined cases C-468 to 478/06, Sotiris Lèlos kai Sia E.E and others v. GlaxoSmithKline AEVE Farmakeftikon 
Proïonton. 
440 See para. 72 of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion. 
441 The AG Colomer did not believe that the economic arguments put forward by the defendant could 
provide a valid and proportionate objective justification to the refusal to supply. In particular, he did not 
consider the existence of the efficiency gains sufficiently proved. See para. 116-118 of his opinion. The ECJ, 
instead, did not enter at all into efficiency considerations. See para. 70 of the decision. See my article Parallel 
Trade and Pharmaceutical R&D: The Pitfalls of the Rule of. Reason, in European Competition Law Review, 2008, no. 
29(11), p. 649-665 for a comment on the AG Colomer’s opinion. 
442 See para. 29 of the Syfait II ruling. 
443 See para. 67-70 of the Syfait II ruling. 
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objective justification that looks at the protection of the commercial interests of one of 
the parties. 
6.2 New cases under Article 101 TFEU: the Glaxo case 
With regards to Article 101 TFEU, the turning point is represented by the ruling 
from General Court in the Glaxo case on dual pricing. 
The GC affirmed that the application of Article 101(1) TFEU could not depend 
solely on the fact that the agreement affects trade between Member States and partitions 
the common market. On the contrary, it also requires checking whether it prevents, 
restricts or distorts effective competition in the relevant market, to the detriment of the 
final consumer. In other words, to be considered contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU, the 
agreement should both impede intrastate trade and hinder effective competition in the 
market444. 
So, for instance, although an agreement intended to limit parallel trade must in 
principle be considered to have as its object the restriction of competition, this would 
apply in so far as the agreement may be presumed to leave final consumers without real 
benefits. 
However, the Court affirmed that it is impossible to presume the existence of 
such benefits in the pharmaceutical market, given that drug price regulation impedes 
the occurrence of the competitive pressure traditionally associated to parallel trade445. 
For this reason, the GC, going against the case law previously analysed446, 
affirmed that such agreement was not contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU in its object but 
only in its effect, insofar it had been demonstrated that it concretely impeded consumers 
to enjoy savings brought about by parallel trade. 
Secondly, the Court said that, in evaluating the conditions for a possible 
exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, the European Commission did not properly carry 
out the necessary economic analysis, required by the specific nature of the 
pharmaceutical sector. Therefore, the GC annulled its decision in that part and required 
a new evaluation from the side of the Commission. 
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444 See para. 118-119 of the Glaxo ruling. 
445 See para. 119-147 of the Glaxo ruling. 
446 Cf. Section 2.1 and Section 5.1 of this Chapter, and in particular the Sandoz case, given that GC in the 
Glaxo case did not explicitly confront itself with that decision. 
 157
The ruling has been appealed by both parties. Following the opinion of the AG 
Trstenjak, delivered on June 30, 2009, the ECJ ruled as following. 
The Court found that the GC committed an error of law, when it required the 
proof of the concrete disadvantages for final consumers for an agreement to be 
anticompetitive by object447. The ECJ, thus, returned to the principles established by 
previous case law, whereby an agreement deemed to restrict parallel trade is 
anticompetitive in its object. 
As regards GSK’s request for an exemption under Article 101(3) TFEU, the Court 
agreed with the GC. In fact, it held that the examination of an agreement, for the 
purposes of determining whether it contributes to the improvement of the production or 
distribution of goods or to the promotion of technical or economic progress, and 
whether that agreement generates appreciable objective advantages, must be undertaken 
in the light of the factual arguments and evidence provided by the undertaking. The 
nature and specific features of the sector concerned have to be taken into account in the 
analysis. 
Lastly, the Court held that the GC correctly held that the Commission had not 
taken account of all the relevant evidence produced by GSK regarding the loss in 
efficiency associated with parallel trade or the gain in efficiency procured by the dual 
pricing clause, and that such decision was, for this reason, vitiated by a failure to carry 
out a proper examination. 
From the above description of the jurisprudential developments on parallel trade 
of pharmaceuticals, it appears that two are the main debated issues that led the judges to 
question the traditional legal approach to restrictions of parallel trade: its effect on static 
efficiency and on dynamic efficiency, i.e. the competitive impact on prices of original 
products and on companies’ incentive to invest in innovation. 
These two topics are going to be at the centre of the following analysis. 
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447 As indicated by the ECJ at para. 65, despite that error of law, the GC judgment remains correct in its 
operative part: the GC, in fact, confirmed the part of the Commission’s decision where it found that the dual 
pricing clause infringed Art. 101(1) TFEU. Accordingly, the Court dismisses GSK’s appeal in so far as it 
seeks to establish that the general sales conditions were compatible with the prohibition of agreements in 
restriction of competition. 
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7. Conclusions 
This Chapter has reviewed forty years of European jurisprudence and 
Commission practice that is at the basis of the development of parallel trade. 
Based on the concept of ‘specific subject matter’ and on the principle of ‘regional 
exhaustion of IPRs’, traditionally European institutions have protected and encouraged it, 
through the firm prohibition of corporate conducts that restrict exports, in the belief that 
it fosters competition and brings about harmonisation in the market. In the 
pharmaceutical market, in particular, parallel trade has been conventionally considered 
one of the best ways to achieve market integration, given that direct harmonising 
measures proved to be ineffective and failed. 
For this reason, export bans and other indirect mechanisms that discourage 
exports have been constantly considered as anticompetitive agreements falling within 
the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU 
Similarly, the refusal to supply wholesalers coming from the manufacturer in 
dominant position with the aim of impeding exports has been strictly prohibited as an 
abuse of such position. The same legal treatment, although in a more controversial way, 
has been generally attributed to discriminatory practices. 
The recent more intensive use of the economics in antitrust analysis have led 
European Courts to question the legal principles underpinning parallel trade and to 
adapt them to the specificity of the pharmaceutical sector. 
However, the history of the analysed cases that marked this U-turn does not 
provide the possibility of envisaging the concrete boundaries of this policy change: the 
ECJ very recently solved the doubts cast by the Glaxo ruling about whether an 
agreement restricting parallel trade is anticompetitive by object or by effect; but it left 
open the R&D issue, because it did not explicitly ruled on the impact that parallel trade 
has on innovation. 
The fact that European Courts opened the way to economic reasoning in a more 
explicit fashion pays tribute to the right need of modernising European competition law. 
Yet, the need to reconcile these developments with well-established principles built with 
forty years of case law arises. 

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CHAPTER III 
 
 
Competition and regulation in the pharmaceutical market: the case of 
parallel trade 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The negative attitude of the Commission and the European Courts towards 
restrictions of parallel trade was particularly marked in the field of pharmaceuticals, 
because it was seen as very damaging for consumers. This type of cross border trade, in 
fact, is the only form of price competition for drugs during patent validity. Putting 
obstacles to it was thus seen as depriving patients of the sole source of cheaper drugs. 
Nevertheless, such effect did not look apparent either to the GC in the Glaxo case 
or to AG Jacobs in the Syfait case, who doubted about the existence of an effective 
pressure from parallel trade on prices of original products, due to the regulatory 
intervention on drug prices. 
I already reported that the GC in the Glaxo case on dual pricing held that Article 
101(1) TFEU applies to agreements aimed at restricting parallel trade, not only when 
they influence intra-EU trade but also when the existence of an appreciable restriction to 
competition is concretely proven448. 
The existence of these two conditions, and especially of the second one, should 
be carefully analysed in light of the specific features of the market in which the 
agreement takes place449. It is, in fact, established case law that in the examination of 

448 See para. 118-119 of the Glaxo ruling. 
449 See also para. 109 of the Glaxo ruling where the Court says that “the degree of competition necessary to ensure 
the attainment of the objectives of the Treaty […] may vary to an extent dictated by the nature of the product concerned 
and the structure of the relevant market. […] its parameters may assume unequal importance, as price competition does 
not constitute the only effective form of competition or that to which absolute priority must in all circumstances be 
given …”. 
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business practices under competition law rules, attention should be given to the 
economic and legal context450. 
In the case of pharmaceuticals, such specificity was identified with the fact that 
prices are regulated differently across Europe. In the view of the Court it appeared, 
firstly, that ‘prices are finally set by Member States’; secondly, that ‘prices fall outside the play 
of supply and demand’; thirdly, that they are ‘established at structurally different levels 
throughout the Community’451. 
These characteristics induced the Court to affirm, even after a prior general 
acknowledgment of the positive effect of parallel trade on prices452, that it is impossible 
to presume the existence of such benefits in the pharmaceutical market, given that drug 
price regulation impedes the occurrence of the competitive pressure traditionally 
associated to parallel trade453. The GC, in fact, suggested that economic agents operating 
at an intermediate stage of the supply chain may keep the price differential for 
themselves. In that case that advantage will not be passed on to the final consumers. 
For this reason, the GC, going against previous case law454, affirmed that such 
agreement was not contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU in its object but only in its effect, 
insofar it had been demonstrated that it concretely impeded consumers to enjoy savings 
brought about by parallel trade. 
In the same wake, in the Syfait I case the AG Jacobs, clearly departing from prior 
jurisprudence under Article 102 TFEU455, argued that a pharmaceutical company does 

450 See Société Technique Minière, p. 249, 250; Consten and Grundig, p. 343; and ECJ, 12 December 1995, in case 
C-399/93 Oude Luttikhuis and Others, para. 20. 
451 See para. 125-134 of the Glaxo ruling. 
452 See para. 107 of the Glaxo ruling, where the Court acknowledged that parallel trade is the only form of 
competition capable of exercising effective pressure on prices during the period of validity of a patent. 
453 See para. 119-147 of the Glaxo ruling and especially para. 134 where the Court affirmed that ‘That 
circumstance means that it cannot be presumed that parallel trade has an impact on the prices charged to the final 
consumers of medicines reimbursed by the national sickness insurance scheme and thus confers on them an appreciable 
advantage analogous to that which it would confer if those prices were determined by the play of supply and demand’. 
See also para. 147 where the Court said ’ … As the prices of the medicines concerned are to a large extent shielded 
from the free play of supply and demand owing to the applicable regulations and are set or controlled by the public 
authorities, it cannot be taken for granted at the outset that parallel trade tends to reduce those prices and thus to 
increase the welfare of final consumers…’. Cf. the opinion of the AG Roemer in Consten and Grundig, cit., p. 299, 
on the role of parallel trade on prices: “… Parallel imports, which the EC Commission has considered necessary, do 
not determine a reduction of final prices, but have as effect the provision of substandard services for consumers… “. 
454 Among the cases discussed in Section 2.1 and 5.1 of Chapter II, see Consten and Grundig, p. 340-342; Miller 
v Commission, para. 7; General Motors I, para. 101-102; General Motors II, para. 66-68 (citing lAZ, para. 23), and 
the opinion of AG Tizzano in that case, para. 63, 69, 71-72, 75; Sandoz, para. 3 of the summary. 
455 See United Brands and the analysis of the case and related case law infra Section 5.2 in Chapter II. 
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not abuse its dominant position if the refusal to supply opposed to wholesalers is 
functional to protect its commercial interests from parallel trade. 
In particular, the AG supported the idea that a departure from the traditional 
anticompetitive assessment of the refusal to supply from the dominant company was 
justified by the specificity of the pharmaceutical sector. 
And, again, the specific nature of the legal and economic context in which the 
pharmaceutical industry operates has been identified by the AG with the fact that drug 
prices are subject to governmental regulation. Such interference, responding to public 
health protection and public expenditures containment goals, would prevent normal 
conditions of competition from prevailing in the price formation. From this point of 
view, thus, the pharmaceutical market would be different from other industries. 
Furthermore, regulatory intervention on drug prices, coupled with the public 
service obligation456, which obliges pharmaceutical companies to maintain adequate 
supplies in each Member State, would lock in pharmaceutical companies. In fact, being 
compelled to supply the export markets, where parallel trade originates, companies 
cannot defend their profits in the importing markets from the competition triggered by 
cross-border price differentials caused by Member States’ different legislation. 
The presence of the strict mentioned regulatory environment, precluding 
companies the adoption of strategies that would defend their commercial interests from 
competitors’ attack, has been thus claimed to justify the anticompetitive behaviour. 
The same features that would justify a dominant company’s attempt to prevent 
parallel trade, according to the AG, would also prevent the latter from bringing benefits 
to consumers. On the contrary, parallel trade would benefit only traders who pocket 
most of the price differential, if not entirely457. 
Dual pricing schemes, as any other form of export ban, have been generally 
scrutinised under Article 101 TFEU, because they embody anticompetitive agreements. 
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456 See the Art. 81 of the so-called ‘Human Use directive’, Dir. 2001/83/EC, as amended by the Dir. 
2004/27/EC of 31 March 2004, which states: “The holder of a marketing authorisation for a medicinal product and 
the distributors of the said medicinal product actually placed on the market in a Member State shall, within the limits 
of their responsibilities, ensure appropriate and continued supplies of that medicinal product to pharmacies and persons 
authorised to supply medicinal products so that the needs of patients in the Member State in question are covered. The 
arrangements for implementing this Article should, moreover, be justified on grounds of public health protection and be 
proportionate in relation to the objective of such protection, in compliance with the Treaty rules, particularly those 
concerning the free movement of goods and competition”. 
457 See para. 96-99 of the AG Jacobs’ opinion on the Syfait II case. 
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Instead, supply quotas have been traditionally regarded as unilateral conducts that may 
fall within the scope of Article 102 TFEU, if put in place by dominant companies. Thus, 
the ban on the oppositions to parallel trade from private parties, albeit inspired by the 
same policy goal – market integration -, is enforced at two different levels, depending on 
the business practice in issue458. 
Notwithstanding this, in the present work the Glaxo case and the Syfait case are 
going to be analysed together for the following reasons. 
First of all, in a competition law framework that looks at the effects of corporate 
practices in the market, and leaves aside formalism - as maintained by the supporters of 
the modernisation of European competition law - a dual pricing clause and a supply 
quota appear equivalent to a certain extent. In fact, from the perspective of a wholesaler, 
the former is a type of vertical price-squeeze that may have the same effects of a supply 
quota. In fact, higher prices for exports discourage arbitrage and induce wholesalers to 
operate in the domestic markets only. Similarly, in a regulatory context where 
pharmaceutical wholesalers are subject to the public service obligation and are 
compelled to serve the domestic market first, the supply of a quantity of goods that 
satisfies solely the domestic demand also leaves wholesalers with that market only459. 
Secondly, the novel approach towards restrictions to parallel trade is based on 
the same claim in both cases: the specificity of the pharmaceutical sector, i.e. the 
presence of drug price regulation, which would require a change in the traditional 
anticompetitive assessment. 
Under Article 101 TFEU, governmental intervention on prices was seen by the 
GC as an element of the legal and economic context that influences the assessment of 
alleged restrictive agreements. In this context, the question arises whether such element 
is capable of changing the traditional findings about parallel trade and if, for instance, 
vertical restrictions aimed at impeding intra-EU trade on pharmaceuticals should not be 
considered anticompetitive in their object any longer. 
Under Article 102 TFEU, the presence of a strict regulatory environment that 
precludes companies the possibility to defend their commercial interests from 
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458 However, note that some corporate practices, like dual pricing, can possibly fall within the scope of both 
provisions, if dominance in the relevant market is proven. 
459 Note, however, that from the perspective of a pure exporter that does not have a distribution network in 
the domestic market but operates only abroad, a dual pricing clause equals to a total refusal to supply. 
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competitors’ attack, was claimed by the AG Jacobs to be equal to those exceptional 
economic conditions that are generally considered by the jurisprudence as an objective 
justification to abusive corporate conducts. 
It follows that an economic issue – the impact of price regulation on competition 
– is at the basis of a possible change in the antitrust analysis of corporate practices aimed 
at hindering parallel trade, and therefore of an eventual reversal of the entire policy at 
this regard at a EU level in the field of pharmaceuticals. 
This Chapter deals with this economic question: whether the pharmaceutical 
sector can be considered ‘special’ under competition law. 
Such question has been divided in three sub-questions: 
a. whether regulation of prices is such that competition cannot take place; 
b. whether parallel trade on pharmaceuticals brings benefits to consumers 
and national health care systems, 
c. and how large are these savings. 
The answer to sub-question a) influences the outcome of sub-question b). It is 
clear, in fact, that if the price formation is not entirely shielded from competitive 
mechanisms, it is reasonable to presume that parallel trade entails savings. If, on the 
contrary, price pressure is overruled by price controls, parallel trade cannot be 
presumed to bring the mentioned savings. 
It is therefore necessary to investigate to what extent regulatory intervention on 
pharmaceutical prices changes companies’ pricing policies and what is the impact on 
consumer welfare. 
To this purpose I will analyse the characteristics of national pharmaceutical 
regulation in Europe and its economic rationale. This overview is complemented with 
the analysis of the theoretical and empirical literature that studied the effect of parallel 
trade on prices of pharmaceuticals. 
The covered literature to date contains comprehensive and updated overviews of 
the European pharmaceutical systems (Öbig, 2008; Kanavos, 2003). There are also 
studies (West and Mahon, 2003; Kanavos, 2005; Pedersen, 2006) that examine if and to 
what extent parallel trade on pharmaceuticals brings benefits to consumers. However, 
the antitrust implications of these issues have not been enough explored so far. 
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Answering the research question purported above has very important 
consequences from an antitrust standpoint: if parallel trade on pharmaceuticals can be 
presumed to bring savings notwithstanding regulation, there is ground to uphold the 
traditional legal treatment towards restrictions to parallel trade, also in the 
pharmaceutical sector. 
If, on the contrary, the regulatory environment is such that parallel trade cannot 
be presumed to bring savings, there may be scope to support a change of the current 
legal treatment. 
Against this backdrop, this Chapter is divided as follows. 
Section 1 provides an overview of pharmaceutical regulations of the most 
representative European Member States, and especially of those where imports mainly 
take place (Sweden, Denmark, UK, Germany), to check to what extent regulation is 
capable of excluding price competition. 
Section 2 examines the economic literature dealing with the impact of parallel 
trade on pricing strategies applied by pharmaceutical companies, in order to verify the 
effect on prices charged in importing and exporting countries. This analysis aims at 
understanding whether parallel trade is capable of putting pressure on prices of original 
products, thereby bringing savings. 
Section 3 deals with the magnitude of such savings, as measured by recent 
studies, in order to analyse if there is and how effective is the pass-on mechanism and 
what is the role of pharmaceutical regulation in determining such effectiveness. 
Section 4 looks into the question of whether parallel trade on pharmaceuticals 
has had the price equalising function that has been legitimating its support at a EU level. 
The issue, besides being empirical, has an important legal facet: the fact that competence 
on health remains national may cast doubt on the legitimacy of the policy of 
harmonisation pursued by the Commission, which may seem a way to bypass the direct 
consent of Member States. 
Section 5 draws the antitrust implications of the foregoing economic analysis. In 
particular, it focuses on the Glaxo case and on the issue of whether an agreement 
restrictive of parallel trade runs against Article 101(1) TFEU in its object or in its effect. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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1. Regulation on prices: is the pharmaceutical sector ‘specific’? 
The first time that the issue of the ‘specificity’ of the pharmaceutical sector under 
European law came up was in Merck v. Primecrown460. In particular, as already 
mentioned in the previous Chapter, the Court was asked whether the absence of patent 
protection and a system of drug price regulation were sufficient conditions to justify the 
non-application of the principle of regional exhaustion of IPRs. 
Recall that in that occasion the AG Fennelly argued in favour of a qualification of 
the principle of exhaustion of IPRs essentially grounded on the absence of patent 
protection461. 
The impossibility to obtain an exclusive right diminished the bargaining power 
of companies in price negotiations with the authorities. In fact, the presence of copyists 
that could provide the same product at a lower price impeded companies to obtain 
prices sufficiently above marginal costs and to recoup R&D investments there. And 
whilst this policy in itself could not be questioned, given that not all Member States can 
be obliged to contribute to the recovery of research expenditures, it was claimed that 
those health care systems enjoying low prices should not have been used by third parties 
to undermine the ability to recover R&D costs on other markets through parallel trade462. 
On the contrary, the presence of price regulation in itself was not considered a 
valid reason to depart from the principle of regional exhaustion. The AG, in fact, based 
on the view that a patent’s subject matter cannot include the right to a monopolistic 
profit, affirmed explicitly that “the fact that the application of such price controls may, along 
with various other factors, affect the potential profits of pharmaceutical patentees is not relevant 
for the interpretation of the balance between the free movement of pharmaceutical products and 
the protection of national patent rights.”463 
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460 See Section 3.2 in Chapter II for a deeper discussion of the case law. 
461 AG Fennelly at para. 111 of his opinion argued that a right could not be exhausted if it has not been 
exercised. Exhaustion, in fact, should only occur when the owner of an intellectual property right has used 
his right once, and correspondingly has had the chance of obtaining a reward for his creative effort. In that 
case, the right had not been used at all, and the creative effort had not been rewarded, due to the 
unavailability of patent protection in the country of export. 
462 See para. 106 of the opinion of the AG Fennelly. It is known that, nevertheless, the Court did not follow 
the advise of the AG and maintained that the only legitimate exception to the principle would be justified by 
the absence of any consent to the marketing of the product concerned from the patentee. 
463 See the opinion of the AG Fennelly in Merck v. Primecrown at para. 163. 
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Also, the existence of a legal and ethical obligation to supply and the presence of 
a system of governmental price controls were not regarded by the AG as providing 
grounds for the qualification of the principle of exhaustion. 
Accordingly, the Court followed the AG opinion on this point (only) and 
confirmed previous case law, where it had already been established that price 
differentials and heterogeneity of price regulation in the pharmaceutical market do not 
have any relevance in the evaluation of the anticompetitiveness of restrictions to 
exports464. 
Yet, in the context of competition law the issue of the ‘specificity’ of the 
pharmaceutical sector seems to be open still465. 
For instance, one may wonder if placing a restrictive agreement in its economic 
and legal context includes the consideration of the presence of regulatory intervention466. 
In light of this, the question of whether a departure from the traditional anticompetitive 
assessment of restrictions to competition is justified by the presence of regulation on 
prices arises. In case of a positive answer, there would be a discrepancy with the 
mentioned case law on free movement of goods467. It is therefore necessary to ascertain 
whether there are economic and legal grounds to support this choice. 
1.1 An overview of national pharmaceutical policies 
From an economic point of view, it is a truism that drug prices formation does 
not follow classical market mechanisms, given that public health protection and public 
expenditures containment goals play an important role in their determination. 
However, not in each and every Member State prices for medicines are directly 
fixed by governments. On the contrary, a multiplicity of regulation of prices for drugs 
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464 See Merck v Primecrown, para. 47, and Centrafarm v. Sterling, summary, para. 2: “It is a matter of no 
significance that there exist as between the exporting and importing Member States price differences resulting from 
governmental measures adopted in the exporting State with a view to controlling the price of the product…”. 
465 In General Motors, para. 75, it was affirmed that lacking harmonisation, it is normal that domestic and 
export sales are subject to different regulations, albeit this does not modify the anticompetitive features of an 
agreement. However, the car industry is not a regulated one, although prices vary to a large extent from 
country to country because of different VAT charged by Member States. 
466 At para. 110, the Court said that “[T]he characterisation of a restriction of competition within the meaning of 
Article 81(1) EC must take account of the actual framework and, therefore, of the legal and economic context in which 
the agreement to which that restriction is imputed is deployed. Such an obligation is imposed for the purpose of 
ascertaining both the object and the effect of the agreement.” 
467 This is what is suggested by REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 171 et seq., where it is 
affirmed that in this respect the application of competition law and free movement of goods rules differ: 
while the goal of market integration, and the consequent prohibition of impediment to cross border trade, 
can be correctly attributed to the latter, the same does not apply for the former. 
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exists in Europe. Whilst in 11 Member States prices are directly fixed by authorities, 
subject to the information provided by companies468, in 8 Member States companies are 
allowed to set the final price to consumers, subject to the price of competing medicines. 
Furthermore, in 14 out of 25 EU Member States pharmaceutical companies are either 
completely free to set their final prices or negotiate them with the authorities. 
Let us have a look at the pharmaceutical pricing regulation in some 
representative European countries, in order to have a better clue of the degree of 
governmental intervention in this field469. 
1.1.1 The pharmaceutical regulations in the importing countries 
In Denmark, all pharmaceuticals at manufacturer and wholesale levels are freely 
priced. The wholesale margin is not regulated by law, but it is negotiated individually 
between wholesalers and pharmaceutical companies. The Danish Medicines Agency 
(hereinafter, the ‘DKMA’) calculates the pharmacy retail price via a linear mark-up 
scheme and makes a list that is distributed to all pharmacies. Prices can be modified by 
companies every two weeks when a new official price list is drawn up by the DKMA. 
The Agency negotiates total pharmacy profits every two years and the pharmacy 
mark-up scheme is adjusted accordingly. 
Finally, the DKMA calculates the reimbursement price based on internal 
reference pricing. The part of the price that exceeds the reimbursement level is on 
patients. This should contribute to render them price sensitive to a certain extent. 
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468 Similarly see para. 59 of the Syfait II ruling, where the Court said that “… in the majority of Member States, 
medicines, in particular those available only on prescription, are subject to regulation aimed at setting, at the request of 
the manufacturers concerned and on the basis of information provided by them, selling prices for those medicines 
and/or the scales of reimbursement of the cost of prescription medicines by the relevant social health insurance 
systems…”. 
469 I will here consider eight Member States, four importing countries (Germany, UK, Denmark and Sweden) 
and four exporting countries (France, Italy, Spain and Greece). I chose the first four as representative of 
importing countries, because they present the highest parallel import market penetration, as it appears from 
Table 8 in Chapter I. After a general overview, I will restrict my analysis to these countries, in order to 
understand if and how price competition takes place there. 
The following analysis is based on KANAVOS, Overview of pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement regulation 
in Europe, in Japanese Pharmacology and Therapeutics, 2003, no. 31(10), p. 819-836, and on the information 
collected in the website of ÖBIG, Österreichisches Bundesinstitut für Gesundheitswesen, a division of the 
Gesundheit Österreich GmbH (Health Austria) responsible for the development of basic principle, 
methodology and instruments regarding the planning, the governance and the evaluation of Austria’s 
health care system. Among the projects run by ÖBIG, there is the PPRI (Pharmaceutical Price and 
Reimbursement Information). This project included the writing of specific reports on health and 
pharmaceutical systems of European countries, with a special focus on pricing, reimbursement and rational 
use of pharmaceuticals. The PPRI Pharma Profiles were written by country experts, often involved in 
pricing and reimbursement decisions, and were reviewed by an experienced editorial team. 
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This pricing system has existed for many years, along with ad hoc interventions 
or agreements between the authorities and one or more of the industry associations, 
providing temporal price freezes, price cuts and price ceilings. 
In Germany, besides temporal price freezes occurring from time to time, ex-
factory prices are basically determined by manufacturers without negotiations involving 
governmental agencies, direct price or profit controls and public procurement. The 
Pharmaceutical Price Ordinance (PRO) stipulates fixed mark-ups on manufacturers’ 
selling prices and thereby guarantees identical prices for prescription drugs in all 
German pharmacies. In this way, manufacturers can determine the ex-wholesaler and 
the ex-pharmacy price of the drug by setting the ex-factory price. 
However, price setting by companies takes into consideration regulations in 
other parts of the market, e.g. reimbursement regulation through reference pricing 
establishing an upper limit for sickness fund reimbursements. 
Cash discounts can be negotiated between manufacturers, wholesalers and 
pharmacies. In addition, pharmaceutical providers have been obliged to give rebate to 
sickness funds470. 
In general full reimbursement is granted for all reimbursable drugs. Currently, 
co-payments are set to 10% of the drugs’ price471. 
In UK, the prices of branded prescription medicines and the profits that 
manufacturers are allowed to make on their sales to the National Health Service 
(hereinafter, the ‘NHS’) are regulated by the PPRS. It is a voluntary agreement made 
every five years between the Department of Health and the branded pharmaceutical 
industry – represented by the Association of the British Pharmaceutical Industry 
(ABPI)472. 
The PPRS provides that there is freedom of pricing at launch for new active 
substance. That means that prices for single products are not directly regulated. The 
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470 While some rebates are mandatory for certain types of drug (e.g. the pharmacy rebate of € 2.30 per 
package), others depend on the existence of contractual agreements (e.g. rebates to an individual sickness 
fund) or special drug characteristics. 
471 Due to a minimum of € 5.00 and a maximum of € 10.00, insured are only price sensitive in a price range 
below € 5.00 and between € 50.00 and € 100.00. 
472 The PPRS covers all licensed, branded, prescription medicines sold to the NHS. A new five-year PPRS 
commenced on 1 January 2005 in succession to the 1999 scheme. The 2005 scheme included a 7% price 
reduction. 
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PPRS only establishes a profit cap473, calculated as the return on capital (hereinafter the 
‘ROC’) target plus a margin (almost 30% of ROC)474. When a manufacturer’s profits 
exceed the target ROC, one or more of the following measures may be taken: price 
reduction, restriction or suspension of price increases requested by the manufacturer, 
repayment of excessive profits475. 
The PPRS sets the NHS list price at which pharmacists are reimbursed. This is a 
maximum price, as pharmacists are able to purchase at a discount. 
All items that can be prescribed on the NHS are fully reimbursable. In particular, 
in England fixed co-payment arrangements apply. A standard prescription fee - GBP6.65 
from 1 April 2006 – is payable in respect of each item supplied. 
In Sweden, the Medical Products Agency (Läkemedelsverket, hereinafter ‘MPA’) is 
the national authority responsible for regulation and surveillance of the development, 
manufacturing and sale of pharmaceuticals and other medicinal products. Pricing and 
reimbursement decisions are made by the Pharmaceutical Benefits Board 
(Läkemedelsförmånsnämnden, hereinafter the ‘LFN’) simultaneously. Reimbursement and 
pricing processes are combined and an application from a pharmaceutical company 
results in a joint reimbursement and price decision by the LFN. 
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473 Companies’ profits are capped by the PPRS if their total home sales of NHS medicines in the United 
Kingdom exceed a certain threshold. The PPRS caps profits by setting ‘target’ returns on capital employed 
on all sales. These target returns on capital are based on the historical average value of invested capital. The 
assessment of profitability is performed on the basis of three main elements: the value of its sales of branded 
prescription medicines to the NHS; the company’s costs that would be appropriate for the NHS to bear 
(manufacturing costs, research and development up to 28% of NHS sales, and marketing expenditure up to 
6% of NHS sales); the capital employed by the company in delivering NHS sales. 
474 There are two levels of ROC. The NHS uses a general ROC of 21% in determining a company’s liability to 
repay excess profits. A lower ROC of 17% will be used to decide price increase application. Companies are 
allowed to deduct a percentage of their sales revenue from ‘gross’ profits as a reward for their R&D 
investments. 
475 The success of the PPRS in securing low prices of medicines for the NHS is undetermined. Some authors 
have argued that the PPRS has done little to control the prices of medicines for the NHS, as the 
pharmaceutical budget has increased approximately 10 per cent per year from 1967 to 1997. United 
Kingdom prices are among the highest in the EU. This is despite the savings of £89.8 million resulting from 
1993 price reductions. See BORRELL, Pharmaceutical price regulation: a study on the impact of the rate-of-return 
regulation in the UK, in Pharmacoeconomics, 1999, no. 15(3), p. 291–303, and most importantly see the OFT 
report on PPRS released in February 2007, available at where it is clearly affirmed that the NHS is paying 
too much for drugs. This is probably the result of important drawbacks of the PPRS: it provides little 
incentive for efficiency, as increased costs can be recovered through allowable price increases, and too much 
incentive for overinvestment in capital equipment or artiÀcially inÁating its asset base. Finally, as target 
proÀts are negotiated and the process may not be transparent, there is the potential for ‘regulatory capture’. 
See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH UK, Pharmaceutical Price Regulation Scheme: Sixth Report to Parliament, 2002, 
December, available from http://www.doh.gov.uk/pprs.htm. 
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One important aspect of the Swedish reimbursement system is that the LFN does 
not negotiate prices. It looks upon the price as an integral part of the cost-effectiveness 
analysis. If the price is too high, the product will not be considered cost-effective. And 
the LFN will reject the application in question. The company will have to decide if they 
should apply again and suggest a lower price. 
Sweden made some major changes to its reimbursement system in 2002. Earlier 
almost all prescription medicines were automatically approved for reimbursement. 
Today applications are thoroughly scrutinized and cost-effectiveness is a crucial 
decision-making criteria. Reimbursed medicines are priced accordingly and no further 
negotiations of the price take place. However, it is common that county councils are 
given discounts on medicines used in hospitals. 
Price freezes or price cuts are not applied. Prices and pricing procedures are 
reviewed and evaluated on a regular basis476. However, companies can appeal against 
the LFN’s decisions in a public administrative court. 
The pharmaceutical policy of the Dutch government is based on the principle of 
safe and affordable pharmaceutical care for all citizens. This policy is implemented by 
the Dutch Ministry of Health, Welfare and Sport and by regulating the price and the 
reimbursement of medicines. 
All prescription-only medicines’ purchased through pharmacies are subject to 
the Medicinal Product Prices Act (hereinafter, ‘MPPA’). This law specifies that the price 
for prescription-only medicines may not exceed a maximum level. The maximum level 
for the prescription-only medicines are determined twice a year by calculating the 
average price of comparable medicinal products (same active substance, same strength, 
same pharmaceutical dosage form) in four reference countries: Germany, France, 
Belgium and the United Kingdom. 
The pharmacist may override the pricing level as determined by the MPPA 
(submit a price other than the level specified in the law) to the purchaser (patient or his 
insurance company), but subject to these restrictions: 
- a discount is made of 6.82% or maximum F15.00 for one prescription (so called claw 

476 However, by order of the government the LFN is currently conducting a review of the entire list of 
pharmaceuticals that were eligible for reimbursement when the new Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme came 
into force in October 2002. 
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back, to compensate for discounts and bonuses earned by pharmacists); 
- for generics the lowest price listed of the same generic can be declared; 
- for parallel imports the lowest listed price per country should be taken; 
- if the price of the delivered medicinal product is lower then the (reference) price of 
an (usual branded) equal medicinal product the pharmacist can charge one third of 
the price difference. 
The Medications Reimbursement System (hereinafter, ‘MRS’) determines the 
level of reimbursement for pharmaceuticals in the sickness funds’ health care package, 
whether they are prescription-only pharmaceuticals or pharmaceuticals for self-
medication use (OTC). Within the Medications Reimbursement System, which was 
introduced by the Pharmaceutical Pricing Act in 2006, the level of reimbursement is 
based on the average price of pharmaceuticals that have a comparable effect, are 
mutually replaceable and can therefore be regarded as a group (according to the 
mechanism of the reference price system). If the price of a given product is higher than 
the group average, the additional costs must be paid by the patients. In practice, there 
are usually enough alternatives available to allow for the selection of a fully 
reimbursable drug. 
1.1.2 The pharmaceutical regulations in the exporting countries 
In France, prices for reimbursed pharmaceuticals are negotiated between the 
Economic Committee for Health Care Products (Commission d’Evaluation des 
Médicaments, hereinafter ‘CEPS’) and pharmaceutical companies. As a rule, they agree 
on a price in line with the technical level of relative improvement provided by the 
product in comparison with other products available in the same therapeutic area. 
The negotiations are carried out in compliance with a procedure described in a 
general agreement between the industry and the CEPS (so called ‘accord cadre’), the 
duration of which is four years. A new agreement was signed at the beginning of 2007. 
According to the accord cadre, prices are determined through external reference 
pricing. That is, the price of pharmaceuticals with good/high of improvement of clinical 
benefit should not be lower than the cheaper price observed in comparable European 
countries, i.e. Germany, Spain, Italy and the United Kingdom, over a period of five years 
starting from their inclusion in the positive list of reimbursable products (the 
 172 
information on these prices is provided directly by the company). 
Non-reimbursable pharmaceuticals in the outpatient sector have benefited from 
free pricing at all levels since 1986, according to an edict that cancels the general price 
control in France. The same goes also for pharmaceuticals purchased by hospitals. 
In Greece, the responsibility for pricing of pharmaceuticals lies with the Ministry 
of Development. The government in 2005 passed a new law (Law no. 3048/2005) 
stipulating a new price setting. 
External price referencing is applied to all new pharmaceutical products 
including OTCs. External pricing is not applied to generic products. External pricing is 
used to determine the ex-factory price of pharmaceuticals. The price of new drugs will 
be determined based on the average manufacturer price level calculated by considering 
the average of the three lowest prices among EU-25 countries system. 
The price of medicinal products for which there is proof that the patent expires, 
is reduced by 20%. 
The government passed a new law in 2006 that defines the reimbursement of 
medicines in Greece (Law no. 3457/2006). According to this new reimbursement law, 
the expenditure for all medicines holding a marketing authorisation is covered by all 
sick funds. Moreover, sick funds cover the expenditure for medicines for the uninsured 
and the poor. Law no. 3457/2006 established that drugs have to be divided in clusters on 
the basis of therapeutic value, cost-effectiveness, cost of daily treatment, safety and 
budget impact: each cluster has a level of co-payment, which goes from 0% to 25%. 
There are no price negotiations in Greece taking place, or free pricing. 
In Italy prices of pharmaceuticals reimbursed by the NHS are regulated at the 
central level and are the same across the whole country. 
In January 2004, the old system based on the Average European Price (AEP) was 
withdrawn and a new price setting system was introduced based on a negotiation 
procedure applicable to all reimbursable pharmaceuticals. 
So, now two different methods for setting prices of pharmaceuticals are used: 
price negotiation for reimbursable pharmaceuticals, and free pricing, with some 
limitations, for non-reimbursable products, including OTCs. 
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The negotiation procedure with manufacturers is managed by the Italian 
Medicines Agency (Agenzia Italiana Farmaco, hereinafter ‘AIFA’) Pricing and 
Reimbursement Unit (PRU), assisted by the Committee for Pricing and Reimbursement 
(Comitato Prezzi e Rimborso, hereinafter ‘CPR’). Pricing and reimbursement decisions are 
strictly interlinked, because the responsibility rests with the same body and because 
both decisions are made within the same procedure. 
AIFA Technical Scientific Committee (Commissione Tecnico-Scientifica, hereinafter 
‘CTS’) expresses an opinion on reimbursement classification. The process of negotiation 
takes place only after this evaluation. 
The negotiation procedure is conducted following criteria: product therapeutic 
value; pharmacovigilance data; price in other Member States; price of similar products 
within the same pharmacotherapeutic group; domestic market forecasts on the number 
of potential patients; and therapeutic innovation. 
Pricing decisions are made at the ex-factory level, then wholesale and pharmacy 
prices are calculated by formula. 
In case of absence of an agreement about the price as a result of the negotiation, 
the reimbursement decision made by the CTS is amended and the pharmaceutical is 
classified as non-reimbursable477. 
In Spain, pricing of pharmaceuticals is negotiated between the health authority 
and the manufacturer following a cost plus criterion, where not only variable costs and 
R&D costs are taken into account, but also the fact that an additional benefit of the 15-
20% of the final price should be granted to the manufacturer. Also, parties often agree on 
price-volume agreements for expensive products478. 
Reimbursement decisions are taken from the Joint Committee for the evaluation 
of New Medicines – composed by experts from the governmental regions of Andalucìa, 
Catalunya and Pais Vasco479 - based on external reference pricing for estimating a 
maximum reimbursement. 
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477 See JOMMI, Il governo del settore farmaceutico: un quadro complessivo, in BRUSONI, L’impresa farmacia: cultura e 
strumenti gestionali per il nuovo mercato, 2001, p. 225-295. See also PARDOLESI, CASSESE and CAROVITA DI 
TURITTO, La disciplina dei prezzi dei farmaci, in Il foro amministrativo, 2003, p. 3117. 
478 See ROVIRA, and DARBA, Pharmaceutical pricing and reimbursement in Spain, in European Journal of Health 
Economics, 2001, no. 2(1), p. 39–43. 
479 The Spanish health care system has been decentralised in 2002 and Regions have become active in 
initiating demand-side measures to reduce health care expenditures. 
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1.1.3 National policies on parallel trade 
Affirming that drug price controls impede that savings deriving from parallel 
trade are passed on to consumers implies that price negotiation leads to fixed price at 
each level of the distribution chain. However, from what was outlined above, it appears 
that in all Members States where price controls mechanisms are applied, prices are only 
upper caps, which do not impede to have lower prices in the market through 
competition at the retail level. 
Policies implemented in several Member States aimed at inducing relevant 
agents, like wholesalers and pharmacists, to seek for cheaper supplies seem to confirm 
the willingness of the regulator to create favourable conditions for competition. This, on 
the one hand, should improve access to medicines and, on the other, relieve public 
finances. 
 
Table 5: Policies used to Promote Use of Parallel Imported Medicines in Selected 
European countries 
 
Source: Kanavos, Gross and Taylor, Parallel Trading in Medicines: Europe’s experiences and its implications for 
commercial drug importation in the US, AARP Public Policy Institute, June 2005, as updated by me through 
with information from members of the EAEPC in 2007. 
 
In Denmark, reference pricing and parallel import prices play a direct role in 
setting reimbursement prices. In UK, schemes that claw back (part) of the price 
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reduction obtained by pharmacists from wholesalers and parallel traders seek to 
translate such rebates in savings for the NHS. 
Direct pass-through arrangements are also implemented. In Denmark, 
Netherlands and Sweden the pharmacist is required to inform the patient of the 
availability of parallel imported drugs and the patient is charged a lower price if he 
purchases them. The same applies in Germany but patients do not face lower prices for 
parallel traded drugs. 
Further, in the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden financial incentives are 
provided to pharmacies to purchase parallel traded drugs. Also Norwegian pharmacists 
face financial incentives to purchase parallel imported drugs but pharmacists do not 
have to inform patients of the availability of such drugs nor do patients face a lower 
price for purchasing parallel traded products. 
In Germany and in Denmark pharmacists are required to sell the parallel 
imported product if its price is lower of a certain percentage with respect to the original 
one480. 
1.1.4 The negotiation of prices for pharmaceuticals 
One of the claims underlining defendants’ allegations in defence of practices 
restrictive of parallel trade on pharmaceuticals is that the regulatory intervention on 
prices for drugs is the primary source of the distortion to competition in this sector481. 
However, it should be recalled also that distortions to competition come in the 
first place from the market failures that characterise this sector and that require 
regulatory intervention482. Regulation, in fact, seeks to achieve prices that strike a 
balance between the need for the cost effective availability of medicines and the 
pharmaceutical companies’ right to earn a fair rate of return483. 
The negative externalities that relevant stakeholders (government, physician, 

480 In Germany, as of January 2004, the pharmacist is required to dispense the parallel imported product 
only if its price is more than 15% cheaper than the original (for values less than €100) or if the price exceeds 
€15 (for values greater than €100). In Demark substitution with parallel imported products is mandatory for 
5 DKK (0.7 €) price difference for prices less that 100 DKK (13 €), for 5% price difference for prices between 
100 and 400 DKK (13 to 54 €) and for 20 DKK (2.7€) for prices above 400 DKK (54 €). 
481 See REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 167; GREEN, Is price regulation necessary? A 
Summary of the arguments, Pharmacoeconomics, 1998, n. 14, p. 137; DANZON and CHAO, Does regulation drive out 
competition in the pharmaceutical market?, in Journal of Law & Economics, no. 43, 2000, p. 311-357. 
482 Cf. Section 1.1 and 1.2 of Chapter I. 
483 See CAPRI and LEVAGGI, Reconciling social and industrial goals: a bargaining model to pricing pharmaceuticals, 
Liuc working paper Economia e Impresa 42, 2005. On this issue see better Section 4.1 of this Chapter. 
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pharmacist, patient) impose on each other in the decision making process484, the limits to 
substitutability among products and the market power enjoyed by companies through 
patents convey rigidity in the supply chain. That is why a regime of pure free pricing 
may not be adequate to discipline prices. Vice versa, a system of direct or indirect control 
of pharmaceutical prices, through parallel trade and other policy tools, serves the 
purpose of setting a more appropriate price. 
The goal of the bargaining process between the regulator and the company is to 
achieve a twofold outcome: on the one hand, it renders the drug accessible to that part of 
the population that would have not afforded it on a private market, and on the other 
hand, it allows the pharmaceutical industry to earn a profit larger than that it would 
have obtained in the private market. Therefore, the authority, through a successful 
negotiation, can obtain the enlargement of the target market for the company and the 
generation of considerable savings for those who had bought the drug anyway485. 
In those countries where prices are negotiated, they are thus a function of the 
willingness to supply of the seller and the willingness to pay of the buyer, even in the 
presence of regulation. It follows that, like in a Nash bargaining process, the agreed level 
of price depends on where the negotiation power resides the most: this in turn depends 
on the social value attributed to the product, on the number and characteristics of the 
alternatives already on the market, and on the presence of the availability of reference 
pricing information, of cross-country price comparisons, as well as of parallel imports486. 
On the one hand, it is true that health care agencies having the task to bargain for 
the price of drugs enjoy the buyer power typical of monopsonists. On the other hand, 
the authoritative power of health care agencies in setting pharmaceutical prices is 
mitigated by the provisions of the so-called ‘Transparency Directive’ (Dir. 89/105/EC). 
Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of this Directive provides that (i) pharmaceutical companies 
participate in the price setting procedures, (ii) authorities are obliged to justify 
objectively the rejection of a company’s price, and (iii) companies have the right to 
market the product at their proposed price if they do not receive notification of the 

484 Cf. Section 1.2 in Chapter I. 
485 See CAPRI and LEVAGGI, Reconciling social and industrial goals, cit., p. 3. 
486 Similarly the ECJ in Syfait II affirmed that “the control exercised by Member States over the selling prices or the 
reimbursement of medicinal products does not entirely remove the prices of those products from the law of supply and 
demand.” 
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authorities’ rejection of the price within ninety days from filing487. Furthermore, the 
Directive mandates, for instance, that any price freezes be reviewed annually to 
determine whether macroeconomic conditions justify their continuance. 
Also, pharmaceutical companies have a certain amount of influence over the 
market488, thanks to the exclusivity rights granted by patents in the production and the 
first commercialisation of the patented drug. This advantage is further strengthened by 
the dossier protection489. The large investments in R&D and marketing efforts endow 
them with a competitive advantage over any potential entrant and thus constitute an 
effective barrier to entry. For this reason, it might happen that there exists no available 
substitute for a given medicinal specialty. This gives them bargaining power vis-à-vis 
governments, especially when the product is life-saving. 
What may additionally weaken governments’ position in the negotiation 
procedure is the responsibility they bear for their citizens’ health. If price negotiations 
fail because the authority does not accept the proposed price, or if it decides to delist it 
from the reimbursed product list, and the company decides to not introduce the drug 
into the market, governments may be held accountable for the lack of newer or more 
effective drugs in the market. 
This may explain why authorities may refrain from using their authoritative 
power and may need to use indirect leverages in order to obtain price concessions from 
companies during negotiations. 

487 See AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion in the Syfait II case at para. 89.  
488 See para. 60-62 of the Syfait II ruling, where the Court said that “…the control exercised by Member States 
over the selling prices or the reimbursement of medicinal products does not entirely remove the prices of those products 
from the law of supply and demand. […] Furthermore, even though the public authorities in other Member States set 
the selling prices of medicines as well, that does not in itself mean that the manufacturers of the medicines concerned 
have no influence upon the level at which the selling prices are set or the proportion of those prices which is reimbursed. 
[…] in some Member States, the public authorities do not intervene in the process of setting prices or limit themselves 
to setting the scale of reimbursement of the cost of prescription medicines by the national health insurance systems, 
thereby leaving to the pharmaceuticals companies the task of deciding their selling prices.” 
489 The provision establishing data protection for medicinal products for human use restrict the access to the 
clinical dossier of reference of medicinal specialties from parties other than the patent owner. Article 14(11) 
of the European Parliament and Council Regulation (EC) No 726/2004 states: "Without prejudice to the law on 
the protection of industrial and commercial property, medicinal products for human use which have been authorized in 
accordance with the provisions of this Regulation shall benefit from an eight-year period of data protection and a ten-
year period of marketing protection, in which connection the latter period shall be extended to a maximum of 11 years 
if, during the first eight years of those ten years, the marketing authorization holder obtains an authorization for one or 
more new therapeutic indications which, during the scientific evaluation prior to their authorization, are held to bring a 
significant clinical benefit in comparison with existing therapies”. The new periods of protection only apply to 
reference medicinal products for which an application for authorisation has been submitted after 20 
November 2005 (Article 89 of Regulation (EC) No 726/2004). 
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These leverages are different in nature: some have been created by law, like 
reference pricing, which allows health authorities to ask for prices equal to those 
charged in countries considered similar in terms of wealth per capita, consumption 
patterns, citizens’ life style, etc.; some others, like parallel trade, were not created by 
Member States ad hoc, but spring from the economic opportunities provided by the EU. 
Member States’ governments may decide to use them to introduce some competition in 
the supply chain to reduce their pharmaceutical expenditures490. 
 
1.2 The role of parallel trade in price negotiations 
Parallel trade may display such function at two different stages: before the 
launch, during price negotiations, and after the launch, in reimbursement and 
substitution policies491. 
In presence of parallel trade, price negotiation in the high-price country can take 
a new dynamic. By the means of the reimbursement system, the regulator (or the 
insurance fund) has the power to govern all sales within the country: it could, for 
instance, deny reimbursement (or insurance coverage) of the current price and ask for a 
lower one, under the threat of the alternative source of supply present in the market. The 
manufacturer may then adjust its price properly so that parallel trade cannot take place. 
As a result, both the regulator and the manufacturer are better off: the government can 
reduce pharmaceutical expenditures and the company can recoup part of its lost profits 
thanks to the elimination of competition492. 
This analysis suggests that parallel trade can display an important potential in 
competitive terms. 
The threat of parallel trade, in fact, gives bargaining power to authorities and 
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490 See better infra Section 4.1 of this Chapter. 
491 KANAVOS, The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union in Light of European Court of Justice 
Rulings, in Pharmacoeconomics, 2000, no. 18(6), p. 523, at 528, where the affirms that parallel trade could be a 
key factor in the process of renegotiation of reimbursement levels in line with price levels prevailing in 
neighbouring countries. As an example see the several aspects of the Danish legislation described in this 
Chapter. 
492 See NASH, The Bargaining Problem, Econometrica,, 1950, no. 18, p. 155-162; RUBINSTEIN, Perfect Equilibrium in 
a Bargaining Model, Econometrica, no. 50, 1982, p. 57-109; MUTHOO, Bargaining Theory with Applications, 1999. 
See para. 5.100 of the OFT report on PPRS: “However, it seems clear that there will always be an element of loss to 
the system – the costs incurred and profits earned by parallel traders. Therefore, pricing systems (such as those based 
on rebates) that take account of parallel trade effects may offer a win / win outcome for industry and government – by 
encouraging industry to accept a higher price cut than would otherwise be the case and ensuring the benefits are shared 
exclusively between industry and the public purchaser”. 
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insurance funds vis-à-vis the companies in price negotiations for domestic products. 
Symmetrically, pharmaceutical companies are more favourably disposed to price 
reductions493. 
When parallel trade takes place in equilibrium, thus, the allocative function of 
the bargaining procedure can be enhanced. A larger opening up of the market can be 
negotiated in exchange for a price reduction, to the benefit of public finances on the one 
hand and of firms’ profit on the other. In this way, savings entailed by parallel trade are 
passed on to consumers and appropriation from third parties is avoided. 
If, for whatever reason, negotiations terminate in favour of the company and its 
proposed price, the government can always expose it to competition from parallel trade 
through three concurring measures: the granting of a market authorisation to a parallel 
importer on a certain product, the negotiation with the latter of a enough lower price (if 
applicable494), and the introduction of provisions that impose on pharmacists the 
substitution through parallel imported products when possible. 
This may help reducing pharmaceutical expenditures in two ways: patients buy 
(and the government reimburses) cheaper products and the companies, subject to 
competition, may decrease the price of their products, if market conditions allows for it. 
The above analysis supports the idea that, despite the presence of regulation on 
prices for pharmaceuticals, there exists in countries where imports take place an 
appropriate legal framework that allows in principle the possibility to have competition 
through lower prices during the validity of a pharmaceutical patent. 
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493 This general effect has been noted by The Swedish Competition Authority in its review of parallel trade: 
“Apart from the direct impact on prices noted above, there are instances of potential parallel imports having an indirect 
impact on prices. Faced with the prospect of competition from an incipient parallel import trade, some original 
suppliers of drugs have on occasion voluntarily chosen to cut prices by over 10%, which had the effect of eliminating 
the conditions necessary for parallel imports.” See Swedish Competition Authority, Parallel Imports- Effects of the 
Silhouette Ruling, 1999, p. 39. Also see the OFT report on the PPRS, February 2007, at p. 69, para. 4.64: “The 
effects of modulations targeted on parallel imports are complex […] but on balance are likely to be beneficial to the 
NHS. Perhaps most importantly, the advantages to companies of being able to modulate are likely to make them willing 
to accept in negotiations a larger overall price reduction than in the absence of modulation”, and then at p. 81, para. 
5.48: “The potential distortion to competition could in principle be addressed by removing companies’ freedom to 
modulate prices but this would substantially reduce their flexibility, in particular to respond to parallel imports. Under 
the current framework, this would in turn make companies less willing to accept price cuts and hence may result in 
higher prices”. 
494 In those countries where, as previously indicated, there is free pricing, regulators do not negotiate prices 
with parallel importers but leave them free to compete with manufacturers. 
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It follows that the pharmaceutical sector cannot be considered ‘specific’ under 
competition law on these grounds. In Syfait II, the ECJ confirmed this view, by holding 
that competition law applies to the pharmaceutical sector as well as it applies to other 
regulated sector495. 
 
2. Savings from parallel trade of pharmaceuticals: do they exist? … 
It is now necessary to examine whether and how the existence of a favourable 
regulatory environment for parallel trade influences the pricing strategies of 
pharmaceutical companies in importing countries. To this purpose I will examine the 
traditional model of arbitrage considered by economic theory, where regulation on 
prices is absent. The latter will serve as unconstrained benchmark for the analysis of the 
outcome of arbitrage under price regulation, as it happens for parallel trade of 
pharmaceuticals. 
2.1 Optimal strategies in a world without parallel trade: price 
discrimination 
In a world without parallel trade, where national markets are perfectly 
segmented, the first-best solution to the maximisation problem of the manufacturer is to 
apply optimal prices in each country. 
Economic theory developed different articulated definitions of price 
discrimination. The most accredited in the literature is the one given by Stigler’s: there 
exists price discrimination when two or similar goods are sold at prices that are in 
different ratios to marginal costs496. It follows that price discrimination, in an economic 
sense, occurs also when identical units of a good are sold at the same price under 
different cost conditions. Vice versa, there is no price discrimination if the difference in 
price reflects the difference in the cost of serving different consumers, i.e. it is cost-based. 
Hence, strictly economically speaking, there is price discrimination only when the price 
difference is demand-based497. 
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495 See para. 67 of the Syfait II ruling, where the ECJ affirmed that the degree of price regulation in the 
pharmaceuticals sector could not preclude the EU rules on competition from applying just because the 
restrictive practice take place in a non harmonised area. 
496 See STIGLER, The Theory of price, 1957, p. 209-215. This definition is also accepted in the legal literature. See, 
for instance, POSNER, Antitrust Law, 2001, p. 79–80. 
497 See TIROLE, The Theory of Industrial Organisations, 1988, p. 134, who also specifies that it should not be 
inferred that price discrimination does not occur when differentiated products are sold to different 
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The economic literature acknowledges three conditions for price discrimination 
to be an optimal strategy: (i) firms should enjoy a certain degree of market power; (ii) 
firms should have information about reservation prices for each consumer (group); (iii) 
arbitrage should be absent, i.e. the firm successfully impedes that consumers who 
purchased the good at a low price resell it to consumers who bought it at a higher 
price498. 
In the pharmaceutical sector, companies commonly apply ‘third degree price 
discrimination’499, where prices differ across groups of consumers or geographic areas. 
Such type of price discrimination follows the Ramsey rule500, where low prices are 
charged to consumers with high demand elasticity, and high prices are charged to those 
consumers with low demand elasticity501. 
This turns out to be a second-best solution for those firms facing problems of 
fixed cost recovery, like in the pharmaceutical industry. By expanding the demand in 
markets with higher price elasticity, companies can spread the fixed cost over a larger 
number of units sold502. 
The analysis of case law previously conducted showed that European 
competition law does not preclude in principle an undertaking from setting different 

consumers, as the use of different qualities of services is also partly an attempt to capture consumers’ 
surplus by separating consumers in different groups. 
498 See TIROLE, The Theory of Industrial Organisations, cit., p. 134 et seq. 
499 This notation follows the well-known classification operated by PIGOU, The Economics of Welfare, 1920, p. 
240-256, after which it is customary in economics to distinguish among first degree, second degree and third 
degree price discrimination. First degree price discrimination - a theoretical model that is unlikely to take 
place in practice because of absence of perfect information – occurs when a firm is able to charge to each 
consumers his reservation price for each unit of a given good, thereby ripping off completely the consumers’ 
surplus and eliminating the deadweight loss eventually caused by pre-existing monopoly prices. If, on one 
hand, this result can be considered welfare enhancing, however on the other hand, it does not address 
distributional concerns and social costs resulting from ‘rent seeking’ behaviours raised by POSNER, The social 
cost of monopoly and regulation, J. Polit. Econ., 1975, no. 83, p. 807-828. Second degree price discrimination, 
occurs when a firms sets a price per unit that varies according to the quantity purchased by the buyer or 
when it applies a two part tariff composed by a flat fee plus a variable fee that depends again on the 
quantity purchased. In this way prices differ across unit of the goods but not across people, so that buyers 
enjoy some consumers’ surplus. See TIROLE, The Theory of Industrial Organisations, cit., p. 134. 
500 This concept was attributed to J. Robinson in 1933, but later on it has been recognized that Ramsey found 
this result before in the context of taxation. See RAMSEY, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxation, in Economic 
Journal, 1927, no. 37, p. 47-61. 
501 Therefore in the case of third degree price discrimination, prices do not differ according across the unit of 
the good, like for the second degree price discrimination, but among individuals or groups of consumers. 
502 See HAUSMAN and MACKEI-MASON, Price Discrimination and Patent Policy, in Rand Journal of Economics, 
1988, no. 19(2), p. 253-265; DANZON and TOWSE, Differential Pricing for Pharmaceuticals: Reconciling Access, 
R&D and Patents, cit., p. 183-205. Finally see Guidelines OFT 414, Assessment of Individual Agreements and 
Conducts, para. 3.13;  
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prices in various Member States503. That is, uniform prices across Europe are not to be 
regarded as compulsory504. 
Accordingly, geographical price discrimination cannot be regarded as 
illegitimate per se, as in itself it does not constitute an obstacle to trade between Members 
States or a barrier to freedom of movement of goods. Actually, it represents an incentive 
to intrastate trade. On the contrary, attempts to put obstacles to such a trade can 
represent a concern, as they run against integration and effective competition in the 
internal market505. 
2.2 Optimal strategies in a world with parallel trade 
The European policy on free movement of goods thus forces companies to find a 
second-best solution that allows them to maximise their profit under the constraint of 
parallel trade. 
Standard economic theory generally predicts that a discriminating monopolist 
prevents arbitrage by ex ante charging a uniform price that eliminates any scope for cross 
border trade506. Consequently, consumers that previously enjoyed a lower price will be 
charged higher prices, while consumers that before were charged a high price, after the 
change will enjoy lower prices. 
Contrary to first degree price discrimination, the welfare effect of third degree 
price discrimination still remains ambiguous in the economic literature507: in fact, the 
latter is welfare enhancing, with respect to a situation of uniform price, only as long as it 
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503 See Section 5.2 of Chapter II. 
504 Cf. fn 428 supra. 
505 See VICKERS, When Discrimination is Undue?, in Regulating Utilities: Understanding the Issue, 1998; RIDYARD, 
Exclusionary pricing and price discrimination under art. 82 – an Economic Analysis, ECLR, 2002, no. 23, p. 286; 
BISHOP, WALKER, The Economics of EC Competition Law, cit., p. 197, who affirms that if accompanies by barriers 
that prevent arbitrage, price discrimination can remove potential gains from trade.  
506 See PHILIPS, The Economics of Price Discrimination, 1983; VARIAN, Price discrimination and social welfare, in 
American Economic Review, 1985, no. 75(4), p. 870-875; ID., Output and welfare implications, cit.; SCHWARTZ, 
Third-degree price discrimination and output: Generalizing a welfare result, in American Economic Review, 1990, no. 
80(5), p. 1259-1262; BATTALIO and EKELUND, Output Change under Third Degree Price Discrimination, in 
Southern Econ. J., 1972, no. 39, p. 285-290; FINN, The Quantity of Output in Simple Monopoly and Discriminating 
Monopoly, in Southern Econ. J., 1974, no. 41, p. 239-43; MAULEG and SCHWARTZ, Parallel Imports, Demand 
Dispersion and International Price Discrimination, in Journal of International Economics, 1994, no. 37, who found 
that a regime of uniform pricing was globally sub-optimal with respect to third degree price discrimination; 
RICHARDSON and MARTIN, An Elementary Proposition Concerning Parallel Imports, in Journal of International 
Economics, 2002, no. 56, p. 233-245, who argued that neither a global policy of uniform pricing nor of full 
segmentation could be supported as a Nash equilibrium. 
507 See SCHMALENSEE, Output and welfare implications of monopolistic third-degree price discrimination, in 
American Economic Review, 1981, no. 71(1), p. 242. 
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leads to an increase in the total output sold. That is, consumers who were not served 
before are served under price discrimination. 
To the contrary, a switch from uniform pricing to price discrimination that leaves 
output unchanged triggers a reduction in consumer welfare. This shrink is given by a 
misallocation of output: some consumers with lower willingness to pay will stop buying 
the good once the price rose. The reduction in consumer surplus dominates the increase 
in monopoly profit and overall social welfare decreases508. 
Therefore, only if it entails an increase in total output, price discrimination is 
Pareto-superior to price uniformity. 
It is argued that in the pharmaceutical sector, differently from others, a uniform 
price is not attainable, due to the presence of regulation on prices509. 
Anecdotal evidence seems to support this prediction. The first pharmaceutical 
company that applied a Single European Price, as a reaction to parallel trade activities 
over its products, was Merck and Co. Inc., which in the 1996 launched its protease 
inhibitor indinavir (Crixivan®) at a common EU price, denominated in European 
Community Units (ECUs)510. 
However, to date this example has remained an isolated case. Reasons are 
manifold. 
Overall it appears that a policy of uniform price is hardly attainable in the long 
run. In fact, it may hold only at the launch of a drug and for ex-factory prices. 
Afterwards, price gaps may emerge again due to currency fluctuations and rebates 
asked by national authorities along time after the launch. For instance, a consistent 
convergence of prices was registered during the period between the mid-1986 and 1997. 
However, later on price differential re-appeared, because of government interventions 
that lowered down prices in countries of Southern Europe511. 
Switching to a global uniform price policy for in-market products is equally 
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508 See LAYSON, Third-degree price discrimination, welfare and profits: a geometrical analysis, in American Economic 
Review, 1988, no. 78(5), p. 1131-1132; ID., Market opening under third-degree price discrimination, in Journal of 
Industrial Economics, 1994, no. 42(3), p. 335-340. 
509 REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 167. 
510 Cf. DANZON, The Economics of Parallel Trade, Pharmacoeconomics, 1998, no. 13(3), p. 300. 
511 In October 1997 in Greece a decree set pharmaceutical prices by reference to the lowest price charged in 
Europe; and in August 1996 in Spain there was a voluntary price freeze that lasted until 1998. Subsequently, 
devaluation of the Drachma, in Greece, and rebates asked by government, in Spain, fostered the divergent 
trend. 
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difficult. In fact, this would require either i) lowering prices in importing countries to the 
level of price charged in the exporting countries (plus the cost of arbitrage), or ii) raising 
prices in the exporting countries and simultaneously lowering them in the importing 
countries, until a point where the price gap is such that there is no longer scope for 
parallel trade, or iii) drop the exporting country512. 
In the following analysis, I will examine the three mentioned pricing strategies, 
in order to understand which is the optimal response of pharmaceutical companies to 
parallel trade and what is the effect on drug prices, both in importing and in exporting 
countries. 
2.3 The impact of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals on price levels in 
importing countries 
Recent economic literature investigated the effect of the first pricing policy by 
assuming that pharmaceutical companies, if subject to competition, cannot influence the 
controlled price in the exporting country but can adjust the price in importing countries 
only513. In this case, parallel trade brings harmonisation towards the bottom, i.e. high 
prices converge towards the controlled low price514. 
In fact, under such hypothesis515, companies may respond to parallel trade in two 
ways. 
If trade costs are high, companies find it more profitable to lower the price in the 
importing country up to the cost of arbitrage so that the latter never occurs (deterrence 
strategy). In the importing country, the price is reduced to the level of the price charged 
in the exporting country plus trade costs, while in the exporting country it remains 
unchanged due to regulation. Price pressure is obtained without parallel trade actually 
taking place, namely without real resources used in arbitrage activities. The deterrence 
strategy results in a per-unit revenue equal to the price in the exporting market plus the 
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512 I will leave this third choice aside for the time being, given that under EU pharmaceutical law there may 
limits to this strategy. I will consider it again infra Section 2.4 of this Chapter. 
513 See GANSLANDT and MASKUS, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union, in Journal of 
Health Economics, 2004, no. 23, p. 1035-1057, at 1050, where regulation is introduced by considering the price 
in the exporting country as given. Also, see MÜLLER-LANGER, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Parallel Trade and 
the Pricing of Pharmaceutical Products, in German Working Papers in Law and Economics, 2007-2-1200, Berkeley 
Electronic Press. 
514 REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 153-177, allege that, whilst this may be positive 
for consumers, companies may suffer too large profit losses that may endanger their investment in research 
and development 
515 However, note that this result derives from the further simplifying assumption that pharmaceutical 
companies do not apply supply management strategies to restrict parallel trade. 
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trade cost. 
The higher the cost of trade, the easier is the deterrence strategy, since the 
manufacturing firm does not need to reduce its price that much in the importing country 
to deter parallel trade. Price pressure takes place also in this case, but it is much lower, 
due to the high level of trade costs. 
Vice versa, if trade costs are low, accommodation – i.e. the firm prefers to sell a 
smaller quantity at a higher price in the importing country, instead of precluding 
parallel trade – is the best response. The accommodation price falls with the volume of 
arbitrage. A larger quantity of parallel trade results in a lower price in the importing 
country, up to a point where it becomes more profitable to again deter parallel trade. It 
should be noted that in the case of accommodation, it is actual parallel trade, and not 
potential, that brings price pressure. 
The volume of arbitrage also plays an important role in determining the impact 
that parallel trade has on prices. When there is an unlimited possibility of parallel 
import, the most likely and profitable reaction from the manufacturers is deterrence. 
Unlimited parallel trade, in fact, is capable of stealing the whole manufacturer’s business 
in the importing country, and the firm would earn profit only in the exporting country. 
Instead, by deterring parallel trade, the manufacturer earns a larger profit. Vice versa, 
accommodation is more attractive when the potential volume of parallel trade is 
relatively small516. 
The development of the parallel trade industry in the last ten years seems to 
support the accommodation hypothesis: on the one hand, the flows of parallel imports 
have been growing, thanks to technological improvements and standards harmonisation 
that lowered the cost of trade; on the other hand, the volume of supplies shipped abroad 
remains limited to a certain volume, because of a) mandatory public services 
requirements that impose on wholesalers the satisfaction of the whole domestic demand 
first, b) supply restrictions imposed by manufacturers, and c) strategies spontaneously 
chosen by parallel traders in order to avoid the deterrence response from the 
manufacturer, which would eliminate any scope for imports. 
As a consequence of the premise of low trade costs and endogenously limited 
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516 GANSLANDT and MASKUS, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union, cit., p. 1040; 
ZHONG, Another Side of Parallel Trade, cit., p. 9. 
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arbitrage, in certain occasions manufacturing firms have been accommodating parallel 
trade and the price in importing markets have been falling as the volume of parallel 
trade raised. 
Substantiation of the accommodation hypothesis comes, for instance, from the 
empirical analysis performed in Sweden, where in the period between 1995 and 1998 an 
increase of parallel import activities (16% of the sales and 15% of commercialised 
products) and a correspondent decrease of home market prices (4%) or a diminution of 
the increase of prices have been observed. Roughly three-fourths of this effect was 
attributed to the lower prices of parallel imports and one-fourth to lower prices charged 
by the manufacturing firm517. 
Anecdotal evidence shows that the strategy of deterrence may also take place, 
when circumstances render it more profitable. 
Merck Sharp & Dohme (hereinafter, ‘MSD’), the UK subsidiary of Merck & Co. 
Inc., in August 2007 voluntarily cut by nearly a third of the price of its antihypertensive 
drug Cozaar®, the UK’s sixth most prescribed drug. Such a reduction appeared to be 
strictly linked to the fact that parallel importers had attained a market share of up to 75% 
for the product in the UK, as the following table shows: 
 
Table 6: Price cut operated by MSD on Cozaar in August 2007 matched with parallel 
import penetration in UK 
 
UK sales 
(£000) 
3/06 - 3/07 
Old price 
(£) 
New price 
(£) 
Price 
reduction 
PI market 
share 
Tabs      
25 mg 14.788 18,09 16,18 10,56% 0,00% 
50 mg 52.455 18,09 12,80 29,24% 75,09% 
100 mg 43.565 24,20 16,18 33,14% 57,27% 
      
Comp tabs      
100/25 mg 1.524 24,20 16,18 33,14% 0,00% 
50/12.5 mg 5.912 18,09 12,80 29,24% 60,58% 
Source: EAEPC, 2008. 
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517 GANSLANDT and MASKUS, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products in the European Union, cit., p. 1049 et 
seq. 
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The strategy of deterrence can be facilitated by regulation. When a general price 
cut is introduced in the UK market at the renegotiation of the PPRS, for instance, 
pharmaceutical companies have two options to meet this price cut: either they reduce all 
their price by the required percentage or they modulate their price by lowering the price 
for some drugs more substantially. 
The analysis of the pharmaceutical prices after the last renegotiation of the PPRS 
in 2005 shows that companies applied the modulation option and that they lowered the 
prices of those drugs subject to parallel trade more than the renegotiation required, as 
the following table shows: 
 
Table 7: Correlation between a reduction in parallel trade activities in UK and price 
reductions at the renegotiation of the PPRS in 2005 
Product PI % 2004 PI % 2005 Price cut 
Lipitor 42.5 14.6 5-17% 
Zoton 37.5 42.7 0-1% 
Zyprexa 48.6 35.5 0-19% 
Plavix 46.2 25.8 0% 
Zoladex 66.5 49.2 0-31% 
Efexor 28.9 30.8 0-2% 
Cozaar 43.7 45.4 -10-0% 
Seretide 16.9 17.5 7% 
Aprovel 80.9 34.8 24-30% 
Serevent 28.7 27.4 0-7% 
Cardura 32.6 6.7 0-55% 
Risperdal 48.4 39.4 8-14% 
Lipostat 30.0 13.2 7% 
Fosamax 27.5 42.7 0-1% 
Aricept 62.2 62.1 7% 
Source: IMS Health, Janice Haigh, Management Forum, Cambridge, 20th February 2005 
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It should be noted that price cuts higher than the mandatory 7% established in 
the new PPRS scheme correspond to the highest level of penetration of import in the UK 
market, thereby suggesting a correlation between these reduction and parallel trade518. 
As a result, parallel trade market share diminished dramatically for those price 
cuts that were more substantial. 
From this it appears that parallel trade stimulates savings. This may happen both 
directly and indirectly. 
Direct benefits accrue to consumers when manufacturers find it optimal to 
accommodate and parallel trade takes place in equilibrium. In this case, savings derive 
from the lower prices paid by patients that purchased parallel imported products, which 
in turn entail lower reimbursement costs for health care systems and lower premium for 
health insurance. 
The indirect benefits may derive, both under accommodation and deterrence, 
from the competitive pressure put on manufacturers by parallel importers that drives 
down patented products prices, or decelerates their increase519. 
For instance, in the Cozaar case, it was estimated that the UK health care system 
would save an approximate £ 30.2 million per annum due to major price reductions for 
only one product, provided that that sale volumes of Cozaar products remain constant 
and that the Government claw back rate stabilises at 10%. In addition, by recouping 
100% of the branded product market in the UK, MSD would gain about £ 30 million per 
annum in revenues despite reducing its price. 
An illustrative example of the dynamic effect on prices is given by the following 
graph: 
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518 This interpretation of price trends was expressed also by an EFPIA officer at the SMi conference on 
Parallel Trade in February 2009 in London, where he said: “[…] as an alternative to a 7% across the board cut, 
companies were allowed to modulate this across their product range and several chose to target brands with high PI 
penetration”. 
519 Similarly see para. 5.98 of the OFT report on PPRS: “In the short term, parallel trading may provide savings for 
consumers (typically public purchasers) in higher price markets as a result of the lowering of prices. This may be 
brought about both as a direct result of the purchasing of parallel imported drugs (which will be cheaper), and by the 
effect that the increase in competition in the markets for these drugs has on the pharmaceutical manufacturer’s pricing 
for domestically sourced products. In the UK, the Department of Health attempts to identify the savings made by 
pharmacies on parallel trade through the periodic Margin Inquiry. It then operates a clawback system whereby some of 
the savings made by pharmacies from the buying of parallel imported products are recovered by the NHS”. 
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Graph 7: Dynamic gains from intrabrand competition 
 
 
Source: Pharmacy price list (Poland) - T. Dzitko – 3rd Annual CEE Pharmaceutical Challenges 
Conference, Budapest, June 2006 
 
The red line identifies the development of the manufacturer’s price, while the 
green and the blue line indicate the price policy pursued by two parallel traders. From 
the graph it is apparent that the entry of the two competitors accelerated an existing 
downwarding trend. 
2.4 The impact of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals on price levels in 
exporting countries  
Until now I have considered only those models that assume that drug prices in 
exporting countries are fixed and that companies can have influence on them only in the 
importing countries. This assumption is a simple way of modelling the difference in 
pharmaceutical policies between Northern and Southern European countries: whilst the 
former apply more ‘market-oriented’ policies and allow free pricing to a certain extent, 
in the latter governmental intervention is more pervasive and price controls tighter. 
It is true that the re-negotiation of prices at a higher level in countries that apply 
stricter budgetary control of pharmaceutical expenditures may not be always successful. 
Although there have been cases where companies managed to obtain higher prices (see 
infra), in general governments are reluctant to accept unjustified increases in price and 
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could threat to de-list products from the reimbursed products lists or to scale down the 
reimbursement level. 
Still, pharmaceutical regulation, as described in Section 1, shows that for new 
products such increase in price may, instead, start taking place. 
The analysis conducted there has shown that even under a scheme of statutory 
prices, pharmaceuticals pricing in all exporting countries considered (with the exception 
of Greece) have switched to negotiation systems. Under such pricing policy final prices 
depend on where the bargaining power resides. Economic investigation showed that the 
latter is influenced, among other things, by the presence of parallel trade. 
When parallel trade is not allowed, if the bargaining power resides with the firm, 
the price level is positively correlated to the market size. If, on the contrary, the 
bargaining power resides with the government in the exporting country, the firm will 
accept a lower price as long as the market size is large. In fact, a larger volume of goods 
sold compensates the lower prices charged520. 
However, in the presence of parallel trade, the negotiated price depends also on 
the level of trade costs. For a given market size, the price in the exporting country rises 
as long as trade costs fall. In fact, a falling transaction costs makes parallel trade more of 
a problem for the manufacturer, who tries to limit parallel trade activity by raising the 
price. Vice versa, higher trade costs that render parallel trade more difficult entail lower 
prices. 
When trade costs are low, the firm is induced to bargaining harder in order to 
obtain a larger price that blocks arbitrage521. As a result, prices in the exporting country 
rise with respect to a situation where parallel trade does not take place. 
The ‘bargaining harder effect’ can be seen as the result of a change in the 
participation constraint of the pharmaceutical company due to parallel trade: without 
parallel trade, in the bargaining process the reservation price for the firm is equal to the 
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520 See SAUER, A Model of Parallel Imports of Pharmaceuticals with Endogenous Price Controls, Economics Bulletin, 
no. 6(36), p. 1-8, who find that when the firm has all of the leverage, the highest foreign price is achieved. As 
the government gains bargaining power, the foreign price decreases. When the government has all of the 
leverage, the firm is forced into marginal cost pricing. 
521 See TABATA, SHINKAI, TANAKA, and OKAMURA, Parallel Imports, Drug Price Control and Pharmaceutical 
Innovation, Discussion Paper no. 26 School of Economics Kwansei Gakuin University, 2005. In GROSSMAN 
and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, Parallel imports and price controls, in RAND Journal of Economics, 
2008, no. 39(2), p. 378-402. 
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marginal cost; while with parallel trade, the reservation price is given by the price that 
entails the same profits the company would earn by serving only the importing market 
at a high price522. 
Economic theory, in fact, shows that under a switch from price discrimination to 
uniform price policy, serving the low-priced country may turn out to be unprofitable for 
the company523. In other words, it may be more lucrative to drop the low-priced market 
and supply only the high-price country at the highest price possible. In that case, low-
priced countries, where arbitrage is likely to originate, might be abandoned. 
In this sense, an increase in price in the exporting countries could be seen as a 
response from governments to the development of parallel trade, in order to avoid the 
possibility that the companies do not serve the market524. That is why price concessions 
from companies in the exporting countries should be less likely under parallel trade and 
negotiated price result higher. 
Is the threat of cutting off supplies really credible? 
From an economic point of view, it should be noted that the abandonment of a 
country occurs, for instance, when consumer demand in the country that enjoyed low 
prices under price discrimination is too small compared to the consumer demand in the 
country where high prices are charged525. Under pharmaceutical price regulation, 
however, this effect is diminished, because the reimbursement system grants an 
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522 Or, equivalently, it could explained as following: more lenient regulation on prices in exporting countries 
is caused by the prospect that the low price is exported in the importing country through parallel trade and 
undermines the innovation pattern there. In that case, the exporting country would not be able to free ride 
anymore on the research activity conducted in the importing country. 
523 In traditional models this effect takes place because the price is too high and quantity purchased in the 
low-price country too low, therefore companies lose too much money. See MOTTA, Competition Policy, cit., p. 
502 et seq. Note that manufacturers’ profits decrease, because the switch impedes them to rip the whole 
consumer surplus. Therefore, the total welfare effect of a uniform price policy is on the whole positive only 
if consumers gain more than the manufacturers lose. 
524 GROSSMAN and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, cit. Contra, see MATTEUCCI and REVERBERI, Price 
Regulation and Public Service Obligations under International Arbitrage, in Journal of Regulatory Economics; 2005, 
no. 28(1), p. 109, who showed, quite counterintuitively, that, by imposing public service obligation, 
regulators in the exporting country may be able to reduce prices in its country by exploiting parallel exports. 
The distributor is willing to accept the lower retail price proposed by the regulator in the exporting country, 
insofar it could recoup profits with exporting activities in the importing country. Such exporting activities 
are more profitable the larger is the gap between the exporting and the importing country, i.e. the lower is 
the price is the price asked by the regulator in the exporting country. 
525 See ZHONG, Another Side of Parallel Trade on Pharmaceuticals: Price, Supply and Social Welfare in the Exporting 
Country, Mimeo, April 2006 available at http://economics.ca/2006/papers/0247.pdf, who finds the 
exporting country’s minimum size that renders the firm indifferent between serving both markets or only 
the importing country under parallel trade. 
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adequate demand level to the company. Thus, the likelihood that a company does not 
launch a product in a low-priced country is also reduced, with respect to other sectors526. 
From the legal perspective, in the pharmaceutical sector the withdrawing of a 
drug from a market after the launch is impossible without infringing the EU legal 
provisions on uninterrupted supplies, as well as competition law provisions. Companies 
are, however, entitled to decide not to launch a drug at all527. 
The provision establishing the public service obligation cannot be interpreted as 
mandating companies to enter a specific market, as they have the right to decide not to 
enter a market at all (especially if they are offered a price that they consider to be too 
low528). However, if they choose to enter, they are obliged by law to grant ‘appropriate 
and continuing’ supplies, in compliance with competition law and the EU rules on free 
movement of goods529. 
The research conducted has evidenced only few cases where pharmaceutical 
companies did not launch a product: one took place in Greece, where a pharmaceutical 
form of Zyprexa® has not been launched; other cases happened in Northern European 
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526 See fn 456 above about the legal provision establishing the public service obligation. In this respect the 
pharmaceutical market presents very different features with respect to other sectors, where the withdrawal 
of a product is always possible and it actually occurred, as a consequence of parallel trade. An emblematic 
case is the Distiller case, (see Commission decision 78/163/EEC in case IV/28.282 — The Distillers Company 
Limited — Conditions of sales and price) where the company, after the Commission’s prohibition to hinder re-
importation of its Scotch whisky in the UK market, it withdrew the product from the other EU countries. See 
KORAH, Goodbye, Red Label: Condemnation of Dual Pricing by Distillers, in Eur. L. R., 1978, no. 3, p. 624. 
527 Note that in this case governments could always issue a compulsory licence and impose to the company 
the introduction of the drug in the market, if the drug is considered essential for the protection of public 
health. Article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement states that “appropriate measures (…omissis…) may be needed to 
prevent the abuse of intellectual property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which unreasonably restrain 
trade or adversely affect the international transfer of technology’. Article 40 of the Agreement affirms the right of 
Members to specify in their legislation licensing practices or conditions that may be in particular cases 
constitute an abuse of intellectual property rights having adverse effects on competition in the relevant 
market and to adopt appropriate measures to prevent or control such practices. An example of such 
measures is compulsory licensing. The words ‘compulsory licensing’ do not appear in the TRIPS 
Agreement, but form part of the scope of Article 31, relating to ‘other use without authorisation of the right 
holder’. See ANDERSON, The interface between competition policy and intellectual property in the context of the 
international trading system, Journal of International Economic Law, 1998, p. 655-678; ABBOTT, First Report (Final) 
on the subject of Parallel Importations to the Committee on International Trade Law of the International Association, 
Journal of International Economic Law, 1998, p. 607-636, at 622-623. However, note that no cases of compulsory 
licence have been registered in the EU so far. 
528 See KANAVOS, The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union, cit., p. 524, where he affirms that 
a medicine may have a license to be sold through the European centralised authorisation system, but may 
not actually be marketed everywhere because of inconclusive pricing negotiations (with the manufacturer 
opting not to launch in a given member state). In other cases, pricing may not be a necessary condition for 
launch and the manufacturer may opt to launch in the country at its preferred price in order to capture the 
private market. However, if reimbursement is sought, then the reimbursement price needs to be negotiated. 
529 See AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer’s opinion in the Syfait II case at para. 89. 
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countries. 
It follows that the unsuccessful launch of pharmaceutical products can be 
considered a problem with marginal relevance in this context. But, while missed 
launches remain a sporadic case, delays in the launch of new products have been often 
observed almost in all Member States530. 
A possible determining factor of delays in the launch of new products is, on the 
one hand, reference pricing. The simultaneous launch of a drug in all Member States 
would in fact influence price negotiation and impede the companies’ price 
discriminating policy: low prices negotiated in some Member States could undercut 
negotiations elsewhere, thereby impeding to obtain higher prices. That is why low-price 
countries typically receive the products later than high-price countries. 
Companies argue that parallel trade also plays a role in this context: some 
reported withholding or delaying launch of new products in traditional low-price 
countries of the EU, rather than accepting prices that would invite parallel trade and 
hence erode the prices that they can earn in other markets531. An example at this regard 
is provided by the facts in the Glaxo case, where GSK claimed that the delay of several 
years in the introduction of its antimigraine product sumatriptan (Imigran®) in France 
was caused by parallel trade532. The defendant claimed that in total, from 1972 until 1998 
there were five delays of GSK products in Spain and five in France. 
Some studies confirm this statement by finding that Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Italy were facing the greatest number of delays in gaining access to modern medicines533. 
However, data provided by the European Commission do not match with this story: in 
fact, there appears to be a large number of cases of delay registered in importing 
countries too. For instance, in the same period, three delays in the launch of GSK 
products were registered in Sweden, eleven in the Netherlands, ten in Denmark, eight in 
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530 TABATA ET AL., Parallel Imports, cit., p. 107, study delays as a form of non-price discrimination or sabotage. 
531 See DANZON, The Economics of Parallel Trade, cit., p. 300. Similarly BALE, The Conflicts between Parallel Trade 
and Product Access and Innovation: the Case of Pharmaceuticals, in Journal of International Economic Law, 1998, p. 
637-653. 
532 See the Commission Decision on GlaxoWellcome, cit., para. 174 et seq. 
533 See BOOER, EDMONDS, GLYNN, OGLIALORO, Economic Aspects of the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, in ECLR, 
1999, no. 5, p. 262, mentioning the figures provided by a study of Europe Economics; DANZON, WANG and 
WANG, The Impact of Price Regulation on the Launch of New Drugs – Evidence from Twenty-Five Major Markets in 
the 1990s, in Health Economics, 2005, no. 14, p. 269. 
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Germany and in the United Kingdom534. 
In sum, the issue of delays in the launch of drugs in national markets is largely 
open to speculations. However, while causes remain ambiguous, their effect is apparent. 
Such strategy helps companies in strengthening their negotiation power vis-à-vis 
the authorities and may lead to the obtainment of higher launch prices also in countries 
that traditionally control prices more strictly. This confirms that the ‘bargaining harder 
effect’ hypothesis is highly plausible and may help understanding the empirical 
evidence that shows a rise in drug prices in exporting countries. 
In fact, in the Glaxo case, there is evidence that between May 1997 and July 1998 
the company managed to obtain substantial price increases for four out of eight 
products, which were claimed to be the prime candidates for parallel trade: Serevent®, 
Imigran® and Lamictal® and Ventolin®535. 
The welfare effect of such a rise in drug prices depends on the policy objectives 
in which the government in the exporting country is interested in. When it is mainly 
concerned with the maximisation of consumer surplus, society will suffer a loss from 
parallel trade536. If, on the contrary, the government is not concerned only with 
consumer welfare but it has other policy objectives, like the contribution to R&D, a price 
that is above the firm’s marginal costs may not necessarily decrease total welfare in the 
exporting country537. 
Overall, considering the effect that parallel trade may have on prices of exporting 
countries, it follows that this form of competition is capable of bringing prices for 
pharmaceuticals towards a medium price, instead of a bottom price. 
The total effect on consumer welfare is indefinite, as it depends on how much 
consumer in the importing country gain and on how much those in the exporting 
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534 See the Commission Decision of 8 May 2001, in case IV/36.957/F3, Glaxowellcome, para. 176, on 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/oj/2001/l_302/l_30220011117en00010043.pdf. 
535 See the Commission Decision on GlaxoWellcome, cit., para. 121 and 122. 
536 TABATA ET AL., Parallel Imports, Drug Price Control, cit., p. 18, found that consumer surplus in the exporting 
country is lower under parallel trade. Similarly see also REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and Pharmaceuticals, cit., 
p. 166, who say that national government in exporting countries cannot benefit from lower prices as they 
could under parallel trade. 
537 See GROSSMAN and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, cit., p. 398, affirm that the higher prices in 
exporting countries are detrimental for the short–term consumer welfare there but are beneficial to 
consumers of both countries in the long-term, thanks to the extra-subsidy from the exporting country that 
sustain investments in innovation, partly relieving consumers in importing countries, which can enjoy lower 
prices. 
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country lose. In terms of profits, the price increase in the exporting country may 
compensate the profit loss suffered by the manufacturer in the importing country due to 
competition. 
 
3. … And how large are they? Competition and regulation in the pharmaceutical 
sector. 
The above analysis shows that savings from parallel trade on pharmaceuticals in 
importing countries do exist. The relevant question at stake then should not pertain the 
existence of benefits from parallel trade, but rather their magnitude, namely, how much 
competitive pressure parallel trade puts on the market. 
In other words, the key question is about who pockets the price differential and 
avail himself of the potential benefits coming from parallel trade538. 
3.1 Measuring the magnitude of savings from parallel trade of medicines 
Three empirical studies conducted by independent organisations attempted to 
quantify the savings entailed by parallel trade on pharmaceuticals but produced 
contradictory results at this regard. 
A study performed by the university of York (hereinafter, the ‘York study’) 
quantified the resulting savings in five main European Member States: Denmark, UK, 
Germany, Sweden and the Netherlands. With regards to indirect savings, it found that 
absent competition, prices increased for on-patent drugs, whereas, with competition 
from parallel trade, prices for on-patent drugs decreased539. 
The York study was subject to criticism in an IMS Health’s evaluation of the 
report findings. Calculations were performed again and indicated that savings realized 
by payers were significantly lower: in particular, figures for Germany and UK were 
criticized, on the basis of an overestimation of the level of parallel trade in those 
countries540.  
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538 The Commission itself noted in its Communication of 1998 on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals 
(1998) that, “Unless parallel trade can operate dynamically on prices, it creates inefficiencies because most, but not all, 
of the financial benefits accrue to the parallel trader rather the health care system or patient.” 
539 See WEST, MAHON, Benefits to Payers and Patients from Parallel Trade, University of York, 2003, where the 
authors considered the competitive effect that parallel imports had on domestic prices in the period 1997-
2002 and tried to quantify the resulting indirect savings. 
540 The York study estimated a level of parallel trade of €2 billion in Germany and an amount of savings 
equal to €194 million. However, IMS estimated the level of parallel imports into Germany to be only €1.3 
billion. Re-applying York’s methodology to this revised parallel import figure, IMS estimated that the 
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Contradicting results with respect to the findings of the York study also came 
from the subsequent study performed by the London School of Economics (hereinafter, 
the ‘LSE study’). The latter found in general little competitive effect and a very small 
price reduction for on-patent drugs subject to parallel import541. 
This result was later explained in a subsequent study performed by the 
University of Southern Denmark (hereinafter, the ‘Pedersen study’). There it was argued 
that the small competitive effect associated with parallel trade was probably due to the 
very small and little relevant sample used and to the interpretation of the observed co-
movement of prices. The study was based on the selection of six product categories that 
covered 21% of the branded medicines market. The between-country comparison of 
prices required that information for the same products were collected in all countries. 
Some products, however, were not subject to parallel import in all countries and not 
during the entire period. The savings, therefore, were estimated for 19 products only for 
the year 2002. 
Furthermore, the market penetration of parallel imports of the selected products 
was relatively low, with two-thirds of the products having less than 20% of the parallel 
import market share. 
On the basis of these remarks, the Pedersen study returned back to the method 
used in the York study and updated the data related to the direct and indirect savings 
for fifty products in the four main European countries: Denmark, Germany, United 
Kingdom and Sweden542. 
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saving to payers in Germany is €126 million. The same was performed for UK, arriving at a figure of €201 
million, instead of €342 million. See HAIGH, Parallel Trade in Europe - Assessing the Reality of Payer and Patient 
Savings A Review of the York Health Economics Consortium report, available at www.imshealth.com. 
541 See KANAVOS, COSTA-I-FONT, MERKUR, GEMMILL, The Economic Impact of Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade – A 
Stakeholder Analysis, LSE, 2004. Among other things, the study aimed at studying price convergence between 
countries. For this reason, the study looked at price co-variance. However, prices co-movement does not 
necessarily imply the absence of price effect. On the contrary, if there is co-movement, one should expect 
price competition à la Bertrand, where each player will undercut its competitor in order to capture the bigger 
or even the whole market share. In case where to prices co-movement does not correspond competition, 
then it is likely that one of the actors has market power. 
542 See PEDERSEN ET AL., The Economic Impact of Parallel Import on Pharmaceuticals, 2006. The study used a 
larger sample: it analyses the price series for 50 products and took into account the development of prices 
over time. The general assumption on which the study is based is that the manufacturers in the absence of 
competition from parallel imports will set their price equal to the maximum reimbursed price. Therefore, 
any deviation from this maximum in markets with parallel imports competition can be attributed to 
competitive effects from parallel imports. 
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Savings were found to be lower with respect to those indicated in the York study, 
because of changes in the relevant national legislation that diminished the incentives for 
parallel trade (see infra). 
Here below are some of the results of three studies compared: 
 
Table 8: Comparison between the findings of three studies measuring direct savings 
from parallel trade on pharmaceuticals in given years (in ml €) 
 York study - 2001 LSE study – 2002 Pedersen study - 2004 
UK 342 6.9 237 
Germany 194 17.7 145 
Sweden 47 3.8 45.3 
Denmark 16 3 14.2 
Total 599 31,4 441.2 
Source: York study, 2002; LSE study 2003; Pedersen study, 2006. 
 
A comparison among the results of the three mentioned surveys is, however, 
hard and not entirely appropriate, given the dissimilar methodology used and the 
different period considered543. It follows that empirical evidence regarding the 
magnitude of the savings entailed by parallel trade currently remains inconclusive. 
Besides the differences in the methodology used, there are other reasons that 
contribute to explain these contradictory findings. 
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543 The York study and the Pedersen study used the same methodology. The calculation of direct savings 
results from the difference in medicine prices between the more expensive local product and the cheaper 
parallel-imported product. The measurement of indirect savings is based on the assumption about how 
prices developed in the absence of parallel imports and about the causal link between parallel imports and 
changes in the price of the direct import. The evolution of the original product’s price before the entry of 
competition from parallel imports has been examined to predict the hypothetical evolution of the price in 
the absence of competition. This fictive or ‘possible’ price has been then compared to the actual price with 
competition from a parallel import to calculate the savings from the price differential. The LSE study 
covered the period 1997-2002. Direct savings were estimated using the intra-country price spread in 
pharmacy purchase price (originator price – parallel import price) and the quantity sold, assuming inelastic 
demand and using a hypothetical average price for parallel imports. The savings realised should also 
include the pharmacy profit margins and VAT. It is thus not surprising that the LSE study resulted in a low 
estimate of the direct savings in the 6 countries. If the selected brand drugs, covering 21% of the market, 
were representative for the rest of the market in terms of extent and price of parallel importing, then for the 
total market a rough estimate for the direct savings in pharmacy purchase price terms would be five times 
the provided figure. This is still considerably lower than the York study estimate, though. 
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The level of price of parallel imported products – and consequently the level of 
associated savings - very much depends on strategies implemented by manufacturers to 
defend their profits from competition. If, for instance, the manufacturer applies quota 
systems or supply restrictions, it limits the degree of freedom of parallel trader in setting 
its profit maximising price or in its ability to undercut the manufacturer. With limited 
volumes at his disposal parallel distributors are often unable to charge lower prices in 
the market of destination and lose part of their competitiveness544. As a consequence, 
savings from parallel trade decrease. 
If, instead, the manufacturer decides to tolerate parallel trade in its distribution 
system and to adapt its price policy to the sensitivity of the market, the quantity of 
original products sold – and the consequent market share gained by parallel traders - 
depends on the size of the price sensitive and insensitive market segments. The bigger is 
this segment, the larger is the number of consumers that buy cheaper parallel imported 
products and the bigger are savings. 
The latter increase even more if the manufacturer decides to enter into price 
competition with traders. 
Also, the level and the distribution of savings deriving from parallel trade 
depend on the degree of wholesale and retail competition present in the importing 
market. Distributors can retain excess profits from exploiting price differences if there 
are barriers to entry to parallel trading, and if buyers of the imported drugs are unaware 
to their source and the sellers’ margins. This may be the case where parallel imports are 
a very limited activity and if there are few competing traders in the markets. But 
economic theory suggests that, where parallel trade is significant and the number of 
traders increases, parallel traders’ margins and prices would fall. And savings increase. 
The incentive to charge low prices is sometimes strengthened by the product 
differentiation existing between parallel imported and original drugs. The former, in 
fact, by regulation must be clearly labelled and re-packaged as imports545. For this 
reason, the aesthetical appearance of parallel imported drugs is often very much 
dissimilar to that of original products. Hence, in order to persuade pharmacies and 
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544 See at this regard PEDERSEN ET AL., The Economic Impact of Parallel Import on Pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 31. 
Similarly KYLE, Strategic Responses to Parallel Trade, 2005, available at 
http://www.duke.edu/~mkyle/Research%20Papers.htm. 
545 See infra Section 4.1 in Chapter I and infra Section 3.2 in Chapter II. 
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health authorities to accept the imported drug, traders may provide additional financial 
incentive to purchase an imported drug546. This may in turn lead to higher potential 
savings for the health care system. 
3.1.1 Competition and regulation in pharmaceuticals 
The regulatory environment influences the magnitude of direct savings too547. 
The magnitude of direct savings appears to have continuously changed over the 
period 2001-2006 in Denmark, Germany, UK and Sweden, as it appears from the figure 
below. 
 
Graph 8: Trend of direct savings from parallel trade from 2001 to 2006 (in ml €) 
 
Source: EAEPC548 
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546 For instance, while in UK wholesalers generally sell to pharmacies with a discount of 8-12% on the official 
price, parallel traders sell with a discount of 10-15%. 
547 Pharmacists margins vary from country to country and it is generally acknowledged by both national and 
EU Courts that they should not be calculated in such a way as to prevent importers from passing on any 
lower cost advantage. See, for instance, ECJ, 13 December 1990, in case C-166/89 Nefarma Pharmaceutische 
Bedriff v. Commission, where it was asked to consider the question of pharmacists’ margins and their impact 
on imports; see also R. v. Secretary of State for Social Services, ex p. Bomore Medical Supplies, 1986 (English Court 
of Appeal). 
548 Data for the years 2002, 2003, 2005 and 2007 were provided by the Secretary General of the EAEPC, in an 
interview in October 2007. Data for the years 2001 and 2004 are sourced from the York study and from the 
Pedersen study respectively. I already warned the reader that these figures have been contested. Still, they 
are the only ones that I could use to perform an evaluation of the trend of savings along time, because they 
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The explanation for these different trends are mainly to be found in the changes 
in the regulation that provides different incentives for stakeholders to supply parallel 
imported products. 
For instance, in Denmark savings from parallel trade in 2003-2004 decreased 
compared to 2001. However, a new increase took place as of 2005, given that regulation 
was amended in three main aspects that are capable of stimulating parallel imports: (i) 
the scope for substitution increased, given that the new law obliged the pharmacies to 
offer the cheapest product; (ii) the reference price for reimbursement of drugs changed 
from the Average European price to the cheapest synonymous Danish product; and (iii) 
a new formula for the pharmacist price margin provided incentives for cheapest 
substitution. 
Parallel imports accounted for 7% of the total turnover in the German market in 
the first half of 2003, but only for 4,5-5% in the first half of 2004. The main reason for this 
decline was probably the reduction in the mandatory quota of parallel imports from 7% 
to 5% at the end of 2003. Furthermore, as of 2004 the parallel importers’ mandatory 
discount to sickness funds on the ex-factory price was temporarily increased from 6% to 
16%, forcing the withdrawal of one third of parallel imported products from the German 
market. However, the reversion of the mandatory rebate to 6% and the new 
reimbursement system that moved from generic reference pricing to therapeutic 
reference pricing in 2004 inverted the trend in the subsequent years. 
The upward trend in the direct savings from parallel trade registered in Sweden 
between 2001 and 2004 did not continue in the next years. The pharmaceutical reform 
and the general price development in the market reduced scope for parallel trade. The 
Pharmaceutical Benefit Act in October 2002 introduced a new reimbursement rule based 
on cost-effectiveness analysis to determine the reimbursement level of pharmaceuticals, 
and the mandatory substitution of the lowest-cost generic alternative. Generic 
substitution was rapidly implemented and the positive attitude developed by doctors 
encouraged generic penetration, which obviously reduced market share of parallel 
imported drugs. 
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come from the same source and they have been estimated in relation to a period of time that is sufficiently 
long to allow such analysis. 
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Secondly, medicine prices have generally decreased with 15% over the period 
2002 to 2005, primarily due to ending of the patent period for a number of top-selling 
drugs549, which has opened up for generic products that compete with branded drugs 
(parallel imported as well as originals). The general decline in the market for brand 
drugs also reduced the potential savings from parallel trade. 
Although it is not included in the graph above, it is also interesting to mention 
how pharmaceutical regulation in the Netherlands influenced the development of 
parallel trade. As a financial incentive to dispense generics and parallel imports, the 
Dutch government allows pharmacists to keep one-third of the price difference between 
a generic or parallel import and the branded equivalent. This was effective in 
encouraging the use of generics and parallel imports for the first year of the scheme. 
Thereafter, its effectiveness fell below expectations as pharmaceutical companies and 
wholesalers reacted by offering discounts and incentives for dispensing branded 
products. 
This effect was countered further by the introduction of the 1996 pricing law. The 
price differentials between branded and generic products fell from 17 to 7% and from 16 
to 5.7% for parallel imports. Some generic and parallel imported products were driven 
out of the market and problems of availability ensued. The pricing law meant declining 
incomes for pharmacists and, as a result, they started looking harder for discount 
bonuses550. 
It clearly appears that regulation also impacts the degree to which manufacturers 
respond to increased competitiveness. And this in turn determines the magnitude of 
indirect savings. 
While price negotiation aims at setting a maximum price under which 
competition is allowed, reference price systems put a minimum cap that blocks 
competition towards the bottom551. Often pharmaceutical companies might not want to 
lower their domestic prices in response to competition for several reasons. 
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549 E.g.: Zocord®, Losec®, Cipramil®, Plendil®, Zoloft®. 
550 Cf. KANAVOS, The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union, cit., p. 529. 
551 In Italy, for example, it has been observed the absence of any kind of price competition bringing prices 
below the reference point. See the reports from the Italian Competition Authority No. AS131/1998 
Determinazione del prezzo dei farmaci and No. AS300/2005 Disposizioni urgenti per il prezzo dei farmaci non 
rimborsabili dal SSN. See also CERM, Il decreto sui prezzi dei farmaci di fascia ’C’ alla luce dell’attività di 
segnalazione dell’AGCM spunti per ‘riflessioni riformiste’, n. 4/0, 2005. 
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First of all, after a successful price war against a competitor, it is not always 
profitable to raise again prices, as, even in countries where pharmaceutical companies 
can freely price their products, the regulator might not increase correspondingly the 
price reimbursement level. 
Secondly, a lower price for a given product could have a knock-on effect on other 
European markets through reference pricing, thereby causing a larger loss than the one 
suffered in the domestic market as a consequence of competition552. 
Therefore, health care and pharmaceutical regulation play a fundamental role in 
determining favourable competition conditions and, hence, the magnitude of the savings 
from parallel trade, as well as the identity of beneficiaries. Yet, the fact that the price 
difference may be pocketed by traders cannot be attributed to pharmaceutical price 
setting. It is rather the signal that the market is characterized by price rigidity. Parallel 
traders enjoy a certain degree of market power for the same reasons that pharmaceutical 
companies do. Having little constraints from the demand side, discipline on prices, and 
consequently traders’ profit, is necessarily determined by appropriate ad hoc regulation 
that provides pass-on mechanisms. 
 
4. The price harmonising function of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals 
The conducted analysis suggests that parallel trade brings harmonisation of 
prices for pharmaceuticals. 
However, the theoretical literature is divided in this respect. 
Some models show a tendency of price convergence under parallel trade, 
because prices in exporting countries increase while in importing countries they 
decrease553. 
There are models that found, instead, that, in some circumstances, parallel trade 
is an unambiguous force for price integration. This has been explained through the 
three-fold trade off that manufacturers face when they set prices in the importing and in 
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552 This was the case of Pfizer in Germany, which, after the inclusion of its product Lipitor in the reference 
price system and the attribution of the lower reimbursement price of simvastatins cluster, still found to be 
rational not to lower its price to the reference and to lose most of its market share in Germany, as this would 
have avoided a larger loss in other markets due the reference price system. 
553 See JELOVAC and BORDOY, Pricing and Welfare Implications of Parallel Imports in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
in International Journal of Health Care Finance and Economics, 2005, no. 5, p. 5-21. 
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the exporting countries: they have to restrict parallel trade, avoid resources waste due to 
actual trade, and reduce the double-markup problem in the exporting country. These 
three competing interests were found to determine the counterintuitive result that retail 
prices could diverge (albeit wholesale prices converge) as a result of declining trading 
costs and as the volume of parallel trade increases554. 
It is difficult to say which of the two predictions is more correct from an 
economic point of view, because drug prices are influenced by a lot of factors. 
Market analysis indicates that there has been overall evidence of progressive 
price convergence during the period 1986-2001. This development can be ascribed to 
changes in pharmaceutical price regulation555. Other studies that show evidence of price 
convergence in the pharmaceutical market556 found explanation of this trend in the 
general integration process that has been activated since 1985, thanks to the EU 
directives that have been adopted to achieve a single pharmaceutical market. 
As already mentioned, we can observe that some European countries that were 
traditionally characterised by strict regulation of drug prices are now introducing more 
lenient regulations. Italy and Portugal, for instance, recently moved their regulated 
prices towards the European average, while France allows freer pricing for innovative 
products557. That is why prices of new products at launch are in average higher than in 
the past in those countries where traditionally prices were low. 
Symmetrically, we observe the recent introduction of tougher cost-containment 
measures (based on parallel trade, on reference pricing and on cost-effectiveness 
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554 See GANSLANDT and MASKUS, Vertical Distribution, Parallel Trade, and Price Divergence in Integrated Markets, 
in European Economic Review, 2007, no. 51(4), p. 943-970, where the authors develop a model of vertical 
pricing in which an original manufacturer sets wholesale prices in two markets that are integrated at the 
distributor level by parallel imports. Also, cf. the GC in the Adalat case, where the Court at para. 181 said: 
“Nor, finally, can the Commission rely in support of its argument upon its conviction, which is, moreover, devoid of all 
foundation, that parallel imports will in the long term bring about the harmonisation of the price of medicinal 
products.” 
555 See EUROPE ECONOMICS, G 10: Recommendation XIV the economic case, 2002, where it is showed that the 
standard deviation of pharmaceutical prices in some Member States between 1986 and 2001 reduced 
significantly. 
556 See TIMUR, PICONE and DESIMONE, The Single Market and Pharmaceutical Industry in the European Union: Is 
There Any Evidence of Price Convergence?, in iHEA 2007 6th World Congress: Explorations in Health Economics 
Paper, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=992975. Using annual 1994-2003 IMS Health data from 
five EU countries on prices of drugs at the molecule level used to treat cardiovascular disease, the paper 
explains how the integration process has affected cross-country drug price dispersion in the EU and show 
that some convergence took place, with long-term price differences arising from country fixed effects. 
557 See KANAVOS and COSTA-I-FONT, Pharmaceutical parallel trade in Europe: Stakeholder and competition effects, in 
Economic Policy, 2005, no. 45, p. 766. 
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analysis) in markets that conventionally applied free pricing, like Denmark, Germany, 
Sweden and the UK, with the purpose of capping prices. 
As a result of these trends, a price corridor is likely to appear in the market. 
However, some caveats to the foregoing conclusion are necessary. 
In fact, the latter have provided a variety of instruments aimed at pursuing, inter 
alia, a policy of price convergence. This is the case, for instance, of reference pricing: this 
price setting mechanism is very much facilitated by the Transparency Directive and has 
the effect of bringing prices in different countries nearer to each other558. 
Also, as long as the process of price setting mechanisms gets more transparent, it 
becomes easier for the Commission, and other stakeholders, to establish whether the 
Treaty rules on free movement and competition are properly respected, particularly if 
national laws favour domestic production over imports559. 
Such control should promote the development of favourable regulatory 
conditions at national level560 for parallel trade to develop. Its growth should inject more 
competition in the distribution chain: this should bring the necessary competitive 
pressure capable of further reducing price gaps among countries and contribute to 
realise what is called the ‘negative integration’ of the internal market. 
Still, parallel trade is not the main driving force behind the observed price 
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558 Convergence is taking place towards the bottom according to LOPEZ-CASASNOVAS and PUIG-JUNOY, Review 
of the literature on reference pricing, in Health Policy, 2000, no. 54(2), p. 87–123. Still, they affirm that reference 
pricing did not bring a large amount of savings to national health care systems, because of the increase in 
volume of products not covered by reference pricing. 
559 For instance, parallel importers claimed, unsuccessfully, that PPRS scheme allows manufacturers to 
introduce deep discounts for prices of products under competition from parallel trade while maintaining 
high prices for other products. See the Sixth PPRS Report to Parliament (Department of Health 2002). The 
research-based industry has also used the Directive to challenge national schemes that use imported product 
prices as a benchmark, thus in their view discriminating against domestic products. See the complaint Àled 
by the Danish pharmaceutical industry association (LIF), Danish LIF complains to ECJ, in Scrip, no. 2612, 16 
January 2001, p. 3. The Commission launched infringement proceedings against the Greek government in 
relation to its so-called ‘conÀrmation price’ system and with regard to its failure to respect the timetables for 
price approval as imposed in the Directive. See Commission threatens Greece with Court proceedings, in Scrip, 
no. 2589, 3 November 2000, p. 7. Infringement proceedings were also initiated against Finland for its failure 
to provide for reimbursement procedures for certain categories of drugs. See Finnish Scheme Challenged, in 
Scrip, no. 2558, 19 July 2000, p. 6. 
560 Several conditions are necessary in order for parallel trade to take place effectively: low trade cost, 
appropriate regulation that allows for fast market penetration and that provides pass on mechanisms, 
absence of supply restrictions, etc. At the same time, companies manage to circumvent the mechanism of 
reference pricing by simply implementing sequential launching of products, starting with the country where 
the higher price is likely to be obtained. 
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harmonisation wave – and this is the first caveat561 -, but it is just one of the several tools 
used by the Commission to achieve this result. In this respect, it certainly contributes to 
the process of market integration that the Commission has been pursuing through 
different means, from direct measures, like Directives, to indirect incentives, like the 
enforcement of free movement and competition law rules, as well as a policy of price 
transparency. 
Understood in this sense, la raison d’être that justified the favourable policy 
conventionally adopted at a EU level towards parallel trade can still be considered well 
founded. 
The second caveat is about the necessary qualification that accompanies the term 
‘harmonisation’ in the field of pharmaceuticals. It has been already shown that the 
market appears highly fragmented, especially at the level of prices. And in fact, whilst 
empirical evidence shows that on average the price gap among countries has been 
narrowing, for individual products price differentials still remain consistent562. 
The reasons of this diverging effect are manifold. But surely governmental 
intervention plays an important role in determining price trends: renegotiations, price 
freezes, and rebates asked by governments from time to time explain why, despite the 
efforts of the Commission, the market still appears non-harmonised at the level of prices. 
In sum, it appears that the attainment of ‘harmonisation’ of prices in the 
pharmaceutical market is determined by two conflicting forces: on the one hand, the 
rules of the internal market push for price convergence and may also achieve it for a 
certain period, until regulation pulls in the opposite direction and may restore the 
situation existing previously to the period of convergence. That is why price 
harmonisation in the pharmaceutical market is still only partial. 
For these reasons, one may wonder whether parallel trade (as well as other 
indirect measures of ‘negative’ harmonisation) is best suited to achieve price 

561 An opposite statement, i.e. finding a relationship of pure causation between parallel trade and trends of 
prices for drugs, is methodologically shaky. This problem of correlation generally affects many international 
comparative pricing studies, as it is difÀcult to isolate causal effects in the cross-country comparisons, 
because of the many factors inÁuencing drug prices in a given market: differences in health system structure 
and Ànancing, pharmaceutical subsidies, cost-containment policies, product mix and production costs, etc. 
KANAVOS and MOSSIALOS, International comparisons of health care expenditures: what we know and what we do not 
know, in Journal of Health Services Research and Policy, no. 4(2), p. 122–126. 
562 This is the outcome of a study by Janice Haigh from IMS, presented at the conference Management Forum, 
held in London, on February 2006. 
 206 
harmonisation, or whether internal market integration in this field should rather be 
accomplished through approximation of national laws and health care systems, as the 
Commission has attempted to do in the first stage of its action. 
This issue is relevant also from a strictly legal point of view. In a sector where 
legislative competence is reserved to Member States, the question of whether it is 
appropriate to pursue a policy of price harmonisation through the use of EU competition 
law rules arises. 
4.1. The ‘constitutional issue’ 
According to Article 168 TFEU, a high level of human health protection is a 
horizontal objective that must be ensured in the definition and implementation of all 
European policies and activities563. 
However, paragraph 7 of the analysed provision imposes an important limit on 
the activities and policies that the EU can adopt in the field of public health. It 
establishes that the EU action in the field of public health has to fully respect the 
responsibilities of the Member States for the organisation and delivery of health services 
and medical care. For this reason, the EU action shall limit itself to complementing 
national policies, encouraging cooperation between the Member States and, if necessary, 
lending support to their action564. 
On the basis of such a division of competences in the field of health, price 
differences due to governmental regulation acquire further legitimacy under the 
architecture of the Treaty. 
As outlined in Chapter I, differences in pharmaceutical prices derive from the 
different national objectives pursued by governments. Some of them focus on containing 
public healthcare expenditures and granting universal access to medicines by keeping 
prices low, while others permit high prices, in consideration of various factors: the 
weight that the pharmaceutical industry plays in their economy, the promotion of R&D, 

563 The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced Commission competence on health care, albeit only to a limited 
extent. Before the introduction of a division of competence on health at a EU level, the EU slowly developed 
a complex, sophisticated system of pharmaceutical regulation on the basis of its general powers under 
Articles 100 and 100A EEC (now Art. 114 TFEU) to promote the internal market. 
564 See para. 2 of the provision under examination. Note that under the new division of competences set by 
the Lisbon Treaty, the field of health remain a suppprting competence. 
 207
as well as the higher purchasing power565. 
As a matter of equity, as well as of efficiency, in fact, high-price countries may be 
charged higher prices for drugs, because they are better placed to finance more 
substantially the competitiveness of the industry. Vice versa, countries that have a low 
purchasing power should benefit from lower prices for pharmaceuticals566. 
Also the regulatory means deputed to implement the policy choice vary to a 
great extent from country to country. As already noted, price regulation is not 
necessarily to be identified with price cuts or price/volume caps. But pharmaceutical 
regulation comprises also profit repayments, negotiations, reference pricing, etc. 
Not only actual polices on prices for pharmaceuticals (should) reflect the 
economic wellbeing of a country, but they also signal the way a government has chosen 
to strike the trade off between low healthcare expenditures and generalised access to 
medicines and the remuneration of the production and distribution or the R&D effort567. 
Given that governmental regulation on pharmaceutical prices reflects the 
different social, budgetary and industrial policies, the most efficient outcome would be 
that each government chooses the desired way of striking the trade off. From this point 
of view, it is claimed that parallel trade undermines such a choice, because it limits 
national authorities ability to control domestic prices through the chosen price-setting 
regime. In particular, by imposing a downward pressure on prices, it diminishes the 
contribution to R&D chosen by a given country568. 
In other words, parallel trade would function like a negative externality that is 
imposed on the importing country: through a spillover effect, the low level of prices 

565 What factors are considered in determining the reasonableness of the price for a medicinal product 
depends on whether the primary objective of the regulator is to achieve the lowest price possible as part of a 
cost-containment strategy or a price level that balances industry incentives and proÀtability with cost-
containment goals. Some countries reward companies that contribute to the national economy or invest in 
R&D, but determining what contributions should be rewarded and how much is not necessarily evident. For 
example, albeit pricing mechanisms are established through a formula, other factors such as therapeutic 
value and prices in other countries may be taken into account without being formally stated. This generates 
lack of transparency in the price setting mechanisms. See MRAZEK and MOSSIALOS, Regulating Pharmaceutical 
Prices in the European Union, in MOSSIALOS ET AL., Regulating Pharmaceuticals in Europe: striving for Efficiency, 
Equity and Quality, 2004, p. 118. 
566 See REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 153-177. Similarly, WHISH, Competition Law, 
cit., p. 507, points out that preventing price discrimination could pose distributional problems, by 
redistributing income from the poorer to the richer countries through trade. 
567 See REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 161. 
568 See REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 161. 
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applied in the exporting country is transferred to the importing country569. 
In this sense, it is argued, price regulation that privileges low prices is liable of 
distorting the entire internal market. In fact, whenever a Member State decides to 
implement a low price policy for pharmaceuticals, this will influence the price policy of 
other countries across Europe, among other things, through parallel trade570. 
It follows that a policy that encourages parallel trade, although in line with the 
objectives of the EU, may be in contrast with the policy objectives of a single Member 
State. This in turn may entails two considerations. 
First of all, given that market fragmentation comes in the first place from 
different pharmaceutical regulations present in each Member State, it would not be 
appropriate to attribute the responsibility of market partitioning to companies571. 
Secondly, it may not be up to the Commission to achieve price harmonisation for 
pharmaceuticals through parallel trade, because it would violate the outlined division of 
competences in the field of health as set forth by the Treaty572. 
In other words, the choice of achieving harmonisation of prices for 
pharmaceuticals through competition law enforcement may be questionable. In this 
wake, the Court of First Instance in the Adalat case argued that the Treaty provides for 
other means to achieve the single market in those fields where fragmentation is caused 
by the exercise of Member States’ sovereignty573.  
Article 5 TEU provides that the EU shall act within the limits of powers 

569 See REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 168. 
570 See the opinion of AG Fennelly in the case Merck v. Primecrown, para. 47, where he recalled that in the 
absence of parallel levels of protection in both the exporting and importing Member States, EU law should 
not export the legislative policy of the former to the latter. 
571 See BOOER, EDMONDS, GLYNN, OGLIALORO, Economic Aspects of the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals, in ECLR, 
1999, no. 5, p. 261. This argument clearly reminds the issue put forward by the defendant for the first time in 
Consten and Grundig and solved in Deutsche Grammophon. 
572 See KON and SCHAEFFER, Parallel Imports of Pharmaceutical Products, cit., p. 130. 
573 See para. 179 of the ruling from the GC in the Adalat case, where the Court said that “under the system of 
the Treaty, it is not open to the Commission to attempt to achieve a result, such as the harmonisation of prices in the 
medicinal products market, by enlarging or straining the scope of Section 1 (Rules applying to undertakings) of 
Chapter 1 of Title VI of the Treaty, especially since that Treaty gives the Commission specific means of seeking such 
harmonisation where it is undisputed that large disparities in the prices of medicinal products in the Member States are 
engendered by the differences existing between the state mechanisms for fixing prices and the rules for 
reimbursement…”. The Court mentioned previous case law that established such principle before: Merck and 
Beecham, para. 47, Centrafarm v Winthrop, para. 17, Musik-Vertrieb Membran and K-tel International v GEMA, 
para. 24, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Others, para. 46, where it was affirmed that that distortions caused by 
different price legislation in a Member State must be remedied by measures taken by the Community 
authorities. 
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attributed and of objectives assigned by the Treaty. Among the latter, Article 3(3) TEU 
indicates the establishment of the internal market. In particular, Article 26 TFEU 
provides that the EU shall adopt harmonisation measures that progressively allow its 
building. To this purpose, Article 114 TFEU establishes that the achievement of the 
objectives indicated at Article 26 TFEU should be obtained through the application of 
the procedure ex Article 294 TFEU574. In this context, the Council is the body that should 
adopt the necessary measure to approximate national laws. 
In sum, one could wonder whether a policy that encourages and protects parallel 
trade of pharmaceuticals in order to indirectly wipe out the obstacles to market 
integration implemented by private parties, and bypasses the institutional provisions 
devoted to harmonisation purposes in the field of health, is legitimate and appropriate 
under the current structure of the Treaty. 
In fact, while in other sectors that are under the competence of the EU, market 
integration can be achieved through the concurrent means of positive harmonisation, 
namely the enacting of EU legislation that forces national laws towards convergence, 
and negative harmonisation, namely the enforcement of freedom of movement of goods 
and competition law rules, such possibilities may not both be available when 
competence is reserved to Member States. 

574 According to the assent procedure established by Art. 294 TFEU, the harmonisation measure should be 
approved by qualified majority by the Council, based on a proposal of the Commission and the opinion of 
the Parliament. Para. 3 and 4 of the provision read as follows. “2. The Commission shall submit a proposal to the 
European Parliament and the Council. 
3. The Council, acting by a qualified majority after obtaining the opinion of the European Parliament: 
— if it approves all the amendments contained in the European Parliament's opinion, may adopt the proposed act thus 
amended, 
— if the European Parliament does not propose any amendments, may adopt the proposed act, 
— shall otherwise adopt a common position and communicate it to the European Parliament. 
The Council shall inform the European Parliament fully of the reasons which led it to adopt its common position. The 
Commission shall inform the European Parliament fully of its position. If, within three months of such communication, 
the European Parliament: 
(a) approves the common position or has not taken a decision, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted 
in accordance with that common position; 
(b) rejects, by an absolute majority of its component members, the common position, the proposed act shall be deemed 
not to have been adopted; 
(c) proposes amendments to the common position by an absolute majority of its component members, the amended text 
shall be forwarded to the Council and to the Commission, which shall deliver an opinion on those amendments. 
4. If, within three months of the matter being referred to it, the Council, acting by a qualified majority, approves all the 
amendments of the European Parliament, the act in question shall be deemed to have been adopted in the form of the 
common position thus amended; however, the Council shall act unanimously on the amendments on which the 
Commission has delivered a negative opinion. If the Council does not approve all the amendments, the President of the 
Council, in agreement with the President of the European Parliament, shall within six weeks convene a meeting of the 
Conciliation Committee. 
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What is, in fact, argued is that market integration for pharmaceuticals should 
rather be achieved through positive harmonisation, i.e. EU legislation, only after that 
Member States have given their consensus on this choice through the appropriate 
legislative procedure. 
4.2. ‘Negative harmonisation’ v. ‘positive harmonisation’ in the 
pharmaceutical market 
These statements give rise to some observations. 
First of all, it is questionable that the path towards harmonisation based 
exclusively on the institutional mechanism proposed by the GC in Adalat is a viable 
solution both from a political and from an efficiency point of view. 
The history of the harmonisation efforts undertaken by the European 
Commission and Council disproves this feasibility. 
Currently, the Commission holds the monopoly of the legislative initiative at a 
EU level, but it believes that in pharmaceuticals any action is left to Member States. 
Therefore it looks like it will not act575. This would be a first institutional impasse that 
may not be easily overcome. 
From Member States’ side, any harmonization attempt would be politically 
extremely difficult, given that health care is a sensitive policy area that is capable of 
determining the outcome of national elections. It follows that Member States are not 
willing to act either576. And this would be a second hurdle that may block the 
harmonisation process. 
Under these circumstances, thus, the successful completion of the single market 
for pharmaceuticals cannot rely only on the approximation of national rules. The 
enforcement of the rules of the internal market, therefore, in my view appears an 
inevitable tool to deal with market fragmentation. 

575 However, the Tobacco Advertising case demonstrated that appreciable distortions of competition could be 
tackled under Article 95 EC. 
576 Cf. HANCHER, Pricing European Pharmaceuticals: Can the Commission untie the Gordian Knot?,  in Fifteen ways 
to price a pill, Eurohealth, 2001, no. 7(2), p. 28, where she recalls that Commission’s attempts to tackle the issue 
of price divergence at source by seeking to harmonise national rules on pricing and profit controls have not 
found much favour from either the Member States, who regard this as a matter of health policy and 
therefore of national competence, or from the research-based industry, who distrust attempts to set average 
‘European’ prices for their products. See for instance, the failure of the efforts to reach consensus within the 
three Bangemann round tables described in the Commission Communication on the Single Market in 
Pharmaceuticals COM(98) 588 final of November 25th, 1998, p. 10-11. 
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Secondly, the call for positive harmonisation as the only legitimate policy tool in 
the pharmaceutical market assumes that Article 168 TFEU attributes to Member States 
the entire and exclusive responsibility in the health car sector. However, health care is 
not totally excluded from EU law577. In fact, internal market provisions inevitably 
influence Member States’ health care policy. For instance, the Internal Market Council of 
May 18, 1998 concluded that the EU policy for pharmaceuticals should, inter alia, aim at 
ensuring the effective further improvement in the operation of the single market in this 
sector based on principles of free movement and competition578. It follows that the 
organization and delivery of health service are sovereign competences that have to be 
exercised by Member States in full respect of the provisions of the Treaty. 
For instance, in the field of organisation and financing of social security, the ECJ 
affirmed that Member States have the power to autonomously organize their social 
security systems, especially given the lack of harmonisation at a EU level. Yet, in 
exercising this competence, Member States are required to do so in compliance with EU 
law, i.e. with the principle of free circulation of goods as well as competition law rules. 
Accordingly, recent case law strengthened access to cross-border health care579. 
Certainly, given that access to health care is a fundamental right and that health 
services constitute a major component of the European social model and contribute to 
social and territorial cohesion in Europe, the application of the rules of the internal 
market should respect the right for the Member States to ensure the availability of high-
quality health care accessible to the population, without endangering the financial balance of 

577 For instance, see the EC Charter on human rights, which gives some competence also to the Community 
on health issues. In the literature, it is also advocated the need for Community health care policy, including 
patients’ rights, and for an increased cross-border alliances (e.g., hospital care), and for a framework for 
cross-border care conditions (quality, equality medical practice, admission, accreditation, patients’ rights, 
etc.). See DEN EXTER, The EC Treaty and Access to Health Care, presentation at conference about health care law 
in Toronto in 2004 available at www.law.utoronto.ca/documents/zhealthlaw04/denExter.ppt. 
578 The Council also considered the goals of: facilitating the delivery of health care in Member States at levels 
at which are affordable and in ways which maximise patients’ access to medicines; maintaining the 
regulation of the pharmaceutical sector to ensure the safety, quality and efficacy of medicines; and 
strengthening the competitiveness of the sector, in particular by encouraging R&D. The Council, 
nevertheless, recognised that there is a tension among these policy objectives. 
579 See recent case law cross-border health care: ECJ, 8 April 1998, in case C-120/95 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de 
maladie des employés privés; ECJ, 7 August 1999, in case C-157/99, B.S.M. Smits-Geraets v. Stichting Ziekenfonds 
VGZ, and H.T.M. Peerbooms v. Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen; ECJ, 12 July 2001 in case C-368/98 Abdon 
Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale des mutualités chrétiennes (ANMC); ECJ, 13 May 2003, in case C-
385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverzekeringen UA, and between E.E.M. 
van Riet and Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekeringen. 
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their national security systems580. 
That fact that the EU must refrain from imposing a financial burden on Member 
States in areas where they retain competence, shows a contrario that internal market 
measures that represent a financial relief for national health care systems do not 
necessarily violate this Member States’ right to secure their financial budgets. 
This is valid a fortiori, as long as Member States choose to take advantage of these 
measures to achieve their own policy objectives. So, for instance, the mentioned ad hoc 
national regulation that aims at encouraging parallel trade of pharmaceuticals in their 
territory is a signal of the fact that Member States are actually willing to avail themselves 
of the internal market rules, insofar these allow them to contain health care 
expenditures581. This happens especially in those countries that normally host the bulk of 
the European pharmaceutical industry where governments over time built a reputation 
of institutions prone to allow high prices. 
These countries, intending to be important home markets for research-based 
products, have traditionally opted for higher prices and lower volumes of consumption. 
For this reason, they have been not willing to ask for lower prices, or they may not 
dispose of enough bargaining power to cut prices themselves582. 
Nevertheless, Member States realised over time that market pricing simply 
resulted in higher prices where the health care system was paying for the brand, without 
that the therapeutic value of products reflected their price. Already from the end of the 
nineties all Member States were concerned that, unless savings could be made elsewhere 
within existing expenditure level in the pharmaceutical sector or elsewhere in the 
healthcare system, the entry of new products onto the market would have represented 

580 See Decker, para. 39. 
581 A doubt at this regard may be cast only for UK, where the claw back system was not implemented 
specifically to encourage parallel trade, but has such an effect only indirectly. However, cf. what the OFT 
affirmed in its report on PPRS as reported in fn 519 of this Chapter. 
582 See JUNOD, An End to Parallel Imports of Medicines? Comments on the Judgment of the Court of First Instance in 
GlaxoWellcome, in World Competition, 2007, no. 31(2), p. 300, where it is affirmed that parallel trade is rather 
used as a political justification to justify a price cut. Contra see REY and VENIT, Parallel Trade and 
pharmaceuticals, cit., p. 167 citing several cases where governments imposed a price cut: UK imposed a price 
cut in 1999 of 4.5%. Spain: 6% in 1999/2000. France: 2,5% in 2000. Italy 7% in 2003. Germany: 6% on ex-
factory prices of product that are not subject to reference pricing. 
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additional calls on health budgets583. 
So, Member States’ financial need to contain pharmaceutical expenditures 
compelled them to take appropriate measures. At the same time, advances in health 
economics created a new awareness in health authorities, which realised that acting on 
the supply-side through statutory pricing only was insufficient and probably 
counterproductive584. 
That is why new pharmaceutical policies are now looking at the demand-side, in 
order to stimulate price sensitivity in all relevant stakeholders. To this purpose, most of 
Member States enacted laws that aim at increasing substitution with cheaper products. 
Facilitating market penetration of parallel imported products contributes to this policy 
objective, especially during patent validity where price competition is lower585. Generic 
penetration serves the same purpose after patent expiry. 
In light of this, it is true that there is a tension between a particular set of prices 
that have been chosen by a country to strike a particular national trade off586 and the 

583 This was one of the concerns expressed at the Bangemann Roundtables. See Commission Communication 
Commission Communication on the Single Market in Pharmaceuticals COM(98) 588 final of November 25th, 
1998, p. 9. 
584 Total pharmaceutical expenditure is the sum of drugs dispensed, multiplied by their price. Consumption 
(i.e. prescribing) patterns are a determinant factor for pharmaceutical expenditures. For instance, 
demographic factors result in volume demand for healthcare and especially for pharmaceuticals increasing 
faster than population growth. Hence even if prices remained constant, expenditure would increase. In 
Sweden, real drug expenditures increased by 95 per cent between 1974 and 1993, due to a 22 per cent rise in 
the number of prescriptions – mainly due to newer, more expensive products – while relative prices 
decreased by 35 per cent (see JONSSON, Pricing and reimbursement of pharmaceuticals in Sweden, in 
Pharmacoeconomics, 1994, no. 6 (suppl. 1), p. 51–60). In France, numerous supply-side policies aimed at 
controlling drug prices have been used since 1975, achieving some of the lowest prices in Europe. However, 
with volumes unconstrained, pharmaceutical expenditures increased with the number of prescriptions (see 
LE PEN, Drug pricing and reimbursement in France, in Pharmacoeconomics, 1996, no. 10, suppl. 2, p. 26–36). In 
Spain, the relative price of drugs decreased by 39 per cent between 1980 and 1996, yet a 10 per cent increase 
in the number of items prescribed, mostly for new products (there was a 442 per cent increase in these) with 
little therapeutic gain, was associated with a 264 per cent increase in real drug expenditures over the same 
period (LOPEZ-BASTIDA, and MOSSIALOS, Pharmaceutical expenditure in Spain: cost and control, in International 
Journal of Health Services, 2000, no. 30(3), p. 597–616.). A similar picture emerges from Greece, where from 
1994 to 2000, despite a 17 per cent decrease in relative prices, the number of prescriptions increased by 16 
per cent while drug expenditures grew by 204 per cent (see KONTOZAMANIS, The Greek Pharmaceutical Market, 
Athens: Institute for Industrial and Economics Studies, 2001). These examples serve only to emphasize that 
while direct price controls may be effective in lowering drug price, pharmaceutical expenditures may 
nevertheless increase. 
585 It follows that price of medicines is only one of the control variables affecting total pharmaceutical cost. 
However, even if much depends on policies that influence volume and prescribing habits of physicians, 
price is still felt by authorities to be a key variable. This, according to KANAVOS, The Single Market for 
Pharmaceuticals in the European Union, cit., p. 527, induces them to implement policies, among which there 
are incentives to parallel trade, that aim at constraining prices. 
586 E.g. it is claimed that the PPRS in the UK is thought to have encouraged investments, not only by 
maintaining a stable and predictable regulatory environment, but also through higher prices that allowed 
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rules of the internal market. However, it’s national governments in the first place that, 
having realised the opportunity provided by cross border competition, have departed 
from the initial choice by allowing parallel imports to access their market. 
Health authorities, in fact, govern the marketing authorisation and the pricing 
and reimbursement system: in some countries, lacking any provision that establishes a 
final price and the related reimbursement level for imported products, parallel trade 
cannot have access to the market and it is unlikely to develop. 
For instance, Italy lacks an appropriate and updated legislation for parallel 
trade587. In particular, nowhere it is established how to price parallel imported products 
and at what level the reimbursement price should be set. Given that in Italy 
prescription-only products are subject to statutory pricing and that the final price is 
negotiated together with the reimbursement price, its absence represents an implicit 
denial of access to the market for imports. As a matter of practice, AIFA has been asking 
for a rebate on the original reimbursement price from 5% to 10%588, or a reimbursement 
price equal to the generic equivalent. However, this price proved to be too low and 
caused the exit of the parallel imported product from the market589. 
As a consequence, despite the release of eight marketing authorisations for the 
import of prescription-only products into Italy, no imported reimbursed product is 
marketed590. 
It follows that parallel trade operates at a significant level only as long as 
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levels of research and development expenditures above the worldwide average. See MOSSIALOS, An 
evaluation of the PPRS: is there a need for reform?, in GREEN, Should Pharmaceutical Prices be Regulated?, London: 
Institute of Economic Affairs, 1997. Similarly, see para. 4.64 of the OFT report on PPRS: “In the longer term, 
lower parallel imports means a higher proportion of NHS payments going to the company which originally developed 
the product, and this may be expected to benefit innovation”. 
587 In Italy the Decree of 29 August 1997 regulates parallel imports. The European Commission in 2002 
started an infringement procedure against Italy and released a reasoned opinion to the Italian Ministry of 
Health (2002/287/I) because the legislation was causing obstacles to cross border trade. The Commission 
asked the Italian government to review the Decree but to date no amendments were made to it. 
588 This method may be not compliant with EU law, because it may discriminate among domestic products 
and imports. For instance, the European Commission already released a reasoned opinion to the Swedish (n. 
2000/4158) and the Austrian (n. 2002/5316) Ministry of Health, which established a reimbursement price 
lower with respect to domestic products. The Commission considered those provisions against Articles 28 
and 30 EC. Both States amended their reimbursement legislation. 
589 This was the case, for instance, of Voltaren phials. The Italian importer had two marketing authorisations 
for the import of the product from France and from Spain (Det. AIFA n. 560 e 561 del 26/09/2005) but for 
both AIFA established that the reimbursement price was granted at the level of the correspondent generic. 
The importer could not market the product, because that price was not profitable. 
590 Imports, on the contrary, take place for OTC products, given that they are free priced. 
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Member States autonomously decide to encourage it through appropriate national 
legislation591. In this context, thus, governments are not entirely passive recipients of the 
Commission’s policy on parallel trade. 
I believe it is more accurate saying that importing countries rather apply an 
ambiguous attitude towards the pricing issue: they do not cut prices directly because 
they do not want to be accused to stifle innovation, but at the same time, given the 
financial constraints they are subject to, they choose to do it indirectly, for instance by 
allowing parallel imports. 
This ambivalent policy is certainly exercised in accordance to the division of 
competence in the field of health at a EU level that gives full responsibility for drug 
prices to Member States. However, it inevitably generates the ‘push-and-pull’ effect that 
delays the accomplishment of price harmonisation in the pharmaceutical industry. 
 
5. Anticompetitiveness by object or by effect? 
The considerations expressed in this Chapter shed some light on the issue, 
presented at the beginning, of whether an agreement that restricts parallel trade on 
pharmaceuticals runs contrary to Article 101 TFEU in its effect, and not in its object, in 
consideration of the heterogeneous regulation of prices for drugs. 
5.1. The modernised approach to Article 101 TFEU and the Glaxo case 
For a long time, the influence of the ordoliberal thought led the Commission to 
consider a restraint to commercial freedom as a restraint to competition. This enlarged 
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591 See KANAVOS, The Single Market for Pharmaceuticals in the European Union, cit., p. 527, who says that 
parallel trade increased at a significant level with the lowering of trade barriers, due to direct action of the 
Commission (Directive 70/50/EC of the 22 December 1969, where the Commission established important 
provisions aimed at eliminating all the national obstacles of legislative nature to cross border trade) and the 
work of the ECJ against discriminatory national regulation that favoured domestic products over imports. 
Until the end of the ‘90s health authorities or sickness funds were not really showing interest in parallel 
trade. Until then cross border trade was benefiting only the intermediaries involved. Afterwards, maybe 
encouraged by the ruling in Decker, started promoting parallel trade in order to benefit from lower prices 
and enacted specific laws that allowed them to translate such lower prices into savings for the health care 
system.  
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very much the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU592 and triggered the criticism of a large part 
of legal scholars593. 
Indeed, improvement in the economic understanding of the functioning of 
markets made clear that a restriction to commercial freedom is not necessary or 
sufficient to find a restriction to competition. Accordingly, EU Courts, starting from 
Société Technique Minière, rejected a formalistic application of the provision and called for 
a deeper market analysis based on the legal and economic context in which the 
agreement under scrutiny operates before a violation of Article 101(1) TFEU – either by 
object or by effect - is alleged. 
In line with the mentioned case law, the old formalistic policy has been 
abandoned, and a new approach has been later on embraced by the Commission. The 
latter in its Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty (now Article 101(3) 
TFEU) (hereinafter, the ‘Guidelines on Art. 81(3)’) indicated that the anticompetitiveness 
of an agreement arises only if damaging effects in terms of output, prices, innovation 
and the variety or quality of goods and services can be found (even only potentially) in 
the market594. 
So, for instance, the Commission starts its analysis of an agreement from the joint 
market shares of the parties, in order to check whether these exceed the thresholds set 
out in the Commission’s de minimis Notice595. But this is in itself insufficient for the 
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592 This also entailed a huge workload for the Commission under Article 101(3) TFEU, as ROUSSEVA, 
Modernizing By Eradicating: How the Commission’s New Approach to Article 81 EC Dispenses with the Need To 
Apply Article 82 EC to Vertical Restraints, in Common market law review, 2005, no. 42(3), p. 589. 
593 Ex multis see KORAH, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity: the need for a Rule of Reason in EEC Antitrust, in 
Northwestern J. of Intellectual Law and Business, 1981, p. 320; FORRESTER and NORALL, The laicization of 
Community Law: Self-Help and the Rule of Reason: How Competition Law is and could be applied, in CMLR, 1984, 
no. 21, p. 11; BRIGHT, Deregulation of EC Competition Policy: Rethinking article 85(1), in HAWK, 1994 Fordham 
Corp. L. Inst., 1995, p. 505-527; WAELBROEK, Antitrust Analysis under Article 85(1) and Article 85(3), in HAWK, 
1994 Fordham Corp. L. Inst., 1995, p. 693-793. These commentators claimed that Art. 101(1) TFEU should have 
been applied on the basis of the rule of reason parallel to the application of the Section I of the Sherman Act. 
The issue of whether there exists a rule of reason under European competition law will be discussed at 
length in Chapter V. 
594 See the Communication from the Commission — Notice — Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
of the Treaty, OJ C 101, 27.4.2004, p. 97–118, para. 16 and 24. 
595 See the Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance that do not appreciably restrict 
competition under Article 81(1) of the Treaty (OJ C 368, 22.12.2001 – hereinafter the ‘de minimis Notice’). The 
thresholds are set as following: the joint market share of parties should not exceed the 10% if they are 
competitors, and 15% if they are not competitors. 
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finding that an agreement is caught by Article 101(1) TFEU. The individual assessment 
of the likely effects produced by the agreement is, on the contrary, required596. 
By reference to this approach, the GC in the Glaxo case recalled that the 
‘restriction to competition’ considered in Article 101(1) TFEU refers to the concept of 
effective competition, i.e. the degree of competition necessary to achieve the goals of the 
Treaty597. The latter is necessarily determined by the legal and economic context that 
characterises the market where the agreement takes place. The analysis of such 
circumstances should drive, according to the Court, the examination of both the object and 
the effect of an agreement598. 
The particular features of the pharmaceutical market, according to the Court, 
would cast some doubts about the existence of a restriction to competition by object. 
More specifically, regulation on prices impeded to presume that parallel trade would 
bring real competition in the market. Hence, in the absence of any presumption of 
negative effects on competition, the agreement could not be caught under Article 101(1) 
TFEU without an analysis of the actual effects on the market. 
While this principle may seem to be an application of that strand of the case law 
that rightly requires the analysis of the legal and economic context before an 
infringement is alleged, de facto it is only paying lip service to this case law, and, instead, 
it is indirectly upsetting it. 
Various reasons support this statement. 
5.1.1. An effect-based approach? 
An effect-based approach in the application of competition law rules is surely to 
be welcomed. However, the application provided by the GC leaves any interpreter 
greatly puzzled. 
The Court acknowledged that the agreement was intended to limit parallel trade 
and partition the common market. However, this was not considered sufficient for an 
infringement of the provision to be alleged599. In fact, the Court affirmed that even when 
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596 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 24. 
597 See Metro I, para. 20-21. 
598 See para. 109-111 of the Glaxo ruling. 
599 See para. 119 of the Glaxo ruling, where the Court said that “… the application of Article 81(1) EC to the 
present case cannot depend solely on the fact that the agreement in question is intended to limit parallel trade in 
medicines or to partition the common market, which leads to the conclusion that it affects trade between Member 
States…” (emphasis added). 
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an agreement has an anticompetitive object, but it does not appear to have effects on 
consumers, it cannot fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. Rectius, no matter the 
fact that the agreement has an anticompetitive object, if there are indicia of absence of 
any anticompetitive effect, it should be ascertained that they concretely exist, in order to 
prohibit it600. 
Actually, this reasoning – quite illogically - leads to affirm that an agreement 
with an anticompetitive object that does not have anticompetitive effects (which may 
well be the case, as I will show infra) is not anticompetitive in its object anymore. 
Such convoluted principle seems to suggest that the absence of any 
anticompetitive effect of the market renders irrelevant the fact that the agreement has an 
anticompetitive object. But this equals to say that the provision under examination 
should be applied only when agreements have negative effects on consumers601. 
From a legal standpoint, however, this view cannot be supported. 
The rationale of Article 101 TFEU is, in fact, designed according to the paradigm 
of consumer welfare. Therefore, only agreements that are welfare reducing should be 
caught under the provision. This means that welfare-enhancing factors deriving from 
the characteristics of the market where the agreement takes place should be taken into 
account in the anticompetitive assessment602. Case law also confirms that there exists a 
restriction to competition within the meaning of Article 101(1) TFEU when, without the 
agreement, consumers enjoy a larger quantity of cheaper products603. On the contrary, 
there is no restriction when the market situation does not appear to be different when 
the agreement is implemented604. 
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600 See JUNOD, An End to Parallel Imports of Medicines, cit., p. 298, who rightly wonders how it is possible that 
an agreement that has an anticompetitive object does not have anticompetitive effects. 
601 See JUNOD, An End to Parallel Imports of Medicines?, cit., p. 297. 
602 Note that this interpretation of Art. 101 TFEU came from its reading in conjunction with Art. 3(1)(g) EC, 
which has been excised from the text further to the Lisbon Treaty. Cf. NAZZINI, Article 81 EC between Time 
Present and Time Past, cit., p. 504; GYSELEN, The Substantive Legality Test under Article 81-3 EC Treaty – Revised 
in Light of the Commission’s Modernization Initiative, in European Integration and International Coordination, 
Studies in Transnational Economic Law in Honour of Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, 2002, p. 181. The economic 
approach purported in the case law has then been definitely adopted in the new block exemption and in the 
Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para 13. 
603 For instance, in Consten and Grundig it was verified that the implementation of the agreement led to 
higher prices of 20%. See KORAH, EEC Competition Policy- legal form or economic efficiency, in Current Legal 
problems, 1986, no. 39, p. 85-109, at 93. 
604 See ODUDU, Demonstrating Restrictive Effect, in ELR, 2001, no. 26, p. 262. 
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However, this cannot substantiate the interpretation that, in the analysis of 
whether an agreement has as its object or effect the restriction of competition, account of 
the disadvantage for the final consumers should always be taken605. The notion of 
restriction of competition includes also cases where an agreement may only have the 
potential and tendency to produce an impact on competition, and not only those 
agreements that concretely harm consumers606. 
Accordingly, in its decision on the Glaxo appeal the ECJ recalled that Article 101 
TFEU aims to protect not only consumers, but also the structure of the market and 
competition as such, because the latter is thought to be by definition the best method to 
serve consumer welfare. 
An opposite interpretation would deprive the category of ‘restriction by object’ 
as one of the alternative criteria under Article 101(1) TFEU of part of its practical 
effectiveness and significance. 
For instance, if one accepts the view expressed by the GC in the Glaxo case, only 
restrictions to competition downstream are caught by the provision, while restrictions 
upstream would never fall within Article 101(1) TFEU. In fact, in the latter case it is more 
difficult to show a detrimental effect on consumers, especially if downstream 
competition is not effective. But without the proof of consumer harm, the agreement 
would not be prohibited. 
However, some restrictions that operate at an upstream market level are capable 
of adversely affecting the final consumer607. These are precisely restrictions of 
competition by object, which are considered as such because by their very nature they 
put at risk consumer welfare. Among horizontal agreements, price fixing, output 
limitation and market sharing agreements are generally considered by the EU Courts 
and the Commission to have this effect. As regards vertical agreements, the examined 
category includes, in particular, fixed and minimum resale price maintenance and 
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605 Cf. ECJ, 6 October 2009, in case C-501/06 P GlaxoSmithKline v. Commission (hereinafter, ‘Glaxo appeal’), 
para. 63. 
606 See the opinion of AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal, para. 104 and 108. 
607 See the opinion of AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal, para. 113-115, where she observes that “[…] as the 
distance from the market level at which the final consumer asks for the end product increases, the analysis of whether 
the restriction of competition at the upstream market level has an appreciable adverse effect on the final consumer 
would probably also be more difficult. Beyond a certain distance, such an analysis would probably be barely feasible 
without carrying out a market analysis. With a market analysis, however, the dividing line between restriction of 
competition by object and restriction of competition by effect would be crossed”. 
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contractual clauses providing absolute territorial protection, as well as restrictions on 
passive sales608. These agreements are immediately caught under Article 101(1) TFEU609. 
Agreements that are anticompetitive by object, in fact, constitute a sort of ‘pure 
conduct offence’610, i.e. the conduct is sanctioned as such and not only when it has a 
negative effect on the market. Such strict treatment is justified on experience showing 
that these clauses have a very high potential to produce negative effects on the market: 
they reduce output and raise prices, leading to a misallocation of resources and to a 
reduction in consumer welfare611. 
In other words, the category of restriction of competition by object embodies a 
presumption of effects612. That is why when agreements between undertakings are 
considered to be anticompetitive ‘by object’, it is unnecessary for the purposes of 
applying Article 101(1) TFEU to demonstrate any actual effects on the market. Once it 
has been established that an agreement has as its object the restriction of competition, 
there is no need to take account of its concrete effects613. 
Obstacles to parallel trade do enter this definition: the features of the legislation 
on pharmaceutical pricing at a national level, as well as market analysis support the 
presumption that cross border trade brings, not only in abstract, but concretely, benefits 
to consumers. And, as held by the ECJ in its decision on the Glaxo appeal, none of the 
characteristics of the pharmaceutical market is capable of casting doubt on this 
presumption. 
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608 Restrictions that are blacklisted in block exemptions or identified as hardcore restrictions in guidelines 
and notices are generally considered by the Commission to constitute restrictions by object. See the 
Guidelines on horizontal cooperation agreements, cited in note, paragraph 25, and Article 5 of Commission 
Regulation 2658/2000 on the application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of specialisation 
agreements (OJ L 304, 5.12.2000, p. 3). (29) See Article 4 Commission Regulation 2790/1999 on the 
application of Article 81(3) of the Treaty to categories of vertical agreements and concerted practices (OJ L 
336, 29.12.1999, p. 21) and the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, cited in note, paragraph 46 et seq. 
609 Extensively on the role that market integration plays within European competition law see WILS, Rule of 
Reason, cit., p. 62-66, who inter alia recalls that economic models that show the positive effects of vertical 
restraints do not take into account the objective of the Community. Similarly, GYSELEN, Vertical Restraints in 
the Distribution Process: Strength and Weakness of the free rider rationale under EEC Competition Law, in CMLR, 
1984, no. 21, p. 651 affirms that free rider issues do not bear market integration overtones. 
610 See European Night Services, para. 136. 
611 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 21. 
612 Cf. NAZZINI, Article 81 EC between Time Present and Time Past: a Normative Critique of ‘restriction of 
competition’ in EU Law, in CMLR, 2006, no. 43, p. 497. 
613 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 20. 
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A restriction to parallel trade thus is a restriction by object. And the way to the 
‘modernization’ of Article 101 TFEU according to an effect-based approach chosen by 
the General Court cannot be sustained, as it does not find any legal or economic ground. 
5.1.2. … Or an ad hoc exception for the pharmaceutical sector? 
By narrowing the scope of the principle set forth by the Court to the 
pharmaceutical sector only, a second interpretation of the Glaxo ruling may be 
envisaged. 
The Court first acknowledged that agreements restricting parallel trade normally 
run against Article 101(1) TFEU in their object614. But then it questioned the validity of 
this statement in the pharmaceutical sector: the underlying justification for the departure 
from traditional analysis of restrictions to parallel trade, as I recalled several times, is the 
presence of regulation on prices. 
It follows that the presumption of illegality of restrictions to parallel trade is 
valid in all sectors but the pharmaceutical market615. Differently stated, it may seem that 
the GC was attempting to tailor an ad hoc departure from the traditional application of 
competition rules only for the pharmaceutical sector616.  
Such exception, although in abstract it is a legitimate policy choice, nevertheless, 
appears founded on a misconception: the belief that regulation on prices drives out any 
competition mechanism. Such statement is not supported by the analysis conducted in 
this Chapter: as previously stressed, the presence of regulation is not sufficient to 
exclude in principle that parallel trade can put pressure on prices of original products. 
On the contrary, national pharmaceutical legislations that encourage paralle trade create 
the virtual conditions for this effect to take place. The existence of savings corroborates 
the finding. 
In this sense, the pharmaceutical market is not ‘special’ under competition rules: 
while the economics of the sector - very large sunk costs, a high degree of uncertainty 
characterising the discovery process, the lengthy of the administrative procedures, 
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614 See para. 115-116 of the Glaxo ruling, where the Court affirmed that “…agreements which ultimately seek to 
prohibit parallel trade must in principle be regarded as having as their object the prevention of competition. […] 
agreements that clearly intend to treat parallel trade unfavourably must in principle be regarded as having as their 
object the restriction of competition”. 
615 Similarly, see SOUTO SOUBRIER, The Concept of an Agreement and Beyond: How to Block Parallel Imports of 
Pharmaceuticals to Protect the Hearth of Competition, in BELLAMY and CHILD, European Community Law of 
Competition, 2008, p. 132. 
616 Similarly, JUNOD, An End to Parallel Imports on Medicines?, cit., p. 296, fn 20. 
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governmental intervention on prices, all together - may distinguish it from other 
markets, regulation as such does not appear sufficient to exclude that traditional market 
mechanisms take place and to justify an exception from competition rules617. 
In fact, there are many regulated sectors where products and services judged 
‘essential’ to consumers – like tobacco products, books, postal and banking services – are 
subject to price regulation and competition law. In such cases, the fact that prices are 
regulated in different ways and differ from State to State does not normally constitute a 
reason to claim a departure from the traditional judgement of anticompetitiveness, due 
to the specificity of the sector. Indeed, the existence of price regulation is not a sufficient 
reason to treat a regulated sector differently from others. 
Secondly, a standard of anticompetitiveness grounded on the presence of 
regulation of prices for pharmaceuticals and on the ‘specificity’ of the pharmaceutical 
sector easily proves to be unworkable and creates problems of consistency in the 
application of competition rules for the way it is crafted. 
For instance, given that it is based on the assumption that regulation of prices 
excludes competition, and since such regulation is not present everywhere, Article 
101(1) TFEU would then apply in a different way according to the Member State 
considered. 
To substantiate this objection it is enough to just depart from a two-countries 
setting and consider a broader context where trade flows in and out from Member 
States. For instance, while parallel trade into UK may appear to not have any beneficial 
effect on British patients because pharmacies are reimbursed on the basis of the prices 
negotiated in the PPRS scheme618, parallel trade from UK, say, into Denmark, where 
pharmaceuticals prices are free and reimbursement covers the level of the price of the 
cheapest equivalent (i.e. the imported product under patent validity), would be 
presumed to bring benefits to Danish patients619. 
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617 The GC seems to contradict itself at para. 105 where it affirmed that “[…] In accordance with the case-law 
[…], it is only where the sector in which the agreement is applied is subject to regulations which preclude the 
possibility of competition that might be prevented, distorted or restricted by that agreement that Article 81(1) EC is 
inapplicable.” 
618 Although recall that the claw back system indirectly allows the NHS in UK to translate the lower prices 
charged to pharmacists, also by parallel traders, into savings. 
619 However, as the GC itself acknowledged later on at para. 130, a deeper look into the mechanism of the 
system reveal that such economic benefits come indirectly in the form of discounts (the claw-back system), 
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In this case, the positive effects of parallel trade are more apparent and there 
should be no need of ascertaining their actual existence. Under these conditions, a dual 
pricing system would have again an anticompetitive object. 
However, it appears that such ‘elastic’ notion of ‘restriction by object’ cannot be 
supported under European law. Either a restriction is by object or it is by effect. In order 
to fall within the second category, it should be demonstrated that the presumption of 
negative effects is false and unsupported by empirical evidence. 
The analysis of regulation conducted so far, however, shows that, no matter the 
magnitude of savings (an aspect that plays a role at a subsequent stage of the analysis, 
under the balancing of anticompetitive effects with pro-competitive effects), these do 
exist. Their existence ultimately rests on the abstract possibility provided by the 
regulatory environment to have competition from parallel trade, notwithstanding 
governmental price controls. It has been shown in this Chapter that such conditions for 
competition to take place are present, and actually endeavour to encourage it. 
Having excluded the validity of this alternative interpretation of the Glaxo ruling, 
and in light of the considerations expressed in the preceding sub-section, it follows that 
the legal principles that guided the previous jurisprudence on parallel trade still apply 
and that restrictions to parallel trade of pharmaceuticals remain restrictions by object. 
The only way to reconcile this, to my opinion, inevitable conclusion with the 
effect-based rationale of the provision under discussion is to interpret the reasoning of 
the Court as an attempt to provide defendants with the possibility to escape the strict 
treatment reserved to hardcore restrictions, through the rebuttal of the presumption of 
the existence of a restriction to competition, where economic and legal circumstances 
allow it620. This is the interpretation that appears to be privileged, for several reasons 
that will be discussed at length in the last Chapter. 
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which are designed by taking into account the ability of wholesalers and pharmacies to buy part of their 
supply at cheaper price from parallel importers. 
620 See, for instance, GC, First Ch., 14 July 1994, in case T-77/92 Parker Pen Ltd v Commission of the European 
Communities, para. 39, where the Court held that even “ […] an agreement according absolute protection 
escapes the prohibition laid down in Article 85 of the Treaty where it affects the market only insignificantly, 
regard being had to the weak position of those concerned on the market for the product in question.” 
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6. Conclusions 
This Chapter analysed the effects of parallel trade in terms of lower drugs prices 
for consumers in the short term, starting from the legal assessment operated two recent 
cases before EU Courts. Both the Court of First Instance of the Glaxo case on dual 
pricing, and the AG Jacobs in the Syfait case, where parallel traders were subject to 
refusal to supply, affirmed that corporate conducts aimed at obstructing parallel trade 
were not to be considered necessarily anticompetitive. 
The main thesis underlining this new approach to limitations to parallel trade on 
pharmaceuticals, proceeds as follows: under price controls, parallel trade could not be 
presumed to bring about any effective pressure on prices of original products and 
consequently benefits for consumers. 
This Chapter showed that price regulation cannot be presumed to impede price 
competition in importing markets and that benefits from parallel trade do exist, as 
confirmed by the fact that health care systems in the importing countries generally take 
appropriate measures in order for public finances to benefit from the presence of 
cheaper products in the market. 
The investigation conducted tried to face the issue at stake by re-formulating it. It 
is believed, in fact, that the relevant question related to parallel trade on pharmaceuticals 
is not whether it entails savings for consumers but rather how large they are. Country-
specific regulation and market dynamics could, in fact, impede the full exploitation of 
the potentials that parallel trade displays and fail to entirely pass savings on to 
consumers, thereby allowing traders or other stakeholders along the distribution chain 
to pocket them. 
Negotiation procedures seem to be the most efficient pass-through mechanism 
that avoid the appropriation of benefits from parallel trade from third parties. When 
parallel trade takes place in equilibrium, the latter plays like a threat that increases the 
bargaining power of authorities and insurance funds vis-à-vis the companies in price 
negotiations for domestic products. It follows that, by helping regulators to convince 
manufacturers to charge lower prices, parallel trade can serve the purpose of achieving 
allocative efficiency goals. 
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However, empirical evidence about the magnitude of savings brought about by 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals appears to be rather inconclusive to date. As well as 
there are no clear-cut results about the effect that parallel trade brings in terms of price 
harmonisation. Some empirical evidence registered a price convergence during the 
period of 1986-2001. Yet, this evidence is not robust enough to make any conclusion on 
this point. 
It rather appears that, whilst on average prices are converging, specific products 
are priced at a very different level across countries. This does not necessarily mean that 
the theoretical rationale of the Commission’s policy towards parallel trade, price 
harmonisation, is flawed, because evidence does not underpin it. It rather appears that 
parallel trade is one of the many tools used by the Commission (and welcomed by those 
Member States that want to use them to achieve their policy objectives in the field of 
pharmaceuticals) to achieve ‘negative harmonisation’ in a market where ‘positive 
harmonisation’ is currently experiencing an impasse. These tools, which are represented 
by the rules of the internal market, compete with an opposing force, regulation. The 
latter often pulls in a direction contrary to harmonisation, thereby nullifying the 
harmonisation action eventually deriving from the enforcement of the rules on free 
movement of goods and on competition law. 
These considerations have important antitrust implications. In this respect, my 
focus was on issues related to Article 101 TFEU and in particular on whether agreements 
restricting parallel trade of pharmaceuticals are to be considered anticompetitive in their 
object or only in their effects, insofar they are present in the market. 
Although an approach to competition rules that bans or allows corporate 
practices depending on the effects of the latter on the market is certainly correct, the 
change of the anticompetitive assessment of agreements restrictive of parallel trade does 
not appear justifiable under the ‘specificity’ of a sector, i.e. on the presence of regulation 
on prices. 
The reference to the intervention of governments on drug prices as a basis for an 
exception in the anticompetitive analysis only for the pharmaceutical sector is flawed. In 
fact, the analysis conducted showed that despite regulation competition works and 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals brings savings to patients. 
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This means that the presumption of negative effects from restrictions to parallel 
trade can be upheld also for pharmaceuticals. An opposite interpretation would, in fact, 
lead to exclude restrictions in the upstream market, which do not have immediate effect 
on consumers, from the scope of Article 101 TFEU, and to reduce the category of 
‘restriction by object’ to empty words. 


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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
Parallel trade and pharmaceutical innovation: the emergence of the 
‘efficiency defence’ in European competition law621 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The second line of arguments used by pharmaceutical companies to justify their 
practices restrictive of parallel trade was based on efficiency grounds. 
They claimed that profits’ erosion caused by parallel trade may slowdown the 
innovation pace, by decreasing the future profitability of R&D projects and consequently 
undermining their incentive to innovate and bring new drugs in the market. In this 
sense, parallel trade may have an adverse effect on consumer welfare in the long term. 
The impediment to parallel trade was thus aimed at indirectly keeping alive the 
incentives to innovate, a key factor for pharmaceutical companies’ competitiveness, as 
well as a means to provide consumers with new and better drugs. For this reason, the 
defendants maintained, first of all, that actions taken to stop parallel trade had a positive 
effect on consumers in the long run. 
Secondly, the defendants argued that actions against parallel trade were 
proportioned. Given that this type of competitive pressure would benefit neither patients 
nor national health care systems, because the price differential is almost entirely 
pocketed by the intermediaries, the elimination of parallel trade caused little consumer 
harm in the short term, as opposed to the long run positive effect arising from the 
stimulation of innovative activity. 

621 This Chapter builds on my article Parallel Trade and Pharmaceutical R&D: the Pitfalls of the Rule of Reason, in 
European Competition Law Review, 2008, no. 29(11), p. 649-665. 
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Such allegations had important implications for the legal assessment performed 
before the EU Courts in both cases under examination. 
In the Syfait I case AG Jacobs supported the idea that a dominant pharmaceutical 
company does not necessarily abuse its dominant position by refusing to supply in full 
the orders placed with it by wholesalers, even when this has an anticompetitive effect, 
i.e. when parallel trade is eliminated. 
In his view, the refusal to supply could be regarded simply as a legitimate 
business behaviour finalized to the protection of commercial interests from the negative 
effects that parallel trade had on profits and on the incentive to invest in innovation. 
Thus the conduct was not to be considered abusive, because it stimulated dynamic 
efficiency. 
However, I shall recall that the Syfait I case was dismissed on procedural 
grounds by the ECJ, while the merit was dealt with only in the opinion of the AG Jacobs. 
Moreover, his approach has been challenged in Syfait II, which revisited the issues of 
Syfait I. In that case, both the AG Colomer and the ECJ contradicted AG Jacobs’ analysis 
and conclusions. 
The AG Colomer, also embracing a more economic approach to legal analysis, 
considered whether recouping financial resources through to the elimination of 
competition provided by parallel trade would have served the purpose of stimulating 
innovation to the benefit of consumers, and would therefore have constituted a valid 
‘objective justification’ for the refusal to supply. 
However, he concluded that there was insufficient evidence that the defendant’s 
conduct would have led to efficiency gains, given the absence of empirical support 
necessary to justify such conduct as against the negative effects caused on competition. 
The Grand Chamber of the ECJ, differently from what both AGs argued, wiped 
away the R&D issue entirely, but it acknowledged that parallel trade threatens 
companies’ commercial interests, insofar it potentially reduces their profits. For this 
reason, the Court left open the possibility for a pharmaceutical manufacturer to justify 
its refusal to supply where the orders are ‘out of the ordinary’, in relation to the requested 
volume of products and to the size of the exporting market and the existing commercial 
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relationships between the pharmaceutical manufacturer and the wholesaler 
concerned622. 
The efficiency defence did not find a concrete application in the Glaxo case either. 
There the defendant contended that dual pricing contributed to technical and 
economic progress, through the increase of the amount of resources to be spent in R&D, 
and to the efficiency of the productive and distributional system, by impeding the 
diversion of products from their traditional distribution channels. 
However, the European Commission did not consider this argument sufficiently 
proved to meet the first condition set forth by Article 101(3) TFEU to obtain the 
exemption for the agreement623. 
But the GC held that the Commission, in denying the exemption, did not 
adequately consider all the economic aspects of the case, especially with regards to the 
possibility that the extra-profits entailed by dual pricing could have translated into larger 
investments in R&D624. Therefore, the GC annulled its decision in that part and required 
a new evaluation from the Commission. 
In appeal, the ECJ held that the GC did not commit any error of law in affirming 
that the Commission’s decision was vitiated by a failure to carry out a proper 
examination. The ECJ also agreed that the Commission had considered the loss in 
efficiency associated with parallel trade, but it did not take account of all the relevant 
evidence produced by GSK regarding about the gain in efficiency procured by dual 
pricing625.  
Interestingly, the Court somewhat provided a modus procedendi for the 
Commission to analyse the request of exemption based on efficiency grounds626. 
However, the link between parallel trade and R&D has not been discussed in the merits. 
It follows that the issue of the impact of parallel trade on pharmaceutical 
innovation is still open627. 

622 See para. 67-70 of the Syfait II ruling. 
623 See the decision of the Commission in cases IV/36.957/F3 Glaxo Wellcome (notification), IV/36.997/F3 
Aseprofar and Fedifar (complaint), IV/37.121/F3 Spain Pharma (complaint), IV/37.138/F3 BAI (complaint), 
IV/37.380/F3 EAEPC (complaint), of the 8 May 2001, from para. 147 onwards. 
624 See para. 301-303 of the Glaxo ruling. 
625 See para. 131 of the ECJ decision in the Glaxo appeal. 
626 See para. 128-129 of the ECJ decision in the Glaxo appeal. 
627 See para. 70 of the Syfait II ruling, where the Court said: “… without it being necessary to examine the 
argument raised by GSK AEVE that it is necessary for pharmaceuticals companies to limit parallel exports in order to 
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The debate surrounding the discussion of this specific issue before EU Courts has 
been quite partisan and sensitive. On the one hand, the Commission, supported by 
parallel traders, has been firmly rejecting the claims of the industry as a pretext to put in 
place market partitioning behaviours. On the other hand, however, companies’ 
arguments are largely underpinned by the findings of part of the economic literature. 
This Chapter intends to contribute to this debate, by providing an answer to the 
questions left open by the jurisprudence. 
To this purpose, the main focus of the analysis will be on the existence of a link 
between parallel trade on pharmaceuticals and innovation. 
To date there exists a large amount of literature of reference, especially in the 
fields of HE and of IO, which investigated the determinants of innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Wiggins (1981), Grabowski and Vernon (1981) investigated that 
variables determining the R&D expenditures firms’ decisions; Myers (1992), Scherer 
(1993, 2001), and Giaccotto, Rexford, Santerre and Vernon (2005) examined the link 
between pricing, profitability and pharmaceutical R&D; Danzon (1997) and Vernon 
(2003, 2005) used those findings to examine the effect on R&D investment potentially 
created by the introduction of price controls in US. 
Still, the question of whether parallel trade can be included among the variables 
influencing the innovation activity of a pharmaceutical company has been explored to a 
more limited extent. To my knowledge, only Danzon (1998) discussed the effect of 
parallel trade on the level of investment in pharmaceutical innovation. The other studies 
available either provide information about the impact of pharmaceutical parallel trade 
on profits only, without any specific implication for innovation (Ganslandt and Maskus, 
2001; Ahmadi and Yang, 2000), or they look into innovation issues but do not focus on 
the pharmaceutical market (Valletti, Szymanski, 2004; Grossman and Lai, 2006; Li and 
Robles, 2007). 
Beside the unambiguous results provided by the economic literature about the 
link between parallel trade and innovation, also, the application of the above-mentioned 
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avoid the risk of a reduction in their investments in the research and development of medicines, it is sufficient to state 
that, in order to appraise whether the refusal by a pharmaceuticals company to supply wholesalers involved in parallel 
exports constitutes a reasonable and proportionate measure in relation to the threat that those exports represent to its 
legitimate commercial interests, it must be ascertained whether the orders of the wholesalers are out of the ordinary…” 
(emphasis added). The underlined incipit could be interpreted as if the Court is disregarding the R&D 
argument, but also as if the economic theory supporting GSK’s allegations is taken for granted and accepted. 
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findings to the field of antitrust is almost entirely lacking. Apart from Veljanovski (2007), 
who dismissed the link between parallel trade and innovation as empirically 
unsubstantiated, to my knowledge no comprehensive studies on how efficiency gains 
can enter the antitrust scrutiny of restrictions to parallel trade on pharmaceuticals have 
been undertaken so far. 
The debate in its general features is not new: already in the ‘70s the Chicago 
School (Bork, 1978; Posner, 2001) was supporting a more economic analysis into antitrust 
law, aimed at seeing corporate behaviours in their long-term pro-competitive aspects. 
Still, Chicagoans believed that the goal of antitrust should be understood as the 
improvement of both allocative and productive efficiency. In their view, innovation 
activities and technological progress should not be given any weight in antitrust 
analysis, because they involve resources that cannot be measured in terms of willingness 
to pay. 
This scepticism most probably determined the hostility, or conscious disregard, 
of US Courts and antitrust agencies towards efficiencies through the ‘60s and the ‘70s. 
Spurred by the advances of the Post-Chicago School, however, this attitude evolved into 
an explicit acknowledgement of their importance, albeit often accompanied by the 
inability to account for them (Leary, 2002). Its more prominent scholars (Hovenkamp, 
2002) regard efficiencies as part of the antitrust scrutiny. Thus, for instance, when 
dominant firms raise their rivals’ costs, inquiry on a possible business justification 
should be made, or in case of foreclosure, it should be ascertained whether the practice 
results in substantial efficiencies. 
From then on, US competition law scholars and Courts attempted to find ways of 
giving significance to efficiency gains deriving from anticompetitive corporate practices 
within the legal assessment.  
In Europe, where the Chicago School had much less influence, the developments 
of the Post-Chicago trend had very limited application. The latter mainly took place 
within Article 101 TFEU, while the enforcement of Article 102 TFEU remained partially 
alien to any kind of economic analysis. The process of modernisation of European 
competition law is now urging the Commission and the European Courts to abandon 
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this formalism and to convey economic analysis into the legal scrutiny of the abuse of 
dominant position. 
The new cases on parallel trade on pharmaceuticals constitute an attempt of 
evolution towards this direction. However, how and to what extent efficiency gains can 
guide the legal assessment is still far from being clear. This vagueness appears to be 
even more pronounced in the cases under discussion, because European Courts did not 
really give any clear guidance in this respect. 
For this reason, the examination of the existence of a link between parallel trade 
and pharmaceutical innovation will not be dealt with as such. Its unravelling is rather 
finalised to ascertain whether the findings of economic theory about this relationship 
can provide a basis for the development of a workable exemption/justification to 
restrictions of parallel trade under efficiency grounds. 
This Chapter is organised as follows. 
Section 1 analyses whether the structure of EU competition law provisions leaves 
scope for the consideration of efficiency gains in the antitrust assessment, how these 
have been concretely conveyed into legal analysis in the past cases and why such 
operation has not been successful so far. 
Section 2 reviews the old theoretical debate among economists – underlining the 
efficiency defence - about the best market structure, competition or monopoly, needed to 
spur innovation. This overview traces the advances in economics starting from the 
Schumpeterian theory of constructive destruction to the more recent developments in 
the IO literature and their application in the empirical literature in health economics, in 
order to provide the reader with a good grasp of the salient elements and conclusions, if 
any, of the academic discussion about this issue. 
Section 3 then focuses on the relationship between patents, profits and firms’ 
incentive to invest in innovation, by disentangling the main finding of the mentioned 
literature, that the higher is the expected return from the development and 
commercialization of a new drug, i.e. the higher are expected profits, the higher is the 
incentive for the company to engage in that project in the first place. The literature that 
investigates the link between parallel trade, profits and innovation is examined. 
Such analysis aims at ascertaining whether it is possible to rely on a presumption 
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of existence of positive effects in terms of increased innovation coming from restrictions 
to competition, and specifically to parallel trade. Stated differently, this Section looks at 
whether efficiency gains can be considered a redeeming virtue per se to anticompetitive 
corporate conducts, or whether it is necessary to demonstrate case-by-case the existence 
of overall positive effects from such practices. 
Section 4 examines how the consideration of efficiency gains practically enters 
the antitrust assessment. This question is relevant especially in relation to Article 102 
TFEU, whose modernisation is still at an early stage. The Section discusses four different 
options, in order to find the test for efficiencies that better suits the rationale of the 
provision and takes into account economic teaching at the same time. 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
1. The ‘efficiency defence’ in the European competition law 
The European Courts and the Commission agree on the fact that competition law 
cannot focus only on allocative efficiency goals. Put it differently, economic welfare 
cannot be restricted solely to price related issues, as consumers are concerned also with 
the level of quality, variety and safety of products628. It follows that also efficiency gains 
appear to be essential to improve consumers’ living standards629. 
1.1. The four-partite test under Article 101(3) TFEU  
In the Guidelines on Art. 81(3), the Commission expressly say that: “The aim of the 
Community competition rules is to protect competition on the market as a means of enhancing 
consumer welfare and of ensuring an efficient allocation of resources. Agreements that restrict 
competition may at the same time have pro-competitive effects by way of efficiency gains. 
Efficiencies may create additional value by lowering the cost of producing an output, improving 
the quality of the product or creating a new product.” 630 
The analysis of efficiency gains is, in fact, devolved upon this paragraph631, 
which explicitly offers the possibility that any agreement632 restrictive of competition is 

628 See LANDE, Proving the Obvious: the Antitrust Laws were Passed to Protect Consumers (Not Just to Increase 
Efficiency), in Hastings Law Journal, 1999, no. 50, p. 962. 
629 See AGHION and HOWITT, A Model of Growth through Creative Destruction, cit., at 349, where it is affirmed 
that progress involves the creation of a new product rather than an old product at a cheaper price. 
630 See Guidelines on Article 81(3) EC, para. 33. 
631 The next chapter traces the stages of the intense theoretical debate that animated legal scholars for long 
time about whether efficiencies should enter the antitrust analysis in the first paragraph of Art. 101 TFEU, 
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exempted from the application of Article 101(1) TFEU, provided that it brings about pro-
competitive effects and or efficiency gains. 
In particular, Article 101(3) TFEU establishes that in order for an anticompetitive 
agreement to be exempted, the latter should cumulatively: i) contribute to the 
improvement of the production or distribution system or to the promotion of technical 
and economic progress; ii) be such that also consumers equally benefit from a fair share 
of the economic advantages; iii) not impose to involved undertakings restrictions that 
are not indispensable to the achievement of this goal; iv) not allow the undertaking to 
completely eliminate competition in a substantial part of the market. 
The first two requirements are positive, whereas the second ones are negative. 
1.1.1. The two positive requirements 
According to the case law, the first requirement is satisfied when efficiency 
claims are substantiated, so that the following can be verified: their nature, the link 
between the agreement and the efficiency gains, their likelihood and magnitude and 
how and when they are going to be achieved. Unsubstantiated claims are rejected633. 
At this stage the analysis of the link between the agreement and the efficiencies is 
limited to examining whether the latter are likely to follow from the former, i.e. whether 
they result from the economic activity object of the agreement or whether they have a 
general efficiency-enhancing effect (suitability test)634. 
The existence of efficiencies must be appreciable in an objective way. This has a 
twofold implication: first of all, any subjective benefit is irrelevant. This means that gains 
should have a positive impact on the market and on competition, and not merely on the 
undertaking635. 
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according to a rule of reason, or in the third. The jurisprudence and the Commission opt for the second 
interpretation. See GC, 15 September 1998, in joined cases T-374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94, T-388/94 European 
Night Services v. Commission of the European Communities, para. 22-24, 107, 111, 113, 119, 132, and 
subsequently GC, III Ch., 18 September 2001, in case T-112/99Métropole Télévision (M6), Suez-Lyonnaise des 
eaux, France Télécom and Télévision française 1 SA (TF1) v Commission of the European Communities, para. 72-74. 
The following analysis in this Chapter is performed under this hypothesis. 
632 See Matra Hachette, para. 85: “[…] in principle, no anti-competitive practice can exist which, whatever the extent 
of its effects on a given market, cannot be exempted, provided that all the conditions laid down in Article 85(3) of the 
Treaty are satisfied and the practice in question has been properly notified to the Commission”. 
633 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 53-57. 
634 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 53. 
635 See Consten and Grundig, cit., para. 13, where the Court said: “… whether there is an improvement in the 
production or distribution of the goods in question … cannot be identified with all the advantages which the parties to 
the agreement obtain from it in their production or distribution activities”. 
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Secondly, the existence of such pro-competitive effects has to be proven 
convincingly636. This means that between them and the agreement there must be a causal 
link, whose evidence must be direct and effective637. In other words, to substantiate the 
claim of a positive effect on productive efficiency it is not sufficient to speculate about 
the existence of such efficiencies but it is necessary that the latter is supported by 
empirical and factual evidence638. It follows that claims must not only be plausible: they 
must be credible639. 
For this reason, the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC require that the party who claims 
the existence of efficiency gains should prove it640. Therefore, not only the defendant has 
to demonstrate that they derive directly from the economic activity object of the 
agreement, but he or she also has to calculate or estimate the probability and the amount 
of such gains in order to ascertain how and when such gains will be obtained641.  
The second condition required by Article 101(3) TFEU, i.e. the attribution of an 
adequate part of such gains to consumers, is strictly linked to the first one. In fact, if 
efficiencies positively impact the market, then also consumers must benefit from them. 
For instance, if the agreement consents the company to produce a better or a new 
product, consumers interested in buying it may benefit from it. 
The ECJ established that ‘the productive efficiency gains should present noticeable 
objective advantages such as to compensate for the inconveniences resulting there-from the level 
of competition.’642 That is, benefits deriving from the latter must be such that they 

636 See ECJ, 17 January 1984, in joint cases C-43/82 e C-63/82 VBVB and VBBB v Commission of the European 
Communities, para. 52; ECJ, V ch., 7 January 2004, in joint cases C-204/00, C-205/00, C-211/00, C-213/00, C-
217/00 and C-219/00 Aalborg Portland and Others v Commission of the European Communities, para. 78. 
637 See GC, II Ch., 27 February 1992, in case T-19/91 Société d'Hygiène Dermatologique de Vichy v Commission of 
the European Communities, para. 93. The Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 54 indicate that indirect effects 
are too indeterminate to be taken into account. However, FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition, 2007, 
p. 304, affirm that the use of the term ‘as a general rule’ in that paragraph implies that indirect effects can be 
taken into account, but that their evidence must be proven convincingly. 
638 See KLEIN, A Stepwise Approach to Antitrust Review of Horizontal Agreements, available at 
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/Jikaba.htm. Also, see the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, 
2000, OJ C291/1, para. 136; the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 51, 56-58; the Guidelines on the 
Applicability of Article 81 of the EC treaty to Horizontal Cooperation Agreements, 2001, OJ C 3/2, para. 32. 
639 In this regard, ODUDU, The Boundaries of EC Competition Law: the Scope of Article 81, 2006, p. 143, affirms 
that the credibility of a plausible productive efficiency claim is affected by how the market power is 
obtained. For instance, if the company intends to restrict competition the claim is not credible. 
640 See Remia, para. 45. See also art. 2 of Reg. (EC) 1/2003 of 16 December 2002, which establishes that the 
burden of proof in the context of Art. 101(3) TFEU is on the party that claims the exemption. 
641 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 56. 
642 See Consten and Grundig, para. 348 e 349; GC, ch. II enlarged composition, 8 June 1995, in case T-7/93 
Langnese Iglo GmbH v Commission of the European Communities, para. 180; ECJ, 29 October 1980, in case C-
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compensate the detriment caused to competition and to consumers. This second 
condition, therefore, provides for the so-called ‘bilan economique’. 
It should be noted that this balancing exercise does aim at weighing the 
consumer welfare against the producer welfare, i.e. it does not apply the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, where a policy option is considered efficient as long as total welfare increases. 
For instance, consider an agreement that entails significant production 
efficiencies but also higher prices and lower output. According to the Kaldor-Hicks 
criterion, the agreement should not be prohibited, if producers gain much more than 
consumers lose. In this case, in fact, society in its whole is better off. 
However, in mandating that agreements should never be detrimental for 
consumers, the balancing exercise rather follows the Pareto criterion643. Accordingly, an 
agreement that entails higher prices for consumers would not pass the test under Article 
101(3) TFEU, unless it is proved that consumers are compensated with improvements in 
quality644. 
1.1.2. The two negative requirements 
The third condition established by the third paragraph of Article 101 TFEU 
requires that the restrictions contained in the agreement must be reasonably necessary. 
That is, there must be a strong connection between the allocative efficiency loss and the 
productive efficiency gain and no alternative options that are less restrictive are 
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209/78, Van Landewyck SARL and Others v Commission of the European Communities, para. 139. See also the 
Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 43. On the difficulties of performing such balance see MANZINI, The 
European Rule of Reason – Crossing the Sea of Doubt, in European Competition Law Review, 2002, p. 392-399; VAN 
DEN BERGH and CAMESASCA, European Competition Law and Economics: a comparative perspective, 2006, p. 252. As 
ODUDU, The Boundaries of EC competition law, cit., p. 148-151, affirms, consumers face an increase price or 
cannot afford buying the product if Art. 81.3 EC is applied. In other words, they are asked to make a 
sacrifice: invest in future cost reductions and innovations by paying more for current consumption. 
Therefore, since it is consumers that invest in the creation of production inefficiency, they should benefit 
from it. 
643 VAN DEN BERGH and CAMESASCA, European Competition Law and Economics, cit., pp. 30 and 41 et seq., seems 
to suggests this hypothesis. 
644 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 86. The Guidelines, however, do not give any guidance about 
how this comparison should be performed: in fact, not only it is difficult to determine what is the loss for 
consumers from higher prices, but it is also difficult to compare such loss with the potential gains from 
improved quality. Also, considering that consumers may have different willingness to pay and different 
preferences for quality, such measurement becomes even more complicated. See NICOLAIDES, The Balancing 
Myth: The Economics of Article 81(1) & (3), in Legal issues of Economics Integration, 2005, no. 32(2), p. 138, 
affirms that this suggests that it will be difficult to apply the second conditions to agreements concerning 
new or improved products, which are to be sold at higher prices. RBB ECONOMICS, Art or Science? Assessing 
Efficiencies under the Commission’s Article 81(3) Notice, Brief 15, available at 
http://www.rbbecon.com/publications/downloads/rbb_brief15.pdf, affirm that measuring the extent to 
which an improved product enhances consumer welfare equals to compare ‘apples and pears’. 
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available (indispensability test)645. Once it has been ascertained that the agreement is 
necessary in order to produce the efficiencies, the indispensability test is applied to the 
individual restrictions contained in the agreement. A restriction is considered necessary 
if its elimination would impair the production of efficiencies through the agreement646. 
The indispensability condition necessarily entails that possible links between 
restrictions and profitability of parties are not accepted. 
Also, profitability as such cannot be relevant under European competition law. 
As it will be illustrated later, it acquires significance only as long as it translates into 
gains for consumers, in terms of new or better quality of products. 
The GC indicated in the Vichy case647 that the profitability of an investment made 
by a producer in connection with the launch of a product or a range of new products, 
depending on the specific circumstances of the case in question, might be one of the pro-
competitive effects that could be taken into account in the balancing exercise. However, 
profits made by undertakings belong in principle to shareholders. Therefore, in order to 
acquire relevance under competition law, they have to be passed on to consumers, for 
instance in the form of investments in R&D, quality improvements, service amelioration, 
etc. In other words, the increase in profitability brought about by an agreement ought to 
be taken into account only where it serves the purpose of fostering an investment, which 
gives rise to benefits to consumers. It follows that, as it will be made clear in the 
following Sections, profitability is relevant only to the extent it contributes to the 
materialisation of the efficiency gains. 
Finally, the fourth condition contained by the analysed provision requires that 
the agreement does not entirely eliminate competition in the market. At this regard, the 
criteria used by the European Courts and the Commission does not refer only to market 
share of companies operating in the market, but also to the ability and the incentive of 
competitors to actually compete with the defendant648. 

645 See GC, 28 February 2002, in case T-86/95, Compagnie Generale Maritime v. Commission. For this reason, 
PAPPALARDO, Il diritto comunitario della concorrenza, cit., p. 129-130 observes that the burden of proof for the 
companies is quite relevant, given that the indispensability is based on prediction, which therefore require 
discretion. 
646 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 79. 
647 See Vichy, para 94. 
648 For instance, if competitors have capacity constraints or have high production costs, their competitive 
response is limited. See PAPPALARDO, Il diritto comunitario, cit., p. 132. 
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From the above analysis it clearly appears that the wording of Article 101(3) 
TFEU allows for the consideration of efficiency gains. However, the underlining 
conditions for their admission are very strict. 
In particular, an overview of the Commission practice and of the case law 
illustrates that hardcore restrictions, like price fixing and import or export bans, very 
seldom pass this test, especially with regards to the indispensability criterion649. 
1.2. The objective justification to abusive conducts by dominant companies 
The way efficiency gains enter the antitrust scrutiny of dominant companies’ 
conducts under Article 102 TFEU is much less clear. 
First of all, what can constitute ‘objective justification’ is not entirely plain. The 
Treaty does not provide any list of defences that can be considered objective 
justifications. Therefore, the concept was filled in with practical significance by European 
Courts. 
This interpretative work never led to identify an exhaustive list of objective 
justifications. The Commission, however, has been recently suggesting the creation of 
such list. Unfortunately, not always in a consistent manner. 
The new Guidance on its enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 EC to abusive 
exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings (hereinafter, ‘Guidance on Art. 82 EC’) affirm 
that an abusive conduct can be justified in two cases: when the conduct is objectively 
necessary, i.e. on the basis of factors external to the company, or when it produces 
substantial efficiencies650. 
However, previously the DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of 
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses (hereinafter, the ‘Discussion Paper on Art. 82 
EC’) had indicated that there are three types of objective justification: the objective 
necessity defence, the meeting competition defence and efficiency gains that outweigh 
the anticompetitive effect651. 
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649 The rationale is that such restrictions may facilitate collusion and reduction of interbrand competition. See 
the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 45-46, 79. VAN DEN BERGH and CAMESASCA, European Competition Law 
and Economics, cit., p. 45, observe that the policy with respect of hardcore restrictions is determined by the 
single market imperative that expands the scope of antitrust provisions in EU. 
650 See the Communication from the Commission on the Guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities in 
applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant undertakings, 9.2.2009, C(2009) 
864 final (hereinafter the ‘Guidance on Art. 82 EC’), at para. 28 et seq. 
651 See the DG Competition Discussion Paper on the application of Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses, 
December 2005, p. 24 et seq.. Cf. LOEWENTHAL, The defence of ‘Objective Justification’ in the Application of Article 
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From the analysis of the EU case law, instead, it appears that the legal doctrine of 
‘objective justification’ refers to three different conceptual categories652: (1) legitimate 
business behaviour, which encompasses the concepts of both ‘competition on the 
merits’653 and ‘defence of commercial interests’654, (2) objective factors out of the control 
of the dominant company655, and (3) efficiency gains656. 
The first case where reference was made to the concept of objective justification 
was Sirena, where the Court affirmed that the fact that the excessive price charged for a 
product was not justified by any objective criteria was a determining factor in the finding 
of abuse657. 
A landmark case that established the first of the three mentioned objective 
justifications was United Brands. In that occasion the ECJ acknowledged that a dominant 
company was entitled to take reasonable steps to protect its commercial interests and 
that this could operate as a ground for justification of its conduct. However, the Court 
added two qualifications: (i) the protection of the commercial interest should be the 
genuine reason behind the behaviour and (ii) any action taken to this purpose should be 
proportionate to the threat to which the company is subject658. 
Few months later, the ECJ had the occasion of discussing the notion of objective 
justification based on causes external to the dominant company. In BP, the Court 
affirmed that a general shortage of petroleum products caused by an economic shock 
justified a practice that at first sight looked discriminatory, i.e. the reduction of supplies 
to occasional customers only659. 
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82 EC, in World Competition, 2005, no. 28(4), p. 464, who refers that the Director General of DG Competition 
at the 30th Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law and Policy at the Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute affirmed that the three objective justifications are the legitimate business behaviour, the objective 
necessity and the efficiency gains that outweigh the anticompetitive effect. 
652 The first two prevailed in the case law, while the third one has been emerging only recently.  
653 See Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 90. 
654 See United Brands, para. 189. 
655 See ECJ, 29 June 1978, in case C-77/77, Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV and others v 
Commission of the European Communities (hereinafter, ‘BP’), where the Court affirmed that the petrol shock 
was considered a force majeure that justified the refusal to supply. 
656 See Irish Sugar, para. 189, where the Court held that in order for the protection of a dominant company’s 
interests to be an objective justification to the abuse, it should be based ‘on criteria of economic efficiency that 
were consistent with the interest of consumers’. 
657 See Sirena, para. 16-17. 
658 See United Brands, para. 189-190. 
659 See BP, para. 33. Note that the Court neither the AG used explicitly used the concept of objective 
justification. The AG, in particular, alluded to it and pointed out that the Commission should have better 
clarified it in its decision. 
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However, this appears to be the only occasion where the Court accepted an 
external cause to justify a dominant company’s abusive behaviour. In Hilti, for instance, 
the ECJ refused the arguments put forward by the defendant, who opposed that safety 
considerations were justifying the practices of tying and price discrimination applied to 
the cartridge strips and nails for which production and commercialisation the company 
was dominant660. The Court, in fact, believed that the defendant’s action were not guided 
by a genuine concern about safety, but were rooted in the willingness to impede the 
entry of competitors in the market for cartridges661. 
The first judgment where efficiency gains were considered a possible objective 
justification to abusive conducts was in Irish Sugar. The company was charged with the 
allegation of applying discriminatory rebates to impede imports of sugar from Northern 
Ireland to Southern Ireland. The Court of First Instance considered that the company was 
entitled to protect its commercial interests on the basis of criteria of economic efficiency 
consistent with the interest of consumers662. However, the Court saw in the policy of 
rebates applied by the company an illegitimate cross-subsidization and therefore did not 
consider the indicated efficiency criterion satisfied. 
EU case-law on refusal to supply by dominant companies suggests that an 
‘objective justification’ can immunize the conduct from the application of Article 102 
TFEU provided that it complies with three requirements in order to be admitted: the 
conduct has to pursue a legitimate aim, be reasonable – i.e. suitable to the proposed goal 
–, and proportionate to the threat posed by its competitors663. 
These filters have probably been applied too strictly by the jurisprudence and 
determined the little role that economics has played in the assessment of abusive 
conducts from dominant companies. 
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660 Similarly in Tetrapack I, para. 83, neither the Commission nor the Courts accepted public interest concerns 
as an objective justification, as they believed that is not for an undertaking to autonomously take steps to 
protect public safety or public health, as these are taken care of by the national legislation of Member States. 
661 See GC, II Ch., 12 December 1991, in case T-30/89 Hilti AG v Commission of the European Communities, 
para. 117. 
662 See Irish Sugar, para. 189. 
663 See United Brands, para. 189-190, where the ECJ affirmed that the application of the proportionality 
principle to Article 102 TFEU presupposes that the conduct of the dominant company is suitable and 
necessary and not excessive means to the protection of its commercial interests. See the opinion of AG 
Kirschner in Tetra Pak I at para. 67, where he stated that the examples of abusive conduct mentioned in 
paragraphs (a) to (d) of Art. 102 TFEU have a common feature: they refer to a conduct that pursues a 
legitimate end of making profits through disproportionate means. 
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Economic considerations, in fact, have been taken into account in few cases 
involving the application of Article 102 TFEU. However, although their role in the 
antitrust scrutiny has been explicitly recognised by the EU jurisprudence, economic 
considerations have practically never worked out as an objective justification to 
anticompetitive restrictions. European Courts, in fact, have been either reluctant to take 
them into account or have tended to narrow down the relevance of economic 
arguments664. 
Recently, however, the claim for a much greater use of economic theory in 
antitrust analysis can potentially enlarge the scope of the application of the concept of 
‘objective justification’ based on dynamic efficiency gains arising from anticompetitive 
conduct665. 
The Microsoft case, where the Commission applied what in the literature has been 
defined as an ‘incentive balance test’666, represents the first attempt to include efficiency 
considerations in the antitrust analysis. 
The Commission found Microsoft to have abused its dominant position by 
refusing to supply to competitors information regarding the interoperability between 
Windows pc and non-Microsoft work group servers, thereby leveraging its dominant 
position in the market for pc operating systems onto the market for work group servers. 
Microsoft claimed that its refusal was objectively justified by the need to protect its IPRs 
and preserve its incentive to innovate. Microsoft’s efficiency arguments were not rejected 
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664 See GC, 28 February 2002, in joined cases T-191/98, T-212/98 and T-214/98, Atlantic Container Line, where 
the Court at para. 1112 said explicitly that ‘… because Article [82] of the Treaty does not provide for any 
exemption, abusive practices are prohibited regardless of the advantages which may accrue to the perpetrator of such 
practices or third parties’. Inter alia, see ECJ, 16 December 1975, in joined cases C-40 to 48, 50, 54 to 56, 111, 113 
and 114-73, Coöperatieve Vereniging "Suiker Unie" UA and others v Commission of the European Communities, 
where Courts always identified efficiency gains solely with cost saving effects. The result of such a 
restrictive attitude was that not in a single instance the Courts applied this defence to a dominant 
undertaking accused to have infringed Article 102 TFEU by the Commission. On the contrary, see US case 
law, where ‘competition on the merits’ is understood as efficiency-enhancing conducts irrespective of the 
fact that aim at excluding a rival. See Aspen Skiing, cit., where the Supreme Court held that a conduct is 
predatory and does not constitute competition in the merits if it excludes or attempts to exclude a rival on a 
basis other than efficiency. 
665 See AG Jacobs’ opinion in the case C-7/97 Bronner GmbH and Co. KG v. Mediaprint Zeitungs und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG Oscar Br. Among proponents of the efficiency defence as an objective 
justification see SHER, The Last of the Steam-Powered Trains: Modernizing Article 82, in ECLR, 2004, no. 5, p. 243; 
TEMPLE LANG, Anticompetitive Abuses under Article 82 Involving Intellectual Property Rights, in EHLERMANN and 
ATANASIU, The European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, p. 589 et seq., 
and GYSELEN, Rebates: Competition on the Merits, cit., p. 287 et seq. 
666 See VEZZOSO, The Incentive Balance Test in the EU Microsoft Case: a Pro-Innovation ‘Economic-Based’ 
Approach?, in ECLR, 2006, no. 27, p. 382. 
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but questioned in the merits: the Commission, and subsequently the Court, balanced the 
negative effects that an obligation to supply would have on Microsoft’s incentive to 
innovate against the general positive effect on innovation that it would have on the 
market as a whole. The latter was found to benefit more than Microsoft would lose from 
the duty to deal. For this reason, the company was held liable and fined667. 
However, the GC rejected the argument that the Commission had used such a test 
in the application of the ‘legitimate commercial interest’ criterion. According to the GC, 
the Commission rightly dismissed Microsoft’s arguments not applying a balancing test 
but simply because the latter did not sufficiently prove that if it ‘were required to 
disclose the interoperability information that would have a significant impact on its 
incentives to innovate’668. 
It is apparent that at present, except for the Guidance on Art. 82 EC669, there is no 
clear indication about the role that efficiencies have within the antitrust assessment of 
abusive conducts from dominant companies. 
The analysis of the Syfait saga, and of the arguments put forward by AG Jacobs 
about the relationship of parallel trade and pharmaceutical innovation, thus, provide an 
additional intellectual stimulus to put forward policy proposals about the crafting of an 
objective justification based on efficiencies to abusive conducts from a dominant 
company. 
 
2. Innovation in the pharmaceutical market 
2.1 The economics of innovation 
Economic efficiency is a heterogeneous concept, which can be divided into 
allocative efficiency, productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency670. It is largely agreed 
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667 See Commission decision in the case COMP/C-337.792 Microsoft, of 24 March 2004, as confirmed by the 
GC, 11 November, 2007, in case T-201/94, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission of the European Communities 
(hereinafter the ‘Microsoft ruling’). 
668 See para. 697-711 of the Microsoft ruling. 
669 Cf. Section 4 of this Chapter, where the Commission’s proposal to account efficiencies is discussed. 
670 Productive efficiency is the relationship between the output of a good and the input of resources used to 
make them. In this process, technology and technical efficiency play a great role: technology represents the 
method with which inputs are transformed in outputs; whereas, technical efficiency describes the 
maximization of outputs given a certain amount of inputs, using a given technology. The adoption of the 
frontier technology among the existing ones, especially if it allows the firm to be more efficient in 
production, is included in the concept of productive efficiency. The adoption of an entirely new technology, 
instead, represents an innovation and thus refers to the concept of dynamic efficiency. 
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both in the economic and the legal literature that all of them should be encouraged in 
order to improve consumer welfare. However, economists share the view that the 
dynamic efficiency, i.e. innovation, has a particularly important role in improving social 
welfare671. That is why policy makers should ensure that firms are given the right 
incentives to invest in R&D. 
In this task, competition policy plays an important role. For instance, competition 
influences innovation, insofar it preserves R&D lines that compete among each other, or 
as long as it provides the incentive to market actors to engage in efficient innovation. 
Nevertheless, regulating dynamically competition industries from an antitrust 
standpoint is difficult, because market analysis necessarily looks at long-term aspects. 
Such difficulty is aggravated by the fact that economic theory did not develop a 
formal model that captures the benefits of innovation on social welfare, as it has been 
done for the paradigm of perfect competition. The main reason behind this theoretical 
gap is that any measurement of innovation necessarily requires the evaluation and the 
comparison of actual and hypothetical situations. 
Still, economic theory has been constantly confronting itself with this issue. 
There are two main strands of the economic literature dealing with the question 
of what are the sources of economics development. 
The first one is represented by the growth theory. The traditional growth theory, 
mostly dealing with the rate of technological change and estimating its value for society, 
claims that capital accumulation is the main driver of such change672. 
However, such statement has been criticised by the endogenous growth theory, 
by showing that an increase in capital accumulation cannot by itself generate persistent 
increases in the standards of living. It is rather the institutional environment that 
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671 Solow’s model of economic growth, also known as the ‘Solow-Swan neo-classical growth model’, allows the 
determinants of economic growth to be separated out into increases in inputs (labour and capital) and 
technical progress. Using his model, Solow calculated that about four-fifths of the growth in US output per 
worker was attributable to technical progress. Such finding drew economists’ attention to dynamic 
efficiency issues. See SOLOW, Technical Change and the Aggregate Production Function, in Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 1957, no. 39, p. 312-320. See also KENDRICK, Understanding Productivity, 1977. 
672 The growth theory was built on decreasing return to capital, perfect competition, perfect knowledge and 
exogenous technology. As savings generated by capital are saved, capital will raise, marginal product of 
capital will decrease, investments are made, until a point where economy cannot grow anymore simply by 
accumulating capital. At this point a technological change occurs and the marginal productivity of capital 
increases, spurring savings and investments, which raise the volume of capital. The marginal productivity of 
capital falls until a new technological change occurs. 
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supports technological change673. In these models, technological progress is no longer 
taken to be at a fixed rate but it is endogenously influenced, as a result of investments. 
Capital incorporates not only physical and human capital but also the accumulation of 
knowledge, assumed to be the basis of technological progress. The possibility of 
excluding for some time third parties from accessing information allows the firm behind 
the discovery to make monopoly profits through the commercialisation at a price higher 
than zero. New technology is developed in view of the prospect of such profit and it is 
its quest that makes long-term growth feasible. 
However, growth theory only provides some indications about the sources of 
economic growth: endogenous technological change, partly privately owned technology, 
imperfect market structures, etc. However, the theory does not give any insight about 
the mechanisms that generate innovation out of these inputs. 
It was the second strand of the literature mentioned that on a microeconomic 
level investigated at length the effect of market characteristics, competition mechanisms, 
and the impact of institutions, on innovation. In particular, it found that, among others 
determinants of the intensity and direction of R&D investment, market structure is 
fundamental in determining the degree of appropriability of returns on innovation for 
firms. 
2.2 Market structure as a determinant of innovation 
The traditional economic paradigm that guides antitrust enforcement is the 
neoclassical model of perfect competition. It describes a Pareto-optimal equilibrium674 
where resources are perfectly allocated through trade and where price equals marginal 
cost, so that no dead weight loss occurs (allocative efficiency), and firms operate at the 
lowest cost possible without making losses (productive efficiency). It is well known that 
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673 ROMER, Beyond Classical and Keynesian Macroeconomic Policy, in Policy Options, 1994, available at www. 
Stanford.edu/~promer/policyop.htm. 
674 The term is named after Vilfredo Pareto, an Italian economist who used the concept in his studies of 
economic efficiency and income distribution. Pareto efficient situations are those in which any change to make 
any person better off would not make anyone else worse off. Given a set of alternative allocations of goods 
or income for a set of individuals, a change from one allocation to another that can make at least one 
individual better off without making any other individual worse off is called a Pareto improvement. An 
allocation is defined as Pareto efficient or Pareto optimal when no further Pareto improvements can be made. 
Under certain idealized conditions, which will be listed in the text, Kenneth Arrow and Gerard Debreu (See 
ARROW and DEBREU, Existence of a Competitive Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy, in Econometrica, 1954, no. 
22(3), pp. 265–90) mathematically showed that a system of free markets leads to a Pareto efficient outcome 
(so called first welfare theorem). 
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this equilibrium takes place only under certain strict conditions: in order to have 
perfectly competitive markets there should be many sellers and many buyers; the former 
should be able to decide the price of the products they sell but not to influence the 
market price; low barriers to entry/exit should characterise the market; products should 
be homogeneous; consumers should have perfect information about products and 
prices; transaction costs should be low; and no externalities should exist. 
It is generally acknowledged that many of the above-listed conditions are rarely 
fulfilled or feasible in real markets. Therefore, perfect competition does not represent 
itself a policy objective to be achieved by competition law but rather a benchmark, a 
paradigm that serves the purpose of providing regulators with a term of comparison 
when analysing real markets675. 
All firms have, in fact, some degree of market power, i.e. they may have 
influence on the market price, erect barriers to entry, differentiate their products from 
others, etc.676. For this reason, antitrust authorities rather pursue a second-best objective 
where competition is not perfect but workable, i.e. a market situation where a certain 
degree of monopolistic power exists but there is sufficient competition between near-
monopolies to protect the buyers from abuse677. 
Still, the findings of the neoclassical model underpin much of modern antitrust 
enforcement and any deviation from that paradigm is generally subject to scrutiny, in 
order to ascertain whether the distortions to productive or allocative efficiency are 
severe. 
So for instance, regarded in absolute terms, the distortion caused by patents 
poses antitrust concerns, insofar it represents a departure from the paradigm of perfect 
competition. 
2.2.1 Market power as a driver of innovation 
However, in markets characterised by technological change, supra competitive 
prices do not necessarily signal a malfunctioning of the market. On the contrary, they 
may provide financial resources to develop new and better products to invest in new 
technologies that may lower future production costs. Also, the market power provided 
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675 See VISCUSI, VERNON, HARRINGTON, Economics of Regulation and Antitrust, 1995, p. 73; GELHORN and 
KOVACIC, Antitrust Law and Economics, 1994, p. 52 et seq. 
676 See MOTTA, Competition Policy, cit., p. 41. 
677 CLARK, Towards a Concept of Workable Competition, in American Economic Review, 1940, no. 30, pp. 241–256. 
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by patents, which allows supracompetitive prices and profits, is the result of successful 
product development, rather than the indication of a market failure. 
Therefore, what would merely look as above-margin pricing in the model of 
perfect competition is a means to reward inventive activity and to keep the pace of 
technological change going in innovation markets. It follows that the model of perfect 
competition cannot in this case provide a useful yardstick for the regulator678. In fact, in 
presence of large sunk costs, pricing at marginal cost is a short way to bankruptcy. 
That is why regulators should not be concerned about market power in 
innovation markets. There, competition primarily occurs for the market rather than in 
the market679: the most successful innovator will gain the whole market; but it will 
dominate it only for some time. In fact, incumbents are continuously replaced by other 
successful entrepreneurs that introduce new and better products in the market. 
This virtuous rent-seeking model traces its roots back to Schumpeter680, who 
explored the relationship between the market structure and R&D investment681. 
According to the Schumpeterian theory of creative destruction, the process of 
transformation that accompanies radical innovation is necessarily linked to the existence 
of temporary market power. In Schumpeter’s cyclical vision of capitalism, innovative 
entry by entrepreneurs was the force that sustained long-term economic growth through 
the ‘destruction’ of existing companies, yet ultimately succumbing to the pressure of 
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678 The idea that the model of perfect competition is of limited applicability in innovation-based markets is 
captured as following by DASGUPTA and STIGLITZ, Uncertainty, Industrial Structure and Speed of R&D, in Bell 
Journal of Economics, 1980, no. 11(1), p. 27: “competition in R&D necessitate imperfect competition in product 
markets”. 
679 Competition for markets may to different degrees found in computer software, communication network, 
mobile phones, biotechnology and pharmaceuticals. See EVANS and SCHMALENSEE, Some Economic Aspects of 
Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries, NBER Working paper no. 8268, 2001, p. 2. 
680 See SCHUMPETER, The Theory of Economic Development: an Inquiry into Profits, Capital Credit, Interest and the 
Business Cycle, 1934; ID., Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, cit., pp. 84-92, at 99-106. 
681 Note also the investigation started in the same years by the ‘Harvard School’, which developed the first 
framework of economic theory with an impact on antitrust policy. See BAIN, Barriers to New Competition, 
1956, who introduced the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SPC) paradigm. Also in that theory market 
structure was the fundamental variable determining the conduct of market participants, such as price, R&D 
and advertising. The SPC paradigm was criticised and overturned by the Chicago School, which, 
reappraising the price theory, formulated a more dynamic model based on the rational behaviour of firms. 
Under this framework, it is firms’ conduct that shapes the market structure and not vice versa. See BORK, The 
Antitrust Paradox, 1978. The Chicago School approach has been revisited by the Post-Chicago thought, which 
supported the idea that firms do not merely respond to external conditions, but they also strategically act in 
order to shape their environment to modify market structures and competitors’ conducts. It follows that 
market structure and conduct influence each other in a bidirectional sense. See WILLIAMSON, Antitrust Policy, 
in The New Palgrave – A direction of Economics, 1987. 
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new inventions commercialised by competing entrants. 
At the centre of this virtuous circle there is the monopolist. According to 
Schumpeter the latter is the engine of technological development, because it has superior 
incentives to achieve innovation. This occurs for two reasons: first of all, from an ex post 
perspective, competition dissipates resources, while monopoly secures financial 
resources for long-run investment planning. Also, economies of scale, i.e. size, enhance 
the opportunity to have enough resources to fund large R&D projects. Finally, a strong 
pre-existing market position endows the company with less fear of rivals that may copy 
its new ideas682. From an ex ante standpoint, a monopolistic structure of the market 
grants inventors the appropriability of the returns from the investment in R&D, 
providing the incentive to engage in innovation in the first place683. So the engine of the 
inventive activity is the prospect of being a monopolist in the market. 
The theoretical IO literature684 and the endogenous growth literature strand685 
have been supporting the Schumpeterian view. All models predicted that more intense 
product market competition reduces the rents of those firms that successfully enter the 
market (i.e. innovate), and therefore it discourages firms to enter the market in the first 
place686. 
Also, empirical studies confirm that historically important innovations were 
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682 For the scope of the present work I will leave the two last mentioned aspects aside, as they are not central 
to the analysis of the efficiency defence. For references about the literature that dealt with the issue of size, 
see the empirical evidence that questions that fact that large firms may be more efficient innovators, and 
support the hypothesis that both small and large firms contribute for a large share of innovation, although to 
different extents. Empirical evidence confirms that incumbents prefer other forms of innovation to those 
chosen by entrants, aspiring to preserve their position rather than fundamentally change the market. 
Breakthrough technology may be more attractive for small challengers than for big incumbents. Still the 
latter play an important role in the innovation process: after the development of a successful idea, big 
companies transform it in marketable products through improvements. Such incremental innovation is still 
very important for society. See AHN, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: a Review of Theory and 
Evidence, OECD Economic Department Working Papers, no. 37, 2002, p. 10. 
683 Among the other scholars of the Austrian School, see VON MISES, Human Action, 1949, who emphasized 
the role of entrepreneurial profit-seeking speculation. 
684 See SALOP, The Noisy Monopolist: Imperfect Information, Price Dispersion, and Price Discrimination, in The 
Review of Economic Studies, 1977, no. 44, p. 39-406; DIXIT and STIGLITZ, Monopolistic Competition and Optimal 
Product diversity, in American Economic Review, 1977, no. 67, p. 297-308; DASGUPTA and STIGLITZ, Industrial 
Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, in Economic Journal, 1980, no. 90, p. 266-293. 
685 See, inter alia, GROSSMAN and HELPMAN, Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, 1991; ROMER, 
Endogenous Technological Change, in The Journal of Political Economy, 1990, no. 98(5), Part 2. 
686 As DASGUPTA and STIGLITZ, Industrial Structure and the Nature of Innovative Activity, cit., p. 300, put it, “ex 
post competition drives out ex ante competition”. 
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spurred by the opportunity of profits687. 
The policy conclusions to be logically drawn from these findings are the 
following. First of all, patent protection raises monopoly rents and encourages 
innovation, whereas increased competition destroys those rents and discourages R&D. 
Secondly, the regulator should not be concerned with monopolistic or oligopolistic 
market structures: these are also subject to the threat of potential entrants that may 
replace the incumbent product with a substitute688. Therefore, concentrated market 
structures do not necessarily harm consumers. On the contrary, they may benefit them 
in the long term, through the discovery of new and better products. 
From these considerations it follows that, in order to spur innovation, the 
enforcement of patent law should be prominent with respect to competition law in 
technological markets. 
2.2.2 Competition as a driver of innovation 
However, other strands of the economic literature point at opposing results and 
policy conclusions. 
Some scholars found that market power might also give raise to productive 
inefficiency. The first source of such inefficiency is determined by the rent-seeking 
behaviour of the monopolist, i.e. the waste of resources used by the incumbent to 
maintain its monopoly position in the market689. The second source of inefficiency is the 
x-inefficiency: in the absence of competitive constraint, managers do not have enough 
incentives to reduce costs, i.e. to innovate690. 
Similarly, Arrow demonstrated that, particularly where products are protected 
by IPRs, the incentive to invest is lower under monopoly than under competition, 

687 See AHN, Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: a Review of Theory and Evidence, OECD 
Economics Department Working Papers, no. 317, 2002, p. 14.  
688 See BAUMOL, The Free-Market Innovation Machine: Analyzing the Growth Miracle of Capitalism, 2002, who 
support the idea that oligopolistic competition among large firms is an important source of innovation. 
689 See POSNER, The Social Costs of Monopoly, cit., p. 821-822 affirms that all super-normal profit will be 
dissipated in the effort to achieve and protect market power. However, TIROLE, The Theory, cit., p. 76-78, 
contests that, while rent-seeking behaviour wastes resources, it is unlikely that all super-normal profit are 
dissipated in such effort. 
690 See LEIBENSTEIN, Allocative Efficiency vs. 'X-Efficiency', in American Economic Review, 1966, no. 56(3), p. 392-
415. However, the managerial slack hypothesis is difficult to test: principal-agent models do not show 
unambiguously that competition reduces managerial slack (see GROSSMAN and HART, An Analysis of the 
Principal-Agent Problem, in Econometrica, 1983, no. 51(1), p. 7-45; SCHARFSTEIN, Product-Market Competition and 
Managerial Slack, in RAND Journal of Economics, 1988, no. 19(1), p. 147-155) but there exists from evidence that 
individual firms’ productivity is higher in more competitive markets (see NICKELL, Competition and Corporate 
Performance, in Journal of Political Economy, 1996, no. 104, p. 724-746). 
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because differential profits are lower for the incumbent than for the entrant691. In other 
words, the additional profit that an incumbent monopolist can get from the 
development and the commercialization of an innovation will not be so large, compared 
to what the entrant can earn by replacing the incumbent entirely thanks to the new 
product (this is known as ‘replacement effect’, because the monopolist replaces itself 
instead of developing a new business)692.  
Such effect varies depending on the type of innovation. If innovation follows the 
investment in R&D with a high degree of certainty and the firm that invests the most 
will be the first at innovating, then the incumbent has a stronger incentive in investing in 
R&D to preserve its market position. On the contrary, if there is a high degree of 
uncertainty from the innovation process and the innovation is drastic, competitors have 
a larger incentive to engage in R&D. For incremental improvements of existing products, 
the incumbent still has superior incentives to innovate with respect to the entrant693. 
It follows that more intense product market competition can enhance 
innovation694. 
For instance, in an industry where there are efficient and inefficient firms, 
competition will drive the latter out of the market. In addition, under competition the 
number of conducted projects, of products and technologies possible is larger. The 
market will allow only the best ones to exist. This increases the industry productivity 
through a process of entry and exit from the market695. 
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691 ARROW, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing, 
1976, p. 157. In the same wake GILBERT and NEWBURY, Preemptive Patenting and the Persistence of Monopoly, in 
American Economic Review, 1982, no. 72, p. 514-526; GILBERT, Looking for Mr. Schumpeter: Where are we in the 
Competition-Innovation debate?, 2005. 
692 This approach seems to be at the basis of Commission’s antitrust policy. See the Guidance on Art. 82 EC 
at para. 30, where it is clearly said that an abusive conduct entailing efficiency gains is allowed only if, inter 
alia, it does not eliminate effective competition. This choice is motivated in the paper by affirming that 
rivalry between undertakings is an essential driver of economic efficiency, including dynamic efficiencies in 
the form of innovation, and that in its absence dominant undertakings lack adequate incentives to continue 
to create and pass on efficiencies. 
693 The same findings may be true, under vertical differentiation, for firms that have different production 
costs. The enlargement of market share for low cost companies encourages their entry in the market. Also, 
high cost firms will be also induced to innovate in cost reducing technology in order to compete with the 
low cost firms. See AGHION and SCHANKERMAN, On the Welfare Effect and Political Economy of Competition 
Enhancing Policies, 2003.  
694 See GEROSKI, Market Structure, Corporate Performance and Innovative Activity, 1995. 
695 See JOVANOVIC, Selection and the Evolution of Industry, in Econometrica, 1982, no. 50(3), p. 649-70. However, 
see MOTTA, Competition Policy, cit., p. 54, for a small mathematical example that shows how too many 
competing firms in the market may reduce overall welfare. 
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Accordingly, the regulator should create an appropriate environment that 
ensures the presence of the necessary conditions for competition to appear. So for 
instance, potential competition should be spurred through the elimination of barriers to 
entry in a market, so that incumbents refrain from misusing their market power696. This 
policy objective should then be prominent with respect to patent policy. 
Despite the efforts of theoretical and empirical investigation, the relationship 
between market structure and innovation process remains unclear. 
Scherer and Ross found that in a model of two firms engaging in R&D for a new 
product, when the incumbent has an advantage from the fact that he is already present 
in the market, both firms increase the speed of development under competition: the 
incumbent does not want to incur large losses by losing the whole market share, which 
the entrant wants to capture. The more firms competing, the smaller the market share to 
be conquered in the market, until a point where it yields too little revenue to cover the 
R&D expenditures697. 
Empirically this mechanism has been captured through an inverted-U 
relationship between competition and innovation698. 
In those sectors where firms compete at the same level, more competition may 
foster innovation and growth, because it increases the incremental profits from 
innovating. That is, firms invest in R&D in order to be pioneers and escape 
competition699. On the contrary, in sectors where leaders and laggard firms compete, 
competition discourages the latter firms from innovating, as it reduces too much their 
rents from catching up with the leaders. Therefore the Schumpeterian effect of 
competition should dominate. 
The overall effect depends on the number of sectors involving competing 
companies operating at the same technological level and of those where unlevelled firms 
compete. If the first type of sector prevails, the escape competition effect is likely to 
dominate the Schumpeterian effect. Vice versa, the latter effect is likely to dominate the 
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696 See the theory of contestable markets: BAUMOL, PANZAR, and WILLIG, Contestable Markets and the Theory of 
Industry Structure, 1982. 
697 See SCHERER and ROSS, Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, 1990, p. 635. 
698 See AGHION, BLOOM, BLUNDELL, GRIFFITH and HOWITT, Competition and Innovation: An Inverted U 
Relationship, AIM research Working Papers, 2004. 
699 They affirm that this should be particularly true in sectors where incumbent firms are operating at similar 
technological levels. 
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escape competition effect, when a larger fraction of sectors has innovation being 
performed by laggard firms. 
Thus patents and monopolistic-like structures of the market are not the only 
drivers of innovation. On the contrary, there are sectors where competition is a catalyst 
for innovation, and sectors where both patents and competition play a role. 
Game-theoretical models also attempted to explain firms’ strategic actions with 
regard to R&D investments. Regardless of the specific underlining assumptions (the 
structure of the market, the existence of a patent race, of spillover effects, repeated or 
non-repeated games), they all provide two basic findings: first of all, the quest for profits 
is an important innovation driver, ceteris paribus, in a stand-alone context; secondly, 
competitive threat, in terms of lost competitiveness and profits if the competitor 
innovates and the incumbent does not, is also conducive to technological progress700. 
2.2.3 Interim conclusions 
In sum, despite the large number of studies conducted, evidence is essentially 
inconclusive about the more appropriate market structure and the level of concentration 
that is best suited to encourage the optimal level of innovation. 
Since technological opportunities, the character of innovation and the 
mechanisms of appropriation vary largely from industry to industry, there is no general 
conclusion able to offer clear guidance for policy701. 
The only indications that economics provided so far are the following. On the 
one hand, competition is necessary to spur firms’ incentive to innovate. On the other 
hand, though, excessive competition may pose problems of appropriation of the benefits 
of an invention. Hence, some degree of appropriability of the returns from an invention 
is necessary to keep the pace of innovation going702. 
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700 See inter alia WICKELGREN, Innovation, Market Structure and the Holdup Problem: Investment Incentives and 
Coordination, in International Journal of Industrial Organizations, 2004, no. 22, p. 693. 
701 Some prominent scholars attempted to give guidance by saying that ‘what is needed for rapid technical 
progress is a subtle blend of competition and monopoly with more emphasis on the former than on the latter, and with 
the role of monopolistic elements diminishing when rich technological opportunities exist’. See SCHERER and ROSS, 
Industrial Market Structure and Economic Performance, cit., p. 660. 
702 See the Commission’s Industrial Property Rights Strategy, where it is affirmed that a strong industrial 
property rights system is a driving force for innovation, stimulating R&D investment and facilitating the 
transfer of knowledge from the laboratory to the marketplace. See Commission Communication of 16 July 
2008 on an Industrial Property Rights Strategy for Europe, COM(2008)465 final. 
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2.3. Market structure and pharmaceutical innovation 
The drug industry represents a meaningful example of the Schumpeterian 
mechanism of competition. 
The pharmaceutical industry is characterised by a lengthy discovery process, by 
high regulatory hurdles, but in particular, by significant investments in innovation, 
which are sunk by the time of product launch and negotiation. 
The European pharmaceutical industry annually spends 26 billion Euros on R&D 
projects. As already indicated in Chapter I, it is claimed that the cost of developing new 
drugs has increased significantly in recent decades and reached approximately the 
amount of $800 million in 2003 compared to $400 million in the early 1990s703. R&D costs 
increased 7.4% annually in real terms from the 1980s to the 1990s704. The reasons of this 
increase have been ascribed to the advent of molecular biology for the basic research, 
which require the use of expensive technology, to the higher complexity of products, to 
the higher hurdles imposed by regulation, etc. 
It is also submitted that R&D represents a large part of the cost of developing 
and producing new drugs. The pharmaceutical industry claims that a firm’s total 
expenditures in R&D cover a substantial part of its sales705. Furthermore, R&D is a global 
joint cost. That is, its level does not change depending on the number of consumers 
supplied and it cannot be allocated to specific products in specific countries. Still, they 
must be covered in the aggregate, in order for a firm to develop new drugs and stay in 
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703 See DIMASI, HANSEN and GRABOWSKI, The price of innovation: new estimates of drug development costs, in 
Journal of Health Economics, 2003, no. 22, p.151. As reported in fn 15 in Chapter I, this measurement has been 
heavily criticised by a US consumer advocacy group, Public Citizen, as well by other independent analysts 
on three grounds. First of all, the Di Masi study considered the cost needed to develop 68 drugs which were 
highly innovative: clearly this cost cannot be attributed to me-too drugs, whose development take much less 
time and cost also much less to firms. Secondly, the figure of $800 million dollar is the capitalized cost, namely 
it is an opportunity cost, i.e. the amount of money that the firm would have earned by investing resources in 
the stock exchange rather than in R&D: Public Citizen affirms that thus measure is inappropriate, because it 
takes the perspective of investors rather than the firm itself. Thirdly, the Di Masi figure does not take into 
account that pharmaceutical firms enjoy a tax credit for R&D expenditures, which amount to 50% for orphan 
drugs. If these adjustments are applied, the figure that comes out is about $200 million dollars. See ANGELL, 
The Truth about Drug Companies, cit., p. 32-36, supporting Public Citizen’s view; at the same time, see ADAMS, 
Estimating the cost of new drug development: is it really $802 million?, in Health Affairs, 2006, no. 25(2), p. 420–
428, whose estimates instead vary from around $500 million to more than $2,000 million, depending on the 
therapy or the developing firm. 
704 The cost of pharmaceutical research, according to the report Innovation in the pharmaceutical sector - A study 
undertaken for the European Commission, delivered by Charles River Associates in 2004, p. 11, had a five-fold 
increase for clinical trials and of 60% for pre-clinical trials. 
705 R&D expenditures amount to the 45,9% of sales of US pharmaceutical firms and to the 31,1% of sales of 
EU pharmaceutical companies. See EFPIA, The Pharmaceutical Company in Figures, 2008, p. 3-4. 
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the market. 
For this reason, it is claimed that a competitive structure of the market would 
yield earnings that are inadequate for companies to cover their costs. Pricing at marginal 
cost, in fact, would fail to provide the necessary revenues to pay for R&D. For instance, 
it has been calculated that if purchasers would pay only for the marginal cost of 
production of drugs, the revenue shortfall would cover only the 70% of total costs of 
such production706. This outcome would impede companies’ to preserve incentive to 
invest in research in the long run. 
That is why most of developed countries grant patents on pharmaceutical 
products: the exclusivity right granted by law enables firms to charge prices above 
marginal cost that are shielded from competitive pressure exerted by perfect substitutes, 
i.e. generics. Pharmaceutical firms claim that this allows them to recoup their costs 
through an adequate return on investments and to keep alive their incentive to spend 
money on innovation707. 
Thus, the pharmaceutical market is one of those sectors where competition 
shows up in the form of the Schumpeterian ‘rent-seeking’ model explained above, with 
competitors competing for the market rather than in the market708. 
The dynamics of competition in the market for drugs can be effectively 
symbolized by a race. Companies compete on the same R&D project to arrive first at the 
patent. The monopoly profits earned by the commercialization of the protected product 
is the prize earned by the winner of the race. 
But the patent-race winner enjoys the market exclusivity only for a certain 
period, until better products enter the market, compete with the pioneer product and 
eventually replace it. Hence, the regulator should not be concerned with market power, 
since the latter will be disciplined by the existence of other innovators, which can 
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706 Consistently with this finding see GRABOWSKI and VERNON, Brand loyalty, entry and price competition in 
pharmaceuticals after the 1984 Act., in J Law Econ, 1992, no. 35, p. 331-350, who found that prices of generics, 
which incur minimal cost of R&D and promotion, ultimately fall to roughly 25% of the price of the 
originator product in the US. If prices cover all costs except R&D, the shortfall would be roughly 30%. 
707 See GRABOWSKI and VERNON, The determinants of pharmaceutical research and development expenditures, in J. 
Evol. Econ., 2000, no. 10, p. 201–215. 
708 See SCHERER, Industry Structure, Strategy, and Public Policy, in Review of Industrial Organization, 1998, no. 
13(3), p. 378-379; ID., The link between gross profitability and pharmaceutical R&D Spending, in Health Affairs, 
2001, no. 20, cit., p. 220, who expressly makes this comparison: as profit opportunities expand, firms 
compete to exploit them by increasing their R&D investments and perhaps also promotional costs until the 
increases in costs dissipates most if not all supranominal profit returns. 
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become future competitors. 
In addition, high technological opportunities characterising the pharmaceutical 
market, in fact, favour entry and competition on innovation. The patent-race hypothesis 
is, in fact, an oversemplification, as it tends to conceive firms like black-box production 
functions. Firms do not only learn from their own experience, but also from other 
stakeholders present in the market: customers, suppliers, competitors, universities, etc. 
The notion of innovation as a vertical process, where the pace starts from basic research, 
and through more specialized R&D, arrives to final products, is not universal. Often, 
innovation takes the features of a process where networks, feedback mechanisms and 
linkages among firms and between firms and institutions take place709. 
The pharmaceutical market very much resembles this model: firms necessarily 
have to confront themselves with the scientific community in the process of discovery of 
a new molecule deemed to target a certain disease; this generates substantial knowledge 
spillovers at the level of research, thereby increasing the technological opportunities, as 
well as investments in R&D710. This, together with the increasing number of strategic 
alliances among pharmaceutical and biotechnological companies, increases 
complementarity of assets and inputs that may enable firms to innovate more rapidly 
and efficiently and compete among them711. 
In competition law parlance, this would mean that in the pharmaceutical market 
entry is very much facilitated by the existence of a wide variety of technological 
opportunities. In other words, each drug has many potential substitutes capable of 
exerting pressure its price, i.e. the pharmaceutical industry is characterised by a fierce 
interbrand competition. 
Under these conditions, it may look harmful to inject additional competition in 
the market through the stimulus of intrabrand competition, as this may greatly dissipate 
profits and endanger investments. 
Stated differently, the encouragement of intrabrand competition would come at 
the expenses of interbrand competition. Instead, the sacrifice of intrabrand competition 
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709 See JORDE and TEECE, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, in JORDE and TEECE, Antitrust, Innovation, and 
Competitiveness, cit., p. 48. 
710 See COCKBURN and HENDERSON, Racing to Invest? The Dynamics of Competition in Ethical Drug Discovery, in 
Journal of Economics and Business Strategy, 1994, no. 3(3), p. 481-519, at 505. 
711 See JORDE and TEECE, Innovation, Cooperation and Antitrust, cit., p. 49; GLADER, Innovation Markets and 
Competition Analysis, EU Competition Law and US Antitrust Law, 2006, p. 35. 
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would leave to companies the necessary resources to invest in new drugs that may 
compete with those already existing in the market and would thus increase interbrand 
competition. 
However, it should be considered that interbrand competition can take place and 
spur technological progress only if competitors can actually enter the market. Only in 
perfectly contestable market, an incumbent monopoly is not able to exploit its market 
power to the detriment of consumers, because the threat of entry induces it to adopt an 
efficient behaviour. However, markets may display an array of entry barriers. These are 
present especially in markets for knowledge-based products, were network effects, high 
risk, large sunk costs, lengthy R&D process, regulatory hurdles, IPRs, etc., reduce the 
possibilities of entry712. 
For instance, some drugs have been developed to cure only a particular disease. 
In that case product markets have reduced dimensions, while concentration is high. 
This, especially for highly specific products, is due to the large investments in R&D 
necessary to develop such products. The huge amount of resources necessary to discover 
a new molecule and the high level of risk associated with the inventive activity 
constitute a natural barrier to entry. The small number of companies having such 
resources to enter a potential market on the one hand, and the patent protection 
(strengthened by the dossier protection, the supplementary protection certificate etc.) on 
the other, reduce and delay the possibilities of penetration of the market from new 
entrants, especially if they are not endowed with sufficient financial resources. 
In sum, when the market is characterised by narrow product segments with little 
opportunity for demand substitution713, as it may be for pharmaceuticals, the number of 
competing technologies available for each product may be limited even though the 
industry as a whole displays seemingly infinite technological opportunities. 
Under these circumstances, where interbrand competition may not be effective, a 
concentrated market structure may pose antitrust concerns. 
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712 See BOUND ET AL., Who does R&D and who patents?, in R&D, Patents and Productivity, 1984, p. 21, 28, 29. See 
GLADER, Innovation Markets and Competition Analysis, cit., p. 18, fn 5 and accompanying text. Cf. Section 1.1 in 
Chapter 1. 
713 Cf. Section 6 in Chapter I. 
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These considerations show that patent enforcement is surely very important to 
spur pharmaceutical innovation714. However, a policy that enforces pharmaceutical 
patents tout court does not consider that the industry is already structurally endowed 
with features that provide firms with high post-innovation appropriability715. 
In the pharmaceutical industry, in fact, market power in terms of size and 
availability of financial resources, plays an important role at the pre-innovation stage, by 
allowing firms to face the lengthy and costly regulatory process716. After the innovation 
reaches the market, because of effectiveness of patents and of the natural barriers to 
entry, the appropriability issue is less crucial for innovation717. 
The reason why pharmaceutical companies fear that competition may reduce 
their profits too much is linked to the phase that the industry is experiencing at present. 
Several patents covering ‘blockbuster’ medicines (i.e. medicines whose annual global 
turnover exceeds US$ 1 billion), which account for a substantial part of the sales and 
profits of big pharmaceutical companies, expired or are about do so in the next years. 
And only few new breakthrough innovations that can grant a substantial flow of 
financial resources have been recently invented. This creates uncertainty about the 
expected profits to be earned in the future and makes companies extremely concerned 
about the revenues coming from the current best-selling products. 
This explains why drug producers are so much distressed about their profitability 
and about any factors that can eventually erode it, like parallel trade. 
2.4. R&D patterns in the pharmaceutical sector 
It has already been mentioned that economic literature identifies two dimensions 
in the appropriability issue: one refers to the financial resources actually available to 
conduct R&D at the time of the investment decision; the other one is related to the 
prospect of profits deriving from the investment. With regards to this latter aspect, 
generally it is affirmed that when companies foresee their inability of recovering 
invention costs due to the inadequate protection of information, they do not invest 

714 Cf. fn 237 in Chapter II for arguments that question the indispensability of patents to spur pharmaceutical 
innovation. 
715 See LEVIN ET AL., Appropriating the Returns from Industrial Research and Development, in Brookings Papers on 
Econ. Activity, 1987, p. 783, at 797. 
716 See DANZON, The Pharmaceutical Industry, in The Encyclopaedia of Law and Economics, 2000, p. 1055, at 1083. 
717 See CARRIER, Two Puzzles Resolved: of the Schumpeter-Arrow Stalemate and Pharmaceutical Innovation Market, 
in Iowa Law Review, 2008, no. 93, p. 393-450. 
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(enough) in innovation718. 
The innovation process follows the sequence below: 
Patent ĺ Profits ĺ R&D activity ĺ Innovation ĺ Patent ĺ … 
Patents provide financial resources that allow recouping the cost of previous 
inventive activity, as well as investing in new projects. Such investment in R&D activity 
leads to a new product that is in turn patented. And the innovation cycle continues. 
The relation between profits and the R&D activity results crucial in this context. 
This link is, in fact, bilateral: the amount of money that the firm obtains from the 
commercialisation of a protected product influences the intensity of the R&D activity, i.e. 
in simple terms, how much money is available for investment in R&D (‘cash-flow 
effect’); this investment is, however, in turn influenced by the amount of money that the 
firm expects to earn from the commercialisation of the new product (‘expected profit 
effect’). In other words, the expectations that firms have about their future profitability 
have an impact on R&D patterns. 
In particular, firms will undertake the most profitable investment projects first – 
those offering the highest risk-adjusted expected rate of return – and continue to 
undertake additional investment projects so long as the expected rate of return from the 
next project exceeds the firm’s marginal cost of capital. The last project to be undertaken 
is the ‘marginal project’, beyond which any other investment is not worth it. 
If, for any reason, the profitability of the ‘marginal R&D project’ decreases until a 
point where the marginal cost of capital is not covered any longer, it is likely to be 
dropped and what was the next-to-the-least-profitable R&D project becomes the new 
‘marginal project’. As a result, the total number of projects undertaken by the firm may 
decrease. 
These findings should apply also to the pharmaceutical sector. 
Economic literature amply explored the impact of the expected return from drug 
innovation on R&D intensity, and between the latter and the level of innovation, and 
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718 Cf. infra Section 1 in Chapter II. See also DAM, The Economics underpinning Patent Law, in J. Legal Studies, 
1994, no. 27, p. 247. 
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found that profit expectations and cash flows are generally found to be the principal 
explanatory variables of firm-level pharmaceutical R&D investment719. 
With regards to the latter aspect, while for most corporations R&D spending 
does not depend upon internal cash flows, pharmaceutical R&D is almost entirely 
internally generated720. That means that profits earned by a company through the 
commercialization of its products are the source of funds that support those 
investments. Lower profits, therefore, would yield lower financial resources available 
for R&D. 
Also, the literature indicates that the distribution of pharmaceutical firms’ profits 
is highly skewed: a minority of products confers blockbuster profits, while the majority 
returns less than the capitalized cost of R&D721. This little profitable fraction of products 
is composed in large part from newly launched, patented, pharmaceuticals722, which are 
generally reimbursed products, and therefore subject to price regulation, at least outside 
US. Any regulatory intervention on prices then affects exactly that fraction of products 
and may be liable of reducing profits to a large extent, as well as the level of investments 
in R&D. 
As with regards to the effect of profit expectations on R&D incentives in the 
pharmaceutical sector, a large part of the literature confirms that there exists a positive 
correlation between the expected return from drug innovation and the level of 

719 See WIGGINS, The Pharmaceutical Research, cit., p. 55-83; GRABOWSKI and VERNON, The Determinants of 
Industrial R&D expenditures in the pharmaceutical industry, in Drugs and Health, 1981, no. 10, p. 201-215; MYERS, 
The Inter-relationship between Pharmaceutical R&D and profit, in Journal of Research in Pharmaceutical Economics, 
1992, no. 4, p. 79; SCHERER, Pricing, Profits, and technological progress in the pharmaceutical industry, in Journal of 
Economic Perspectives, 1993, no. 7(3), p. 97; SCHERER, The link between gross profitability, cit., p. 216. However, 
see COCKBURN and HENDERSON, Racing to invest?, cit., p. 421, where interviewed managers claimed that in 
planning their investment programs they focused on three criteria: the size of the unmet medical need, the 
scientific potential of a field, and the idiosyncratic capabilities of their researchers. 
720 Basic economic theory predicts that firms invest in capital up to the point where the expected marginal 
efficiency of investment is just equal to the firm’s marginal cost of capital. In a neoclassical world, with 
perfect information and well-functioning capital markets, the supply of funds would be constant at the real 
market rate of interest, implying that firms consider the source of investment finance irrelevant. See 
MODIGLIANI and MILLER, The cost of capital, corporation finance and the theory of investment, in Am. Econ. Rev., 
1958, no. 48, p. 261–297. Recent research, however, both theoretical and empirical, suggests the source of 
finance does matter, and cash flows, because they have a lower cost of capital relative to external debt and 
equity, exert a positive influence on firm investment spending. HUBBARD, Capital market imperfections and 
investment, in J. Econ. Literature 1998, no. 37, p. 193–225. This is particularly true in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where the difficulty in finding external funding raises, due to the uncertainty that characterises 
pharmaceutical R&D. Cf. Section 1.1 in Chapter I. 
721 SCHERER, The link between gross profitability, cit., p. 216. 
722 DANZON, Price Regulation for Pharmaceuticals: Global vs National Interests, The American Enterprise Institute 
Press, 1997. 
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investment in R&D723. 
For instance, recent investigation suggests that, provided that other determinants 
of innovation are held constant, a 10% increase in the growth of real drug prices is 
associated with nearly a 6% increase in the growth of R&D intensity724. 
That is why it is claimed that the greater a firm’s exposure to price regulation 
that lowers drug prices, the lower a firm’s expected returns to R&D, the lower its 
incentive to invest in R&D in the first place. 
In sum, any pharmaceutical policy that shapes prices for drugs may affect the 
level of investments in R&D in a twofold way: it influences the expected returns to R&D 
and has also a cash flow effect. If such regulation has the effect of lowering prices, it may 
discourage investments, because expected profits may be perceived by pharmaceutical 
companies to be too low to recoup the investment; and it leaves the company with less 
money available for investment in R&D725. For instance, it has been calculated that 
regulating pharmaceutical prices in the US could lead to a decline in R&D intensity of 
between 23.4% and 32.7%. Of this decline, the cash flow effect accounts for between 44% 
and 60% of this drop, and the expected profit effect account for between 56% and 40%726. 
It could be argued that, similarly, parallel imports, as a form of price competition 
that lowers pharmaceutical prices and profits, could reduce the resources available for 
R&D727. 
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723 See WIGGINS, The Pharmaceutical Research and Development Decision Process, in Drugs and Health: Issues and 
Policy Objectives, 1981, p. 55-83; GRABOWSKI and VERNON, The Determinants of Industrial R&D expenditures, cit., 
p. 201-215; MYERS, The Inter-relationship between Pharmaceutical R&D and profit, in Journal of Research in 
Pharmaceutical Economics, 1992, no. 4, p. 79; SCHERER, The link between gross profitability, cit., p. 216. 
724 GIACCOTTO, REXFORD, SANTERRE AND VERNON, Drug Prices and research and Development Investment 
Behaviour in the Pharmaceutical Industry, in Journal of Law and Economics, 2005, no. 48, p. 195-214. 
725 See SCHERER, Pricing, profits, and technological progress, cit., p. 97–115; GRABOWSKI, Health Reform and 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 1994; HELMS, Commentary, in Competitive Strategies in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 
1996; GREEN, Is price regulation necessary: a summary of arguments, in Pharmacoeconomics, 1998, no. 14(Suppl. 1), 
p. 137–142; VERNON, Drug research and price controls, in Regulation, 2002-2003, no. 25(4), p. 22-25. 
726 VERNON, Examining the link between price regulation and pharmaceutical investment, in Health Economics, 2005, 
no. 14, p. 1-16. However, the author pointed out that figures represented only a lower bound, because other 
factors influence pharmaceutical profitability and it has been assumed that margins will fall below margins 
existing outside US. 
727 MASKUS, Parallel Imports, CU Working paper, 2000; LI AND MASKUS, Parallel imports and cost reducing 
research and development, CU working paper, 2002; VALLETTI and SZYMANSKI, Parallel Trade, International 
Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: a Welfare Analysis, in Journal of Industrial Economics, 2006, no. 54(4), 
p. 499-526; BARFIELD and GROOMBRIDGE, Parallel Trade in the Pharmaceutical Industry: Implications for 
Innovation, Consumer Welfare, and Health Policy, in Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J., 1999, no. 10, p. 185. 
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Pharmaceutical firms recoup their sunk costs by charging above cost prices that 
are differentiated on the basis of the price sensitivity of groups of consumers, according 
to the Ramsey rule. This allows firms to solve their maximisation problem by earning a 
larger profit that does not distort consumption patterns in the markets served. 
However, parallel trade undermines the pricing policy of a discriminating firm. 
This, pharmaceutical companies claim, may entail an overall profit that is not sufficient 
to cover all the costs the firm incurred to discover and develop a new drug, including 
the cost of failed projects728. 
It follows that, through the elimination of parallel trade, pharmaceutical 
companies would avail themselves the ability to fully exploit the value of their patent, 
thereby stimulating further research and promoting dynamic efficiency. 
The policy conclusion to be drawn from pharmaceutical companies’ allegations is 
that behind restrictions to parallel trade there is an important business justification: the 
preservation of the competitiveness of the company in terms of innovative activity. For 
this reason, they should not be prohibited under competition law rules. 
This conclusion has consequences of overriding importance, not only for the 
policy to be adopted towards parallel trade, but also for the application of EU 
competition law in general. 
For instance, it may imply that any restriction of competition that allows 
diversion of revenue from ‘non innovative stakeholders’ (like consumers) to ‘innovative 
firms’ is presumed to always entail an improvement in innovation and on this basis 
should escape the application of competition rules. 
If applied to abusive conducts, such an interpretation would imply, for instance, 
that the presence of ex ante efficiencies always justifies a refusal to supply by a dominant 
undertaking to its rivals. To this purpose, in fact, the defendant should merely object that 

728 However, the theoretical literature is not unambiguous with regards to the effect of parallel trade on 
manufacturers’ profits. Recent literature, in fact, identified some conditions, like the presence of price 
regulation, where the effect of parallel trade on profits, and on innovation, can be positive. See AHMADI and 
YANG, Parallel Imports: Challenges from Unauthorized Distribution Channels, in Marketing Science, 2000, no. 19(3), 
pp. 279-294; RAFF AND SCHMITT, Why Parallel Trade may raise Producers Profits, CESIFO Working paper No. 
1503, 2005; PECORINO, Should the US allow prescription drug reimports from Canada?, University of Alabama 
Economics Working Paper No. 01-01-04, 2002, finds this result under the assumption that demand function 
is identical in the two markets. GROSSMAN and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, in RAND Journal of 
Economics, 2008, no. 39(2), p. 378-402, achieve this result by finding that parallel trade increases prices in the 
exporting country. From this, overall profits increase, and so does the money invested in R&D. 
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its refusal to deal with rivals increases its overall expected profits and that such a profit 
increase will necessarily bring about the efficiency benefit of increasing the ex ante 
incentive to innovate. This would indicate that an IPR owner never has a duty to supply. 
However, the principle that a dominant company never bears a duty to deal with 
its rivals, as much as the notion that it always has such a duty, does not find any legal 
ground729. 
The opposite statement would equal to grant a blank immunity to IPRs owners, 
on the basis that the limited duration and scope of these rights already reflects a trade 
off between the exclusion of competition and the promotion of innovation730. 
Such a minimalist vision of antitrust law, which should not intervene at all in the 
market where private incentives to innovate are at stake731, implies that innovation is a 
policy objective that has relevance as such, and not as long as it promotes consumer 
welfare. But this inevitably contrasts the fundamental principles that found the EU 
competition law system as a whole, whose main objective is the protection of consumer 
welfare732. 
It is thus clear that pharmaceutical companies’ claim about the potential impact 
of parallel trade on R&D incentives has an economic justification. Still the deriving 
policy conclusions in the field of European competition law should be carefully 
designed, in order to make sure that efficiency claims appropriately fit the law. 
 
3. Patents, profits and incentive to innovate in the pharmaceutical sector 
The claim on which defendants based the alleged efficiency of restrictions of 
parallel trade can be subdivided into two stages: firstly, they recall the existence of a 
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729 ELHAUGE, Defining Better Monopolisation Standards, cit., p. 310, reads into US Supreme Court case law the 
principle that ex ante efficiencies virtually give the right to refuse to supply in all cases to IPRs owners, 
except when such refusal is discriminatory towards rivals. 
730 In No. 00-62 CSU, LLC v. Xerox Corp., the DOJ opposed categorical antitrust immunity for refusals to 
license in its brief to the Supreme Court opposing certiorari. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae 
at para. 10 (expressing “serious concerns about such a holding” and stating that the U.S. “would not be prepared to 
endorse it”). 
731 Cf. AREEDA, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, in Antitrust Law Journal, 1989, no. 
58, p. 841; CARRIER, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, in University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 2002, no. 
150, p. 761-845, at 816 et seq. who affirmed that in those sectors where both patents and competition play an 
important role in stimulating innovation, like the pharmaceutical market, competition rules should not 
apply, in order to avoid interference with patent incentives and discouragement of innovation. 
732 Cf. supra fn 391and accompanying text. 
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positive correlation between the general level of current profits, or the expected 
profitability of the products, and expenditure on research and development; secondly, 
they submit that those factors (level of current profits, profitability of the products) are 
adversely affected by parallel trade. 
Reverting the logic, restrictions to parallel trade increase profits, and such 
increment spurs innovation. 
However, this reasoning has one main drawback: it requires the assumption that 
all rewards bring the same incentive effect, as if innovation were a one-size-fits-all 
concept. In my opionion this hypothesis is overly simplistic and needs some refinement. 
To this purpose, I will firstly analyse the impact of parallel trade on profits, and then I 
will examine the effect on innovation. 
3.1. The impact of parallel trade on profits 
It has already been pointed that the granting of a patent does not necessarily give 
rise to a monopolistic profit733. The patent puts the owner in the virtual condition to 
obtain it, but the concrete level of profitability of a new product depends on several 
variables affecting market conditions: the presence of competitors, barriers to entry, 
product differentiation, brand loyalty, successful marketing, etc. 
Some firms consistently profit more than others from their R&D activities, 
because they are more successful at penetrating the market734. This in turn depends on 
the competitive advantage that the firm enjoys in the market: tangible and intangible 
assets, as well as the capabilities in discovering, developing, and marketing and the 
know-how. In fact, given that technological progress is essentially the process of using 
resources to learn or acquire new knowledge, it is very important how quickly the firm 
is able to go down the learning curve. 
Profitability is also determined by the advantage of being a ‘market pioneer’. 
This is particularly important in markets like the pharmaceutical sector, where customer 
(read: doctors’) familiarity and brand loyalty have helped companies in maintaining 
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733 See infra Section 3.2 in Chapter II. 
734 See VERNON, Drug research and price controls, cit., p. 14; VERNON, The relationship between price regulation and 
pharmaceutical profit margins, in Appl. Econ. Lett., 2003, no. 10, p. 467–470. 
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significant market shares long after they entered the market for the first time735. 
Therefore, the profitability of R&D investments varies from firm to firm and 
cannot depend solely on the degree of price competition, which the firm is going to be 
exposed to736. Other variables play an important role. In the pharmaceutical market price 
regulation is one of the most important. 
Given the long period that is typically necessary (10-15 years) in order to develop 
new molecules and to bring them onto the market, as well as the complex regulatory 
context in which the pharmaceutical industry operates, the reasons that could lead to a 
lower profitability of an R&D project can be manifold. For instance, the ‘domino effect’ 
of reference pricing systems is capable of reducing profits not only in the European 
market but also at a global level. Furthermore, the expiry of one or more patents and the 
subsequent arrival of generics on the market force companies to lower their prices in 
order to sustain competition, thereby reducing profits. 
The second factor that influences the most the profitability of a pharmaceutical 
R&D investment is marketing and promotional activity. Advertising and marketing 
cover a large part of pharmaceutical companies’ expenditure. From recent estimates it 
appears that US pharmaceutical companies spend almost twice as much on promotion 
as they do in R&D737. The market success of many pharmaceutical products is driven by 
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735 For two years after the expiration of patents, the average market share of pioneers in the pharmaceutical 
market was 51%. See WILLIAMSON, First-Mover Advantage from Pioneering New Markets: a Survey of Empirical 
Evidence, in Rev. Ind. Org., 1994, no. 9, p. 1, at 5. 
736 The literature on the theory of the firm finds substantial theoretical arguments to support the existence of 
heterogeneities in firm R&D capabilities. See PENROSE, The Theory of the Growth of the Firm, 1959; BARNEY, 
Firm resources and sustained competitive advantage, in J. Manage, 1991, no. 17(1), p. 99–120. COCKBURN and 
HENDERSON, Racing to Invest?, cit., p. 482, similarly affirms that by examining ethical drug discovery - 
research intended to identify promising new drugs - rather than drug development, they find that 
investment levels are very weakly correlated across firms. This has been interpreted by the authors as 
consistent with the hypothesis that adjustment costs and firm heterogeneities play a significant role in 
determining investment patterns. See also the US DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N ANTITRUST 
GUIDELINES FOR THE LICENSING OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 3.2.3, where it is said that “the capabilities to engage 
in the relevant R&D can be associated with specialized assets or characteristics of specific firms”. 
737 See GAGNON and LEXCHIN, The Cost of Pushing Pills: a New Estimates of Pharmaceutical Promotion 
Expenditures in the United States, in PLoS Med, 2008, no. 5(1), p. 29 contesting IMS’ and PhRMA’s findings that 
pharmaceutical firms spend more on research and development (R&D) than on marketing: US$29.6 billion 
on R&D in 2004 in the US as compared to US$27.7 billion for all promotional activities. See IMS HEALTH, 
Total U.S. promotional spend by type, 2004. The study compared estimates performed by IMS and CAM in 
2004. CAM reported total promotional spending in the US of US$33.5 billion. See CAM GROUP, Total U.S. 
promotional activity for 2004, from CAM USA Newsletter, 2005. However, the authors found that both 
estimates are incomplete and that the real amount of resources invested in marketing is US$57.5. However, 
see CALFEE, The Role of Marketing in Pharmaceutical Research and Development, in Pharmacoeconomics, 2002, no. 
20 (Suppl. 3), pp. 77-85, and KWONG and NORTON, The Effect of Advertising on Pharmaceutical Innovation, in 
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huge marketing operations, which determine the profitability of a product much more 
than competition738. 
It follows that price competition (read: parallel trade) is only a concurrent factor 
that determines the expected profits deriving from an R&D investment. In other words, 
parallel trade is not the only determinant of the possible reduction of the value of a 
patent and of the discovery rate of new drugs. Conversely, parallel trade can only have 
an incremental impact on firms’ profits and, on the basis of the magnitude of such 
incremental impact, potentially also on innovation739. 
3.1.1. When parallel trade increases manufacturers’ profits 
Such incremental impact on profits has been traditionally believed to be 
negative, as much of the relevant literature affirmed740. Recent literature has been 
questioning this finding under certain hypothesis, though. 
Ahmadi and Yang741 show that parallel trade may extend the global reach of 
patented products and increase global profits. This is because parallel trade enables a 
manufacturer to further segment consumer groups. The model shows through a three-
stage Stackelberg game that the market can be segmented into three groups when 
parallel trade occurs742 – a) those customers who continue to purchase the product from 
authorised dealers because they value the warranty and service levels; b) customers who 
previously purchased the product from authorised dealers but switch to the parallel 
trader due to the lower prices; and c) new customers who purchase from the parallel 
trader attracted by lower prices. Parallel trade increases sales but its effect on profits 
depends on the relative sizes and profitability of these three groups. If the profits from 
group c) exceed the losses from group b) then aggregate profits will increase. 
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Rev. Ind. Org., 2007, no. 31, p. 221-136, both supporting the thesis that pharmaceutical advertising has a 
positive effect on product innovation. 
738 This for instance the case of Prozac. At the expiry of the patent, Ely Lilly got the patent on the weekly 
Prozac and with a massive operation of marketing managed to keep doctors prescribing it instead of the 
cheaper generic version of the daily Prozac. 
739 One can read this also in para. 277 of the Glaxo ruling, where it stated that the Frontier Economics II study 
found that a connection existed between the general level of current profits or the expected profitability of 
the products and decisions on research and development, and that those factors were affected by parallel 
trade, although admitting that parallel trade was not the main factor underlying decisions on research and 
development. 
740 Among many see MALUEG and SCHWARTZ, Parallel Imports, Demand Dispersion, cit., p. 187-196. 
741 AHMADI and YANG, Parallel Imports: Challenges from unauthorized distribution channels, in Marketing Science, 
2000, no. 19, p. 279-294. 
742 A fundamental assumption behind this result is that parallel traded products are different with respect to 
the original ones, or at least they are perceived as such by consumers. 
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Raff and Schmitt743 develop a model that shows that letting retailers trade unsold 
inventories may result in larger orders being placed with the manufacturers and higher 
profits and consumer gains. Raff and Schmitt show that this will be the case where 
distributors must place orders for the good before they know actual demand; the 
products have little value at the end of the demand period or inventories are costly to 
maintain. Demand differs across countries and the differing demand affects the quantity 
of the good demanded rather than the consumer’s willingness to pay.  
If, under these conditions, the manufacturer were to ban parallel trade, then 
distributors could become saddled with large inventories, which would depress prices. 
Distributors foresee such a loss and reduce their orders, thereby reducing also 
manufacturer’s profits. 
If the manufacturer allows parallel trade, then this stops the retail price falling 
dramatically since the distributors are able to sell to parallel traders if demand is 
unexpectedly lower. Thus, the distributor will place a larger order with the 
manufacturer than it would do without parallel trade. The manufacturer’s incentive to 
allow parallel trade is stronger when the price elasticity of demand is similar across 
countries but country demand is uncertain. Conversely, when the price elasticity of 
demand differs across countries, then the manufacturer’s inclination is toward banning 
parallel distribution so as to practice third degree price discrimination. 
Three other papers model the relationship between parallel trade, profits and 
R&D incentives. 
Valletti and Szymanski744 find that parallel distribution causes a reduction in 
investment in product R&D and quality. Consequently, consumers are supplied an 
inferior product which lowers their surplus ex ante. However, ex post there is a gain in 
consumer surplus since consumers who did not previously purchase the good now buy. 
The overall effect of parallel trade depends on whether the ex ante loss dominates the ex 
post gain in welfare. They show that when the monopolist can price discriminate based 
on differences in demand (willingness to pay) allowing parallel distribution will reduce 
their investment in R&D. However, if consumers in the low priced market have different 
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743 RAFF and SCHMITT, Why Parallel Distribution may Raise Producers’ Profits, CESIFO Working Paper No. 1503, 
July 2005. 
744 VALLETTI and SZYMANSKI, Parallel distribution, International Exhaustion and Intellectual Property Rights: A 
welfare analysis, in Journal of International Economics, 2006, no. 70, p. 314-324. 
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valuations depending on whether there has been investment in R&D which they value 
more after the investment has been made, then the marginal return on investment, 
together with the incentive to innovate, will be greater when parallel distribution is 
allowed. 
Li and Robles745 also challenge the claim that parallel trade necessarily decreases 
the incentive to innovate by reducing profits and they show that this form of 
competition may also spur innovation. 
They argue that innovation incentives depend not so much upon post-innovation 
profits, but upon the difference between post-innovation and pre-innovation profits. 
That is, if parallel trade reduces pre-innovation profits more than it reduces post-
innovation profits, than it is not detrimental to innovation. The degree of this effect 
depends on the type of products involved. If goods are independent, parallel trade 
decreases post-innovation profits. If goods are complements, parallel trade reduces both 
pre-innovation and post-innovation profits. If goods are substitutes, parallel trade 
reduces more pre-innovation profits than it may reduce post-innovation profits, 
provided that the manufacturer has a competitive advantage (e.g. in transportation 
costs) in distributing the new good. In this latter case, parallel trade provides an 
incentive to innovate. 
But the most important contribution to the literature on the subject comes from 
Grossman and Lai746. They also challenge the view that parallel trade necessarily reduces 
investment in R&D. This result stems from a specific assumption, which suits very much 
the case under examination: unlike other studies that treat the government as an 
exogenous actor, the authors incorporate government price controls in their analysis. 
The result is that where the level of prices set in negotiations with health 
authorities/governments is endogenous, it is not self evident that the pharmaceuticals 
companies’ profits would necessarily fall. There may be a harder bargaining over price 
levels in the knowledge that prices set in different countries will encourage some re-
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745 LI and ROBLES, Product Innovation and Parallel Trade, in International Journal of Industrial Organization, 2007, 
no. 25, p. 417-429. 
746 GROSSMAN and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, cit., p. 378-402. 
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importation of drugs from lower to higher priced countries. This allows the firm to earn 
a larger profit, so that innovation is not undermined747. 
This model shows that the relationship between parallel trade and prices, profits 
and R&D is more complex for pharmaceuticals, because of price regulation. Government 
regulation, pharmaceuticals companies’ actions, prices and strategies, and the level of 
parallel trade are all simultaneously determined. However, the former has a 
fundamental impact on all the other variables considered: it affects gross profits directly, 
through price controls, but also indirectly, through the scope it leaves to parallel trade. 
For instance, the lower the price in the exporting country, the higher the level of parallel 
and exports. Vice versa, the higher the price in the exporting country, the tinier the scope 
for parallel trade and the smaller is the negative impact on pharmaceuticals (expected) 
profits. 
In other words, the impact of parallel trade of pharmaceuticals on manufacturers’ 
profits is not straightforward to determine, as it depends on several variables. It follows 
that in the analysis of efficiency claims such effect should concretely ascertained and not 
just presumed. Pharmaceutical companies should, thus, produce enough evidence that 
shows how specifically parallel trade has negatively affected their budget. 
3.2. Does more money always bring more innovation? 
The correlation between expected profits and the investment on innovation – 
supporting the second stage of pharmaceutical companies’ efficiency claim - is largely 
underpinned by the literature mentioned in the previous Section, which investigated at 
length the issue and substantiated it. 
However, it appears incorrect to interpret such literature as supporting the 
statement that more money always brings more innovation. 
From an ex ante perspective, an R&D project is going to be undertaken provided 
that the expected return is enough to cover costs and give a sufficient profit. If this 
expected profit is going to be jeopardized, then there may be discouragement to invest 
in the project. If competition dissipates only what is in addition to this profit, there 
should not be any disincentive to innovation.  
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747 GROSSMAN and LAI, Parallel Imports and Price Controls, cit., p. 398. 
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That is why, beyond a certain point, more financial incentives in the form of a 
broader exclusive right do not necessarily lead to an increased innovation activity. That 
is, additional future profits to those necessary to sufficiently reward the inventive effort 
do not necessarily spur more innovation ex ante748. 
This means that the appropriation of all possible return from an innovation is not 
necessary to induce companies’ innovative effort749. In fact, as some legal commentators 
exemplified, the economic return per invention, which is attributable to patent 
protection, i.e. the ‘patent premium’, and the production innovation curve ‘are not 
indefinitely parallel, as at some point, the innovation curve diverges’750. 
The innovation pattern that has been characterising the pharmaceutical industry 
in the last twenty years seems to substantiate these objections. 
The virtuous rent-seeking model appears to experience a crisis and the major 
pharmaceutical companies are mostly producing ‘me-too drugs’751. In 2002 the FDA 
approved 78 new drugs. Of these, only 17 contained new active substances. Among the 
latter, only 7 were classified as improvements with respect to the existing products752. 
The other 61 were just ‘me-too drugs’753. From these figures, it clearly appears the 
difficulty for companies to refill the product pipeline and to increase the number of 
novel medicines reaching the market. 
The reason behind the proliferation of me-too drugs is that discovering new 
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748 Similarly see KAPLOW, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection, cit., p. 1824 and 1825, who affirms that prolonging 
patent life in order to induce further inventive activity increases the period of monopolistic exploitation for 
those inventions that would have been created even without lengthening the patent life. In these cases, a 
stretching patent life would only result in a social cost that is not offset by any social benefit. 
749 See LEMLEY, Property, Intellectual Property and Free Riding, Texas Law Review, 2005, no. 83, p. 1057, who says 
that “Sufficient incentive … is something less than perfect control”; LESSIG, Intellectual Property and Code, Saint 
John’s Journal of Legal Commentary, 1996, no. 11, p. 635; BRUNNELL, Appropriability in Antitrust: How much is 
enough?, Antitrust Law Journal, 2001, no. 69, p. 1; LANDES and POSNER, An Economic Analysis of Copyright Law, 
Journal of Legal Studies, 1989, no. 18, p. 325. 
750 See HUMPE and RITTER, Refusal to Deal, in GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC, cit., p. 151. 
751 For instance, in 2005 there were 6 statins in the world market: Mevacor, Lipitor, Zocor, Pravachol, Lescol 
and Crestor, all variations of the first one. Cf. the Table 2 in Chapter I. 
752 The FDA classifies drugs in two ways. First it examines the chemical compound, in order to ascertain 
whether this is new or it exists already in the market. In the former case, the compound is classifies as drug 
number 1; in the latter, it is classified as a compound derived from another one or combined with an old 
one. Secondly, the FDA looks at the therapeutic effect, to check whether the drug offers any superior 
therapeutic benefit with respect to existing products. In the affirmative case, the FDA classifies it as ‘P’ 
(privileged) and accelerates the approval procedure. Technically speaking, only a drug whose compound is 
new and adds new therapeutic benefits is a new drug, i.e. an innovation. The other are just improvements to 
previous innovations. 
753 See www.fda.gov/cder/rdmt/pstable.htm to check the number and the type of drugs approved every 
year. Note that the 7 drugs that were considered really new products were not produced by US companies. 
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drugs has become more complex and more expensive, and pharmaceutical companies 
have become risk averse. This, besides triggering a wave of mergers during the nineties, 
generated a substantial flow of investments directed towards ‘easier products’. In terms 
of profitability, in fact, it is financially safer to make a small improvement on an existing 
drug, patent it and re-direct patients to that one, instead of investing a large amount of 
resources in R&D projects for entirely new products whose commercial success is highly 
unknown754. 
This loss of ‘creative vein’ is happening notwithstanding the increased 
investment in R&D, but most importantly, despite the extraordinary earnings that the 
sale of some blockbusters has been entailing to them755. In 2002, for instance, big pharma 
together were earning 200 billions dollars of sales in US and 400 billions worldwide; in 
average, their profits amounted to 17% of sales, while 14% went into R&D, and 31% in 
marketing and administration. 
It is evident, thus, that more money may not necessarily lead to increased 
innovation. It rather seems more appropriate to affirm that pharmaceutical companies 
invest in innovation that percentage of their profits that allows them to stay competitive 
in the market. 
In determining such amount, the shape of the innovation production function is 
fundamental. With decreasing marginal returns to scale from investment in innovation, 
there is a certain point where an extra dollar invested in R&D entails less than a unit of 
innovative output. In other words, beyond the point where the marginal cost and the 
marginal benefit of investing in innovation balance each other, any further penny in 
R&D is not worthwhile. 
The form of the innovation function over the research and development cost 
levels is essential to understand also the impact that price competition can have on 
innovation. Assuming diminishing returns to scale from investment on innovation, there 
will be cost levels at which the marginal productivity is high and at which the effect of 
reduced research and development costs, due to lower profits, on innovation will be 
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754 Cf. the interview to Sharon Levine, doctor and director of the Kaiser Permanente Medical Group, in 
FamiliesUSA, Out-of-Bounds: Rising Prescription Drug Prices for Seniors, July 2003. 
755 Similarly see the interview to Silvio Garattini, founder and director of the Istituto di Ricerche 
Farmacologiche Mario Negri in Italy, in Il Messaggero on October 30th, 2005, where he declares that out of 
8500 drugs available in Italy, only 100 are really effective. 
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substantial. At the same time, there will also be cost levels at which marginal 
productivity is low and where this effect is moderate or negligible. 
In addition, the effect of competition on innovation depends on the type of 
projects that the company is running. 
For instance, R&D projects that lead to the introduction of me-too drugs do not 
entail the extraordinary costs that are generally attributed to the discovery and the 
development of an entirely new compound with new therapeutic effects. At the same 
time, me-too drugs are blockbuster products in terms of per year earnings for 
pharmaceutical companies756. On the contrary, new drugs that treat diseases for which 
there is not an adequate cure often cover a smaller part of the worldwide population and 
entail much lower earnings compared to the huge costs needed to develop them. 
If, within a company’s R&D portfolio, the number of low-risk projects, i.e. 
projects that require lower R&D investment and entail high expected profits, prevails 
over the number of high-risk projects, i.e. projects that require higher R&D investments 
and entail lower expected profits, a given profits loss is overall less detrimental than in 
the case when the company is running a larger number of high-risk projects compared to 
low-risk projects. 
From these considerations follows that the same profit loss does not have the 
same effect on each pharmaceutical company’ incentive to invest in innovation, and that 
a certain reduction in the profitability of patents cannot be expected to discourage firms’ 
innovation activity that would not take place anyway. Differently stated, some 
limitation on an IPR owner’s right to exclude competitors may have only a marginal 
effect on investment decisions or not have it at all757. 
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756 AstraZenceca’s Prilosec was per-year 6 billion dollars drug for the treatment of conditions caused by 
excess stomach acid. At the expiry of the patent, the company isolated the active part of Prilosec’s molecule 
and patented with the name of Nexium. With a massive campaign (cost: 500 millions dollars) and a 
temporary reduction of price, the company managed to convince doctors to move to Nexium and prescribe 
it also when the price rose. See HARRIS, As a Patent Expires, Drug Firms Lines Up Pricey Alternative, in Wall 
Street Journal, 6 June 2002, p. A1 and SWIDEY, The Costly Case of the Purple Pill, in Boston Globe Magazine, 17 
November 2002, p. 11. Similarly, Schering-Plough substituted its per-year 2.7 billion dollars Claritin with 
Clarinex, which is just the active metabolite, i.e. the molecule in which the human body converts the former. 
A similar story happened for Prozac and its weekly version. 
757 Similarly see AYRES and KLEMPERER, Limiting Patentee’s Market Power Without Reducing Innovation 
Incentives: The Perverse Benefits of Uncertainty and Non-Injunctive Remedies, in Mich. Law Rev, no. 97, 1999, p. 
987-990, who affirmed that ‘unconstrained monopoly pricing is not a cost-justified means of rewarding patentees 
because the last bit of monopoly pricing produces large amounts of deadweight loss for a relatively small amount of 
patentee profit. […] Restricting the patentee’s monopoly of a small amount is likely to increase social welfare because 
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That is why it appears more appropriate to say that parallel trade may curtail 
incentives to innovate, but the magnitude of that risk varies from case to case, 
depending on the impact it has on profits. 
3.3. Interim conclusions 
From the analysis above it appears that the impact of antitrust intervention in the 
market, in the form of a policy encouraging parallel trade, on dynamic efficiency is not 
clear. Parallel trade may or may not decrease profits, depending on circumstances. Even 
when it has a negative impact on companies’ budget, its harm on innovation is not 
straightforward. 
Observing a decline in profits of a certain percentage is of limited value from a 
policy perspective. While it may decline as a consequence of price competition, it is 
necessary to measure what would be exactly the consequence on R&D intensity and, in 
turn, on innovation, if any. 
This means that it is not possible to rely on a presumption of existence of positive effects 
in terms of increased innovation coming from the extra-money earned through the 
restrictions of parallel trade. 
This has an important twofold implication, for the policy on parallel trade and 
for antitrust in general. 
The analysis conducted has shown that it is possible to presume that restrictions 
to paralle trade have negative effects on consumers in the short run. Unfortunately, there 
are no economic grounds to support the existence of an equivalent presumption with 
regards to the efficiencies coming from such restrictions in the long run. It follows that 
pharmaceutical companies have to specifically demonstrate through convincing 
evidence that their strategies against parallel trade are going to generate gains for 
consumers. 
In fact, economic theory does not support a standard of proof of efficiencies 
coming from anticompetitive practices that leaves carte blanche to innovators. On the 
contrary, it requires to concretely demonstrating the existence and the magnitude of 
positive effects from business practices in order to escape the application of competition 
law rules. 
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the benefit of reducing the deadweight loss of supra-competitive pricing is likely to outweigh the cost of a slightly lower 
incentive to innovate.’ 
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And this leads me to the more general implication: although efficiency gains are 
relevant in the assessment of anticompetitive corporate conducts, they cannot represent 
a goal in themselves under EU competition law. Hence, the preservation of innovation 
incentives cannot be considered a redeeming virtue per se to anticompetitive corporate 
conducts. 
 
4. A test for efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU 
The considerations expressed in the previous Sections help shedding some light 
on one of the most interesting aspects of the debate over the modernization of Article 
102 TFEU. 
It is largely discussed whether dynamic efficiencies should be actually proved, 
also in their magnitude, and compared to the static inefficiency created by an abusive 
conduct, or whether their mere assertion, absent quantification, would be sufficient to 
escape the application of Article 102 TFEU.
The Commission, supported by prominent scholars758, opted for the former 
choice759. However, other scholars, inspired by recent developments in the US case 
law760, criticize it and privilege the latter761. 
Those scholars who support the former option, also discussed whether the 
proportionality test for efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU should be crafted according 
to a ‘softer’ version of the test or according to a ‘stricter’ one: the former would consist 
only of the balancing exercise between the efficiencies and the anticompetitive effects, 
whereas the latter require that the dominant undertaking proves that it can do no 
business without the alleged restriction of competition762. 
I personally envisage four possibilities, which I am going to name as following: 
1) the ‘legitimate business conduct à la Syfait I’; 
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758 See GYSELEN, Rebates: Competition on the Merits, cit., p. 291; TEMPLE LANG and O’DONOGHUE, in The Concept 
of an Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82 EC, in GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC, cit. 
759 See the Guidance on Art. 82 EC, where at para. 30 et seq. See better infra this Section. 
760 See Verizon Communications Inc v Law OfÀces of Curtis V Trinko, LLP, 540 US, 2004 (Case No 02-682). 
761 See EVANS and PADILLA, Designing Antitrust Rules for Assessing Unilateral Practices: A Neo-Chicago Approach, 
in University of Chicago Law Review, 2005, no. 72; AHLBORN, DENICOLÒ, GERADIN, and PADILLA, DG Comp’s 
Discussion Paper on Article 82: Implications of the Proposed Framework and Antitrust Rules for Dynamically 
Competitive Industries, 2006. 
762 The latter option was supported by AG Cosmas in his opinion in the case C- 344/98 Masterfoods Ltd v. HB 
ICE Cream Ltd. 
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2) the ‘legitimate business conduct à la Syfait II’; 
3) the ‘strict approach’; 
4) the ‘efficiency defence’. 
In this subsection I am going to analyse all of them in the presented sequence, in 
order to pick the one that better suits the structure of Article 102 TFUE and that is in line 
with economic theory. 
4.1 The ‘legimate business conduct à la Syfait I’ 
By this name I identify the efficiency arguments put forward by the 
pharmaceutical companies, which I discussed at length in the previous Section from an 
economic perspective.  
The similarity of this test with the type of analysis employed in the United States 
in relation to Section 2 of the Sherman Act, where the concept of ‘competition in the 
merits’ is already inclusive of efficiency gains763, is evident. 
Indeed, it recalls the innovation-centred rebuttable presumption proposed by 
one US scholar764: a company’s patent-based action would be lawful as long as there is a 
plausible justification based on efficiency, rather than on injuring competitors. Being 
substantially based on the presumption that any action that defend the IPR owner profits 
stimulates innovation, this test supports the recognition of efficiencies also when their 
existence is not concretely proved and, most of all, even if it is not demonstrated that 
they benefit consumers. 
Such test is claimed to have three nice properties: first, it avoids the prohibition 
of efficient conducts; second, it prevents costly and lengthy forward-looking inquiry that 
may not provide any useful insight; third, it offers clarity and predictability for Courts 
and parties. 
The question is, thus, whether an American approach to Article 102 TFUE is 
envisageable. 
Despite its easy manageableness, the test has two main drawbacks. First, it 
overlooks the fact that this presumption does not hold and that a case-by-case analysis is 
needed, in order to account for the actual materialisation of efficiency gains. Secondly, 
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763 See United States v. Grinnel Corp., 348 US 563 (1966), where the Court defined the actual monopolisation as 
‘the wilful acquisition or maintenance of [monopoly] power as distinguished from growth or development as a 
consequence of superior product’, i.e. based on efficiency. 
764 CARRIER, Unraveling the Patent-Antitrust Paradox, cit., p. 816. 
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the test does not require a balance between pro-competitive effects and anticompetitive 
effects of the conduct. Nor does it require the conduct to be the least restrictive 
alternative that will achieve the goal. 
This approach can be hardly reconciled with Article 102 TFEU’s policy objective.  
It is largely recognised that the main goal of this provision is to protect the 
competitive process765, as the method of interfirm rivalry that better serves the interest of 
consumers according to economic theory. This objective, which to a certain extent also 
protects the freedom of competitors to compete on the merits, is not, however, a policy 
goal in itself. Case law, in fact, indicates that before a finding of material adverse effect 
on consumer welfare can be made, the competitive assessment must focus on the 
consequences of a practice on the marketplace. It follows that the substantive test for the 
application of this provision should be based on the effect of the company’s conduct on 
consumer welfare766. The latter paradigm represents, thus, the rationale of the provision. 
In line with an effect-based approach, the substantive test underpinning the 
application of Article 102 TFEU should look at the consequences the conduct has for 
consumers767. 
This approach, claimed by a large number of legal and economic scholars768, has 
been recently and more explicitly endorsed by the European Commission in the 
Discussion Paper on Art. 82, which at § 55 states that ‘Article 82 prohibits exclusionary 

765 See GYSELEN, Rebates: Competition on the Merits, cit., p. 297; FOX, Abuse of Dominance and Monopolisation: 
How to protect Competition without Protecting Competitors, in World Competition, 2003, no. 26, p. 149. 
766 See among others, BPB, cit., para. 65 and 66, which held that promotional payments made by a dominant 
supplier to a customer in return for an exclusive purchasing commitment are “a standard practice forming part 
of commercial cooperation between a supplier and its distributors” that “cannot, as a matter of principle, be 
prohibited,” but rather must be assessed in the light of their effects on the market in the specific 
circumstances. 
767 See for example, BPB, para. 65-66, which held that promotional payments made by a dominant supplier 
to a customer in return for an exclusive purchasing commitment are “a standard practice forming part of 
commercial cooperation between a supplier and its distributors” that “cannot, as a matter of principle, be prohibited,” 
but rather must be assessed in the light of their effects on the market in the specific circumstances. 
768 See BISHOP, Price Discrimination under Article 86: Political Economy in the European Court, in MLR, 1981, no. 
44, p. 282; LORENTZ, LUBBIG and RUSSEL, Price Discrimination: a Tender Story, in ECLR, 2005, no. 26, p. 355; 
SINCLAIR, Abuse of Dominance at a Cross-roads: Potential Effect, Object and Appreciability under Article 82 EC, 
ECLR, 2004, no. 25, p. 491; TEMPLE LANG and O’DONOUGHUE, Defining Legitimate Competition: how to clarify 
abuses under Article 82 EC, in Fordham Int’l L J, 2002-2003, no., 26, p. 83-84, at 108-111, and at 158-162; 
AHLBORN and PADILLA, From fairness to welfare: implications for the assessment of unilateral conduct under EC 
Competition Law, 2006; EILMANSBERGER, How to distinguish good from bad competition under Article 82 EC: in 
search of clearer and more coherent standards for anti-competition buses, in CMLR, 2005, no. 42, p. 129; GLYNN, 
Article 82 and price discrimination in patented pharmaceuticals: the Economics, in ECLR, 2005, no. 3, p. 135; 
EHLERMANN and ATANASIU, European Competition Law Annual 2003, cit.; GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 
EC, cit. 
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conduct which produces actual or likely anticompetitive effects in the market and which can harm 
consumers in a direct or indirect way’. 
Mutatis mutandis, this reasoning also applies to efficiencies in my opinion. Given 
that the paradigm of consumer welfare is the rationale of Article 102 TFEU, it is not 
appropriate that efficiency gains are accounted for irrespective of the identity of the 
ultimate beneficiary. It is correct, on the contrary, that their admission to antitrust 
analysis of abusive conducts is subject to the passing on requirement. Differently stated, 
as much as the proof that a reduction of consumer welfare has actually materialised as a 
result of the exclusionary conduct is necessary, proof that consumers benefit from the 
efficiency gains entailed by the conduct should be also required769. 
Differently from what is required under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, the 
analysis of potentially anticompetitive unilateral conducts under Article 102 TFEU 
presupposes that the existence and the magnitude of the efficiency gains are actually 
proved and that simply putting forward their future possibility is not sufficient. That is 
why a test similar to the one applied under the former provision is not applicable to the 
latter770. 
4.2. The ‘legitimate business conduct à la Syfait II’ 
The second option is the ‘legitimate business conduct à la Syfait II’. 
In the ruling rendered by the ECJ in that case, the Court acknowledged that it is 
legitimate under EU competition law for a dominant company to honour only part of 
the received orders when these are out of the ordinary, so as to protect its commercial 
interests. This necessarily implies that the Court recognised that an unlimited amount of 
parallel trade may have a negative impact on such interests. The ECJ, thus, implicitly 
acknowledged that parallel trade might threaten companies’ profits. 
For this reason, the Court left open the possibility for a pharmaceutical 
manufacturer to justify its refusal to supply where the orders are ‘out of the ordinary’. 
This ‘rule of thumb’ indicates that the ECJ was aware of the fact that, on the one 
hand, parallel trade is capable of entailing short-term savings for consumers, but that, on 
the other hand, parallel trade may have an impact on manufacturers’ profits and, on the 
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769 Cf. GYSELEN, Rebates: Competition on the Merits, cit., p. 287. 
770 Cf. ROUSSEVA, Abuse of Dominant Position Defences. Objective Justification and Article 82 EC in the Era of 
Modernization, in European Community law of competition, 2008, p. 406. 
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basis of the magnitude of this impact, potentially also on R&D investments, thereby 
harming consumers in the long term. 
In order to strike a balance between these two effects, the ECJ maintained that 
the protection of commercial interests could justify only a limitation of quantity 
supplied, but never a total refusal to supply771. The Court clearly said that there is no 
way to escape from the application of competition law when a company puts in place 
conducts aimed at avoiding all parallel exports772. In other words, the EU Treaty cannot 
be interpreted as to allow companies to drop markets in order to protect their 
commercial interests773. 
On the contrary, following the principle of proportionality in evaluating the 
anticompetitiveness of a dominant company that refuses to supply wholesalers to 
defend itself from parallel trade, it appears that honouring only those requests that are 
not out of the ordinary constitutes a balanced way for dominant companies to respond 
to the threat that parallel trade may pose to their commercial interests. A supply quota, 
contrary to a total refusal to deliver goods, in fact, does not eliminate all competition but 
it leaves some room to it. 
This suggests that the proportionality test should look at whether the response of 
a pharmaceutical company that refuses to supply wholesalers that engage in export 
activities is appropriate and proportionate to protect the company’s profits, and, 
indirectly, its incentive to innovate. 
One may argue against the criterion identified by the ECJ in Syfait II that the ‘out 
of ordinary rule’ is not an adequate tool to carry out an analysis of dominant companies 
conducts according to an effect-based approach, because it lacks the flexibility to account 
for the fact that innovation is not a one size-fits-all concept and that the same level of 
parallel trade may have a different impact on the R&D expenditures of two different 
pharmaceutical companies. 
It seems, however, that this objection overlooks that fact that the reference to 
previous commercial relationships between manufacturer and distributor, in relation to 
the size of the domestic market, for single products, may give a good measure of the 
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771 See para. 71 of the decision on Syfait II 
772 See para. 66 of the decision on Syfait II. 
773 See para. 69 of the decision on Syfait II. 
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amount of parallel trade that the manufacturer believes to be sustainable for its R&D 
activity774. 
In my view, the shortcoming lies somewhere else: being an application of the  
‘legitimate business conduct’ doctrine, this criterion does not mandate the measurement 
of the efficiency gains to perform the balancing exercise, whose outcome should be 
decisive to permit (or prohibit) the conduct775. Therefore, the test elaborated by the ECJ 
in the Syfait II case is incomplete, as it does not allow for an exhaustive analysis of the 
effects of a supply quota on consumer welfare. In sum, it also seems inappropriate to 
match Article 102 TFUE’s rationale. 
4.3 The ‘strict approach’ 
The two tests that have been analysed so far appear to be too lenient with respect 
to the objective of ascertaining the existence and the magnitude of efficiency gains 
accompanying an anticompetitive conduct of a dominant company. 
An analogy with the proportionality test applied under Article 106(2) TFEU to 
the supply of universal services, thus, may help providing an interesting paradigm to 
craft a stricter approach776. 
The jurisprudence on Article 106 TFUE experienced a development. At an earlier 
stage the jurisprudence affirmed that the grant of an exclusive right that restricts 
competition was not indispensable to ensure the existence of a universal service 
whenever the State could support the company entrusted with the provision of this 
service with subsidies. At a later stage, the European Courts held that the legitimacy of 
the exclusive right under Article 106 TFUE should be checked in light of a thought 

774 This does not mean I am not aware of the fact that the ‘out of ordinary’ criterion poses several 
interpretative problems that render more difficult its practical application. For instance, when it comes to a 
new product or to a new customer of the producing company, there are no previous commercial 
relationships on which the ordinarity of the supply requested can be evaluated. 
775 Cf. supra fn. 685 and accompanying text, where it is recalled that in the context of the Microsoft case 
before the GC, the latter indicated that there is no balance test within the legitimate business conduct. 
776 Art. 106 TFEU disciplines state measures, like the granting of an exclusive right to private undertakings 
to carry out activities in the public interest, which may restrict competition. For a general comment on the 
provision see BUENDÌA SIERRA, Article 86 – Exclusive Rights and Other Anti-competitive State Measures, in FAULL 
and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition, cit., p. 593-646; ID., Exclusive Rights and State Monopolies Under EC 
Law, 1999. The provision applies, inter alia, to those exclusive rights conferred to private undertakings to 
provide universal services, i.e. services to which all citizens have the right to access. The right to every 
individual to have access to medicines and the corresponding duty of the State to provide them to protect 
public health clearly in this sense fall within the scope of the notion of ‘universal service’. Note that the ECJ 
excluded patents and other IPRs from the notion of ‘exclusive right’. See ECJ, 16 November 1977, in case C-
13/77 Inno v. ATAB, para. 41. 
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experiment that looks at whether the elimination of such right would render the 
provision of the service more difficult. 
In Corbeau, the ECJ for the first time held that the grant of an exclusive right to an 
undertaking does not contrary to Article 106 TFUE if this is necessary to offer a universal 
service that is rendered under acceptable economic conditions777. 
The Court followed this reasoning: in many cases where a universal service is at 
stake, the State requires the entrusted company to set a uniform tariff for the whole 
territory, no matter the ability to pay of consumers in the different areas composing it. In 
this situation, the more densely populated areas paying also for the (fixed) cost of 
serving those areas where few people live and the price they pay does not cover the cost 
of guarantee the service there. If competition is introduced, competitors would enter the 
densely populated area where prices are higher than costs and undercut the 
undertaking, which would be left with the unprofitable area. This is known as ‘écrémage’, 
or ‘cherry picking’. 
Pharmaceutical companies charge (in this case, different!) prices to consumers in 
different geographic areas, depending on their ability to pay. Wealthier consumers pay 
medicines a much higher price than the cost of producing them, because they are 
somewhat called to ‘subsidize’ the R&D activity, which poorer consumers cannot pay 
for. The introduction of parallel trade in this setting may have the same effect of the 
écrémage: traders would enter the more profitable market and undercut the company 
there. Exporters could even gain the whole market share for a given portfolio of 
products in the importing country and consequently endanger the profits of a 
pharmaceutical company, together with its investment in R&D. 
Under these conditions, it appears reasonable to assume that the company 
cannot run its activity in a situation of economic equilibrium that allows it to offset those 
unprofitable markets with profitable ones and to cover its R&D costs any longer. 
Therefore, a conduct restrictive of parallel trade would be justified. 
It should be noted, however, that for parallel trade to be capable of endangering 
the economic equilibrium of a pharmaceutical company, the volume of exported 
products should be unlimited. This would require two conditions: (i) wholesalers should 
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777 See ECJ, 19 May 1993, in case C-320/91 Criminal proceedings against Paul Corbeau, para. 15-18. 
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be entitled to receive all quantities they have ordered, i.e. they should have an unlimited 
right to be supplied; (ii) no public service obligations should oblige them to serve the 
domestic market first778. 
However, none of these conditions appear realistic. The first one cannot be 
supported, because it would call for the imposition on undertakings of a permanent 
duty to supply their rivals, which – as already recalled – is not recognized in any legal 
system. The second assumes a violation of the provision of the Human Use Directive. 
Also, such a crafting of the proportionality test may indeed be too strict or just 
miss the innovation issue behind the efficiency claims. R&D investments are very much 
likely to be endangered when the volume of parallel trade is unlimited. Nevertheless, 
even under a more limited but substantial amount of parallel trade, traders may achieve 
very high percentages of market penetration for a large range of products in the 
importing country. This may represent a considerable threat for pharmaceutical 
companies’ profits that may urge them to downsize their investment in R&D.  
Stated differently, profit losses may force the firm to drop one or more 
investment projects, determining the erosion of the optimal amount of resources 
devoted to R&D that allows the firm to be competitive in the market, without that the 
firm is driven out of the market. 
Such efficiency losses represent harm for consumers and competition law should 
prevent them. That is why it appears that the proportionality test should be shaped 
differently, in order to capture the mentioned inefficiencies. 
4.4 The ‘efficiency defence’ 
The considerations previously expressed about the need to prove efficiency gains 
in the same way that foreclosure is demonstrated implicitly suggests that the inquiry on 
efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU should be the mirror image of the ‘bilan economique’ 
under Article 101(3) TFEU779. 
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778 These assumptions are fictitious, given that they do not comply with European law. As with regards to 
the public service obligation, I have already explained in Chapter III that the Human Use Directive provides 
for this obligation both on manufacturers and wholesalers, thereby obliging them to serve the domestic 
market first. Although this provision is mirrored everywhere in European countries, most of them have it. 
With regards to refusal to supply practices and the right of wholesalers to be given all the goods they have 
ordered I will show infra that this right does not have citizenship within European competition law. 
779 Note that this interpretation implicitly requires that it is up defendant companies to prove the existence 
of efficiencies. However, this issue is going to be dealt with in the next Chapter. 
 280 
This is precisely the approach of the Guidance on Art. 82 EC, where the 
Commission established that for the ‘efficiency defence’ to be admitted it must 
demonstrated that the following conditions are fulfilled: (i) that efficiencies are realised 
or likely to be realised as a result of the conduct concerned; (ii) that the conduct 
concerned is indispensable to realise these efficiencies; (iii) that the efficiencies benefit 
consumers; (iv) that competition in respect of a substantial part of the products 
concerned is not eliminated780. 
This choice has an important policy implication: it guarantess a uniform 
enforcement of both Articles 101 and 102 TFUE required by the EU jurisprudence781, and 
it creates consistency with merger analysis. 
With regards to Article 101 TFEU, as I already recalled, the jurisprudence requires 
that profitability and innovation must be proven and must concretely contribute to 
consumer welfare, in order to take them into consideration in the balancing exercise 
between the anticompetitive and the procompetitive effects of a corporate conduct. 
With regards to merger analysis, under EU competition law, when the merger 
both causes a reduction in allocative efficiency and produces pro-competitive benefits, 
only if the latter outweigh the former, the merger is permitted by the Commission782. 
Efficiencies must be merger-specific and likely to be passed on to consumers, in order to 
be considered in the competitive analysis of the merger783. 
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780 Cf. the opinion of the AG Colomer in the Syfait II case at para. 70 and 118. 
781 See ECJ, 21 March 1972, in case C-6/72 Continental Can v. Commission, para. 25, where the Court affirmed 
that the provision pursue the same objective, albeit at a different level. Cf. on this TEMPLE LANG and 
O’DONOGHUE, in The Concept of an Exclusionary Abuse under Article 82 EC, in GCLC Research Papers on Article 
82 EC, cit., who observe that, given that the purpose of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU should be consistent then, 
as Article 101(3) TFEU incorporates an analysis of consumer interests, so too should Article 82, even in the 
absence of an express exemption clause. 
782 See Recital 29 of the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 on the control of 
concentrations between undertakings (hereinafter the ‘EC Merger Regulation’), where it affirmed that “in 
order to determine the impact of a concentration on competition in the common market, it is appropriate to take account 
of any substantiated and likely efficiencies put forward by the undertakings concerned. It is possible that the efficiencies 
brought about by the concentration counteract the effects on competition, and in particular the potential harm to 
consumers, that it might otherwise have and that, as a consequence, the concentration would not significantly impede 
effective competition, in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or 
strengthening of a dominant position. The Commission should publish guidance on the conditions under which it may 
take efficiencies into account in the assessment of a concentration.” 
783 See US Guidelines state that merging firms ‘must substantiate efficiency claims so that the Agency can verify by 
reasonable means the likelihood of magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would be achieved, how 
each would enhance the merged firm’s ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-specific’. This 
policy orientation is usually referred to as an effect-based analysis. This approach for merger controls 
resulted in the switch from a dominance test to a significant-restriction-of-competition test in EC Regulation 
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Similarly, also under Article 102 TFEU, efficiencies must be properly 
substantiated and balanced with the foreclosure effect, in order to enter the 
anticompetitive assessment. 
The case law underpins this view. Both in British Airways784 and Michelin II785, the 
GC affirmed that if the efficiency justifications put forward by defendants would have 
been based on countervailing advantages that outweighed the foreclosure caused by 
their conducts, their argument would have likely to be accepted. 
In light of the above, the choice of the Commission appears to be the most 
appropriate. 
The following proportionality test786 should thus be applied when abusive 
dominant conducts are analysed in their pro-competitive facets: firstly, efficiencies must 
be conduct-specific, i.e. there must be a link between the latter and the gains, and the 
conduct must be indispensable to achieve them; secondly, they must outweigh the 
anticompetitive effects787. 
Whilst this test appears to be the only one that complies with both economic 
theory and the acquis communautaire, it is also affected by a weakness.  
This test overall is quite demanding, because it includes a suitability test, a 
necessity test, a test of proportionality strictu sensu, and a ‘multi-variable’ 
proportionality test, because the anticompetitive effects have to be balanced with the 
pro-competitive effects788. Not surprisingly, thus, this test may rarely be found to apply. 
The whole case law on Article 102 TFUE and, in particular, the opinion of AG 
Colomer in the Syfait II case confirms this prediction. The AG Colomer, in fact, 
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no. 139/2004. Also according to the Guidelines on the assessment of mergers, para. 86, efficiencies and the 
resulting benefits for consumers should be quantified. 
784 See British Airways, para. 244 et seq. 
785 See Michelin II, para. 74. 
786 See DE BÙRCA, The Principle of Proportionality and its Application in EC Law, in YEL, 1993, p. 103-150, at 113; 
STEENBERGEN, Proportionality in Competition Law and Policy, in LIEI, 2008, no. 35(3), p. 259–268, at 265; 
TRIDIMAS, Proportionality in Community law: Searching for the appropriate standard of scrutiny, in ELLIS, The 
principle of proportionality in the laws of Europe, p. 84. 
787 Cf. DOLMANS, Efficiency Defences Under Article 82 EC Seeking Profits Or Proportionality? The EC 2004 
Microsoft case in context of Trinko, 24th Annual Antitrust and Trade Regulation Seminar, NERA, Santa Fe, 
New Mexico July 8, 2004, who suggested a four-stage analysis: (1) there should be an efficiency or another 
legitimate objective other than exclusion of competitors; (2) the conduct should be ‘suitable’, i.e. capable of 
achieving the legitimate goal; (3) the conduct should be ‘necessary’, in the sense that there is no alternative 
that is equally effective in achieving the legitimate goal; (4) the conduct should be “proportionate”, in the 
sense that the legitimate objective pursued by the firm should not be outweighed by the exclusionary effect.  
788 STEENBERGEN, Proportionality in Competition Law and Policy, cit., p. 266. 
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dismissed the defendant’s claim because the latter did not succeed in demonstrating the 
existence of a causal link between parallel trade and GSK’s reduced incentive to invest in 
R&D, or the diminished value of GSK’s patents caused by parallel trade789. On the 
contrary, AG Colomer felt that GSK’s claim only showed the company’s expectation of 
being in a position to recoup lost profit, without actually proving that such extra-profit 
would have spurred innovation and promoted efficiency to the benefit of consumers790. 
Also, with regard to the necessity test, AG Colomer observed that European law 
provides different policy instruments aimed at spurring innovation and revitalize the 
European pharmaceutical sector such as the tax credit, the block exemption for 
technology transfer agreements and of R&D agreements791. For this reason, he 
considered GSK’s conduct as disproportionate to the threat posed by parallel trade and 
inappropriate to pursue the object of protecting the competitiveness of the company792. 
This outcome is likely to be replicated whenever efficiencies are at stake in 
abusive conducts cases, because not only the assessment is more complex, but also it 
also takes a perspective that clashes with the traditional approach generally taken by 
antitrust agencies to conduct market analysis. 
In fact, dynamic efficiencies are at odd with static efficiency considerations in 
competition enforcement. This is because they take place from different perspectives (ex 
post v. ex ante). 
This creates an asymmetry: whilst the legal assessment of anticompetitive 
agreements and abusive conducts typically takes place from an historical standpoint, 
efficiencies require a prognosis. Thus, anticompetitive effects would be analysed from an 
ex post perspective, whereas efficiencies would be assessed from an ex ante point of view. 
This clearly creates disparity in the burden of proof that parties bear in relation to the 
existence of the facts they allege. 
In particular, this discrepancy creates severe problems both for convicted 
undertakings and for antitrust authorities, or judges: the former may not be able to 

789 See AG Colomer opinion at para. 109. 
790 See AG Colomer opinion at para. 116-118. 
791 See the Reg. EC of the 29 November 2000 n. 2659, applying Article 101(3) TFEU to agreements on R&D. In 
particular see Recital 10 of the Regulation. 
792 See AG Colomer’s opinion at para. 113-114. 
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provide a certain proof of the existence of efficiencies, and consequently the latter may 
not be in the position to evaluate such allegations and ascertain the alleged existence. 
It follows that the test for efficiency should be structured in a more flexible way. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The Chapter analysed the claim put forward by pharmaceutical companies about 
the efficiency gains obtainable from restrictions to parallel trade of pharmaceuticals. 
Based on the positive correlation between the expected return from drug innovation and 
the level of investment in R&D, they argue that the strong enforcement of patents against 
parallel trade puts the right incentives to innovate on privates. The extra money 
recouped from the restriction to competition, in fact, would be invested in innovation to 
the benefit of consumers. From this it should follow that actions against it are justified 
under efficiency grounds and thus permitted. 
This reasoning would underpin a minimalist vision of antitrust intervention, 
which should not interfere with the market when incentives to innovate are at stake. 
However, under competition law this approach leads to give carte blanche to 
innovators and entails the paradoxical conclusion that any restriction to competition that 
allows the diversion of monetary resources from non-innovative subjects to innovative 
ones should be considered legal. 
Also, a deeper analysis of economic theory shows that evidence is largely 
inconclusive about the relationship between parallel trade, profitability and R&D 
incentives: traditionally it was believed that this was a negative one; however, recent 
economic investigation suggested opposite findings under certain conditions. 
In addition, even assuming that parallel trade has a negative impact on profits, 
the magnitude of such impact is unknown at a general level. It depends on the 
innovation skills of the firm, on where it stands in the innovation production function, on 
the type of product and on the characteristics of the market for that product. 
This uncertainty appears stronger when applied to the pharmaceutical sector, 
given that the inquiry involves an analysis of future outcomes that leads to an antitrust 
scrutiny based on an empirical investigation. 
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From this it follows that it is not possible to rely on the presumption that the extra 
money earned through the elimination of competition will generate a higher level of 
innovation. On the contrary, a case-by-case analysis is necessary to ascertain the 
existence and the magnitude of efficiencies. 
These considerations have important implications in the process of 
modernisation of Article 102 TFEU, as they provide an answer to the question of how 
efficiency gains should enter the antitrust analysis of potentially anticompetitive 
unilateral conducts. 
For the purpose of answering this question, four options are analysed. 
The arguments put forward by the pharmaceutical companies resemble very 
much the application of the Section 2 of the Sherman Act, where efficiencies are included 
in the concept of ‘competition in the merit’. According to this approach, defendants may 
just put forward a justification to their conduct based on efficiency, without the concrete 
proof of the existence and magnitude of such gains, in order to escape the application of 
competition rules. 
However, this method contrasts the fundamental principles of European 
competition law, which requires that efficiencies contribute to the improvement of 
consumer welfare. This, in turn, calls for a test that looks into the link between the 
abusive conduct and the procompetitive effects and allows a balancing between the 
latter and the anticompetitive effects. 
In view of these considerations, both the ‘out of ordinary criterion’ elaborated by 
the ECJ in the Syfait II case, and the strict approach provided by the case law on Article 
106 TFUE on universal service, do not appear appropriate either. The first one provides 
a good rule of thumb that account for innovation considerations, but does not allow for 
any concrete inquiry into the materialisation of efficiencies. It is, thus, too lenient. The 
second one is, in the contrary, too strict, as it requires the jeopardization of the economic 
equilibrium of the company, in order for a corporate conduct to be justified. 
Therefore, it appears that the choice of envisaging a bilan economique of the sort of 
Article 101(3) within the provision prohibiting the abuse of dominant position is 
preferable. The existence of a link between their conduct and the efficiencies should be 
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proven; the former should be indispensable to achieve the latter; and such gains should 
outweigh the detriment caused by foreclosure. 
This choice, however, leaves us with two open questions. 
The first one relates to who bears the burden of such proof, although the 
preference for an analysis similar to the one performed under Article 101 TFUE 
necessarily leads to one answer only: the defendant. 
The second one relates to the practical feasibility of this case-by-case approach. 
Interpreting the provision that prohibits the abuse of dominant positions in light of the 
rule of reason certainly looks more appropriate both from a legal and economic 
standpoint, because it is in line with the effect-based rationale of the provision. 
However, the uncertainty linked to a full-blown market analysis can severely increase 
the administrative costs of the rule. 
Such costs appear enormous when efficiency considerations are involved, as they 
require a prognosis that may not perfectly fit the legal analysis as traditionally 
structured. 
It follows that it is necessary to determine a standard of proof that capitalizes on 
economic teaching and is workable at the same time. A proposal at this regard will be 
put forward and examined in the next Chapter. 
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CHAPTER V 
 
 
The welfare effects of parallel trade: a workable rule of reason 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Rules can be of two types: per se rules and rule of reason793. The former embody a 
presumption of lawfulness or unlawfulness794 of certain corporate conducts that does not 
admit rebuttal and is not accompanied by market analysis. The latter, instead, consists of 
a full-blown analysis and admits the prohibition of business practices only if their 
negative effects in the market are demonstrated795. 
The choice between the two should solve a tripartite trade off. Legal rules should 
provide clear principles to facilitate compliance and enforcement, prevent the retroactive 
imposition of liability and minimize error costs. Errors can be of three types: type I 
errors, which identify the problem of over-inclusiveness of the legal rules; type II errors, 
which concern the opposite problem, the under-inclusiveness of the legal rules; and type 
III errors, which look into the administrative costs of a rule, including the costs of 
diminished legal certainty796. 
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793 For an articulated analysis of per se rules and the rule of reason, see BLACK, Per se Rules and Rules of Reason: 
What are They?, in ECLR, 1997, no. 3, p. 145 et seq., where it demonstrates that there is not a single rule of 
reason, nor one per se rule, but there are several rules of reason and numerous per se rules. 
794 With reference to US competition law, per se rules originally pertain to ‘unreasonableness of the restraint of 
trade’. 
795 The dichotomy per se versus rule of reason taken from US competition law appears to be à la mode in the 
recent literature. However, it should be recalled that under EU competition law it might be more 
appropriate to talk of restrictions by object and by effect for bilateral agreements and of burden of proof of 
the objective justification of abusive conducts from dominant companies. Similarly see WHISH, Competition 
Law, cit., p. 112-113. 
796 In 1928, two statisticians, Jerzy Neyman and Egon Pearson, discussed the problems associated with 
‘deciding whether or not a particular sample may be judged as likely to have been randomly drawn from a 
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Neither of the mentioned rules is capable of optimally striking this trade off. 
Per se rules increase legal certainty but are rigid and bring the risk of incurring in 
type I or type II errors. 
For instance, per se illegality of anticompetitive corporate conducts may lead to 
prohibit overall efficient corporate practices (type I errors). 
Per se legality, on the other hand, may entail the permission of overall 
anticompetitive business practices (type II errors). 
A rule of reason minimizes both risks through a case-by-case analysis that serves 
the purpose of prohibiting only those business practices that harm consumers. Still, it 
requires a full-blown market analysis that may increase the administrative costs of its 
implementation (type III error). 
In the choice of the policy to be adopted with respect to parallel trade, the design 
of competition law rules plays an important role. 
The consideration of agreements impeding cross border exports as hardcore 
restrictions to competition that cannot be exempted, and the substantial application of 
the prohibition for companies in a dominant position to refuse to supply as a per se rule, 
have practically given full citizenship to a potentially unlimited parallel trade under 
European law. 
It is claimed that this formalistic approach to the enforcement of competition 
law rules does not take into account the trade off that parallel trade may create. 
On the one hand, a significant amount of parallel trade is capable of exerting 
pressure on prices of original products and of entailing short-term savings for 
consumers. On the other hand, it may have an impact on manufacturers’ profits and 
potentially also on R&D investments. In this way, it may harm consumers in the long 
term. 
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certain population’ and identified ‘two sources of error’: Type I error, also known as an ‘error of the first 
kind’, or a ‘false positive’, in statistics is the error of rejecting a null hypothesis when it is actually true. 
Plainly speaking, it occurs when we are observing a difference when in truth there is none. Type I error can 
be viewed as the error of excessive credulity. Type II error, also known as an ‘error of the second kind’, or a 
‘false negative’, is the error of failing to reject a null hypothesis when it is in fact not true. In other words, 
this is the error of failing to observe a difference when in truth there is one. Type II error can be viewed as 
the error of excessive scepticism. 
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This makes clear that a per se prohibition of restrictions to parallel trade that does 
not take into account this trade off may risk prohibiting corporate practices that on the 
whole are efficient. 
Similarly, per se legitimacy of restrictions to parallel trade based on efficiency 
grounds does not seem to be appropriate either, given that the stimulus to innovation 
provided by the increased resources devoted to R&D may be negligible, with respect to 
the anticompetitive effects entailed in the market. 
That is why a rule of reason should be favoured to identify the circumstances 
where restrictions to parallel trade should be prohibited and those where they could be 
permitted. 
The implementation of the rule of reason and its workability has been debated 
for long time among US scholars. 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Standard Oil case, first, and the Chicago 
Board of Trade case, later, established the ‘rule of reason’ as the legal standard pursuant 
which Section I of the Sherman Act should be enforced. Still, many US judges feared the 
‘sea of doubt’ entailed by a test established by some Courts that required the 
consideration of any reasonable argument for a restraint, and rejected it as unsuitable for 
judicial decision-making. 
The opacity of the boundaries of the rule of reason impeded lower Courts to fully 
apply the standard and urged them to replace it with a net of per se rules applying to all 
restraints having ‘pernicious effect on competition and lack of redeeming value’. 
Between 1940 and 1970s, the scepticism for the rule of reason grew until the standard 
was defined ‘an euphemism for an endless economic inquiry resulting in a defence verdict’797. 
Theoretically judges were free to approve any restraint that looked reasonable. De facto, 
however, per se rules dominated for over three decades and almost eclipsed the rule of 
reason. 
From the ‘70s, the Supreme Court backed away from the prevalence of per se 
rules and, starting with Sylvania, expanded again the scope of the rule of reason. This 
step-back was favoured by the progress of economic thinking over the functioning of 
markets and firms. As a result, per se rules and the rule of reason were considered 
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797 See BLECHER, The Schwinn Case. An Example of a Genuine Commitment to Antitrust Law, in AJL, 1975, no. 44, 
p. 550, at 553. 
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complementary categories of antitrust analysis designed to form a judgement about the 
competitive significance of a corporate conduct. 
From then on, the rule of reason little by little expanded its coverage and became 
the default standard for decision making in antitrust cases. The recent Leegin case, where 
the Supreme Court re-examined the per se rule against resale price maintenance 
witnesses this expansion. 
Its scope and application, however, still does not assume clear-cut contours. 
Some per se rules have been sometimes subjected to exceptions. At the same time, some 
Courts developed an ‘abbreviated’ rule of reason, or ‘quick look’, in order to avoid a 
full-blown market analysis. Such shortcut have been applied differently though: 
sometimes the defendant is required to establish a pro-competitive justification and if he 
succeeds the Court reverts to a full-blown market analysis; some other times the plaintiff 
must make some showing of actual anticompetitive effects, without a full-blown market 
analysis. 
Also, whilst most judicial statements establish that in the application of the rule 
of reason Courts must balance pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects, prominent 
commentators admit that this standard is not practical and, as a matter of fact, Courts 
avoid it by shifting burdens of proof on parties (Hovenkamp, 1998). 
For this reason, even after such long history of theoretical refinement and 
practical application, commentators feel that some unanswered issues still remain, 
especially with regards to how the burden of proof is shared between parties (as it 
appears from the issue no. 68 of the Antitrust Law Journal entirely devoted to this topic in 
2000-2001). 
Indeed, the analysis of the case law shows that the outcome of court cases is 
definitely a matter of proof. As it has been affirmed: “[…] the outcome-determinative event 
is not the precise measurement itself but the judgement-call that determined where the ball was 
placed.”798 The same goes with the examination of the effects of a business practice: the 
outcome of a case depends on the ability of parties to convince the judge. 
It follows that the way the burden of proof is shared between parties and what is 
the standard of proof is crucial in this context. 
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798 See LEARY, Efficiencies and Antitrust: A Story of Ongoing Evolution, Address delivered at the ABA Antitrust 
Section 2002 Fall Forum in Washington D.C. (Nov. 8, 2002), reporting the words of Don Baker. 
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To my knowledge, very little has been said about how facts are proven and 
evidence presented before ECJ. The literature on the burden of proof is quite dated 
(Weber, 1967; Andre, 1967; Lasok, 1982; Brealey, 1985), and recently only Nazzini (2006) 
examined this issue in the context of the modernisation of European competition law. 
The aim of this Chapter is to formulate a proposal about how parties may 
discharge their burden of proof in relation to their claims in parallel trade cases. This 
should help European Courts in applying an effect-based approach to business practices 
restrictive of parallel trade, in order to form learned judgments that avoid type I and 
type II errors, as well as a costly full-blown analysis. 
Section 1 examines what is the scope for a full-blown welfare analysis under 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU respectively. It reviews the old theoretical debate about the 
existence of a rule of reason under Article 101(1) TFEU through the analysis of the 
literature on the issue and of the related case law. A similar analysis is performed under 
Article 102 TFEU, especially in light of the recent debate about the modernization of this 
provision. 
Section 2 implements a theoretical welfare analysis of the impact of parallel trade 
on consumers, by weighing anticompetitive against pro-competitive aspects in the 
scrutiny of restrictions to parallel trade under competition law rules. The main 
theoretical references used are the Williamsonian trade off analysis and the Kaplow test. 
These methods of analysis are analysed in their practical feasibility, particularly 
in view of the prognostic analysis entailed by the integration of efficiency considerations 
into the antitrust analysis. 
The acknowledged difficulty related to the balancing of anticompetitive effects 
and efficiencies provides ground to formulate in Section 3 a proposal about how these 
difficulties can be overcome. The answer to the question is found in the instruments of 
the law of evidence: the Section analyses how the burden of proof can be allocated 
between parties, in order to help judges perform the balancing between the 
anticompetitive and the pro-competitive effects of restrictions to parallel trade, and what 
is the standard of proof to be fulfilled in this discharging. 
Section 4 concludes. 
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1. The rule of reason 
The term ‘rule of reason’ was not developed in the area of EU competition law, 
but it was imported from US antitrust jurisprudence. 
Already in the first years of application of the Section I of Sherman Act, US 
judges felt that applying literally the wording of the provision prohibiting ‘every restraint 
on trade’ would have not been appropriate, as all business practices have a restrictive 
effect on trade and other parties’ economic freedom799. 
The first refinement of the rule came with the judgment in U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & 
Steel Co., where Justice Taft stated that restrictive clauses that are ancillary to a lawful 
agreement should not be prohibited800. 
In Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. U.S., the US Supreme Court asserted that the 
Section I of the Sherman Act does not prohibit tout court any agreement restrictive of 
trade but only those that entail unreasonable restraints of competition. What still 
remained unclear was what ‘unreasonable’ meant, though. 
In Chicago Board of Trade, the Court clarified that a restraint of trade was 
unreasonable when capable of producing monopolistic effects in the market, i.e. when it 
would yield higher prices and lower output801. 
Accordingly, an economic analysis was necessary to understand the possible 
effects of an agreement in the market. Only when such agreement was found to be 
overall anti-competitive it would fall within the scope of the provision. Otherwise, it 
would have not been caught by the prohibition802. 
This way of applying Section I of the Sherman act was termed the ‘rule of 
reason’. 
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799 The most eloquent objection to a strict application of Section I of the Sherman Act came with the well-
known statement from Justice Brandeis in the case Board of Trade of the City of Chicago v. United States, 1918, 
246 U.S. para. 231, at para. 238: “[E]very agreement concerning trade, every regulation of trade, restraints. To bind, 
to restrain, is of their essence”. Compare Bork’s point that an agreement to eliminate competition is basic to 
almost every productive unit consisting of more than one person: BORK, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se 
Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, in Yale Law Journal, 1966, II, no. 75, p. 377. 
800 U.S. v. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co., 1898, 85 F. 271. 
801 See Chicago Board of Trade, cit., where Justice Brandeis stated that “the true test of legality is whether the 
restraint imposed is such that as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether is such that it 
may suppress or even destroy competition”. 
802 See National Society of Professional Engineers v U.S., 1978, 435 US 679, 691-2, where the Court said that 
“[T]he inquiry mandated by the Rule of reason is whether the challenged agreement is one that promotes competition or 
one that suppresses competition… [T]he purpose of the analysis is to form a judgement about the competitive 
significance of the restraint”. 
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This approach showed immediately its virtues and its drawbacks, though. While 
it crafted a very flexible application of the provision that allowed to perform an 
assessment that took into account the reality of markets, it also required an ‘incredibly 
complicated and prolonged economic investigation into the entire history of the industry 
involved’803. 
In order to lighten the excess of work, the Supreme Court developed a series of 
per se rules. The latter establish that certain business practices, like price fixing or market 
sharing, are presumed to be restrictive of trade and, for this reason, are automatically 
prohibited, without that further economic analysis is needed. It may well be that also 
those practices have positive effects on competition, but economic theory is generally 
unanimous in affirming that the chances that this happens are so limited that concerns 
on judicial economy and certainty of law justify a strict approach. 
Accordingly, US Courts make a distinction between hardcore restrictions and all 
other restrictions. The former are presumed iuris et de iure to harm competition, and 
rebuttal is not admitted. 
But also these rules were subject to refinement, because practice showed that the 
risk of catching pro-competitive agreement within the scope of the prohibition was high. 
In the past two decades, Courts restricted the scope of per se rules and expanded 
that of the rule of reason, as the improved understanding of economics of competition 
gave the possibility to Courts to better perform economic analysis in a wider range of 
cases804. 
Following this trend, in Continental TV Inc v. GTE Sylvania the Supreme Court 
reversed its previous orientation towards the per se prohibition of non-price vertical 
restraints and called for a case-by-case evaluation of all the circumstances that may 
determine the likely effect of these agreements in the market805. On this view, only 

803 See Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United States, 1958, 356 U.S. 1. 
804 WHISH and SUFRIN, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, cit., pp. 7 and 9 affirms that the influence of the 
Chicago School has spurred a drift away from the per se illegality, while the rule of reason is playing a larger 
role. 
805 See Continental TV Inc v. GTE Sylvania, 1977, 433 US 36, where the Court accepted that a location clause in 
a distribution agreement should no longer be subjected to a per se rule, but rather should be analysed under 
the rule of reason. See also Broadcast Music v. CSB, 1979, 441 U.S. 1, 99, S. Ct. 1551, where the Court said that 
one has first to look into efficiency rationales before condemning an agreement as per se illegal. Among the 
economists who spurred this view, see TELSER, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, in Journal of Law 
and Economy, 1960, no. 3, p. 86. Among the legal scholars see AREEDA and TURNER, Antitrust Law, 2003, Vol. 
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agreements that have a “pernicious effect on competition and lack […] any redeeming virtue” 
are caught by the prohibition806. 
The distinction between per rules and rule of reason was further elaborated in 
Polygram (The Three Tenors)807, where the Court distinguished between agreements that 
appear harmful, and therefore are ‘inherently suspect’, and those that are not obviously 
harmful. In order to assess the effect of the latter in the market, according to the Court it 
is necessary to conduct a full market analysis to see whether there are anti-competitive 
effects resulting from the agreement and whether these are outweighed by pro-
competitive effects. 
As of the ‘70s, the rule of reason little by little expanded its coverage and became 
the default standard for decision making in antitrust cases, as the recent decision in 
Leegin, where the Supreme Court re-examined the per se rule against resale price 
maintenance, shows808. 
The appealing of the effect-based approach captured the attention of EU 
competition law scholars, who, as of the ‘80s, engaged in an intense debate about the 
application of the rule of reason to the assessment under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
1.1 Is there a ‘European rule of reason’? 
In Europe, the term ‘rule of reason’ has been somewhat confusingly used to 
indicate both the netting of positive and negative effects deriving from a business 
practice, as applied by the described US jurisprudence, and the consideration of non-
competition objectives in the antitrust assessment. 
Typically, the latter are generally identified with integration and completion of 
the internal market, economic and social cohesion, regional development and 
environmental protection. 
These policy objectives generally play an important role under EU law and often 
enter the legal assessment of alleged anti-competitive practices or agreements. As a 
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VII, ch. 15; HOVENKAMP, Federal Antitrust Policy: the Law of Competition and its Practice, 2000, paras. 6.4, 11.1, 
11.2 and 11.6, supporting the approach of the Court.  
806 See Northern pacific Railway v. US, 1958, 356 US 1, 5. 
807 See In the Matter of Polygram Holding Inc. v. FTC, 2005, 426 F. 3d 29. 
808 See, for instance, the recent case Leegin Creative Leather Prods., Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., decided in 2007, where the 
U.S. Supreme Court overruled its 1911 precedent declaring vertical minimum resale price maintenance to be 
per se illegal. The Court held that the practice should instead be examined on a case-by-case basis under the 
rule of reason. 
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result, the freedom of movement principle and, more recently also competition law 
rules, are usually enforced so that appropriate room is left to national policies that 
deserve particular protection under the ‘philosophy’ of the EU809. 
This ‘balancing’ may sometimes reduce the scope of antitrust enforcement 
actions. 
For instance, in the field of free movement of goods, starting with Dassonville and 
Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ established that certain national measures aimed at protecting 
national public policy are shielded from the application of the rules of the internal 
market. This principle has been recently applied to competition law rules in Wouters810, 
where the consideration of policy objectives other than the welfare of consumers led the 
Court to favour a more limited application of competition law, with the purpose of 
accommodating other policy concerns. 
In other cases, the consideration of these additional goals may expand the scope 
of competition law rules beyond the traditional purpose of protecting the competitive 
process and promoting allocative and productive efficiency811. The achievement of the 
internal market is, for instance, the reason why distribution agreements that entail 
absolute territorial protection are prohibited no matter if there are pro-competitive 
effects812. 
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809 See MONTI, Article 81 and Public Policy, cit., p. 1057, for an analysis of how public policy considerations 
could play a role under Art. 101(3) TFEU.  
810 See ECJ, 19 February 2002, in case C-309/99 JCJ Wouters, JW Savelbergh and Price Waterhouse Belasting-
adviserurs BV v. Algemene van de Nederlandse Orde van Advocaten, where the ECJ held that the Dutch 
regulation of the Bar Council of the Netherlands prohibiting lawyers from entering into partnerships with 
accountants did not infringe Art. 101(1) TFEU. In doing so, it adopted a test whereby it balanced anti-
competitive effects of collusive behaviour against both pro-competitive effects and non-
economic/regulatory objectives. See NAZZINI, Article 81 between time present and time past, cit., p. 521 et seq., 
where he supports the view that the Court applied a bi-dimensional test: it balanced the anti-competitive 
effects of the practice against both the pro-competitive effects and mandatory requirements of national 
public policy. He rejected both views that Wouters incorporates the Cassis de Dijon test, thereby rendering 
consistent the application of Articles 34 and 101 TFEU (as proposed by MONTI, Article 81 and Public Policy, 
cit., p. 1087), and that the Court carried out an assessment of the anticompetitive effects of the regulations in 
the legal and economic context (See MANZINI, The European Rule of Reason Crossing the Sea of Doubt, in ECLR, 
2002, no. 23(8), p. 396-7). 
811 See WHISH and SUFRIN, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, cit., p. 13, where he states that Treaty itself, 
through the backdrop of the former Articles 2 and 3(g) EC (now replaced in substance by Article 3 TEU and 
Article 3(1)(b) TFEU) against which competition rules have been developed, envisages an expansive role for 
competition rules and that there is potential for growth in several directions. 
812 And in fact, WHISH and SUFRIN, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, cit., p. 14, suggests that the integration 
function attributed to EU competition law justifies the centralized enforcement of competition rules, instead 
of leaving this task to single Member States. 
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It is widely acknowledged among legal scholars that the rule of reason, intended 
in the last mentioned sense, under EU competition law exists and it is a legal principle813. 
The question, however, remains whether there exists under European 
competition law the balancing between anti-competitive effects and pro-competitive 
effects of a business practice as it is applied by US jurisprudence. 
1.1.1 The rule of reason under Article 101 TFEU: the old doctrinal 
debate 
This issue has been highly debated among European scholars. In particular, the 
academic debate focused on Article 101 TFEU and the excessive formalistic application 
of this provision from the Commission. 
Generally the conditions set forth by Article 101(1) TFEU are met when a) a 
restriction of competition exists, b) it is appreciable and c) affects trade between Member 
States. As already mentioned in Chapter III, before the beginning of the modernisation 
process of Article 101 TFEU, the Commission had considered a restraint to commercial 
freedom as a restraint to competition. This enlarged very much the scope of Article 
101(1) TFEU and triggered the criticism of a large part of the legal scholars814. 
In particular, many scholars claimed that Article 101(1) TFEU should have been 
applied in a more flexible way and that a rule of reason should be foreseen within the 
first paragraph of the provision815. 
This triggered a long interpretative debate among scholars about the scope of the 
first paragraph of the provision under discussion. The choice was between a narrow and 
a broad scope: according to the former, only agreements that on net are anticompetitive 
should fall within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU; according to the latter, the presence 
of anticompetitive effects, without the consideration of pro-competitive effects, is 
sufficient to catch the agreement under the mentioned provision. 
The procedural pendant of a substantive interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU as 
a narrow provision is that the Commission bears the burden of proving that, taken as a 
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813 See SCHRAUWEN, In Defence of Public Interest: The Rule of Reason, in The Rule of Reason, cit., p. 1; GORMLEY, 
The Genesis of the Rule of Reason in the Free Movement of Goods, in The Rule of Reason, cit., p. 21. 
814 Cf. supra fn 593 in Chapter III. 
815 See JOLIET, The Rule of Reason in Antitrust Law: American, German and Common Market Laws in Comparative 
Perspective, 1966; KORAH, The Rise and Fall of Provisional Validity, cit., p. 320; SCHECHTER, The rule of Reason in 
European Competition Law, in Legal Issues of Economics Integration, 1982, p. 11; FORRESTER and NORALL, The 
laicization of Community Law, cit., p. 11; STEINDORF, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, in CMLR, 1984, p. 621; 
KON, Article 85, para. 3: a Case for application by National Courts, in CMLR, 1982, p. 541. 
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whole, the agreement is anti-competitive. In other words, not only does it have to show 
that competition is restricted, but also that there are no pro-competitive effects arising 
from the agreement capable of justifying it. 
In this case, the Commission’s burden of proof is much harder, because it has to 
prove that no pro-competitive effects that outweigh the anticompetitive ones are 
produced by the agreement. Symmetrically, defendants do not bear any burden of proof 
in relation to the existence of efficiency gains, if not disproving what their counterpart 
put forward. 
If, on the contrary, Article 101(1) TFEU is considered to be broad, i.e. to catch all 
agreements that have anticompetitive effects no matter the existence of efficiencies, it is 
easier for the antitrust authority to make the case and allege the anticompetitiveness of 
the practice. And once the Commission has affirmed the anticompetitiveness of the 
agreement, it is up to the defendant to prove that the agreement has pro-competitive 
effects that outweigh the negative effects. It follows that the procedural pendant of such 
interpretation of the provision is that defendants have the burden of proof of the 
existence of pro-competitive effects. 
Supporting the existence of a rule of reason within Article 101(1) TFEU was 
obviously leading to opt for the allocation of the burden of proof of both anticompetitive 
and pro-competitive effects on the Commission. 
Scholars endorsing this view adduced that this interpretation avoided the 
procedural paradox generated by the division of competences in the application of 
Article 101 TFEU. Whilst the first paragraph of the provision had (and has) a direct effect 
and could (and can) be enforced directly by national Courts, the Commission kept an 
exclusive role in applying the third paragraph. The result was that national Courts 
where subject to the obligation of applying Article 101(1) TFEU, but they were unable to 
apply Article 101(3) TFEU, because the Commission had the ‘monopoly’ over it816. 
Therefore, companies were basically denied the possibility of exemptions domestically. 
The procedural need of having a rule of reason within Article 101(1) TFEU 
ceased when the EC Regulation no. 1/2003 came into force. The Regulation, besides 
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816 See the First Regulation Implementing Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, 1962, OJ Special Edition 204/62. 
 298 
establishing that defendant have to prove the existence of efficiencies817, also turned the 
centralised system based on ex ante authorisation of anticompetitive agreements into a 
decentralised system based on the legal exemption provided for by Article 101(3) TFEU. 
Thus the latter is now applicable also by national Courts818. 
But the view that Article 101(1) TFEU contains a rule of reason was backed also 
by substantive arguments. The ECJ in the case Société Technique Minière refused a 
formalistic application of the provision contained in Article 101(1) TFEU and affirmed 
that in the legal assessment of an agreement account of the economic and the legal 
context should be taken, by comparing the effects of the agreement on existing and 
potential competition with a situation in the absence of the agreement819. More 
specifically, under the framework of a counterfactual analysis, parties’ market power, 
and consequently the relevant market, the market structure, interbrand competition, and 
opportunities for the parties to launch a new product should be analysed. 
The Commission has later on adopted this approach. In the Guidelines on Art. 
81(3) EC, it indicated that the anticompetitiveness of an agreement arises from the 
damaging effects of the latter in terms of output, prices, innovation and the variety or 
quality of goods and services820. 
This approach has some commonalities with the analysis under the Section I of 
the Sherman Act. However, there are several reasons that may cast doubts about the tout 
court application of the US rule of reason to Article 101(1) TFEU821. 
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817 See Article 2 of EC Reg. 1/2003 reads as following: “In any national or Community proceedings for the 
application of Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 
of the Treaty shall rest on the party or the authority alleging the infringement. The undertaking or association of 
undertakings claiming the benefit of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of 
that paragraph are fulfilled”. 
818 The rationale of this change rests on the need to reduce the administrative workload to which the 
Commission was subject and to share the burden of the application of competition rules among the 
Commission and the national authorities, in order to grant an effective enforcement. Also, it affirmed that, 
while a centralised system was needed in the first phase of the application of the system of competition 
rules, in order to ensure an adequate learning process and uniformity in the practice. See the White Paper on 
Modernisation of the Rules Implementing Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty Commission Programme No. 
99/027, 1999, OJ C 132/1, of the Commission (hereinafter the ‘White Paper’). 
819 See Société Technique Minière, para. 71. 
820 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3), para. 16 and 24.  
821 See WHISH, Competition Law, cit., p. 125, where he says that calling for reasonable judgements from EU 
Courts does not equal to implement the US rule of reason under EU competition law. In his opinion such 
claim is misplaced because the structure of Art. 101 TFEU and the additional goal of market integration, for 
instance, render EU law materially different in many respects from US law; see WILS, Rule of Reason: une régle 
raisonnable en droit communautaire?, in Cahiers de Droit Europeén, 1990, p. 27, who affirms that “La règle de 
raison est une invitation aux tribunaux fédéraux américains d’utiliser leur méthodes traditionnelles de common law 
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First of all, Article 101 TFEU, differently from Section 1 of the Sherman Act, has a 
bifurcate structure822. 
The first paragraph contains a list of agreements, hardcore restrictions that are 
considered anticompetitive by object, which are automatically caught under Article 
101(1) TFEU and declared void pursuant Article 101(2) TFEU. Such declaration of 
anticompetitiveness comes notwithstanding the existence of any effect in the market823. 
For instance, the Commission is aware of the fact that the effect of vertical 
restraints on consumer welfare is ambiguous: in fact, it is not obvious that consumer 
surplus is diminished when intrabrand competition is reduced through vertical 
restraints, because supra-competitive profits may be already dissipated by interbrand 
competition. Actually, the implementation of an exclusivity contract may help a new 
competitor penetrating the relevant market and thus increase interbrand competition824. 
Still, a legal assessment of vertical restraints solely based on economic 
considerations does not bear market integration overtones. On the contrary, the Treaty 
imposes that whenever this principle is violated, agreements are immediately 
considered void. That is why these types of agreement may look similar to the 
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pour développer le droit en l’appliquant”. This, together with the fact that European competition law - 
differently from US - does not a unique objective, would pose a substantial obstacle in importing the rule of 
reason under EU law. 
822 See WHISH and SUFRIN, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, cit., p. 1; similarly MANZINI, The European Rule of 
Reason Crossing the Sea of Doubt, cit., p. 392; GYSELEN, The Substantive Test, cit., p. 189, affirms that the dual 
structure of Article 101 TFEU provides two filters for the assessment of agreements. 
823 By this expression it is not in any way meant that agreements whose object is anticompetitive are not 
analysed in their economic and legal context. The latter, on the contrary, serves the purpose of ascertaining 
the anticompetitiveness of the object. However, recall that anticompetitiveness by object embodies a 
presumption of anticompetitive effects that renders futile any concrete ascertainment of the effects of the 
agreement in the market. 
824 This was the argument of the Chicago School to claim that vertical restraints should be considered per se 
legal. See BORK, The Rule of Reason and the Per Se Concept, cit., p. 375; COMANOR, Vertical Territorial and 
Customer Restrictions: White Motor and its Aftermath, Harv. L. Rev., 1968, no. 81, p. 1419; ID., Vertical Price 
Fizing, Vertical Market Restrictions, and the New Antitrust Policy, Harv. L. Rev., 1985, no. 98, p. 983, at 986-90. 
Other strand of the literature argued for presumptive illegality: see LOUIS, Vertical Distributional Restraints 
Under Schwinn and Sylvania: An Argument for the Continuing Use of a Partial Per Se Approach, Mich. L. Rev., 
1976, no. 75, p. 275; POSNER, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections on the Sylvania Decision, 
in University of Chicago Law Review, 1977, no. 45, p. 1; ID., The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of Restricted 
Distribution: Per Se Legality, in University of Chicago Law Review, 1981, no. 48, p. 6; PITOFSKY, The Sylvania Case: 
Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, in Colum. L. Rev., 1978, no. 78, p. 1; ID., In Defense of 
Discounters: The No-Frills Case for a Per Se Rule Against Vertical Price Fixing, in Geo. L.J., 1983, no. 71, p. 1487. A 
third strand proposed the presumptive legality of vertical restraints: see MEEHAN and LARNER, A Proposed 
Rule of Reason for Vertical Restraints on Competition, 26 Antitrust Bulletin, 1981, p. 185. 
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‘inherently suspect’ business practices that are prohibited per se under US antitrust 
law825. 
However, there is an important difference between the EU and the US 
competition law: practices prohibited per se do not have the possibility to be exempted 
under the latter system. On the contrary, European Courts – as already said826 - 
expressly rejected the per se approach and established that any agreement that is 
anticompetitive can be exempted if it meets the criteria established in Article 101(3) 
TFEU827. 
1.1.2 The rule of reason under Article 101 TFEU: the case law 
But what differentiates the most the European provision from its American 
equivalent is the presence of the third paragraph itself. This was, in fact, the main 
objection of the ECJ in Métropole Télévision to the view that Article 101(1) TFEU 
incorporates a rule of reason828. 
In that occasion the ECJ dispelled all doubts that emerged in the literature about 
the substantive interpretation of Article 101(1) TFEU829. The Court, confronted with the 
question of whether there exists a rule of reason under Article 101(1) TFEU, held that 
there is no such balancing under this provision830. Also, it affirmed that any pro-
competitive effect and its balancing with the anticompetitive effect brought about by an 
agreement should be taken into account in the application of the third paragraph of the 
provision under examination, otherwise that provision would be useless. 
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825 See MANZINI, The European Rule of Reason, cit., p. 395, but see contra ROBERTSON, What is a Restriction of 
Competition? The implications of the CFI’s Judgement in O2 Germany and the Rule of Reason, in ECLR, 2007, no. 4, 
p. 261, who says that the fact that these types of agreements are immediately caught under the provision 
does not derive from the wording but rather from their nature. In this sense he sees a parallelism with the 
per se rules under US antitrust law.  
826 Cf. fn 632 supra. 
827 It should be noted that this difference may be sometimes more theoretical than practical. The overview of 
the Commission practice has shown, in fact, that hardcore restrictions are unlikely to pass the individual 
exemption because they lack the indispensability criterion and they do not fall within the block exemption. 
See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC, para. 46. 
828 See Métropole Télévision, para. 73 et seq. 
829 However, ROBERTSON, What is a Restriction of Competition?, cit., p. 257, affirms that from some sentences of 
the decision it appears that the Court is pre-supposing the net effect of the agreement without balancing. 
830 See Métropole, para. 72 et seq., at para. 74-76. The defendants had argued that the EU Commission should 
have applied the rule of reason, according to which an anti-competitive practice falls outside the Article 
101(1) TFEU if it has more positive effects than negative effects on competition on a given market (See para. 
68 of the GC ruling). Such approach has been confirmed in O2 Germany, where the Court at para. 69 said 
taking into account the competitive situation existing in the absence of the agreement “did not amount to 
carrying out an assessment of pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects of the agreement and this applying a rule of 
reason, which the Community judicature has not deemed to have its place under Article 81(1) EC”. 
 301
The ECJ clarified that Société Technique Minière did not intend to incorporate a 
rule of reason in EU competition law, and it explicitly said that calling ‘rule of reason’ 
that trend in the case law that affirmed that not each and every agreement restricting the 
freedom of action of one or more parties is necessarily caught by the prohibition under 
Article 101(1) TFEU, is a mistake. The consideration of the economic context is functional 
to understand what are the negative and the positive effects entailed by a business 
practice to competition. But it is not the balancing exercise itself. 
In Metro831, the Court affirmed that qualitative conditions of selective distribution 
networks might in some cases fall outside the scope of the provision. Such conclusion 
was driven by the fact that the structure of the market did not preclude the existence of 
various channels of distribution capable of satisfying consumers’ needs, despite the 
absence of price competition among distributors. In other words, price rigidity (absence 
of intra-brand competition) was balanced against high quality and technology products 
and adequate distribution system (promotion of inter-brand competition)832. However, 
the language of the judgement does not allow drawing a clear distinction of where such 
balancing was taking place833. It follows that, while a balancing of anti-competitive and 
pro-competitive facets of an agreement is possible, the question is rather where it takes 
place834. 
In Pronuptia, the Court said explicitly that the effect on competition deriving 
from a franchise agreement has to be based on the economic context where the latter 
takes place and made a list of ancillary restraints that do not violate Article 101(1) TFEU 
because of their objective necessity with respect to the attainment of a lawful agreement. 
The Court considered that market sharing may be necessitated by the willingness to 
penetrate a new market. In that case, the agreement may qualify for the exception under 
the third paragraph of the provision835. Accordingly, it follows that this is where the 
balancing should take place. 
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831 See ECJ, 25 October 1977, in case C-26/76 Metro SB-Großmarkte v Commission. 
832 However, the Court also evaluated the existence of a justification by weighing the price rigidity created 
by the selective distribution system against the other improvements, like the maintenance of standards of 
service. This is by definition an economic evaluation. 
833 See para. 20-22 of the Metro ruling. 
834 Cf. HILDEBRAND, The Role of Economic Analysis in the EC Competition Rules, 2002, p. 218; ID., Economic 
Analyses of Vertical Agreements: a Self-Assessment, 2005, p. 220. 
835 See Pronuptia, para. 24. 
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In Nungesser836, the Court held that an exclusive licence of maize seeds to plant 
breeders in the form of an open licence, whereby the owner merely undertakes not to 
grant other licences in the same territory and not compete himself there, does not violate 
Article 101(1) TFEU. In fact, such licences do not affect third parties’ rights, such as 
parallel traders or licensees for other territories. In addition, the Court considered that 
the protection of plant breeders’ rights was important in view of the nature of the 
product, whose development require substantial investments, and in view of the 
dissemination of new technology and of the promotion of competition in the EU through 
new products. Therefore, it appears that this judgement contains a hint of a partial rule 
of reason within the first paragraph of the provision837. 
The same goes for the Gøttrup-Klim case838: in the analysis under the first 
paragraph of the provision under examination the Court explicitly weighed beneficial 
effects against the adverse effects on competition of a provision in the statute of a 
cooperative purchasing association prohibiting members from joining other association 
in direct competition with it839. 
In Delimitis the Court was confronted again with an exclusivity agreement that, 
however, had an impact only on interbrand competition. Intrabrand competition was not 
an issue there. On the contrary, what was discussed was the possible foreclosure effect 
towards potential entrants of a beer supply contract between a brewer and a publican 
whereby the latter agreed to buy a minimum quantity of beer and soft drinks from the 
brewer or a company nominated by it. 
In that case, the ECJ established a two-parts test: first the assessment focuses on 
the relevant market where undertakings operate, in order to ascertain whether entry is 
difficult or not, and then it is checked to which extent the agreement contributes to 
render entry difficult840. If the latter is significant, the agreement is caught by the 
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836 See ECJ, 8 June 1982, in case C-258/78 Nungesser v Commission, para. 54-58, where the Court said that a 
total prohibition of an open exclusive licence was contrary to the interest of the Community, because this 
would hamper the dissemination of new technology; but the Court also reaffirmed the prohibition of 
exclusive licences that confer absolute territorial protection against parallel imports, because they partition 
the common market. 
837 See Nungesser, para. 56-57. 
838 See ECJ, 5 December 1994, in case C-250/92 Gøttrup-Klim e.a. Grovvareforeninger v Dansk Landbrugs 
Grovvareselskab AmbA. 
839 See Gøttrup-Klim, para. 34 and 35. 
840 See Delimitis, para. 27. 
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prohibition. The Court applied a kind of rule of reason that led to analyse the relevant 
market, parties’ market position, the number and the size of producers, the degree of 
saturation, customer fidelity, and consumption trends841. 
The test has been further refined in Mars/Langnese and it became a tripartite test: 
the Commission checks whether the agreement has an appreciable negative effect on 
competition or trade between Member States, whether other agreements entered by the 
undertaking have this effect, and whether other agreements existing in the relevant 
market have this effect. If one of the questions is answered in the affirmative, then the 
agreement falls within the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. In the specific case the 
agreement was an exclusive purchase obligation and was found to have an indirect 
effect on competition between suppliers of goods throughout the relevant market, 
because it made more difficult to set up an independent distribution system for new 
entrants that wanted to access the market842. 
In the O2 Germany case the GC reaffirmed the approach of Métropole and said 
that pro-competitive and anti-competitive effects are not to be balanced under Article 
101(1) TFEU. Nevertheless, the Court de facto conducted a balancing, because it 
performed an analysis of the conditions of actual and potential competition in the 
absence of the agreement843. 
1.1.3 Recent contributions to the academic debate 
In the interpretation of the jurisprudential strand initiated by Société Technique 
Minière scholars are still divided. Prominent commentators did not see in that case law a 
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841 See Delimitis, para. 15-26. 
842 See para. 72 of the Mars/Langnese judgement. 
843 See para. 78-79 of the O2 Germany ruling: “[…] it was unlikely that O2 would have been able, individually, 
without the agreement, to ensure from the outset better coverage, quality and transmission rates for 3G services, to roll 
out a network and launch 3G services rapidly, to penetrate the relevant wholesale and retail markets and therefore be an 
effective competitor […] Such considerations, which imply some uncertainty concerning the competitive situation and, 
in particular, as regards O2’s position in the absence of the agreement, show that the presence of O2 on the 3G 
communications market could not be taken for granted, as the Commission had assumed, and that an examination in 
this respect was necessary not only for the purposes of granting an exemption but, prior to that, for the purposes of the 
economic analysis of the effects of the agreement on the competitive situation determining the applicability of Article 81 
EC”. In the view of MARQUIS, O2 (Germany) v Commission and the Exotic Mysteries of Article 81(1) EC, in E.L. 
Rev., 2007, no. 2, p. 29-47, this is equal to weigh positive and negative effects on competition, i.e. to apply a 
rule of reason. 
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rule of reason in a US sense844; others saw an application of the rule of reason limited to 
the concept of ‘ancillary restraints’845; others saw the hint of a balancing exercise846. 
From the above-described case law, it appears that European Courts sometimes 
have been applying some balancing in the context of the first paragraph of Article 101(1) 
TFEU. However, to equate this analysis to the US-style rule of reason appears excessive. 
The term indicates a much broader analysis under US law: it comprised the 
identification of the relevant market, the assessment of entry barriers, of buyer power 
and of general market circumstances, etc. and it involves a multitude of factors used to 
analyse whether a restraint adversely affects competition in the interbrand market and 
the justifications establishing a legitimate objective and the necessity of the restraint to 
achieve that objective. In Europe, the assessment done by European Courts so far 
involved the identification of the relevant product market, but, for instance, the 
assessment of market power needs more refinement. The analysis of interbrand 
competition, of justifications establishing a legitimate objective and the necessity of 
restraints can be found in some judgments only847. 
This does not mean that there is no balancing under Article 101(1) TFEU. 
The Court in Métropole said that not all the economic analysis should take place 
under the first paragraph of the provision. This still leaves us with the question of 
whether there is some economic analysis to be performed there848. 
Some legal scholars put forward the hypothesis that certain types of efficiencies 
are relevant under Article 101(1) TFEU and others are considered under Article 101(3) 
TFEU849. But which ones? 
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844 WHISH and SUFRIN, Article 85 and the Rule of Reason, cit., p. 28, affirm that those restrictions were permitted 
in application of the doctrine of objective necessity. As a confirmation, see the para. 26-28 of the Metro 
judgement: “Provided that the obligations undertaken in connection with such safeguards do not exceed the objective 
in view they do not in themselves constitute a restriction on competition but are the corollary of the principal obligation 
and contribute to its fulfilment. […] Since such obligations concerning verification do not exceed what is necessary for 
the attainment of their objective and in so far as they are designed to ensure respect for the conditions of appointment 
regarding the criteria as to technical qualifications, they fall outside the scope of Article 85(1) whereas, in so far as they 
guarantee the fulfilment of more stringent obligations, they will fall within the terms of the prohibition contained in 
Article 85(1), unless they together with the principal obligation to which they are related are exempted where 
appropriate pursuant to Article 85(3).” 
845 WILS, Rule of Reason, cit., p. 59, affirms that the case law on ancillary restraints can be seen as very limited 
application of the rule of reason. 
846 NICOLAIDES, The Balancing Myth, cit., p. 123; NAZZINI, Article 81 EC between Time Present and Time Past, cit; 
ROBERTSON, What is a Restriction of Competition?, cit.; MARQUIS, O2 Germany v. Commission and the exotic 
mysteries of Article 81(1) EC, in E.L. Rev, 2007, no. 32, p. 29. 
847 See HILDEBRAND, Economic Analyses of Vertical Agreements, cit., p. 220. 
848 ODUDU, A New Economic Approach To Article 81(1)?, in European Law Review, 2002, no. 27, p. 104. 
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As underlined in the literature, there are two categories of pro-competitive effects 
that may be considered850: welfare-enhancing effects, which impact on output and price, 
namely interbrand competition and market power, and agreement-specific efficiencies, 
like cost reduction and incentive to innovate851. 
The first category should be part of the analysis performed under the first 
paragraph of the provision under examination, in order to detect those elements in the 
agreement that are capable of influencing consumer welfare, both in a positive and in a 
negative way. The second category is represented by dynamic efficiencies and should be 
assessed under the third paragraph852. 
So, for instance, it has been suggested that the analysis under Article 101(1) TFEU 
aims at looking whether the agreement has the effect of bringing about (interbrand) 
competition that benefits consumers and that would have not emerged otherwise 
(namely, without restricting intrabrand competition)853. 
Instead, under Article 101(3) TFEU agreement-specific efficiencies are 
considered. Such analysis takes place once it is verified that the agreement is detrimental 
to consumer welfare and it is performed in order to ascertain that such efficiencies 
compensate the deadweight loss caused to consumers. It follows that the ultimate effects 

849 See ODUDU, A New Economic Approach To Article 81(1)?, cit., p. 104, who says that the first paragraph is 
concerned with allocative efficiency, while the third is about productive efficiency. In his opinion, restriction 
to competition and allocative inefficiency are synonymous.  
850 See NAZZINI, Article 81 EC between time present and time past, cit., p. 519. 
851 See MARQUIS, O2 Germany v. Commission, cit., p. 38, who says that the third paragraph does not refer to the 
elements of price and output. He also adds that this approach appears to be confirmed by the new approach 
taken by the Commission towards the enforcement of Art. 102 TFEU: in the Discussion Paper, for instance, 
the Commission consider foreclosure as taking place if the maintenance f the degree of competition still 
existing in the market or the growth of that competition is likely to be hindered. In the view of the author, 
only if this analysis reveals market distortive effects, the efficiency defence would come into consideration. 
Similarly see NICOLAIDES, The Balancing Myth, cit., p. 142, affirms that the third paragraph of the provision 
provides for a series of filters rather than for a balancing test. 
852 However, such approach seems to be circular to ROBERTSON, What is a Restriction to Competition?, cit., p. 
262, because under Art. 101(3) TFEU efficiencies are relevant as long as they benefit consumers, i.e. they 
entail lower prices, larger output, better variety and quality, criteria that should guide the analysis under 
Art. 101(1) TFEU instead. For this reason, he suggested that all the effects of an agreement should be taken 
into account under the first paragraph of the provision under examination and that the analysis under third 
paragraph should be devoted to the consideration of non-competition goals, i.e. public policy objectives. 
853 See NICOLAIDES, The Balancing Myth, cit., p. 133-134, who says that the first paragraph of Art. 101 TFEU 
checks whether there is an increase of competition through joint action against potential competition. Note 
that this interpretation is only partially supported by EU case law. For instance, in Pronuptia the Court said 
at para. 24 that “It is of course possible that a prospective franchisee would not take the risk of becoming part of the 
chain, investing his own money, paying a relatively high entry fee and undertaking to pay a substantial annual 
royalty, unless he could hope, thanks to a degree of protection against competition on the part of the franchisor and 
other franchisees, that his business would be profitable. That consideration, however, is relevant only to an examination 
of the agreement in the light of the conditions laid down in Article 85(3).” 
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on consumers of a restriction to competition, if any, are established in the third 
paragraph of the provision. 
In light of this, it can be affirmed that a sort of ‘European structured rule of 
reason’ can be envisaged in Article 101 TFEU as a whole854. 
1.1.4 The rule of reason under Article 102 TFEU 
Drawing on the well-known concept of ‘competition in the merits’, Article 102 
TFEU case law indicates that a dominant undertaking, having a “special responsibility not 
to allow its conduct to impair undistorted competition on the common market”855, must refrain 
from any action that would lead to an increase in its market power and harm 
competitors856. 
The special responsibility principle, however, cannot be interpreted as imposing a 
general positive obligation on the dominant undertaking not to distort the competitive 
process, because it would impair firms’ incentive to compete in the market to win 
customers with better products or through improved production process, i.e. through 
methods of ‘normal competition’857. 
As the ECJ affirmed in Hoffmann-La Roche, the essence of abuse of dominant 
position lies in the weakening of the competitive process through recourse of methods 
different from those which condition normal competition in products or services858. 
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854 See MARQUIS, O2 Germany v Commission, cit, p. 46, who says that the real difference between EU and US 
competition law is that consumer welfare test and productive/dynamic efficiencies are weighed all together 
in the latter system, while under the former Art. 101(3) TFEU takes care of efficiencies. 
855 See Michelin I, at para. 57. The origin of the ‘special responsibility’ traces back to the ordoliberal principle 
according to which firms which are price makers, i.e. which posses (significant) market power, do not only 
have a negative obligation (i.e. not to commit certain harmful acts), but also a positive obligation (i.e. to 
behave as if they do not have any market power). 
856 The concept of ‘normal competition’ was mentioned for the first time in Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 120 and 
then referred as ‘competition on quality’ by the ECJ, V ch., 3 July 1991, in case C-62/86, AKZO Chemie BV v 
Commission of the European Communities, para. 70 and 81, and as ‘competition in the merits’ by the GC, 7 
October 1999, in case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v Commission, para. 111. As it was affirmed by the ECJ, 13 
February 1979, in case C-85/76, Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. AG v Commission of the European Communities, para. 
91, a dominant firm does not compete on the merits when “through recourse to methods different from those 
which condition normal competition in products or services on the basis of the transactions of commercial operators, 
has the effect of hindering the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the market or the growth of that 
competition”. An abuse is therefore a commercial practice that cannot be regarded as normal competition 
based on quality and price and which has the effect of restricting competition. Or, according to the 
formulation put forward by the GC in Michelin II, para. 107 and 110, any conduct that lacks objective 
economic justification. 
857 See JONES and SUFRIN, EC Competition Law. Text, Cases and Materials, 2007, p. 280. 
858 See Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 91. 
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This definition generated what it is known as a ‘two-tier analysis’: for a conduct 
to amount to an abuse it must a) affect the economic opportunities of rivals in the market, 
and b) not be performance-based competition859. 
The first part of the two-tier analysis is directed at ascertaining the likelihood of 
foreclosure; the second part looks at the existence of objective justifications or objective 
necessity to the anticompetitive conduct. 
As previously indicated860, the Commission and the European Courts have 
seldom found a dominant company’s conduct that had the effect of hindering 
competition to be proportionate and justified. As a result, the prohibition of abuse of 
dominant position has been almost always applied as a per se provision. This has 
generated the criticisms of large part of legal and economic scholars, who claimed that 
the provision should have been also applied according to a rule of reason, and triggered 
the second wave of the process of modernization of European competition law861. 
In the wake of this process, the AG Colomer in Syfait II, as well as AG Jacobs 
previously in Syfait I, claimed that the legal analysis under Article 102 TFEU cannot be 
discharged by simply limiting the analysis to the first tier, i.e. to the likelihood of 
foreclosure862. 
According to the AG Colomer, a careful reading of Article 102 TFEU does not 
support such an interpretation. First of all, the wording of Article 102 TFEU, as already 
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859 The identification of a two-tier analysis in the context of Article 102 TFEU can be traced back to Prof. 
Ulmer who acknowledged the necessary existence of two features in order for a conduct to be considered 
abusive: the significant impairment of the opportunities of rivals on the market, and the absence of a 
performance-based competition. It should be noted that this analysis is very much similar to examination of 
monopolisation practices under Section 2 of the Sherman Act: according to United States v. Grinnel (see 384 
US 563, 570-1, 1966), it should be distinguished between the wilful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly 
power and its development as a consequence of a superior product. See LOEWENTHAL, The defence of 
‘Objective Justification’ in the Application of Article 82 EC, cit., p. 458. 
860 See infra Section 1.2 in this Chapter. 
861 See KORAH, An Introductory Guide to EC Competition Law and Practice, 2000; GYSELEN, Vertical restraints in 
the distribution process: Strength and weakness of the free rider rationale under EEC competition law, in CML Rev., 
1984, no. 21, p. 647; HAWK, System failure: Vertical restraints and EC competition law, in CML Rev., 1995, no. 32, 
p. 973; EHLERMANN AND ATANASIU, European Competition Law Annual 2000: The Modernisation of EC Antitrust 
Policy, 2001; WESSELING, The Modernisation of EC Antitrust Law, 2000; WHISH and SUFRIN. Community 
competition law: Notification and individual exemption – Goodbye to all that, in HAYTON, Law’s Future(s), 2000, p. 
150; EHLERMANN, The modernization of EC antitrust policy: A legal and cultural revolution, in CML Rev., 2000, no. 
37, p. 537; EHLERMANN and ATANASIU, European Competition Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of Dominant 
Position?, 2005; GCLC Research Papers on Article 82 EC, 2005; O’DONOGHUE, Verbalizing a General Test for 
Exclusionary Conduct under Article 82 EC, in EHLERMANN and MARQUIS, European Competition Law Annual 2007: 
A Reformed Approach to Article 82 EC, 2008, p. 15. 
862 See para. 54-62 of AG Colomer’s opinion. 
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pointed, clearly suggests that the conduct of a dominant undertaking amounts to an 
abuse when two cumulative conditions are present, namely (a) existence of the 
exclusionary effect in the downstream market, and (b) the absence of any valid and 
proportionate objective justification for the refusal863. 
The reasoning goes that, if the conduct of the dominant undertaking was 
presumed to be abusive iuris et de iure, without looking into the existence of possible 
objective justifications, such undertaking would be deprived of its right of defence. The 
examples of abusive conducts listed in Article 102 TFEU, no. 2, lett. a)-d) should be 
regarded as presumptions iuris tantum, which admit rebuttal864. 
Indeed, a per se approach would run counter to the principle under the EU 
jurisprudence that requires a careful assessment of the legal and economic context in 
which the infringement was put in place. 
Also, it would also conflict with the rationale of Article 102 TFEU, whose 
objective is to preserve the competitive process, as a means to protect consumer 
welfare865. 
Therefore, when applying the consumer welfare test, the assessment of dominant 
undertakings’ conduct should consider whether such a conduct, besides harming 
consumers, also yields benefits to them. To this purpose, a potential reduction of 
consumer welfare should be weighed also against the possible efficiency gains resulting 
from that conduct. 
Accordingly, as both AG Colomer and AG Jacobs recognized866, a dominant 
pharmaceutical company does not necessarily abuse its dominant position by refusing to 
supply in full the orders placed with it by wholesalers, even when such a refusal has an 
anticompetitive effect, i.e. when this hinders parallel trade. It should still be assessed 
whether such a conduct that looks prima facie anticompetitive can be objectively justified, 
among other things, by the existence of efficiency gains for consumers867. 
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863 See Télémarketing, para. 26. 
864 See para. 69 of AG Colomer’s opinion. 
865 Cf. the analysis performed in Section 4.1 in Chapter IV. 
866 See para. 69 of AG Jacobs’ opinion and para. 76 of AG Colomer’s opinion. 
867 While previous jurisprudence was reticent in admitting economic justifications to dominant companies’ 
behaviours – see Tetra Pack and General Motors - more recently the Courts are relaxing such approach. For 
instance, as AG Colomer recalled, the GC, Ch. II, extended composition, 25 June 1998, in case T-219/99, 
British Airways v Commission, did not consider a system of rebates connected to the achievement of sales 
targets from travel agencies as per se abusive and conceded the company to economically justify the practice. 
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It follows that either a dominant firm’s conduct is abusive, or it is not. And the 
presence of an objective justification or of efficiencies must be taken into account when 
assessing such conduct, following a dialectic process. 
On this basis it appears correct to infer that Article 102 TFEU does not contain per 
se prohibitions of abusive conducts from dominant undertakings and that its seeming 
unitary structure does not preclude the balancing of anticompetitive and pro-competitive 
effects. 
The above interpretative analysis supports the conclusion that the structure of 
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU abstractly permits the application of an effect-based 
examination of competition law rules to anticompetitive business practices. The question 
of how such examination should take place is going to be examined in the following 
Sections. 
 
 
2. The impact of parallel trade on welfare 
As it emerges from the analysis previously conducted, a rule of reason cannot 
consist of the mere acknowledgement of dynamic efficiencies deriving from an 
anticompetitive business practice. This would be of a limited significance from a 
consumer welfare perspective. In considering the welfare implications of a conduct 
restricting parallel trade, for instance, it is necessary to consider two dimensions: the 
short-term harm to consumers (or losses in static efficiency) and the long-term benefits 
to consumers (or gains in dynamic efficiency)868. It follows that after having 
acknowledged and measured the effect of price competition on dynamic efficiency, it is 
necessary to weight it against the dead weigh loss created by impeding such 
competition869. 
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868 On this point see VERNON, Examining the link, cit., p. 10; BRUNNELL, Appropriability in Antitrust: How Much 
is Enough?, cit., p. 20, who affirmed that ‘[a]cknowledging that the long-term welfare effects of dynamic efficiency 
gains are far more significant than short-term allocative efficiency gains does not mean that any possible diminution in 
incentives, no matter how remote, ought to trump significant and certain short-term gains’. 
869 See the opinion of the AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal, at para. 295: “It must first be borne in mind in this 
context that, in the present case, the disadvantages in terms of efficiency resulting from the limitation of parallel trade 
constitute the ‘debit side’ of the overall assessment in terms of competition to be carried out under Article 81(3) EC, 
whereas the ‘credit side’ includes, in particular, the advantages in terms of efficiency which may result from promoting 
technical progress.” The AG supported the GC on this issue and affirmed that the Commission did not carry 
out a balancing exercise in respect of the assumed gains and losses in efficiency. 
 310 
For instance, a dominant undertaking’s conduct preventing parallel trade, like the 
refusal to supply wholesalers who engage in exporting activities, would involve some 
static efficiency loss and some dynamic efficiency gain. Ex post static efficiency gains, 
which can be maximised by an obligation to deal, should be weighed against the ex ante 
dynamic efficiency gains, which could be preserved by not imposing such a duty870. On 
this view, a refusal to supply would fall within the scope of Article 102 TFEU where 
static losses prevail over dynamic gains.  
Symmetrically, as suggested by the GC in the Glaxo case, the analysis of the legal 
and economic context in which an agreement restrictive of parallel trade on 
pharmaceuticals takes place should have taken into account the loss in efficiency 
associated with parallel trade and a gain in efficiency associated with the agreement. 
Secondly, the disadvantages in terms of efficiency resulting from the limitation of 
parallel trade should be weighed against the advantages in terms of efficiency that may 
result from promoting technical progress871. 
2.1 Balancing the anti- and pro-competitive effects of a business practice 
Two important theoretical tools have been developed in the economic literature 
to perform this balance: the Williamson’s trade off872 and the Kaplow test873. 
The first one assesses both the anticompetitive and the pro-competitive effects of 
a business practice and weigh the latter against the former. When the harm caused to 
competition is likely to be offset by the efficiencies produced by the conduct, a corporate 
practice that produces anticompetitive effects in the market is considered legitimate. 
The second test looks at the proportion between the profits earned by the 
defendant through its anticompetitive practice and the harm caused. The first term of 
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870 See the Guidance on Art. 82 at para. 89 et seq. where the Commission shows to be aware of the possible 
adverse effect on the incentive to innovate from companies if they are imposed a pervasive duty to supply. 
The Commission, in fact, affirms that careful attention should be placed when imposing a duty to deal on 
companies: this should happen always by taking into account that it is necessary to allow the dominant 
undertaking to realise an adequate return on the investment required to develop its business, thus 
generating incentives to continue to invest in the future, taking into account the risk of failed projects into 
account. For this reason, defendants should demonstrate the negative impact that the obligation to supply 
would have on its level of innovation.  
871 See para. 267-301 of the Glaxo ruling. Furthermore, see para. 294-295 of the opinion of the AG Trstenjac in 
the appeal to that ruling, where she affirms that in the overall assessment in terms of competition to be 
carried out under Article 101(3) TFEU, the anticompetitive effects constitute the ‘debit side’ of such 
assessment, whereas efficiencies are the ‘credit side’. She also adds that such a balancing might be 
performed also on the assumption that efficiencies were achieved. 
872 WILLIAMSON, Economies as an antitrust defence: The welfare Tradeoffs, in Am. Econ. Rev., 1968, no. 58, p. 18. 
873 See KAPLOW, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection, cit., p. 1829 et seq. 
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comparison considered under antitrust law only represents just part of the total costs 
society has to bear by permitting the anticompetitive behaviour from the company874. 
However, when also patent law is considered, the profits of the company serve as the 
reward, and therefore the incentive, for the innovative activity conducted by the 
company. 
Inventive activity should take place at the least cost possible for society. To this 
purpose, the reward the patentee receives from the practice should be balanced against 
the resulting monopoly dead weigh loss: 
km/DWL 875 
In a competition policy that aims at maximising consumer welfare, this second 
test appears more appropriate, because it allows corporate practices that overall sacrifice 
the lower social cost in the short run. 
So, to determine whether a policy encouraging parallel trade on pharmaceuticals 
is, on net, good or bad for social welfare, it is necessary to know what is the effect on the 
reward (read: profits) of the innovator, namely in terms of dynamic efficiency, and on 
consumer welfare, namely in terms of static efficiency. 
To this purpose, let us consider the graph below: the level of the industry’s 
average pharmaceutical profit margin (in the horizontal axis) is fundamental. If the 
current position is point B, then it is possible that parallel trade will be welfare 
enhancing, as long as industry profit margins are not pushed below the level associated 
with minimum total social cost. If instead the company’s profits are currently at this 
minimum point, or to the left of it (e.g., point A), then parallel trade will have a negative 
effect on social welfare876. 
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874 See POSNER, The Social Costs of Monopoly, cit., p. 807. 
875 The nominator represents the patentee incremental reward. K reflects the fact that not all the monopoly 
profits are invested in innovation but just a percentage, which in the pharmaceutical market is around 15% 
of gross profits. The denominator represents the incremental loss for society deriving from the 
anticompetitive practice. 
876 See VERNON, Examining the Link, cit., p. 11, where he affirms also that the policy could move industry 
margins below the minimum point and still be welfare enhancing: so long as margins were not displaced 
too far below the minimum point, and the sum of static and dynamic efficiency costs still declined relative to 
their pre-policy level. 
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Graph 9: The net effect of parallel trade on welfare 
 
 
In the former case, restrictions to parallel trade from the company should not be 
allowed. In the latter, they may be allowed. 
This approach is in line with the process of abandonment of the per se 
competition law rules in favour of a rule of reason, through the use of economic analysis, 
where Courts are called to apply a case-by-case standard that weighs the extent to which 
the anticompetitive practices contribute to innovation incentives against the allocative 
inefficiency created877. 
Notwithstanding the theoretical appealing of this test, especially in the academic 
world, Courts have never applied it so far. The reason is that the application of the test 
rests on a full-blown market analysis that Courts often avoid to perform. 
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877 Note, however, that Kaplow himself admitted that a pure case-by-case approach may not be the most 
appropriate approach to solve the patent-antitrust paradox. In fact, outcomes of different cases are not 
necessarily autonomous. On the contrary, they can be interdependent. In other words, the same amount of 
reward that is considered appropriate for the innovator can be given both by permitting a series of practices 
that were prohibited or by prohibiting others that were previously allowed. See KAPLOW, The Patent-
Antitrust Intersection, cit., p. 1844-1845. 
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2.2 The workability of the rule of reason 
It is often claimed that Courts are not able to perform the balancing exercise 
required by the rule of reason, given that it involves a measurement that so far has never 
been performed878. 
For instance, the feasibility of the Wiliamsonian trade off has been questioned 
several times as ‘enormously complex and impossible to implement’879 for two concurrent 
reasons: the difficulty of the concrete assessment of efficiencies, which often involve 
obscure predictions about the future, and the weight of the latter with the 
anticompetitive effects, which requires the comparison between two differently 
measured objects. 
The Williamsonian trade off, in fact, requires an arbitrage between elements that 
cannot be compared in similar terms: the analysis of the anticompetitive effects is 
necessarily ex post, while dynamic efficiencies are about ex ante incentive to invest in 
innovation and thus necessarily have not materialised yet. Thus, whilst dynamic 
efficiencies are praised as providing the greatest potential enhancement of social welfare, 
still they are the least measurable880. For this reason, their quantification may be 
problematic and may trigger the scepticism of Courts and the legal community881. 
In fact, Courts may not be skilled enough to appreciate the dynamic efficiency 
facets of a business practice, especially in absence of any theoretical framework that 
shows how much appropriability is necessary to spur innovation, and of any empirical 
evidence that establishes a clear correlation between profits, R&D intensity and 
innovative output882. 
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878 See HOVENKAMP, Antitrust Law, 1998, p. 302, where he affirms that the “set of rough judgements we make in 
antitrust litigation does not even come close to this ‘balancing’ metaphor. Indeed, most courts do not define a unit of 
measurement in which the quantities to be balanced can be measured’. 
879 See FISHER and LANDE, Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, in Calif. L. Rev., 1983, no. 71, p. 1582. 
880 See BORK, The Antitrust Paradox, cit., p. 123, 124, 126-127, where he affirms that the consideration of 
efficiency in a trade-off analysis may promote some uncertainty, because the related quantification is likely 
to become an intractable subject for litigation; CARLTON and GERTNER, Intellectual Property, Antitrust and 
Strategic Behaviour, in Innovation Pol. & Econ., 2003, no. 9, p. 42, where it is affirmed that innovation is 
intangible, uncertain, immeasurable and often even unobservable, except ex post. 
881 Legal scholars expressed their scepticism about the feasibility of this quantification exercise, as 
production efficiencies are too complex to be contemplated and measured. See RAPP, The Misapplication of the 
Innovation Market Approach to Merger Analysis, in Antitrust L.J., 1995, no. 64, p. 19, at 27. The difficulties of 
performing an entire full-blown analysis are discussed in Chapter V. 
882 See BOURGEOIS and BOCKEN, Guidelines on the Application of Article 81(3) of the EC Treaty or How to Restrict a 
Restriction, in Legal issues of Economic Integration, 2005, no. 32(2), p. 121, where it is affirmed that few courts 
are sufficiently proficient in economics to consider the evidence of efficiency gains submitted by companies 
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The Kaplow test suffers similar drawbacks, as the author himself 
acknowledged883. 
These difficulties appear harder when the assessment involves parallel trade of 
pharmaceuticals. As pointed in the previous Chapter, proving the link between parallel 
trade and innovation, and performing a balancing exercise between anticompetitive 
effects and efficiencies, is very difficult, especially in the pharmaceutical market884.  
The existence of savings can be reasonably presumed. However, their magnitude 
is not always entirely measurable, especially with regards to indirect savings. Moreover, 
whilst it is possible to envisage that a large amount of parallel trade may decrease the 
profits so much that investments in innovation may sharply decline, by how much this 
would decline and what would be impact on innovation is not easily measurable. 
The empirical analysis necessary to determine the outcome of the inquiry under 
competition law rules is thus complex. The features of the market, the role of regulation 
and the significant time lag between the possible reason of the erosion of profits and the 
effect on innovation turn the identification of a robust causality link between parallel 
trade and rate of pharmaceutical innovation into a hard task885. 
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under Article 101(3) TFEU in order for them to seek the exemption; similarly ELHAUGE, Defining Better 
Monopolisation Standards, cit., p. 307; FLETCHER, ‘The Reform of Article 82: Recommendations on Key Policy 
Objectives”, Speech at the Competition Law Forum in Brussels, where he affirmed that the balancing exercise 
goes beyond the skills of antitrust agencies and creates uncertainty from the firms’ side. See also PITOFSKY, 
Policy objectives of competition law and enforcement, in EHLERMANN and ATANASIU, The European Competition 
Law Annual 2003: What is an Abuse of a Dominant Position?, p. 127, who said that there are limits to what 
enforcement officials, judges can deal with in terms of economic complexity; MELAMED, Exclusionary Conduct 
Under the Antitrust Laws: Balancing, Sacrifice, and Refusals to Deal, in Berkeley Technology Law Journal, 2005, no. 
20, p. 1249; O’DONOGHUE, Verbalizing a General Test for Exclusionary Conduct under Article 82 EC, cit., p. 15, 
who affirmed that ‘A firm embarking on a course of unilateral conduct ex ante may be unsure as to where the balance 
between pro-competitive and anticompetitive aspects lies and when such effects will materialize. Much would depend 
on the effect of a practice on the dominant firm’s rivals, which the dominant firm cannot generally be expected to know. 
Moreover, what a firm expects ex ante may of course turn out to be different from what occurs ex post’. 
883 See KAPLOW, The Patent-Antitrust Intersection, cit., p. 1842-1845. 
884 Technological opportunity determines the productivity of R&D, as WESLEY and COHEN, Empirical Studies 
in Innovative Activity, in Handbook f the Economics of Innovation and Technological change, p. 182, 197, show, 
while appropriability determines the fraction of the returns from R&D that the innovator is able to retain, as 
KLEVORIK ET AL., On the Sources and Significance of Interindustry Differences in Technological Opportunities, 
Cowles Foundation Discussion Paper no. 1052, 1993. The relationship between these two variables and 
innovation is complex, because they are endogenous to the market structure. That is, they affect innovation 
but are also affected by innovation. CARRIER, Two puzzles resolved, cit., p. 408, affirms that to the extent that 
the two variables affect market structure, they weaken the link between market structure and innovation. 
885 SOAMES and LEBRUN, Self-Assessment, a New Burden of Proof for Companies, in Lawyers Europe, 2004, believe 
that it should not be too difficult for parties to show efficiency gains; however, see RBB ECONOMICS, Art or 
Science? Assessing Efficiencies under the Commission’s Article 81(3) Notice, Brief 15, available at 
http://www.rbbecon.com/publications/downloads/rbb_brief15.pdf, who say that quantifiable savings are 
achieved with horizontal agreements, while vertical agreements tend to generate benefits in terms of 
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In other words, a rule of reason that bans or allows parallel trade depending on 
the effects of the latter on the market is certainly justified from the perspective of a 
competition law that looks at the maximisation of consumer welfare. But the uncertainty 
of the effects of parallel trade, especially in the long term, is such that the related inquiry 
may become too costly. 
Courts generally avoid this impasse by attributing the burden of proof to parties. 
In particular, Courts distribute the burden of proof in relation to the facts that may help 
them ascertain the existence of the facts alleged by parties. 
A correct allocation of the burden of proof, thus, rests crucial, as it determines the 
dialectic between the parties in the proof of facts: what evidence should be submitted by 
defendants and by the Commission in support of their arguments and what is the 
standard of review of such material from judges. 
The success, or the failure, of a party in discharging the burden of proof 
determines the anticompetitiveness judgement over a business practice. The latter is 
going to be more adherent to market reality the more the parties adduce evidence that 
strengthens their allegations. 
This procedural activity can be effectively stimulated by carefully formulated 
presumptions. As proposed by a prominent scholar, for instance, presumptions should 
be framed on the basis of the rationale of the involved provisions and on the 
accumulated experience about markets’ functioning. And they should be rebuttable on 
the basis of empirical evidence showing the inapplicability of the general rule to the 
particular case886. In this way parties are called to overcome such presumptions by 
presenting sufficient evidence to rebut them. Such activity helps the judge form a 
learned judgement over the effects of the business practice in the market. 
Otherwise stated, a proper division of the burden of proof between parties may 
serve the purpose of rendering the effect-based analysis truly operational. This could 
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enhanced investments and improved quality, which are difficult to quantify and to prove. Similarly VAN 
DEN BERGH and CAMESASCA, European Competition Law, cit., p. 31, also say that in case of dynamic efficiency, 
it must be shown that new and improved products create sufficient value for consumers. While in the case 
of productive efficiency it is possible to measure them, it seems very difficult to assign values to dynamic 
efficiencies. 
886 See AREEDA, Antitrust Law as Industrial Policy: Should Judges and Juries Make it?, in TEECE, Antitrust 
Competitiveness and Innovation, 1992, p. 40. 
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facilitate the implementation of open-ended legal rules that provide the necessary clarity 
without sacrificing flexibility.  
 
3. Sharing the burden to lighten it: the law of evidence and the rule of reason 
This sub-section is going to analyse how the burden of proof works under EU 
law, and especially how this is shared between parties in competition cases. This 
overview on the principles of the law of evidence is aimed at identifying the tools that 
parties could use to discharge their burden of proof in parallel trade cases. 
3.1 The legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of proof 
The burden of proof is the burden borne by a party of persuading a Court of the 
truth of a fact alleged. If the party bearing this burden fails to do so, it will not be able to 
secure an outcome favourable to his interests in relation to the whole or part of the 
proceedings887. 
In the law of evidence, there are two fundamental burdens: the legal burden of 
proof and the burden of adducing evidence. The latter encompasses the so-called 
‘evidential’ burden and the ‘tactical’ burden. 
The evidential burden of proof requires any proponent of a fact to adduce 
sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the existence of such fact. Its discharging is 
very important, because the failure to raise an issue about the existence of the claimed 
fact determines the dismissal of the claim888. 
The evidential burden is generally borne first by the claimant. Until then, the 
defendant may remain idle. But when the claimant has adduced the evidence that would 
entitle the judge to find the fact, the defendant is urged to adduce counterevidence in 
rebuttal. If the defendant succeeds in this task, the claimant is called again to produce 
new evidence to strengthen its case (so-called ‘duty of going forward’). 
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887 See GENIN-MERIC, Droit de la Preuve: l’Example Français, in LEBRE DE FREITAS, The Law of Evidence in the 
European Union, p. 159-160. 
888 Different, but often identified with the evidential burden of proof, is the burden of making a definite 
allegation. The latter expresses the duty of setting out precise facts relied upon in support of his claim and of 
presenting his conclusions in an unequivocal manner. The difference with the evidential burden is that the 
failure to discharge the latter leads to the rejection of the claim, although admissible in principle, as 
unfounded. On the contrary, the failure to discharge the burden of making a definite allegation leads to the 
inadmissibility of the claim, because the Court risks giving judgement ultra petita and the defendant does 
not know precisely what he is charged of. 
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The evidential burden of proof has been developed in the Common Law system. 
However, also Civil Law systems recognised the existence of circumstances where one 
of the parties may rely on the evidential burden, although this generally assumes the 
characteristics of inferential reasoning based on presumptions889 or prima facie evidence. 
The inferential reasoning is based on the assumption that if certain facts are established, 
other facts can normally be presumed. The establishment of a prima facie case consists of 
the presentation of evidence that, if left uncontradicted and unexplained, could be 
accepted as a proof890. 
The tactical burden is borne by the opponents after the proponent has discharged 
the evidential burden. The essential difference with the evidential burden is that the 
latter is imposed by law, whilst the tactical burden stems from procedural strategy. It is, 
in fact, up to the counterpart to produce counterevidence, if it does not want to incur in 
the risk of having the facts adduced by the other party accepted. 
The evidential burden is different from the legal burden of proof, or burden of 
persuasion, where the party has not only to come forward with evidence that supports 
its claim, but also to actually prove it (actori incumbit probatio)891. 
Not only must the applicant adduce sufficient evidence to raise an issue as to the 
existence of facts essential to his claim, he also bear the legal burden of ultimately 
proving those facts to the satisfaction of the Court. 
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889 The term ‘presumption’ is generally used to indicate a presumption of law, i.e. inferences as to the 
existence of a fact on the basis of certain evidence that the tribunal is compelled to draw. However, the term 
also includes presumptions of fact. Under European competition law, the presumptions of law are quite 
rare, because judgements are not formally binding in subsequent cases. It follows that any ‘presumption’ 
established in EU jurisprudence is a presumption of fact. 
890 In German law, according to the Anscheinbeweis, when a party has produced evidence of the facts in issue, 
the other party bears the burden of adducing counterevidence in rebuttal, if it does not want to bear the risk 
of having those facts established by the judge. Under administrative French law the evidential burden of 
proof is defined as the act of ‘faire un commencement de preuve’ and ‘faire naître le doute dans l’esprit du juge’ as 
to the substance of his allegations. Also, in civil law, judges can evaluate presented evidence through a 
‘raisonnement probatoire (tendant à cerner la vérité) érigé en mode de preuve’. In Italy, courts can inferentially 
draw the existence of a fact at stake from the evidence adduced by a party according to the model of 
‘presunzioni giurisprudenziali’. Symmetrically, the other party is urged to adduce counter evidence to avoid 
that the judge operates such inference. 
891 On the basis of this distinction, concerns about the definition of the burden of proof for efficiencies in the 
EU Commission Discussion Paper have been expressed at a public debate held on June 2006 in Brussels. 
There it was objected that an obligation for the undertaking to prove efficiency gains is contrary to Art. 2 of 
the Regulation 1/2003, which requires the authority to prove the alleged abuse. For theories supporting 
such interpretation see NAZZINI, The wood began to move, cit., p. 51. However, see ROUSSEVA, Objective 
Justification and Article 82 EC in the Era of Modernisation, in BELLAMY and CHILD, European Community Law of 
Competition, 2008, p. 427, where she affirms that this concern is unfounded because it does not match the 
principle of negativa non sunt probanda. 
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In sum, each party bears the legal burden of proof and the burden of adducing 
evidence as to his own allegations. The defendant also bears the burden of disproving of 
the applicant’s claim. Such tactical burden can be shifted back to the applicant, once 
discharged by the defendant. 
The distinction between the legal burden of proof and the evidential burden of 
proof has become part of the EU law of evidence. Article 38 of the Rules of Procedure 
before the ECJ establishes the evidential burden, by requiring the applicant to give the 
‘nature of any evidence founded upon’. The case law confirms the existence of the evidential 
burden of proof: in Italy v. Council, the Court dismissed the applicant’s action for the 
annulment of certain regulations because it has not been ‘able to furnish any proof 
whatsoever in support of its allegations’892. 
Also, European Courts consistently adopt a framework for the evaluation of 
evidence that relies on the establishment of a prima facie case and on the distinction 
between the burden of persuasion and the evidential burden of proof. 
In sum, before the ECJ the burden of proof has three meanings: the legal burden, 
the evidential burden, and tactical burden, although the last two are not technically 
burdens of proof but just burdens of adducing evidence. 
The same evidence may serve to discharge the three burdens. The applicant may 
put forward some evidence that satisfies the evidential burden and make the case prima 
facie. Such evidence, if strengthened by the passivity or the incapability of rebutting such 
evidence of the defendant, may lead to the discharging of the legal burden of proof for 
the applicant. 
The burden of proof should be distinguished from the standard of proof. The 
latter is the level of proof required in a legal action to discharge the burden of proof, i.e. 
the quantity and quality of evidence that is necessary to convince the Court that the 
alleged fact is true. 
These distinctions are very helpful to ascertain how the balancing between 
anticompetitive effects and pro-competitive effects may take place in competition cases. 
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892 See ECJ, 28 August 1978, in case C-166/78 Italy v. Council, para. 16. 
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3.2 The proof of restriction of competition 
In competition cases, the Commission must prove a breach of the Treaty. The 
standard of proof of such violation is high, as it is subject to the burden of persuasion of 
the Court and to the burden of adducing evidence in this respect. 
The defendant does not bear the legal burden of disproving a breach of the 
Treaty, but of proving that the Commission was not correct in its findings. 
If, for instance, the Commission draws conclusions as to the prevailing market 
conditions based on ‘objectively justified evidence from stated sources, the undertaking 
concerned cannot refute the Commission’s findings’ by simply disputing them. It falls on the 
undertaking to adduce arguments and evidence that show ‘why the information used by 
the Commission is inaccurate, why it has not probative value, or why the conclusions drawn by 
the Commission are unsound’.893 Such confutation does not entail a reversal of the burden 
of proof strictu sensu, but just the pressure on the defendant to adduce evidence in 
rebuttal. 
For instance, in United Brands the Commission, inter alia, accused the firm of 
charging excessive prices. The firm challenged this allegation through documents in its 
possession. The Court considered these documents as unreliable and unsupported by 
any other evidence, but at the same time it affirmed that the Commission was not able to 
refute the applicant’s arguments that proved ‘beyond doubt that the basis for the calculation 
adopted by the Commission was open to criticism’894. The Court, therefore, annulled the 
decision in that part, concluding that ‘the Commission has not adduced adequate legal proof of 
the facts and evaluation which formed the foundation of its findings that U.B.C. had infringed 
Article 86’. 
3.2.1 The burden of proof under Article 101(1) TFEU 
Let us apply these principles in the context of agreements restrictive of parallel 
trade895. 
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893 See the opinion of the AG Kokott in case C-105/04 P Nederlandse Federative Vereniging voor de Groothandel 
op Elektrotechnisch Gebied v. Commission, December 8, 2005, para. 73. 
894 See United Brands, para. 265, where the Court referred to ‘the normal operation of the respective burdens of 
adducing evidence’. 
895 I will not consider here the foreclosure analysis to be performed in the context of Art. 102 TFUE, as in the 
examined case law this point was not under discussion. 
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It has been already indicated that an agreement is considered to run against 
Article 101(1) TFEU when it a) restricts competition and b) hinders cross border trade, 
both in an appreciable way896. 
In parallel trade cases, the requirement sub b) does not entail particular issues for 
the proof of its existence. It is, in fact, plain that any ban on export, also when indirectly 
provided by a dual pricing clause, displays its effect on trade covering the whole 
territory of the European Union. 
The requirement sub a) represented the debated issue in the Glaxo case. 
As discussed earlier, such debate focused on whether market mechanisms 
characterising the pharmaceutical sector allow to presume that parallel trade brings 
savings to consumers, and consequently, also that any obstacle to it constitute a 
restriction of competition ‘by object’. 
The analysis conducted in Chapter III showed that in principle there are all the 
economic and legal conditions for having savings from parallel trade. It follows that it is 
not unreasonable to adopt a presumption of effects also in the pharmaceutical sector and 
to consider a restriction to parallel trade anticompetitive in its object. 
Still, being competition law provisions based on the paradigm of consumer 
welfare, the need of giving significance to the effects of an agreement remains, also when 
the restriction is by object. 
In fact, in the application of Article 101 TFEU, it is always open to parties to 
argue that their agreement does not appreciably affect competition. This is conceptually 
different from affirming that the practice is not restrictive of competition. A restriction, 
in fact, can run against Article 101(1) TFEU in its object, but have little effects in the 
market. Put it differently, qualitatively, the agreement is anticompetitive, but 
quantitatively, it may not be. 
Otherwise stated, defendants always have the possibility to demonstrate that, in 
a quantitative sense, a given agreement does not affect competition in a sensible manner, 
namely that actual anticompetitive effects are negligible. I believe that allowing the 
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896 See ECJ, 9 July 1969, in case C-5/69 Franz Völk v S.P.R.L. Ets J. Vervaecke. 
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rebuttal of the presumption emobodied in the category of ‘restriction by object’ serves 
this purpose897. 
Such approach resembles the de minimis doctrine898 and the above considerations 
may suggest its application to hardcore restrictions. 
At present, part II, paragraph 11(3), of the de minimis Notice excludes hardcore 
restrictions, like those blacklisted in the EC Regulation no. 2790/99 on vertical 
agreements, from the scope of the Notice, and it specifically states that export bans 
cannot benefit from the ‘safe harbour’. 
This does not mean that the criterion of ‘non appreciability’ can never be applied 
to hardcore restrictions. The case law confirms that it is possible for an export ban to fall 
outside the scope of the provision because its effects on the market are negligible: the 
landmark case that initiated the de minimis doctrine did concern an export ban. Still, at 
present there is no assurance that the Commission would not proceed against a hardcore 
agreement where the market share of the parties is less than the indicated threshold. 
Whilst these considerations may enrich the debate about the further 
improvement in the policy towards vertical restraints recently started by the 
Commission899, they do not seem to solve the issue at stake, i.e. the crafting of an 
appropriate effect-based approach to antitrust analysis of restrictions of competition. 
Even if one believes that the de minimis doctrine should be applicable also to 
hardcore restraints such as restrictions to parallel trade, the related threshold is 
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897 Cf. AMATO and ELHERMANN, EC Competition Law, p. 164-165, who also suggest that this is a possible 
reading of the Glaxo ruling, where the Court envisages for the first time the possibility of rebutting such 
presumption through the analysis of the economic context. 
898 The de minimis doctrine was first formulated by the ECJ in Völk v. Vervaecke. A German producer of 
washing-machines granted an exclusive distributorship to Vervaecke in Belgium and Luxembourg and 
guaranteed its absolute territorial protection against parallel import. Volk’s market share was negligible and 
the ECJ held that ‘an agreement falls outside the prohibition in Article 81(1) where it has only an insignificant effect 
on the market, taking into account the weak position which the persons concerned have on the market of the product in 
question’. The EU Commission has provided guidance on the de minimis doctrine in a series of Notices, the 
most recent of which was released in 2001 (Notice of Minor Importance Commission’s Policy Newsletter, June 
2001): there the EU Commission set out the aggregate market share threshold for determining when a 
restriction to competition is not appreciable (the ‘safe harbour’): 10 per cent, where the agreement is made 
between undertakings which are actual or potential competitors in the relevant market; 15 per cent, where 
the agreement is made between undertakings which are not actual or potential competitors in the relevant 
market. Agreement above that threshold may have only a negligible effect on competition and for this 
reason they will not be caught. 
899 See the ongoing review of the rules applicable to vertical agreements through a public consultation 
launched by the EU Commission. See 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2009_vertical_agreements/index.html. 
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generally grounded on the weak position of parties in the market, i.e. on the absence of 
market power. Parallel trade on pharmaceuticals generally involves products that are 
covered by patents: the exclusivity right conferred to pharmaceutical companies endows 
them with substantial market power. Therefore, any action undertaken is likely to have a 
potential significant impact on the market. 
This does not mean that appreciability cannot be relevant to the application of 
Article 101(1) TFEU to restrictions to parallel trade in a different way. Judgements of the 
European Courts and decisions of the Commission can be found in which it was 
concluded that a restriction of competition was not appreciable, not because the parties 
to an agreement lacked market power, but because the restriction itself was 
insignificant900. 
I believe that the principles expressed in these cases provide a useful paradigm of 
how the concrete effects of the restriction of parallel trade in the market may acquire 
significance. 
In order to discharge its evidential burden of proof in relation to the 
anticompetitiveness of the agreement, the Commission may adduce evidence about the 
analysis of the legal and economic context showing that the latter allows it to reasonably 
presume a potential restriction of competition, and the consequent violation of Article 
101(1) TFEU, without going into the concrete analysis of the effects of the examined 
agreement on consumers. 
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900 See ECJ, 12 September 2000, in case C-180/98 v. Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische Specialisten, para. 90-97, 
where the ECJ concluded that a decision by medical specialists to set up a pension fund entrusted with the 
management of a supplementary pension scheme did not appreciably affect competition within the common 
market: the cost of the scheme has only a marginal and indirect influence on the final cost of the services that 
they offered. In Irish Banks’ Standing Committee (see the EU Commission decision no. 86/507/EEC of 30 
September 1986 relating to the case IV/31.362 - Irish Banks’ Standing Committee), the Commission decided 
that an agreement on the opening hours of Irish banks did not appreciably restrict competition. Similarly, in 
the mentioned Visa International case, the Commission considered that one of rules of the Visa card system, 
which required a bank to issue a certain number of Visa cards before contracting with retailers for 
processing credit card payments, did not appreciably restrict competition since it improved the utility of the 
card system for traders and did not create significant barriers to entry. In its decision no. 2001/478/EC of 19 
April 2001 relating to the case 37.576 — UEFA’s broadcasting regulations, the Commission concluded that 
regulations preventing the live transmission of football matches at, did not result in an appreciable 
restriction of competition. Finally, in the decision no. 2001/696/EC of 31 July 2001 relating to the case No. 
COMP/37.462 — Identrus, the Commission decided that a prohibition on the members of Identrus selling 
their equity interest in it to third parties without first offering to sell the interest to Identrus itself or its other 
members did not amount to an appreciable restriction of competition. 
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By producing such evidence, the Commission is making a prima facie case of 
anticompetitiveness. This does not mean that it discharged its legal burden of proof, 
because the firm has always the possibility of disproving the Commission’s allegations. 
In other words, once the Commission has discharged the evidential burden, the 
defendant acquires the tactical burden (not the legal burden, which rests on the 
Commission) of rebutting the facts affirmed by the Commission. 
Three scenarios are then available. 
If the defendant does not challenge the evidence adduced by the Commission, 
through convincing counterevidence, the judge may use the prima facie evidence 
provided by the latter to infer that the agreement runs contrary to Article 101(1) TFEU. 
If the evidence produced by the defendant is capable of casting doubt about the 
prima facie case established by the Commission, the burden is shift back to the latter. It is 
then up to the Commission to make a definite allegation of precise facts in support of his 
claim to present his conclusions in an unequivocal manner. 
If the Commission manages to challenge the evidence provided by the defendant 
and the Court considers this new evidence apt to strengthen the likelihood of the 
anticompetitive story, the Court will be likely to believe that the agreement falls within 
the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
If the Commission does not succeed in providing the definite proof of the facts 
supporting the anticompetitive story, the Court may be more prone to believe that 
agreement is out of the scope of Article 101(1) TFEU. 
Applied to parallel trade cases concerning pharmaceuticals, the Commission can 
show that there exists regulation encouraging parallel trade and pressure on prices of 
original products, and on this basis claim that the economic and legal context suggest 
that any restriction to this form of trade will most likely impede national health care 
systems to benefit of savings from price competition. If left uncontradicted, this evidence 
represents the indicia on which the judge can consider, through inferential reasoning, 
the Commission’s allegation of violation proven.  
Pharmaceutical firms have two options to rebut the evidence put forward by the 
Commission: they may either provide evidence that the legal and economic context is 
different from what the Commission presented, or they may agree on the economics 
 324 
presented by the Commission but allege that the restriction does not have an appreciable 
effect in the market. 
Thus, for instance, a pharmaceutical company may adduce evidence of the 
absence of any negative effect from the restriction to parallel trade by showing that 
savings accruing to consumers were negligible. It is then up to the Commission to 
provide its own assessment of the effects of the restriction on consumers. 
In sum, the consideration of agreements restricting parallel trade as 
anticompetitive in their object is not at odd with an effect-based approach to European 
competition law. By interpreting the category of restriction of competiton ‘by object’ as a 
rebuttable presumption of anticompetitiveness, it is possible to construe a rule that has 
two positive properties. As a general rule, which has been set in light of the accumulated 
knowledge on the effect of certain business practice in the market, it avoids costly 
market inquiry and save transaction costs. At the same time, the rebuttal allows to 
account for the concrete effect of the specific practice and to eventually call for the non-
application of the general rule to the particular case. 
3.3 The proof of efficiencies 
As indicated earlier, the application of competition law rules that looks at the 
effect of business practices in the market necessarily includes also the accounting of their 
long-term facets. The previous Chapter has been devoted to the crafting of a test that 
allows for the consideration of efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU. However the choice 
of the ‘efficiency defense’ left two questions unanswered. 
A first question concerns the identification of the party who bears the burden of 
proof in relation to the existence of efficiencies. 
The second question regards the standard of proof that has to be adopted in 
order to discharge such burden of proof901. 
The two issues are going to be discussed in the indicated sequence. 
3.3.1. Who has to prove efficiencies under Article 102 TFEU? 
It is now clearly established that defendants bear the legal burden of proof with 
respect to the existence of efficiencies under Article 101 TFEU. 
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901 Note that this issue remains open also in the context of Art. 101 TFEU. Therefore, the analysis will be 
applied also to this provision. 
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As mentioned earlier, this interpretative question has, in fact, been solved by the 
EC Regulation no. 1/2003. The Regulation provides guidance about the burden of proof 
of parties under Article 101 TFEU, specifies that the legal, as well as the evidential, 
burden of proof in relation to the breach of Article 101(1) TFEU is on the antitrust 
authority/plaintiff, who has to prove that the practice has an appreciable (actual or 
potential) negative effect on competition and influences the trade flow among Member 
States. Symmetrically, it is up to the defendant to give proof of the existence, of the 
magnitude of efficiency defence, and to show that consumers benefit from them under 
Article 101(3) TFEU 902. 
Whilst the bifurcate structure of Article 101 TFEU renders somewhat easier this 
interpretative task, Article 102 TFEU is more of a problem from this point of view. The 
issue of how to allocate the burden of proof under the latter provision is still under 
discussion among scholars. 
Two options are available: either efficiency considerations come into the 
assessment in the form of a defence, or as a factor within the overall assessment of a 
corporate conduct.  
While the latter choice requires the Commission to bear the burden of proof in 
relation to efficiencies, the former interpretation implicitly entails the shifting of the 
burden of proving their existence and magnitude, compared to the static inefficiency 
created with the conduct, on the company alleging them. 
One main argument may lead to exclude the second option: the wording of the 
examined provision does not support the existence of an ‘Article 102(3) TFEU’. In fact, 
unlike Article 101 TFEU, Article 102 TFEU does not contain a paragraph where 
exemption is granted to abusive conducts903. 

902 This provision reads as follows: ‘In any national or Community proceedings for the application of Articles 81 
and 82 of the Treaty, the burden of proving an infringement of Article 81(1) or of Article 82 of the Treaty shall rest on 
the party or the authority alleging the infringement. The undertaking or association of undertakings claiming the 
benefit of Article 81(3) of the Treaty shall bear the burden of proving that the conditions of that paragraph are fulfilled.’ 
903 AG Jacobs in his opinion in Syfait I at para. 72 said that ‘the two stage analysis suggested by the distinction 
between an abuse and its objective is to my mind somewhat artificial. Article 82 EC, by contrast with Article 81 EC, 
does not contain any explicit provision for the exemption of conduct otherwise falling within it. Indeed, the very fact 
that conduct is characterised as an ‘abuse’ suggests that a negative conclusion has been already reached… It is more 
accurate to say that certain types of conduct on the part of a dominant undertaking do not fall within the category of 
abuse at all.’ See also ALBORS-LLORENS, The Role of Objective Justification and Efficiencies in the Application of 
Article 82 EC, in CMLR, 2007, no. 44, p. 1747; NAZZINI, The wood began to move: an essay on consumer welfare, 
cit., p. 518, especially makes the following argument: Reg. 1/2003 does not support this interpretation, as 
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The ECJ confirmed this by saying that ‘no exemption may be given, in any manner 
whatsoever, in respect of abuse of a dominant position; such abuse is simply prohibited by the 
Treaty and it is for the competent national authorities or the Commission, as the case may be, to 
act on that prohibition on that prohibition within the limits of their powers’904. 
Similarly, the AG Kirschner in his opinion in Tetra Pack in reply to Tetrapack’s 
arguments that Article 102 TFEU should be examined in two stages, namely whether the 
conduct was prima facie an abuse and whether it was objectively justified, affirmed that ‘it 
is not possible to read into Article [82] a set of criteria for dispensation’905. 
Alternatively, if the second option purported above is chosen, efficiency gains 
are considered merely as a factor to be accounted for when deciding whether the 
dominant company’s conduct is abusive or not, the burden of proof rests with the 
Commission, which should demonstrate that the conduct falls within the scope of 
Article 102 TFEU, because there are no efficiencies stemming from the conduct906. The 
company would only have to show that there is evidence of potential efficiency gains 
and not the full burden of proving their existence and magnitude. 
Again, if interpreted in this way, the analysis under Article 102 TFEU could 
resemble the appraisal performed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 
The Supreme Court recently developed a ‘structured rule of reason’ under this 
provision, where the burden of proof has been clearly attributed to each party: the Court 
established that if the defendant puts forward a pro-competitive justification that stands 
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm caused by 
the defendant’s conduct outweighs the pro-competitive benefit907. 
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Article 2 provides for distribution of the burden of proof between the authority and the defendant only in 
relation to Article 101 TFEU. Moreover, Recital 5 of the same Regulation states only in the context of Article 
101(3) TFEU that it is for the undertaking invoking the benefit of a defence to demonstrate to the required 
legal standard that the condition for applying such defence are satisfied. 
904 See ECJ, 11 April 1989, in case C-62/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and Silver Line Reiseburo GmbH v. Zentrale 
Bekampfung Unlauteren Wettbewerbs eV, para. 32. 
905 See AG Kirschner’s opinion at para. 21. 
906 Notice that it is a consolidate principle of law that negativa non sunt probanda and it is, therefore, obvious 
that the authority cannot bear the burden of proving the absence of efficiencies. Cf. AG Colomer at para. 68. 
907 See U.S. v. Microsoft, cit., at para. 95-97, where the Supreme Court established that ‘First, to be condemned 
as exclusionary, a monopolist’s act must have an ‘anticompetitive effect.’ That is, it must harm the competitive process 
and thereby harm consumers. In contrast, harm to one or more competitors will not suffice. Second, the plaintiff, on 
whom the burden of proof of course rests, must demonstrate that the monopolist’s conduct indeed has the requisite 
anticompetitive effect. Third, if a plaintiff successfully establishes a prima facie case … by demonstrating 
anticompetitive effect, then the monopolist may proffer a ‘pro-competitive justification’ for its conduct. If the 
monopolist asserts a pro-competitive justification—a non-pretextual claim that its conduct is indeed a form of 
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However, the same reasons that led to exclude the establishment of a US-like test 
for efficiencies within Article 102 TFUE also apply here. It clearly appears that if 
defendants were not required to show the existence of efficiencies, the burden of proof 
for defendants would be lighter, with respect to what is generally required under EU 
competition law. In particular, it would be unbalanced compared to what is called for in 
the context of Article 101(3) TFEU. This may represent a problem within the acquis 
communautaire. 
In fact, it established case law that the analysis under Article 102 TFEU should 
not differ from that in Article 101 TFEU, otherwise the enforcement of the two 
provisions would be lop-sided908. Thus, proposing that the burden of proof, also for 
efficiency gains, rests entirely on the Commission would render the test under Article 
102 TFEU more lenient with respect to what Article 101(3) TFEU provides. The 
coherence of the EU competition law system thus would not admit this solution. 
Hence, as much as the analysis of efficiency gains should be performed both 
under Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU, such gains should enter the antitrust 
assessment under Article 102 TFEU in the same way they do under Article 101 TFEU, 
despite the absence of an explicit paragraph providing an exemption. 
Another reason supports the view that the burden of proving the efficiency 
defence rests on the undertaking. 
Calling the ‘objective justification’ an exception or a factor that enters the 
antitrust scrutiny does not change the practical means that are going to be used by 
parties to prove the existence of the efficiency gains909. 
Under Article 101 TFEU, the agreements that prevent, restrict or distort 
competition are caught by the prohibition set forth in the first paragraph of the provision. 
It is then necessary to check whether such agreement can be exempted, notwithstanding 
the fact that competition remains restricted. Similarly, under Article 102 TFEU, only 
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competition on the merits because it involves, for example, greater efficiency or enhanced consumer appeal—then the 
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to rebut that claim. Fourth, if the monopolist’s pro-competitive justification stands 
unrebutted, then the plaintiff must demonstrate that the anticompetitive harm of the conduct outweighs the pro-
competitive benefit’. 
908 Cf. fn 781 supra. 
909 See LOEWENTHAL, The defence of ‘Objective Justification’, cit., p. 463, who says that the difference between 
the two provisions lies more in their wording than in their application. Also he welcomes the adoption of a 
two-tier structure under Art. 102 TFEU, similar to Art. 101 TFEU, in order to give a greater degree of 
structure to the application of the provision, otherwise vague in its wording. 
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conducts that have the effect of hindering competition will be subject to the second tier of 
analysis, to check whether they are objectively justified. If the conduct passes this test, it 
is not abusive, but that does not mean that competition is not hindered any longer. 
In fact, especially when efficiency gains are considered, i.e. when the foreclosure 
of rivals is claimed to aim at increasing the resources devoted to R&D activities, the 
anticompetitive effect in the market does not cease and eventually cause harm to 
consumers in the short-term. However, they may be ‘tolerated’ to provide companies 
with the incentive to invest in innovation and benefit consumers in the long-term. 
The law of evidence confirms this. 
It is a well-established principle of procedural law that incumbit probation qui dicit, 
non qui negat. It follows that, besides the fact that undertakings are better placed to 
discharge this burden of proof, it is up to the party who asserts the existence of a fact to 
prove it, and not to the counterpart to prove its absence. 
Therefore, also under Article 102 TFEU it is up to the plaintiff to make the case 
and demonstrate the anticompetitiveness of the conduct, at least prima facie. Then the 
defendant may allege justifications to its conduct. 
If this happens through a an affirmative defence, or through a negative one, i.e. 
by putting forward enough evidence that casts doubt about the findings of the plaintiff, 
it appears largely immaterial. 
In fact, even if the plaintiff bears all the burden of proof, it will discharge it by 
proving that the efficiency gains do not exist, or are insufficient, or are not passed on to 
consumers. It follows that it remains up to the defendant to overcome this allegation and 
affirm their existence. De facto, the burden of proving the efficiency gains rests on the 
defendant, through convincing evidence910. 
The case law again comes in support of this statement. Even if European Courts 
have never addressed the issue of how the burden of proof is shared between parties in 
Article 102 TFEU cases, in those cases where defendants put forward economic 
arguments to justify the foreclosure caused by their conducts, judges always asked them 
to substantiate their allegations with evidence. 
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910 ROUSSEVA, Objective Justification and Article 82 EC, cit., p. 427, affirms that given that the objective 
justification is formulated as a negative fact, i.e. the conduct is abusive if not justified, the undertaking has to 
prove the corresponding positive fact. 
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For instance, in Michelin II, the Court affirmed whether the dominant 
undertaking has established that the quantity rebate system was based on objective 
economic reasons911. Similarly, in British Airways, the Court affirmed that the defendant 
did not appear to have demonstrated that the fidelity-building character of its 
performance reward scheme was based on economically justifiable considerations912. In 
Atlantic Container, the Court stated that the company failed to show that its conduct was 
necessary to bring about these advantages913. 
On this basis, I believe that, no matter whether in the discharging of its legal 
burden of proof or of its tactical burden of proof, a defendant undertaking charged of 
abusive conduct restrictive of parallel trade must adduce evidence that shows that such 
conduct is likely to have a positive impact on the market in terms of innovation. 
One last reason to support this view is that the sharing of the burden of proof 
between parties should be designed so that administrative costs are minimized. It 
follows that it should up to the party in the best position to gather the relevant 
information that provides the proof at the cheapest cost914. And clearly, while an 
antitrust agency might suffer from information asymmetry with respect to the existence 
of efficiencies, the undertaking is better placed to collect and provide evidence at this 
regard915. For the same reasons, agencies should bear the burden of demonstrating the 
violation of the competition provisions. 
This division thus appears optimal, because the burden of demonstrating effects 
is on the parties that are ‘closer to the proof’, in terms of ability to acquire the necessary 
information to adduce the required evidence. 
This does not mean that the Commission does not have any role in ascertaining 
the existence of efficiencies. As much as defendants cannot just dispute the 
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911 See Michelin II, para. 107. 
912 See British Airways, para. 281. 
913 See Atlantic Container, para. 1117. 
914 Also case law confirms this approach: see Michelin II, where the Court said it was necessary to examine 
‘whether the dominant undertaking has established that the quantity rebates … were based on objective economic 
reasons’; see British Airways, where the Court held that the defendant ‘does not appear to have demonstrated that 
the fidelity-building character of its performance reward scheme was based on an economically justified consideration’; 
see finally Atlantic Container, where the GC said that ‘the applicants fail to show how the practices in question are 
necessary to bring about the alleged advantages’. 
915 The Guidance on Art. 82 EC at para. 31 affirm that, after that the defendant has proven the efficiency, is 
then up the Commission to make the ultimate assessment of whether the conduct is necessary and whether 
it causes consumer harm. 
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Commission’s findings, if they want to be successful in casting doubts about the 
existence of a violation of the Treaty, also the Commission cannot disprove the 
efficiencies claimed by defendants by simply disagreeing on their existence. 
This issue has been subject to an intense debate in the context of the Glaxo case 
and, thus, specifically in relation to the analysis under Article 101(3) TFEU. However, 
the adoption of an ‘efficiency defense’ under Article 102 TFEU implies that the analysis 
of the considerations expressed in that context apply also to the latter provision. 
Both the GC and ECJ believed that the Commission did not properly examine 
GSK’s request for an exemption to the dual pricing clause through a thorough analysis 
of the factual evidence provided by the undertaking916. This conclusion was driven by 
the fact that the Commission did not follow the modus procedendi that the Court 
considered more appropriate to examine the existence of efficiencies. 
The Court suggested a four-pronged test: the Commission should first examine 
the factual arguments and evidence to check that there is an appreciable objective 
advantage. Secondly, it should consider whether there is a loss in efficiency associated 
with parallel trade. Thirdly, it should measure the extent of that loss in efficiency. Lastly, 
the gain in efficiency associated the restriction should be analysed. This four-stage 
analysis should precede the balancing917. 
Both Courts found that the Commission had examined whether parallel trade 
would give rise to a loss in efficiency for competition, but not whether dual pricing 
would entail a gain in efficiency for competition. They therefore held that the 
examination carried out by the Commission had not been sufficient. 
Stated differently, the Commission bears the tactical burden of proof in relation 
to the evidence provided by undertakings about the existence of efficiencies. If the 
Commission want to convince the judge that such efficiencies do not exist, it should 
adduce countervailing evidence that casts doubt on the pro-competitive story put 
forward by the defendant: by showing why the defendant did not sufficiently proved 
that efficiency gains are likely to be realized, or by arguing that, even if their 
manifestation is highly probable, the defendant did not prove that they are likely to 
offset the anticompetitive effects. 

916 See para. 261-262 of the Glaxo ruling. 
917 See para. 128-129 of the ECJ ruling in the Glaxo appeal. 
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3.3.2 The standard of proof for efficiencies 
The analysis conducted in Chapter IV and in the previous Sections has already 
introduced the reader to the main difficulty concerning the considerations of efficiencies 
in the antitrust assessment: the impossibility to affirm their certain existence and 
ascertain their magnitude at that time when the analysis is performed. That is, efficiency 
considerations require a prognostic analysis that renders their effect on consumer 
welfare hardly verifiable. 
The forward-looking feature of dynamic efficiencies, in fact, does not perfectly fit 
the traditional antitrust scrutiny. The provision fails to provide an appropriate legal 
framework for the accounting of ex ante standpoints, being the analysis based on 
verifiable and quantifiable elements. 
Still, whilst it is neither legally possible nor economically justified to base the 
assessment exclusively on the situation ex ante, it does not mean that this perspective is 
totally irrelevant918. Both the ex post and the ex ante perspectives should be taken into 
account when analysing the innovation process, in order to ascertain the several factors 
that inform efficiency gains. 
The question of how to give significance and appropriate weight to efficiencies in 
the antitrust assessment, thus, remains. In procedural parlance, the standard of proof, 
with which the evidence supporting the existence of efficiency gains from restrictions to 
parallel trade should be reviewed, is controversial. 
The rationale of both provisions, as previously analysed, validates the adoption 
of a standard of proof that requires the full substantiation of the efficiency gains is in line 
with the teaching of economic analysis. However, it seems to be destined to fail before 
European Courts and antitrust agencies. The speculative nature inherent to dynamic 
efficiencies, in fact, is likely to render very difficult the discharging of this onus for 
defendants. 
From an ex post perspective, in fact, the judge is unlikely to observe the effect of 
competition on innovation. Nor is the effect of price competition on R&D investments 
always apparent. 
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918 See FAULL and NIKPAY, The EC Law of Competition, cit., p. 297-298. 
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For instance, in the Glaxo case the defendant declared that it had abandoned nine 
R&D projects due to the lack of financial resources919. However, by looking at the 
percentage of the company’s turnover devoted to R&D in the last twelve years, it appears 
clearly that the latter steadily increased along time: it was 13.9% in 1996, 15% in 1999, 
16.7% in 2006, 16.2% in 2007920. The immediate conclusion from this analysis is that 
parallel trade has not affected the company’s R&D budget and, therefore, that it did not 
have any negative impact on innovation. 
However, parallel trade expanded in a significant manner only at the beginning 
of this decade921. Therefore, any possible impact on R&D intensity might show up only in 
a considerable time lag, because of the long period needed for a new molecule to be 
developed and brought into the market. 
In sum, even if parallel trade did not affect innovation in the past, it may do it in 
the future. However, such conclusion remains only theoretical. And hardly any tangible 
evidence can now provide the full proof of something that may happen in the future.  
Judges can only guess that the impact that parallel trade has today on profits, in 
the future may also turn into a further impact on the investments in innovation. Still, the 
only thing measurable at the moment when the legal assessment is performed is the 
profit loss. Unfortunately, as explained in the previous Chapter, the latter is not always 
an adequate proxy for a reduction in innovation, though. 
Stated differently, the examination of efficiency gains necessarily requires a 
projection of market analysis in the future. The full substantiation of efficiency gains, as 
generally intended in the law of evidence, in these cases appears difficult. It is necessary 
thus to envisage a more appropriate tool to allow companies to discharge their burden 
of proof when the prediction of future outcomes is involved. 
Evidential inference seems to me the more appropriate standard. The company 
should be allowed to present evidence that provides concrete indicia supporting the 
probability of a future materialization of the efficiency gains. That is, the defendant 
should produce sufficiently proved facts that allow the judge to infer the reasonable 

919 See para. 98 of the decision of the European Commission on the Glaxo Wellcome case. 
920 See GSK’s annual reports for data. There it is also indicated that the 3% decrease that took place between 
2006 and 2007 was due to winding-down of restructuring activities. 
921 See data provided in Section 5 in Chapter I. 
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conclusion that the realization of efficiency gains from the agreement is more probable 
than not, following a standard of proof based on the preponderance of evidence922. 
Such forward-looking analysis is not entirely unknown to the Commission, 
which can build on previous cases decided under Article 101 TFEU, where it exempted 
anticompetitive agreements also when related benefits were just highly likely923. 
True, this approach is entirely new in the analysis under Article 102 TFEU, but it 
is certainly in line with the criteria chosen by the Commission in the Guidance on Art. 82 
EC to perform the analysis of foreclosure924. 
It has been previously indicated that Article 102 TFEU’s baseline is consumer 
welfare. However, this does not mean that direct consumers harm should be considered 
as the necessary requirement to find an abuse, as the standard of proof would be too 
demanding. Article 102 TFEU applies also to conducts that do not have any direct effect 
on consumers but just on the effective competitive structure of the market925. It follows 
that the test in Article 102 TFEU looks at whether the conduct under examination has 
potential anticompetitive effects for consumers. 
As much as it is possible for the Commission to prove foreclosure in terms of 
likelihood, it should be possible for defendants to show that efficiencies are probably 

922 The preponderance of the evidence, also known as balance of probabilities, is the standard of proof 
required in most civil cases in US. The standard is met if the proposition is more likely to be true than not 
true. Effectively, the standard is satisfied if there is greater than 50 percent chance that the proposition is 
true. In Lord Denning, in Miller v. Minister of Pensions, [1947] 2 All ER 372 it was affirmed that the standard is 
satisfied where a proposition is ‘more probable than not’. 
923 See Commission decision 2004/841/EC of 7 April 2004 in case COMP/A.38284/D2 - Société Air 
France/Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane SpA; Commission decision 2004/207/EC of 16 July 2003 in case 
COMP/38.369 - T-Mobile Deutschland/O2 Germany: Network Sharing Rahmenvertrag, where the Commission 
affirmed that the agreement ‘may have’ efficiency gains; Commission decision 2003/778/EC of 23 July 2003 
in case COMP/C.2-37.398 – Joint selling of the commercial rights of the UEFA Champions League, where the 
Commission affirmed that ‘the benefits are … evident’. 
924 See para. 16 of the Guidance on Art. 82 EC, where the concept of ‘tendency to foreclosure’ has been replaced 
with the ‘likelihood of foreclosure’. The reference to the ‘likelihood of effects’ of conducts distances the 
definition of exclusionary abuse adopted in Michelin II, where it was affirmed that the anticompetitive object 
or potential restrictive effects are sufficient to prove an abuse and it is unnecessary to prove that there was 
an actual or concrete effect. Among critics of the Commission’s approach, see NAZZINI, The wood began to 
move: an essay on consumer welfare, evidence and burden of proof in Article 82 cases, in Eur. L. Rev., 2006, no. 31, p. 
518, at 520. Among supporters see LOEWENTHAL, The defence of ‘Objective Justification’, cit., p. 468; 
EILMANSBERGER, How to Distinguish Good from bad Competition Under Article 82 EC: In Search of Clearer ad More 
Coherent Standards for Anti-competitive Abuses, in CMLR, 2005, no. 42, p. 136. 
925 Note that this interpretation sprang from the wording of the former Art. 3(1)(g) EC, which has been 
excised from the Treaty after the amendments of the Lisbon Treaty. For cases underpinning this view, see 
Continental Can, para. 36; Hoffmann-La Roche, para. 89 et seq.; Michelin I, para. 71; Irish Sugar, para. 232. Also 
cf. NAZZINI, The wood began to move, cit., p. 522, who acknowledges that the full proof of a reduction of 
consumer welfare would risk rendering difficult the public and private enforcement of Article 82 EC. 
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going to materialise. The choice of a similar test for efficiencies creates symmetry within 
the provision that is capable of eliminating that imbalance between ex ante and ex post 
analysis. 
Thus, prognostic analysis is suitable to guide the application of the test for 
efficiencies under both Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Such test should be crafted as 
following. 
First comes the proof of the existence of efficiencies. 
The existence of an appreciable objective advantage, which is a necessary 
requirement to grant the exemption, might require a prospective analysis regarding the 
occurrence of the advantages associated with the restriction of parallel trade. Thus, it 
contains a prognostic element. And a prognosis can ultimately never be made with 100% 
certainty926. It follows that it should be considered sufficient for a finding of an 
appreciable objective advantage to arrive, on the basis of the arguments and evidence 
submitted, at the conviction that the occurrence of such appreciable objective advantage 
is likely in the light of actual experience927. In parallel trade cases, pharmaceutical 
companies should show that additional financial resources are going to be used in the 
completion of pending or planned R&D projects that aim at developing new and better 
drugs. 
Secondly, defendants should prove the link between the anticompetitive 
behaviour and the efficiencies. 
To this purpose, defendants should provide evidence of the effects that parallel 
trade has on their activity by disclosing relevant information, inter alia, in relation to (i) 
the amount of resources that price competition has dissipated as compared with the 
whole budget of the company, (ii) the amount of money that is invested in innovation at 
present and that is going to be invested in the future, (iii) the ongoing and the upcoming 
R&D projects, and (iv) the way these projects are going to be affected by the profit losses. 
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926 Cf. para. 247-249 of the Glaxo ruling. These premises are certainly correct. Hence, the fact that the Courts 
spoke of the ‘possibility’ that profits are translated into investments in innovation comes as a surprise. 
927 Cf. para. 193-194 of the opinion of AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal, where she affirmed that the fact that 
the Court of First Instance took as its basis whether the occurrence of the advantage is likely is not wrong in 
law per se. 
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So, for instance, a large impact of parallel trade on a company’s profit could lead 
the judge to reasonably infer that, lacking enough resources, the company may drop 
some important planned high-risk projects that require substantial financial resources.  
If the losses from parallel trade appear negligible compared to the budget of the 
company, no concern should rise about the company’s R&D projects, even when this is 
going to involve a considerable investment.  
Thirdly, defendants should prove that the restriction is indispensable for the 
attainment of the efficiencies. 
This requirement is the more difficult one to be fulfilled. It is, in fact, very difficult 
to show that restrictions to parallel trade are the only available means to increase the rate 
of innovation and foster the competitiveness of a pharmaceutical firm. One may, in fact, 
object that, being R&D the key for the company’s competitiveness, it should be the last 
part of the budget to be cut and that resources to conduct R&D can be drawn from other 
parts of the company’s budget. For instance, marketing and administration expenses can 
be easily reduced without endangering the pace of innovation. 
However, reference to the test applied in the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC helps 
overcome this hurdle. There the indispensability test is one of ‘reasonable necessity’ and 
not of ‘strict necessity’928. This assessment is made by reference to the actual context in 
which the agreement operates and must take into account the structure of the market, 
the risk to which the economic activity is subject and the incentive for the parties. That 
means that also the concept of indispensability can be evaluated in a forward-looking 
perspective: not according to a criterion of perfect certainty, but scaled to the standard of 
likelihood929. And this should also apply in the context of Art. 102 TFEU. 
Let us imagine, for instance, that the amount of resources devoted to R&D is not 
sufficient any longer for a company to be competitive in the market and it wishes to 
increase the R&D budget. Clearly, additional monetary resources would be very useful 
to this purpose. 
Investments’ growth may take place also if profits overall do not increase (for 
instance, by diminishing other parts of the budget). However, it may not occur to the 
same extent and with the same degree of certainty, as if it was supported by larger 
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928 See the Guidelines on Art. 81(3) EC at para. 73. 
929 Cf. para. 220 of the opinion of AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal. 
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profits. It follows that a corporate conduct that aims at achieving some efficiencies 
should be considered indispensable not only when the advantages pursued cannot be 
attained in any other way at all, but also when they cannot be brought about to the same 
extent, within the same period of time or with the same degree of certainty930. 
Fourthly, the defendant should also demonstrate that competition in the market 
is unlikely to be entirely eliminated. 
This requirement can be quite controversial too, as parallel trade is the only form 
of competition during patent validity. Therefore, the defendant should prove the 
likelihood that the completion of additional R&D projects leads to the highly probable 
introduction in the market of new products, which in turn is likely to increase interbrand 
competition and to outweigh the elimination of intrabrand competition. 
Finally, defendants should demonstrate that the efficiencies that the restriction of 
parallel trade is expected to bring are likely to outweigh the negative effects on 
consumers in the market. 
Altogether, it appears that the policy on parallel trade, whilst on the whole it 
remains well founded and deserves to be upheld, does need some refinement. The belief 
that parallel trade exerts competitive pressure on prices of original products has 
economic grounds also in the pharmaceutical market. The judgement of 
anticompetitiveness generally attributed to obstacles to parallel trade of pharmaceuticals 
should be thus upheld. More careful consideration of efficiencies eventually deriving 
from such restrictions is required, though. This statement cannot be interpreted as if the 
protection of innovation should legitimize any corporate strategy against parallel trade 
per se, as this would entail the paradoxical conclusion that innovation is a policy goal 
that is pursued irrespectively from the benefit that consumers can get from it. 
Pharmaceutical companies should, instead, prove the likelihood of such efficiencies from 
the restrictions through appropriate evidence showing that the recouped profits are 
going to finance R&D projects that would otherwise be abandoned; also, they should 
demonstrate that restrictions are indispensable, in the sense that those projects could not 
be retrieved through other means with the same degree of probability; they should 
finally prove such projects are going to lead to products that are highly beneficial for 

930 Cf. para. 267-268 of the opinion of AG Trstenjac in the Glaxo appeal. 
 337
consumers and, thus, compensate the detriment they suffered for having paid prices 
higher than those they would have otherwise paid under parallel trade. 
These considerations apply also at a more general level and provide useful 
insights in the context of the modernization of European competition law. In particular, 
with regards to Article 102 TFEU, I believe that the modernization process cannot lead to 
craft a test for efficiencies that transplants the American approach to monopolization 
into the provision sanctioning the abuse of dominant position. The theoretical baseline 
that shapes antitrust analysis in US is very different from the one adopted in the 
European system, as the former does not consider the protection of consumer welfare as 
a condicio sine qua non. The test for efficiencies under Art. 102 TFEU must be, on the 
contrary, necessarily in line with this ‘philosophy’: i) efficiencies must be substantiated 
and not just claimed; ii) efficiencies must be proved by the party that asserts their 
existence. 
However, in order to take into account the forward-looking perspective that is 
inevitably inherent to this proof, the test cannot require the full substantiation of 
efficiencies. On the contrary, the Commission should be considered the test fulfilled 
when the proof is provided with a high degree of credibility. 
 
 
 
4. Conclusions 
This Chapter examined the procedural mechanisms that may facilitate the 
application of the balancing between the anticompetitive effects and the efficiencies in 
the antitrust assessment of corporate practices aimed at impeding parallel trade both 
under Article 101 and 102 TFEU. 
The conducted analysis starts from the apparent inability of the Commission and 
the ECJ to integrate efficiency considerations in the antitrust assessment of corporate 
conducts restrictive of parallel trade and to balance them with the related 
anticompetitive effects under Article 102 TFEU. Such failure, which has triggered the 
criticism of a large part of the literature that calls for the adoption of the rule of reason in 
EU competition law, is partially linked to the formalism that to a certain extent still 
characterises the application of EU competition rules. 
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However, it is very much likely that judges feel uneasy about the prognostic 
analysis related to efficiency considerations. Such perspective clashes with the ex post 
categories that generally characterise the antitrust assessment. Thus, judges may find 
themselves with inappropriate instruments to perform an assessment of the efficiency 
claims purported by the defendant undertakings. 
The examination of US case law shows that, even in a legal environment where 
the use of economic analysis in antitrust scrutiny has a longer tradition, the uncertain 
boundaries of the rule of reason - i.e. the difficulties entailed by a full-blown market 
analysis, and the elusiveness of efficiencies’ measurement - are still putting obstacles to a 
clear-cut application of the rule. Transposed into our system, these findings, together 
with the little acquaintance of judges to this institution, may explain why European 
Courts have shown even more hostility towards the rule of reason. 
The analysis of the relevant case law has also shown that, even when willing to 
look into efficiency arguments, European Courts were sceptical about them because the 
evidence presented by defendants was insufficient to perform a comprehensive analysis 
of the overall effects of their practices in the market. 
In fact, especially when they are unfamiliar with economic concepts, Courts 
rather base their decision on presumptions built on legal analysis and on their 
accumulated experience. 
It follows that the judgment of anticompetitiveness depends on the ability of 
each party to overcome these presumptions, or the prima facie evidence, and cast doubt 
on the facts alleged by their counterpart. 
For instance, the Commission may adduce the anticompetitiveness of a 
restriction of parallel trade, based on the presumption that this has negative effects for 
consumers. The judge may use this prima facie evidence to infer the existence of a 
restriction to competition, unless defendants adduce contradicting evidence to show that 
the claimants’ findings do not correspond to market reality. In particular, in this Chapter 
it has been envisaged the possibility for defendants to demonstrate, through appropriate 
evidence, that, even though the existence of a restriction cannot be disputed, as it is for 
restrictions by object, the effects of the impediment to parallel trade on the market are 
negligible. 
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These considerations led me to affirm the existence, within the first paragraph of 
Article 101 TFEU, of rebuttable presumption of anticompetitiveness. Such rebuttal also 
appears to be the most appropriate legal instrument that allows applying an effect-based 
approach to the EU provision sanctioning agreements restrictive of competition. 
Two important issues were then analysed: the identification of the party that 
bears the burden of proof under Article 102 TFEU and the standard of proof that should 
be fulfilled, in order to discharge such burden, both under Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. 
Attributing the burden of proof to parties according to their ‘proximity’ to the 
evidence and facts that constitute the object of the proof seems to be more appropriate 
on several grounds: claimants should prove the anticompetitive effects of a corporate 
practice and the defendant should provide the proof of the existence of efficiencies that 
outweigh the consumer harm. 
This approach should guide also antitrust litigation in parallel trade cases: 
antitrust agencies should bear the burden of proving the anticompetitive effects of 
restrictions to parallel trade; symmetrically, defendants should prove that such 
restriction is outweighed by the derived efficiency gains. To this purpose, defendants, 
not only they have to prove the existence of efficiencies, but also they should provide 
evidence of their magnitude. 
The law of evidence provides a useful instrument, inferential reasoning, which 
may be very useful to overcome the difficulty surrounding the proof of efficiency gains 
and their balancing with anticompetitive effects. 
Efficiency considerations are necessarily based on a prognostic analysis. Thus, 
defendants should be allowed to discharge their burden of proof in relation to their 
existence on the basis of sufficient evidence that shows that such efficiencies are going to 
materialise with a very high degree of probability, according to the rule of 
preponderance of evidence. 
This criterion should apply to the four filters contained in Article 101(3) TFEU 
and to the proportionality test under Article 102 TFEU. That means that the analysis of 
an anticompetitive agreement should be subject to a prognostic form of the notion of 
indispensability, as much as a flexible forward-looking proportionality test should apply 
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to abusive conducts from dominant companies, followed by balancing exercise between 
the efficiencies and the anticompetitive effects. 
Should defendants fulfil this standard of proof and succeed in making their case 
about the increase in R&D activity to the benefit of consumers, the Commission bear the 
tactical burden of proof of disproving such evidence if they do not want to incur the risk 
that the judge infers the existence of efficiency gains. 
The main contribution of this Chapter is the identification of procedural rules 
that are capable of solving the imbalance between ex post analysis of anticompetitive 
effects and ex ante examination of pro-competitive effects created by the integration of 
efficiency considerations into the antitrust analysis.  
Given the practical difficulties related to a balancing between differently 
measured objects – the present reduction of savings against the future increased 
pharmaceutical innovation - and the risk of losing procedural economy, the conducted 
analysis envisaged the procedural mechanisms that should help judges overcome these 
hurdles and form a learned judgement that reflects market reality and is workable at the 
same time. 
This proposal has important reflections also at a wider level, as it provides a 
paramount of integration of economic reasoning into antitrust analysis that is valid also 
outside the field of parallel trade. It ultimately attempted to answer the question of how 
to actually modernise EU competition law and be consistent with the acquis 
communautaire. In other words, it sought to provide European Courts with the 
appropriate legal tools to implement flexible, but clear-cut, rules that allow for an effect-
based analysis of anticompetitive business practices. The proposed procedural rules are, 
in fact, simple and clear, so that compliance and enforcement is facilitated, and can be 
adapted to market reality, without that procedural economy is excessively sacrificed. 





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Conclusions and future research 
 
 
 
 
This work analysed the current policy applied at a European level towards 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals, with the view of responding the question of whether 
the enforcement of EU competition law rules against restrictions to this form of cross 
border trade in this sector should change to embrace a new policy. 
Traditionally, restrictions to parallel trade were regarded negatively because 
they hampered intrabrand competition and impeded cross border trade. However, in 
recent judgments, Courts doubted that in a highly regulated environment parallel trade 
could bring lower prices for consumers and even feared that parallel trade could 
undermine pharmaceutical companies’ incentives to innovate due to the erosion of their 
profits. 
Such jurisprudential reversal has been certainly influenced by the so-called 
‘process of modernization of European competition law’. It is, in fact, apparent that EU 
competition law is currently undergoing an important stage of development, especially 
concerning the way Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are enforced. And the Commission and 
the European Courts are now urged to abandon formalism and to convey economic 
analysis into the legal scrutiny of anticompetitive business practices. A new awareness 
among legal scholars about the findings of economics on the welfare effects of parallel 
trade - especially in the long term – thus led to question the approach that the 
Commission and the European Courts had endorsed for almost forty years. 
This revirement suggested that there might be scope for improvement in the 
current policy towards parallel trade. However, how and to what extent this change 
should have been performed appeared far from clear. 
Against this backdrop, I analysed the impact that parallel trade of 
pharmaceuticals has on consumer welfare, both in a static and in a dynamic sense. This 
examination aimed at determining whether the current legal treatment of parallel trade 
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in pharmaceuticals pursued at a EU level reflects the findings of economic theory, 
whether there is scope for a change, and, if so, on what basis the latter should take place. 
The analysis led me to reach the following conclusions: 
 
1. The literature shows that price regulation does not impede price competition and 
that health care systems take appropriate measures in order for public finances to 
benefit from cheaper products. Parallel trade brings savings that accrue to 
consumers (or national health care services) in two ways: directly, when they buy 
parallel traded products, and indirectly, by exerting a competitive pressure on the 
price of original products. 
 
2. The magnitude of these savings is, however, disputed. It depends on several 
issues: on the number of parallel traders operating in the importing markets, on 
general competition conditions in such markets, on firms’ strategies that limit the 
ability of traders to compete on prices, but, most of all, on appropriate regulation 
that encourages market penetration from imported products. 
 
3. Price negotiation procedures are the most efficient pass-through mechanisms that 
avoid the appropriation of savings from the traders. When parallel trade takes 
place in equilibrium, the latter plays like a threat that increases the bargaining 
power of authorities and insurance funds vis-à-vis the companies in price 
negotiations for domestic products. Thus, provided that appropriate regulation is 
in place, parallel trade serves allocative efficiency purposes. 
 
4. There is no clear-cut evidence about the effect that parallel trade brings in terms of 
price harmonisation. My personal explanation of this ambiguous result is that 
regulation often pulls in a direction opposite to harmonisation. This does not mean 
that the baseline of the Commission’s policy on parallel trade is flawed. It rather 
appears that parallel trade is one of the many tools used by the Commission to 
achieve ‘negative harmonisation’ in a market where ‘positive harmonisation’ is 
currently experiencing an impasse. 
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5. The strand of the EU case law that affirmed that antitrust analysis should take into 
account the legal and economic context in which the business practices are put in 
place, cannot be interpreted as if for an infringement of competition law rules to be 
alleged it is always necessary that final consumers are concretely deprived of the 
advantages of effective competition in terms of supply or price. Otherwise 
restrictions in the upstream market, which are unlikely to have immediate effects 
on consumers, would seldom be caught. In light of this, agreements restricting 
parallel trade of pharmaceuticals can be still presumed to have negative effects, 
albeit negligible, in the market and should be thus considered anticompetitive in 
their object, and not only in their effects when the latter are concretely 
demonstrated. 
 
6. The relevant literature shows that the relationship between parallel trade, 
profitability and R&D incentives is ambiguous. It is therefore not possible to rely 
on the presumption that the extra money earned through the elimination of 
parallel trade always generates a higher level of innovation. On the contrary, a 
case-by-case analysis is necessary to ascertain the existence and the magnitude of 
these efficiencies. 
 
7. Economics does not support a minimalist vision of antitrust law when innovation 
incentives are at stake. Thus, also under Article 102 TFEU, even in the absence of 
an exemption paragraph equivalent to Article 101(3) TFEU, the existence and 
magnitude of efficiencies gains related to abusive conducts of dominant 
companies should be proved and balanced against the negative effects deriving 
from foreclosure. 
 
8. Attributing the burden of proof to parties according to their ‘proximity’ to the 
evidence and facts that constitute the object of the proof seems to be more 
appropriate both on substantial and on procedural grounds. It follows that under 
Article 102 TFEU, claimants should prove the anticompetitive effects of a corporate 
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conduct and the defendant should substantiate the existence of efficiencies that 
outweigh the consumer harm, along the style laid down by Article 101(3) TFEU. 
 
9. The proof of efficiencies cannot be provided with certainty but it requires a 
prognosis. Thus the test for efficiencies should be flexible enough to account for a 
forward-looking perspective. Efficiency gains should be proven and reviewed in 
light of a standard of proof based on the preponderance of evidence, i.e. the 
defendant should produce sufficiently proved facts that allow the judge to infer 
the reasonable conclusion that the realization of efficiency gains from the 
anticompetitive business practice is more probable than not. 
 
10. Restrictions to parallel trade may be allowed or may be prohibited, depending on 
the type of product involved, on the economic and legal environment in which the 
undertaking operates, on the competition conditions, and most of all, on the ability 
of parties to discharge their burden of proof in relation to the magnitude of 
savings for consumers and to the losses entailed by parallel trade and to the 
likelihood that these may jeopardize the level of investment in innovation. 
 
This work has contributed to the competition law literature by showing that 
there are grounds, not to change, but to improve the current legal treatment towards 
parallel trade in pharmaceuticals. The enforcement pursued so far, in fact, overlooked 
the dynamic aspects of a policy that potentially gives raise to unlimited parallel trade. 
My claim, thus, is that in the assessment of restrictions to parallel trade account should 
be taken of the efficiencies eventually deriving by such restrictions in terms of increased 
innovation. This measurement should be afterwards weighed against the negative 
effects for consumers coming from the restrictions, in terms of reduced savings. 
This claim goes along with the process of modernisation of EU competition law, 
whose supporters advocate for a more economic approach in the enforcement of 
competition provisions. 
The embracement of this methodology is not, however, plain. The attempt to 
apply it to parallel trade showed that in so doing several tradeoffs arise: the practical 
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difficulties related to an effect-based approach increases the risk of losing procedural 
economy; also, the application of economic theory to EU competition law cannot leave 
aside the market integration goal. 
Within this work, I tried to suggest a legal standard that helps judges form a 
judgement that reflects market reality, that is workable and that is line with the acquis 
communautaire at the same time. But I am aware that at this stage there is ample scope to 
further refine these proposals. Their further exploration is going to be the object of my 
future research. 
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Dutch Summary 
 
Het onderwerp van deze studie is de antitrustwetgeving in relatie tot de 
parallelhandel in farmaceutische producten. 
De hernieuwde academische belangstelling voor dit vraagstuk is terug te voeren 
op de jurisprudentiële kentering die zich sinds kort voltrekt in het spoor van het proces 
dat wel de ‘modernisering van het Europese mededingingsrecht’ wordt genoemd. 
Tot voor tien jaar was het beleid van Europese instellingen met betrekking tot 
parallelhandel helder, eenduidig en gebaseerd op een degelijke jurisprudentie, zowel  
wat betreft het vrije goederenverkeer als de vrije mededinging. Parallelhandels-
beperkingen werden als negatief ervaren om een tweetal complementaire redenen: zij 
vormden een obstakel niet alleen voor de merkenconcurrentie maar ook voor de 
grensoverschrijdende handel. Door belemmering van de vanouds daarmee verbonden 
prijsdruk waren parallelhandelsbeperkingen schadelijk voor de consument, en werkten 
deze de integratie van de interne markt tegen doordat de nationale markten langs de 
grenzen werden afgesloten. 
Echter, sinds het Bayer-arrest zijn de visies van de Commissie en die van de 
rechtbanken binnen de Unie uiteen gaan lopen. Het waren met name de rechtbanken die 
op grond van de bevindingen van de economische theorie betwijfelden of de 
parallelhandel in farmaceutische producten inderdaad wel zo heilzaam zou zijn voor de 
consument. Om die reden stelden rechters zich op het standpunt dat alleen indien was 
aangetoond dat de handelwijzen van ondernemingen daadwerkelijk nadelig uitvielen 
voor de consument, deze als verboden moesten worden beschouwd. Ook werd 
geopperd rekening te houden met de mogelijkheid dat de praktijken van deze bedrijven, 
zelfs als deze tegen de mededingingsregels indruisten, gerechtvaardigd zouden kunnen 
worden uit efficiëntieoverwegingen, namelijk vanwege de prikkel tot innovatie bij 
farmaceutische bedrijven die hun verwachte winst in gevaar zien komen door de 
parallelhandel.  
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Deze ontwikkelingen volgend, rijst de vraag of er ruimte bestaat om 
veranderingen te bewerkstelligen in het beleid dat momenteel binnen de Unie wordt 
gevoerd op dit terrein, en op welke grondslag dit dan zou moeten geschieden. 
Het moderniseringsproces dwingt de Commissie en de rechtbanken binnen de 
Unie er nu toe om in plaats van een buitensporig formalistische toepassing van het 
Europese mededingingsrecht te kiezen voor een meer economische benadering. Hoe dit 
moet worden vormgegeven is echter verre van duidelijk. 
Met name moet worden geconstateerd dat de recente jurisprudentie niet echt een 
verhelderend licht werpt op de grenzen van dit nieuwe beleid voor de parallelhandel: 
wollige formuleringen, procedurele hinderpalen en ambigu bewijsmateriaal - om maar 
te zwijgen van het partijpolitieke debat waardoor maar al te vaak het dispuut tussen 
partijen wordt aangezwengeld - resulteerden in een aantal knelpunten die nader 
onderzoek verdienen. 
Ook doet zich de noodzaak gevoelen deze ontwikkelingen op elkaar te laten 
aansluiten door middel van algemeen aanvaarde principes die zijn opgebouwd in 
veertig jaar jurisprudentie. 
Hieruit volgt dat er momenteel nog voldoende ruimte is voor onderzoek en 
suggesties over hoe de nieuwe benadering van de parallelhandel moet worden 
vormgegeven. 
De studie vangt aan met de analyse van de huidige situatie op de Europese 
farmaceutische markt in termen van het ontstane overschot, investeringen in onderzoek 
en ontwikkeling, en werkgelegenheid. Ook wordt gekeken naar de voortgang van het 
harmonisatieproces. Het beeld dat uit deze analyse naar voren komt is dat van een grote 
en groeiende markt die evenwel achterblijft bij die van de VS en Japan. De hoofdoorzaak 
van dit gebrek aan concurrentievermogen kan worden gezocht in de versnippering van 
de markt. Feitelijk geldt dat, ook al heeft de Europese Commissie een bepaalde vorm 
van gecentraliseerde regelgeving gecreëerd, de prijsvorming van geneesmiddelen en de 
daarmee verband houdende besluitvorming nog altijd het exclusieve domein zijn van de 
lidstaten, gelet op het feit dat de private uitgaven van de farmaceutische sector 
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grotendeels worden gefinancierd door nationale overheden. Door deze budgettaire 
gegevenheden neigen overheden er in feite toe vast te houden aan hun soevereiniteit op 
het terrein van de gezondheid. Hierdoor ontstaat een versnipperde markt, vooral op 
prijsniveau. 
De hardnekkigheid waarmee prijshiaten zich voordoen, heeft economische 
mogelijkheden geschapen voor arbitrage, oftewel parallelhandel. Vooral sinds het eind 
van de jaren negentig heeft deze zich ontwikkeld tot een bloeiende tak van industrie, 
met name in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, Zweden en Duitsland. De belangrijkste variabelen 
waaruit deze ontwikkeling kan worden verklaard, zijn de afname van de handelskosten 
dankzij de harmonisatie van de wetgeving inzake het vergunningenstelsel voor het in de 
handel brengen van farmaceutische producten, de geneesmiddelenbewaking, de 
vereisten voor bijsluiters en verpakkingen van via parallelhandel op de markt gebrachte 
producten, alsook de nieuwe marktmogelijkheden die zich aandienen door de 
toetreding van nieuwe landen binnen de Unie (Spanje, Portugal, Zweden) en, niet in de 
laatste plaats, door het - reeds aangestipte - gunstige wettelijke klimaat. 
Deze ontwikkeling bracht onrust teweeg bij de farmaceutische ondernemingen, 
die betwijfelden of parallelhandel binnen een strak gereguleerd kader inderdaad wel 
leidt tot lagere prijzen voor de consument, en zelfs vreesden dat parallelhandel hun 
prikkel tot innovatie zou kunnen ondergraven door afkalving van hun winsten. 
In deze studie worden dan ook de volgende macrovragen geanalyseerd: 
3. is de farmaceutische sector een ‘speciale’ sector waarin regelgeving zo diep 
is doorgedrongen dat parallelhandel geen enkele invloed heeft op de 
prijzen van oorspronkelijke producten; 
4. heeft parallelhandel een schadelijk effect op farmaceutische innovatie? 
Daarbij is de eerste vraag gesplitst in een drietal deelvragen: 
d. is prijsregulering van dien aard dat er geen concurrentie mogelijk is; 
e. levert parallelhandel in farmaceutische producten besparingen op voor de 
consument en de nationale gezondheidszorg; 
f. en van welke omvang zijn deze besparingseffecten? 
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Het antwoord op deze drie deelvragen kan worden gegeven door de kenmerken 
van de nationale regelgevingen voor de farmaceutische sector en de economische 
grondgedachten daarachter te onderzoeken in het raam van een verkenning die de 
belangrijkste Europese lidstaten bestrijkt, met bijzondere aandacht voor de landen waar 
import plaatsvindt: Zweden, Denemarken, het Verenigd Koninkrijk en Duitsland. Dit 
geldt met name voor de mechanismen die voeding geven aan de 
onderhandelingsprocedures tussen de instanties voor gezondheidszorg en 
farmaceutische bedrijven, een en ander om zicht te krijgen op de rol die de 
parallelhandel speelt met betrekking tot de onderhandelingsruimte van partijen. Deze 
verkenning wordt aangevuld met een analyse van de theoretische en empirische 
literatuur over het effect van parallelhandel op de prijzen van farmaceutische producten. 
Uit deze analyse blijkt dat prijsregulering geen belemmering vormt voor 
prijsconcurrentie en er binnen de gezondheidszorg adequate maatregelen worden 
genomen om de prijsdaling van producten positief te laten uitwerken voor de 
overheidsfinanciën. Parallelhandel leidt tot besparingen die op twee manieren voordeel 
opleveren voor de consument (of de nationale gezondheidszorg): langs directe weg 
wanneer producten worden gekocht die via parallelhandel op de markt komen, en langs 
indirecte weg door concurrentiedruk uit te oefenen op de prijs van oorspronkelijke 
producten. 
De meningen zijn echter verdeeld over de orde van grootte van deze 
besparingen. Deze is afhankelijk van verschillende factoren zoals het aantal partijen in 
de parallelhandel dat actief is op de importmarkten, de algemene 
concurrentieomstandigheden binnen deze markten, bedrijfsstrategieën die handelaren 
beperken in hun mogelijkheden om op prijs te concurreren, maar bovenal een adequate 
regelgeving die de marktpenetratie van geïmporteerde producten stimuleert.  
Prijsonderhandelingsprocedures zijn het meest effectieve middel om besparingen 
te realiseren zonder partijen in de parallelhandel te belasten. Wanneer parallelhandel 
plaatsvindt in een evenwichtig kader, vormt dit een bedreigende factor die instanties en 
verzekeringsmaatschappijen ten opzichte van ondernemingen meer bewegingsruimte 
geeft in prijsonderhandelingen over binnenlandse producten. Mits sprake is van 
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adequate regelgeving, verhoogt parallelhandel derhalve de efficiëntie bij het realiseren 
van besparingen. 
Er is geen duidelijk bewijs dat parallelhandel van invloed is op 
prijsharmonisatie. Een mogelijke verklaring daarvoor is dat regelgeving zich dikwijls 
beweegt in een richting die tegengesteld is aan harmonisatie. Dit wil niet zeggen dat de 
basis van het beleid van de Commissie inzake parallelhandel ondeugdelijk is. Eerder 
blijkt dat parallelhandel een van de vele instrumenten is die de Commissie gebruikt om 
‘negatieve harmonisatie’ te bewerkstelligen in een markt waarin ‘positieve harmonisatie’ 
momenteel in een impasse verkeert. 
Vervolgens worden de antitrustimplicaties van deze resultaten onderzocht: 
gegeven het feit dat de prijsvorming van geneesmiddelen niet geheel is afgeschermd van 
de mededingingsregels en -procedures, mag redelijkerwijs worden aangenomen dat 
parallelhandel, de regelgeving ten spijt, besparingen oplevert. Elke 
parallelhandelsbeperking blijft dan ook van mededingingsbeperkende aard, ongeacht de 
effecten daarvan. In dit geval is er reden om vast te houden aan de traditionele 
juridische visie op parallelhandelsbeperkingen, ook in de farmaceutische sector. 
Vervolgens spitst de discussie zich toe op het bestaan van een relatie tussen 
parallelhandel en de prikkel bij farmaceutische bedrijven om te innoveren. 
Uit de economische theorie blijkt dat de hoogte van de verwachte winst invloed 
kan hebben op de intensiteit van onderzoeks- en ontwikkelingsactiviteiten, namelijk op 
de hoeveelheid middelen die wordt geïnvesteerd in innovatie, en daarmee op het 
productieniveau van de onderneming. Deze kwestie bleef echter onderbelicht in de 
geraadpleegde arresten. Feit is dat toen door twee verschillende advocaten-generaal in 
het ene geval (advocaat-generaal Jacobs in de zaak Syfait I) uitgebreid werd betoogd dat 
sprake is van een dergelijke relatie in de antitrustanalyse en in het andere geval 
(advocaat-generaal Colomer in de zaak Syfait II) het bestaan van deze relatie even stellig 
werd ontkend, het Europese Hof van Justitie het gehele dispuut terzijde schoof en 
herclassificeerde als louter betrekking hebbend op winstvorming. 
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Het bestaan van een relatie tussen parallelhandel en farmaceutische innovatie is 
als zodanig geen onderzoekspunt. Echter, door deze relatie door te lichten zou inzicht 
kunnen worden verkregen in de mate waarin besparingseffecten een rol spelen in de 
antitrustanalyse. 
De studie geeft tevens een overzicht van de economische literatuur die, van de 
schumpeteriaanse theorie van constructieve destructie tot de meest recente 
ontwikkelingen in de theorie van de industriële organisatie en in de empirische 
literatuur over de gezondheidseconomie, voorspellingen doet over het bestaan van een 
positieve correlatie tussen het verwachte rendement uit farmaceutische innovatie en het 
niveau van de investeringen in onderzoek en ontwikkeling. 
Op deze grondslag wordt het innovatiepatroon in de geneesmiddelenindustrie 
verder onderzocht, met bijzondere aandacht voor de relatie tussen octrooien, 
winstvorming en de prikkel bij ondernemingen om te investeren in innovatie. Ook 
wordt de literatuur over de relatie tussen parallelhandel, winstvorming en innovatie 
geanalyseerd en besproken. 
De desbetreffende literatuur laat zien dat de relatie tussen parallelhandel, 
rendement en de prikkel tot investering in onderzoek en ontwikkeling niet eenduidig is. 
Er moet dan ook niet van worden uitgegaan dat het extra geld dat wordt verdiend met 
de eliminatie van de parallelhandel altijd een hogere graad van innovatie oplevert. 
Integendeel, een analyse per individueel geval is noodzakelijk om het bestaan en de 
omvang van deze besparingseffecten te kunnen vaststellen. 
Hieruit volgt dat de economische theorie geen steun biedt voor een 
minimalistische visie op de antitrustwetgeving voor zover het de prikkel tot innovatie 
betreft. Derhalve dient mede op grond van artikel 82 EG, ook bij afwezigheid van een 
vrijstellingsparagraaf in de trant van artikel 81(3) EG, het bestaan en de omvang van 
besparingseffecten die verband houden met laakbaar gedrag van ondernemingen met 
een dominante positie te worden aangetoond en afgewogen tegen de negatieve effecten 
van uitsluiting. 
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Marktanalyse kan niet ophouden op het punt waarop is vastgesteld dat er 
besparingen zijn gerealiseerd. Bij de analyse van de welzijnsimplicaties van activiteiten 
ter beperking van de parallelhandel moet een tweetal dimensies worden onderscheiden: 
het verlies bij een statische vorm van besparing en de winst bij een dynamische vorm 
van besparing. Deze facetten dienen volgens een bepaalde rule of reason te worden 
gemeten en tegen elkaar te worden afgewogen om zicht te krijgen op het algemene effect 
dat zij hebben in de markt. 
Een dergelijke afweging vooronderstelt echter een volwaardige marktanalyse 
wier complexiteit de rechtbanken altijd omzichtig uit de weg zijn gegaan. De 
hindernissen die inherent zijn aan deze rule of reason doen zich gevoelen wanneer de 
effecten in de markt niet zo evident zijn en het onderzoek toekomstgericht is. In zaken 
op het gebied van de parallelhandel vormt dit laatste het meer problematische aspect: 
ofschoon de theoretische literatuur een relatie voorspelt tussen deze vorm van 
mededinging en innovatie, is er geen empirisch materiaal voorhanden ter staving 
daarvan.  
Met andere woorden, de belangrijkste hinderpaal die marktanalyse te kostbaar 
zou kunnen maken is het leveren van het bewijs voor het bestaan en de omvang van 
besparingseffecten. 
De studie richt zich vervolgens op de manieren waarop rechtbanken zich 
trachten te bevrijden uit de impasse die een volwaardige marktanalyse met zich 
meebrengt. De belangrijkste juridische instrumenten zijn vooronderstellingen en het 
leggen van de bewijslast bij partijen naargelang van de feiten en het oogmerk waarmee 
zij hun stellingen poneren. Daaruit volgt dat de uitkomst van een zaak wordt bepaald 
door het vermogen van partijen de rechter te overtuigen van het bestaan van dergelijke 
feiten. Dit houdt op zich weer in dat de wijze waarop de bewijslast door partijen wordt 
gedragen en de aard van de bewijsnorm in dit verband van cruciaal belang zijn.  
De beste manier om te komen tot een analyse die recht doet aan de realiteit van 
de markt zonder de procedurele efficiëntie al te veel geweld aan te doen, is de bewijslast 
bij partijen te leggen naargelang van de graad waarin zij in directe relatie staan tot het 
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materiaal en de feiten die het bewijs vormen. Hieruit volgt dat de eiser op grond van 
Artikel 82 EG de concurrentieverstorende effecten van de handelwijzen van een 
onderneming dient aan te tonen en dat de verweerder volgens de lijnen die zijn uitgezet 
in Artikel 81(3) EG het bestaan van besparingseffecten die in het voordeel van de 
consument werken, dient te motiveren.  
Toch blijft de vraag bestaan welke bewijsnorm dient te worden gehanteerd om 
het bestaan van besparingseffecten te kunnen vaststellen. Feit is dat er niet met 
zekerheid bewijs kan worden geleverd van besparingseffecten, maar dat daarvoor een 
prognose noodzakelijk is. Zodoende zouden de onderzoekscriteria voor 
besparingseffecten flexibel genoeg zijn voor een toekomstgerichte analyse. 
Besparingseffecten dienen te worden aangetoond en beoordeeld in het licht van een 
bewijsnorm op basis van de doorslaggevendheid van het bewijsmateriaal, dat wil 
zeggen dat de verweerder voldoende onderbouwde feiten dient aan te dragen waaruit 
de rechter in redelijkheid de conclusie kan trekken dat concurrentieverstorende 
bedrijfspraktijken naar alle waarschijnlijkheid leiden tot een hogere graad van efficiëntie. 
Deze studie wil een bijdrage leveren aan de literatuur over het 
mededingingsrecht door aan te tonen dat er gronden zijn om veranderingen te 
bewerkstelligen in de huidige juridische visie op de parallelhandel in farmaceutische 
producten. In feite wordt bij de wetshandhaving tot dusver voorbijgegaan aan de 
dynamische aspecten van een beleid dat in potentie leidt tot onbeperkte parallelhandel. 
De stelling is dan ook dat bij de beoordeling van parallelhandelsbeperkingen rekening 
moet worden gehouden met besparingseffecten die uiteindelijk uit deze beperkingen 
resulteren in termen van intensievere innovatie. Deze resultaatmeting moet nadien 
worden afgewogen tegen de negatieve effecten die voor de consument resulteren uit 
deze beperkingen in termen van lagere besparingen.  
Hieruit volgt dat parallelhandelsbeperkingen kunnen worden toegestaan dan 
wel kunnen worden verboden naargelang van het betreffende type product(en), de 
economische en wettelijke omstandigheden waaronder de onderneming opereert, de 
concurrentieverhoudingen, en bovenal de mogelijkheid van partijen om aan te tonen dat 
de consument aanzienlijke besparingen ten deel valt of dat parallelhandel leidt tot grote 
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verliezen die het niveau van de investeringen in innovatie bij farmaceutische bedrijven 
in gevaar zouden kunnen brengen. 
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